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Abstract:  Poor farmers have been blamed for environmental degradation in developing countries.  
Struggling to survive, they have been claimed to overexploit their natural resource base; but 
empirical testing has provided confusing evidence.  To clarify the discourse, Thomas Reardon and 
Steven Vosti proposed the concept of investment poverty.  It identifies the potentially large group of 
households that are not poor by traditional welfare poverty measures, but that are too poor in that 
their surplus above the welfare poverty line is too small to allow them to make investments for the 
conservation of their natural resource base.  They also emphasize the role of assets in generating 
welfare for rural households, thus affecting production and investment decisions.  This research 
pursues two questions:  How can investment poverty be conceptualised and measured?  And, which 
are the welfare-enhancing effects of household assets? 
 
Empirical data is collected in the province of Herrera of the Republic of Panama.  402 farmer 
households are interviewed with a structured questionnaire, using a non-probabilistic quota 
sampling frame.  Household welfare is measured with household consumption and income 
aggregates, and traditional welfare poverty lines are calculated.  This allows to divide the studied 
households by their per capita consumption aggregates into extremely poor (15,4% of households), 
moderately poor (33,6%) and non-poor (51,0 %).  Comparisons reveal that welfare poverty groups 
differ significantly not only in asset endowments, income and investment strategies, but also in 
household structure and in their access to infrastructure and extension services.   
 
Although clearly defined in theory, the empirical measurement of investment poverty is 
challenging.  In Herrera, pure conservation investments are not found and welfare is not associated 
with the sustainability of land use.  Hence, the investment poverty line is studied as a level of 
welfare below which household welfare ceases to be linearly associated with investments that have 
both productive and conservation aims.  Such an investment poverty line, located roughly at twice 
the annual price of a minimum nutrition, is surpassed by 42,3% of studied households.  Investment 
non-poor households are characterized by both spouses working, high level of social involvement, 
high farm productivity, growing input-intensive crops, and naturally by having accumulated more 
land, cattle, vehicles, education, and better housing than the investment poor households.   
 
The contribution of assets to household welfare is explored by hypothesizing mechanisms through 
which land, livestock, education and labour force could enhance welfare, and under which 
conditions.  Results of multinomial logistic regressions using the elaboration method reveal that 
among extremely and moderately poor households, education is the only studied asset contributing 
to higher welfare levels.  Among the moderately and non-poor households, on the other hand, 
education, land and labour force contribute to higher welfare through several mechanisms, but 
depending on conditioning variables, such as input use.  There is no automation by which assets 
generate welfare flows towards households.  And, asset accumulation strategies change as welfare 
increases; the mechanisms are different among the poorest from among the richest households.   
 
The relationship between poverty and the environment remains problematic.  Overcoming the 
investment poverty line can be seen as the necessary price of overcoming poverty and accumulating 
assets in the long run, but under current circumstances it is way out of reach for the poorest 
Herreran households.  Even beyond the investment poverty line environmental sustainability is not 
necessarily achieved, if cattle herds increase and pastures spread. 
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Panama, Central America 
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1. Introduction 
 
 
The relationship between poverty and environmental degradation has intrigued 
researchers for decades.  Many developing regions have experienced environmental 
problems, such as soil degradation, deforestation and pollution of waters, leading 
not only to numerous negative repercussions on health and the environment, but 
causing also economic losses to households.  The blame on environmental 
degradation has been commonly placed on local farmers, particularly on the 
poorest of them.  According to the widespread view, the challenge of a mere 
survival forces the poor to care little for any negative impacts their livelihoods 
cause on the environment.  Since environmental degradation often appears hand in 
hand with high incidences of farmer household poverty, one is tempted to conclude 
that the two are causally interconnected.  But are they really, and if so, how?  
Shouldn’t the poor have the least land in their control and the least resources to 
degrade it with?  And given that poor farmers themselves are most dependent on 
land and most critically affected by the degradation through declining agricultural 
yields and increasing production costs and other risks, shouldn’t the poor be most 
concerned about environmental sustainability?  The relationship between rural 
poverty and the environment has motivated a wealth of both empirical and 
theoretical studies, and some central contributions of this discourse will be 
presented below.   
 
 
1.1 Background on the poverty – environment discourse 
 
The discourse on the poverty-environment –nexus has its roots in the much older 
debate on interactions between population growth and food production.  The 
population pressure discourse can be traced back as far as the 18th century, when 
Thomas Malthus proposed that population increases in a geometrical ratio and food 
production increases in an arithmetical ratio, and that hence, the ultimate check on 
population growth will be human misery.  Any technical improvement on food 
production can only relieve this misery for a while, since it will merely enable 
more people to be born and to end up in misery, increasing the total sum of human 
suffering.  (Malthus 1798: 7.)  While decades later Malthus’s views were still 
shared by many, including Myrdal (1968), more optimistic views on the 
interactions between population and agricultural productivity gained ground.  
Among the many critics over time, Boserup (1965) challenged Malthusian views 
and proposed that population growth actually triggers technical change, leading to 
more intensive farming and consequently to cultural and economic development.  
But, while population growth did thus not need to cause increased pressure on 
natural resources, in many developing regions farming was indeed evolving to a 
more extensive rather than intensive direction (Boserup 1965: 75-77; Swinton & 
Quiroz 2003a). 
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Poverty-environment –discourse gradually emerged from the population pressure 
discourse, when the environmental problems of developing countries gained 
attention around the 1970s.  The new discourse had ties to its roots:  poverty was 
seen as the driving force of population growth (e.g. Mink 1993), and population 
growth was seen to lead to environmental degradation (e.g. Grepperud 1996).  But 
soon the poverty-environment –discourse evolved independently and the 
relationship between poverty and the environment became under scrutiny without 
explicit focus on population growth.  The discourse on direct poverty-environment 
–interactions in developing countries was highly influenced by the vicious circle 
argument, also described as a downward spiral, according to which poor farmers 
overexploit their natural resources in the struggle for daily survival and the 
environmental degradation they cause in this process impoverishes them further 
(WCED 1987).  It could be argued that poor farmers were identified as agents of 
environmental destruction by political rather than scientific processes (Sachs 1999: 
56-68), but the view spread even among academics.  This view has also been 
persistent; decades later poor farmers are still portrayed to operate with a short 
horizon due to their pressing needs and, precluded from making investments into 
soil conservation, to face declining yields and deepening poverty (Scherr 2000; 
Bekalo & Bangay 2002; Bahamondes 2003a; Dasgupta et al. 2005; Agudelo et al. 
2003a; Barbier 2000). 
 
The vicious circle argument inspired empirical testing, but evidence was more 
likely to challenge than to support it (e.g. Ravnborg 2002; Scherr 2000; 
Bahamondes 2003a; Swinton & Quiroz 2003a).  Studies found striking 
heterogeneity in environmental management by the rural poor and in their success 
in adapting to environmental change (Scherr 2000).  Although environmental 
problems were often found in areas of widespread poverty, empirical studies 
suggested that in some cases it had been the non-poor farmers causing degradation 
(Ravnborg 2003a) and contamination from, for instance, the excessive use of 
agrochemicals (Swinton & Quiroz 2003a).  The relative importance of the poor vis-
à-vis the non-poor in explaining environmental degradation could not be 
empirically established (Ravnborg 2002).  In other settings environmental 
degradation was found to depend on causes other than the poverty or wealth of the 
farmers.  (Scherr 2000.)  For instance soil degradation could be related to the kind 
of farming practices and to local natural resource settings, suggesting that natural 
resource outcomes might have little to do with conventional measures of poverty 
(Swinton & Quiroz 2003a; Ravnborg 2003a; Sawers 2000; Duraiappah 1998).   
 
But what if household poverty was found unrelated to environmental outcomes of 
farming, because poverty measures used in the studies had been inadequate to 
grasp poverty-environment -dynamics?  To clarify the controversial discourse, 
Reardon and Vosti (1995) proposed a theoretical framework with a new concept of 
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investment poverty.  They argued that studying poverty-environment –interactions 
with traditional welfare poverty measures would miss the considerable share of 
farmer households that are not welfare poor in the traditional sense, but that are too 
investment poor in that their surplus above the welfare poverty line is too small to 
allow them to make minimum investments in resource conservation.  Reardon and 
Vosti thus suggested that instead of traditional welfare poverty measures based on 
the costs of mere survival, environment-poverty –links could better be understood 
by knowing of the investment poverty level of farmer households.  Since 
investment poor households could not invest in conservation, their natural resource 
base would degrade and impoverish them further.  A downward spiral could 
materialize. 
 
Reardon and Vosti saw that at the heart of the poverty-environment –nexus at the 
household level are the assets a household possesses.  Assets generate flows of 
product and cash incomes, and the level of these incomes determines how poor or 
rich the household will be.  A virtuous cycle could, instead, take place if 
households managed to accumulate assets, since these assets would increase their 
welfare, and thus foster further resource development (Ravallion 1996).  The 
emphasis of the importance of assets in the behaviour of rural households became 
central to the poverty-environment –discourse (Freeman et al. 2004; Carter & 
Barrett 2006; Bebbington 1999; Shiferaw & Bantilan 2004; Ngugi & Nyariki 2005; 
Dorward et al. 2003; Barrett et al. 2004).  Assets are commonly portrayed as the 
most important determinant of income and investment strategies, and it has been 
argued that a more equitable distribution of assets could contribute to poverty 
alleviation (Rahman & Westley 2001).  Whereas Reardon and Vosti originally 
perceived assets as means to generate income flows, some have even suggested 
using assets as direct measures of welfare or poverty (e.g. Baquero et al. 2003; 
Bahamondes 2003b; Agudelo et al. 2003b).  However, no empirical evidence to 
support either idea has been found.  On the one hand, studies have not proved that 
an asset-based poverty measure would reveal the relevant dynamics for 
environmental outcomes.  But, on the other hand, empirical testing of assets as a 
means to generate income flows has also been lacking.  The contribution of assets 
in poverty-environment –interactions thus invites further scrutiny. 
 
Although the Reardon and Vosti framework became a landmark in the poverty-
environment -discourse, its investment poverty concept has not been empirically 
employed in subsequent studies.  Its relevance was acknowledged, but poverty-
environment -research continued with traditional welfare poverty concepts and 
continued to reach inconclusive results.  And, despite Reardon and Vosti’s 
emphasis on assets as a means to generate income flows, the role of assets in 
household welfare and behaviour is still taken as a given without empirical 
foundation.  Whether and how various assets generate welfare flows has not been 
demonstrated.  It is obvious that many questions pertinent to the poverty-
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environment –nexus are far from solved and that there is an opportunity to 
contribute to the discourse particularly through the concepts of investment poverty 
and the welfare-generating effects of assets.    
 
 
1.2 The research agenda 
 
The investment poverty concept introduced by Reardon and Vosti (1995) invites 
further elaboration and empirical testing.  The concept is of direct theoretical and 
practical importance: knowing where and how to find an investment poverty line 
would greatly add to the understanding on the determinants of the environmental 
consequences of farming in developing countries.  One task of this research is thus 
to elaborate the concept of investment poverty and innovate ways to empirically 
measure it.  Is it possible to locate a level of welfare above which households tend 
to invest in land improvement investments?  Can the environmental impact of 
household action ultimately be explained by its investment poverty, as measured 
according to its welfare?  Based on the work of Reardon and Vosti (1995), the 
hypothesis is that there is a level of welfare below which a household is not welfare 
poor by the traditional welfare poverty measure, but is too poor to make land 
improvement investments or follow key land use practices to forestall or reverse 
natural resource degradation, and that such a threshold can be empirically located.   
 
Also, Reardon and Vosti’s view of assets as a means to generate welfare to farmer 
households has lacked empirical scrutiny.  The role of assets in household welfare 
generation is commonly taken as a given, while the understanding of the 
relationship has been deficient.  This topic is also theoretically and practically 
important: understanding the dynamics of assets in household economics would 
add to the knowledge on household income and investment strategies and perhaps 
even suggest pathways out of poverty.  Another task of this study is to develop an 
approach to empirically study if and how assets contribute to household welfare.  
In order for assets to generate welfare to the household rather than merely indicate 
past solvency, it should be possible to identify mechanisms through which assets 
generate welfare flows to the household.  How can the contribution of assets to 
household welfare be empirically studied?  Which assets generate welfare for 
farmer households, through which mechanisms and under which conditions?  The 
results will enable to evaluate the theory-based hypothesis that assets contribute to 
household welfare by producing income flows and consequently add to the 
understanding of the role of assets in poverty-environment -dynamics.   
 
A measure of welfare will be needed as a tool for the estimation of both an 
investment poverty line and the welfare-contributing effect of assets.  This research 
will thus take on the task of empirically measuring household welfare from 
household level data, with the aim of forming a quantitative measure of welfare.  
How should welfare be measured for it to reflect a household’s welfare level as 
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comprehensively as possible, and how can this empirically be carried out?  The 
resulting welfare measure will be used for the other analyses of this research as the 
estimate of household welfare.   
 
Ultimately, while there is little doubt that the economic situation affects farmer 
household land use decisions, it is not clear whether a traditional poverty measure 
is useful for understanding poverty-environment –interactions at the household 
level.  The final task adopted by this research is thus to carry out a traditional 
welfare poverty study for the empirical household data.  What is this so-called 
welfare poverty, and below which level of welfare can it be seen to occur?  Do 
welfare poor households differ from less welfare poor households in their asset 
possessions, income and investment strategies, or in other traits?  The results can 
suggest factors that contribute to the perpetuation of poverty or, on the other hand, 
may lead a pathway to higher welfare levels, and enable the discussion of the 
relevance of welfare poverty to the poverty-environment –discourse.   
 
It is a natural choice to approach the poverty-environment –nexus of rural areas in 
developing countries at the micro-level of farmer households, since in this research 
it is thought that the ultimate connection of the two should demonstrate itself in 
individual level decisions and activities, if such a connection exists.  The data 
needed for solving the research questions is very specific and concerns many 
dimensions of farmer household life.  Such a combination of information is not 
available from previous research or censuses, due to which new empirical data is 
needed.  Farmer households themselves are considered to be experts on their 
farming practices and household economics.  Therefore farmer households are to 
be interviewed directly, rather than approaching the questions only with, for 
instance, local authorities.  There are many problems with the reliability of 
interview data, but there are several ways to control for possible errors.  There is no 
reason to believe that other alternative approaches would provide data of better 
quality or higher accuracy on these research topics.  The benefits of having direct 
contact with farmer households themselves outweigh the possible shortcomings.  
 
The research questions, as outlined above, pose several requirements on the 
empirical data collection site.  It is crucial to find an area where agriculture is 
important for rural livelihoods, where there have been environmental problems 
related to farming, where land use has been target to the fewest possible outside 
policy interventions and where a considerable proportion of farmers is non-poor by 
traditional welfare poverty measures, in order to be possible to find capacity for 
investments.  Among the Central American countries1, Panama was chosen as the 
country where data was collected for this study.  It represents an excellent 
                                                 
1 This study forms part of the research project “Natural Resource Management and Local 
Livelihoods in Central America” of the Department of Biological and Environmental Sciences of 
the University of Helsinki, Finland.  The project was funded by the Academy of Finland and by the 
Trust of the University of Helsinki, and led by professor Pekka Kauppi and docent Anja Nygren. 
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opportunity for studying farmer household economies in relation to environmental 
consequences of land use for a number of reasons.  Panama is the second wealthiest 
country of the Central American isthmus, but its inequality measures are among the 
greatest in the world.  While in 1997 poverty affected 37% of the entire population, 
in rural areas the poverty rate reached 65% (WB 1999).  Despite a developed, 
globalized service economy in the capital, in the peripheral countryside very 
rudimentary lifestyles are still led.  For the rural population, agriculture is still a 
major source of livelihoods, and production for home consumption is common.  
Panama has a long history of environmental problems relating to land uses, 
including deforestation, erosion, and pollution of its soils and waters.  Of the 
original forest cover 30% were lost by 1947 and by year 2000 only 44,6% of the 
original forests were left.  Consequently agricultural production has expanded to 
areas that are poorly suitable for farming, and most of the farmed lands have been 
classified as severely degraded.  Land use is extensive, especially in livestock 
production, and agricultural productivity is low, causing obvious losses to farmers 
and hampering the development of the rural areas and hence of the whole nation.  
Panama has been target to far fewer international agricultural development 
interventions than its neighbours, thus offering a relatively unaffected setting to 
study land use decision-making of farmer households.  Finally, the country presents 
an interesting research site, because it has received virtually no attention in 
previous academic research on the poverty-environment –nexus.  Perhaps 
considered “too wealthy” for traditional poverty studies, Panama provides an ideal 
location for studying farmer investment behaviour.  (ANAM 1999c; ANAM 
1999b; ANAM 1999a; Conservation Atlas 1996; DEC 2004a; Perez 2002.) 
 
The main body of work will be based on 402 structured farmer household 
interviews carried out between January and May of 2005 in the Panamanian 
province of Herrera, inserted into the statistical software SPSS and analysed with 
an array of statistical methods.  In addition, other types of data is collected, 
including local food prices for the empirical construction of a nutrition-based 
welfare poverty line, and information on markets, infrastructure and institutional 
setting of the research area.  Empirical data collection is carried out only in one 
province, in order to eliminate the effect that differences across the distinct regions 
of the country could have on the data that could make it incomparable.  In addition, 
concentrating on one province offers substantial logistic advantages for the field 
research period, making it possible to sample larger quantities of households and 
collect most exhaustive set of background information in a given period of time.   
 
Structured interviews are seen as the most adequate method to collect data that is 
sufficiently detailed for the analytical purposes of the study.  The research 
questions on the economic situation of the households, including poverty, 
investments and assets, suggest that the data should be quantitative, allowing 
situating studied households not only relative to one another but also relative to 
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different thresholds of poverty.  Adequacy of the interview questionnaire is thus of 
crucial importance for the quality of the data and, hence, for the success of the 
study in answering the research questions.  The analyses to seek an investment 
poverty line and to assess the contribution of assets to household welfare will be 
carried out with linear and logistic regression models, which seek predictable 
patterns of association between variables in the data.  These models will seek to 
find if a household’s welfare measure is associated with its conservation 
investments or key intensification practices, and if a household’s asset endowments 
are again associated with the household’s welfare poverty level.  The employed 
statistical models can be expected to yield statistically significant results, if among 
the Herreran farmer households the phenomena are related as proposed by theory.    
 
This research is reported in the form of a monograph.  Chapter two presents the 
theoretical framework of Reardon and Vosti, on which this research is based.  The 
chapter introduces the central concept of investment poverty and the dynamics of 
assets in household income and investment strategies, and presents later 
contributions to the poverty-environment –discourse.  It also presents previous 
studies in which the framework has been applied, outlines the research questions 
and their operationalizations, and describes the statistical methods that will be 
employed.  
 
Chapter three describes the survey of farmer households in the province of Herrera 
of the Republic of Panama, which constitutes the main empirical data of this 
research.  After a brief introduction on Panama, detailed information is given on 
the Herrera province, with a focus on the dimensions of society and agricultural 
production that are pertinent to the themes of this research.  The farmer household 
interviews are described in detail, including the sampling method, the questionnaire 
and the practical procedures of the interviews.  The sample is compared to existing 
statistics of the region to assess the sample’s representativeness, and possible 
sources of errors are discussed. 
 
Chapter four generates a welfare measure for the studied households.  The main 
alternatives of quantitative money-metric household level welfare measurement, 
namely income and consumption, are discussed in light of literature.  For each 
studied Herreran household, both income and consumption aggregates are 
calculated, describing in detail the choices made in the process.  Distributions of 
the results are presented, comparing also households’ consumption and income 
aggregates to one another and relating them to household structure.   
   
Chapter five comprises a study of welfare poverty in the Herrera province.  After 
presenting a short review on different welfare poverty measurement methods, the 
consumption-based poverty line-approach used in this study is justified.  Empirical 
welfare poverty measurement is carried out through the construction of two 
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specific welfare poverty lines for the Herrera province: the extreme and moderate 
poverty lines.  They are based on local food prices, food consumption patterns and 
the non-food consumption habits of surveyed households.  The chapter presents the 
resulting three poverty groups:  extremely poor, moderately poor and non-poor 
households, and compares them in a variety of characteristics. 
 
Chapter six explores the concept of investment poverty.  Attempts to define and 
outline ways to operationalize investment poverty are followed by a number of 
attempts to empirically locate an investment poverty line with the Herreran farmer 
household data.  The chapter will present an empirical local investment poverty 
line, based on a threshold below which environmentally beneficial investment 
behaviour could no longer be explained by household welfare.  Studied households 
are divided into investment poor and investment non-poor groups and compared, in 
order to understand the effects investment poverty has on farmer household 
livelihoods, activities and asset possessions.    
 
Chapter seven examines whether and under which conditions assets generate 
welfare to farmer households.  The approach is mechanism-oriented, emphasizing 
the understanding of assets as generators of welfare to the households, and 
sensitive to the context or situation in which assets are used, conditioning whether 
assets generate welfare and if so, how much.  Four assets are taken under scrutiny:  
land, livestock, education and labour force.  Hypotheses are formulated for the 
welfare-generating mechanisms of each asset and conditioning factor.  Each 
hypothesized mechanism and conditioning variable is step-by-step empirically 
tested with farmer household data using the method of elaboration, to present new 
insights on the contribution of assets to household welfare.   
 
Chapter eight concludes this thesis with drawing together the main findings of this 
study and contrasting them to previous research and theory.  Future research 
suggestions will be given and the implications for policy will be outlined.  
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2. Poverty and the environment:  the theoretical 
framework 
 
 
In 1995 Reardon and Vosti proposed a new framework for the investigation of the 
relationship between poverty and the environment.  The key concept invented was 
investment poverty, which captures the segment of population that is above the 
traditional poverty line but yet too poor to make conservation investments.  The 
framework, its later development and empirical applications are presented in 
section 2.1-2.3, respectively.  Section 2.4 outlines the theoretical interpretations 
and empirical operationalization of the investment poverty framework for this 
study.   
 
 
2.1. Conceptual framework of investment poverty 
 
Thomas Reardon and Stephen A. Vosti challenged the traditional approach to 
poverty-environment research, because it had omitted the strength and symmetry of 
the causal links between poverty and the environment and paid no attention to the 
farm household economics and food security strategies pertinent to the 
environment-poverty links.  Reardon and Vosti provided a new investment poverty 
approach to the poverty-environment study by differentiating types of poverty and 
types of environmental change, and by showing the household behaviour 
determinants of the poverty-environment links.  Their paper was published in the 
series World Development in 1995 and it soon became a landmark in the discourse.  
Its transforming ideas were widely quoted in the subsequent publications on links 
between poverty and environment and it was employed in empirical research (e.g. 
Scherr 2000; Bahamondes 2003a; Swinton & Quiroz 2003a). 
 
The investment poverty framework is built around four blocks of variables: the 
asset components of poverty, components of the environment, household and 
village behaviour, and conditioning factors.  These variables interact as shown in 
figure 2.1.  The main argument is that the assets a household possesses influence 
household and village behaviour, which in turn has impacts on the environment and 
on household and village assets.  There are conditioning factors influencing both 
the link between types of poverty and behaviour, and the link between behaviour 
and natural resources.   
 
2.1.1 Assets, welfare poverty, investment poverty and components of the 
environment 
 
Unlike the common income or consumption based poverty measures, Reardon and 
Vosti (1995) prefer to approach poverty through assets asking "poor in what?"  The 
asset portfolio of the rural poor may consist of natural resources, human resources, 
on-farm resources, off-farm resources and community-owned resources.  Such a 
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broad concept of assets is vital to the understanding of rural livelihoods.  As 
Bebbington (1999) has also emphasized, whereas rural livelihoods are often 
equated with agricultural and natural resource-based strategies, in reality they are a 
mix of many types of resources of which natural resources and land may not be the 
most important ones. 
 
Figure 2.1  Poverty and environment links according to Reardon & Vosti (1995). 
Markets 
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Assets are not ends in themselves; rather they are used to generate flows of product 
and/or cash income.  The level and composition of that income determines whether 
households are poor and how poor they are.  Asset categories are thus no direct 
indicators of poverty.  If markets function perfectly and assets can easily be 
exchanged for one another or converted into cash, a decomposition of assets into 
different categories will not be necessary.  But when the fungibility of assets is 
limited, as is often the case in developing countries and particularly in rural 
settings, an asset decomposition of poverty will be useful.  Market imperfections 
may make it impossible for households to convert their assets into cash or other 
forms of wealth, such as household labour into cash.  There is thus the possibility 
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of asset-specific poverty, which can influence livelihood activities and investment 
decisions.  For instance, if a household is poor in land, but land is the required 
collateral for obtaining a loan, the household's ability to make loan-based on-farm 
and off-farm investments is limited.  In addition, assets are neither static nor 
endless; they are as much products of previous activities as inputs of future 
possibilities.  Although assets serve as buffer against shocks, they are also 
vulnerable to risks and shocks themselves. 
 
Traditionally poverty is measured according to income, consumption or nutrition 
criteria, often a money-metric level equivalent to attaining minimum caloric intake 
or to meet an anthropometrical standard.  Reardon and Vosti (1995) call this 
welfare poverty.  While it may be appropriate for assessing human misery it may 
not reveal all relevant dimensions for understanding environment-poverty links.  
Welfare poverty measures may miss the large group of households that are not 
absolutely poor in the welfare poverty sense, but are too poor in that their surplus 
above the minimum diet line is still too small to make necessary conservation or 
intensification investments so that their land use would not damage the resource 
base (Reardon and Vosti 1995: 1498).   
 
It is vital for the analysis of poverty-environment links to find concepts to cover 
this group of people.  Reardon and Vosti propose a measure of "investment 
poverty": 
 
“Rather, for analysis of poverty-environment links, we suggest the use of a 
measure of ‘investment-poverty’, the cut-off point for which we define as 
the ability to make minimum investments in resource improvements to 
maintain or enhance the quantity and quality of the resource base – to 
forestall or reverse resource degradation.”  (Reardon and Vosti 1995: 
1498.)   
 
Whereas welfare poverty lines are used for regions, countries or even globally, the 
investment poverty cut-off point has many site-specific characteristics.  It is the 
function of local labour and nonlabour input costs, and depends on the types of 
investments that are needed for forestalling environmental degradation in the area.  
While most of the welfare poor will also be investment poor, the converse is not 
necessarily true.  A household may be above the welfare poverty line, but it may 
nevertheless be investment poor.  Investment poverty may eventually lead to 
welfare poverty through natural resource degradation, and the vicious circle may 
thus be realized (also Duraiappah 1998; Shiferaw & Bantilan 2004).  
 
Investment poverty thus impedes households from making conservation 
investments and intensification investments necessary for their agricultural 
practices or to prevent extensification of cultivation or pastures into sensitive land 
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areas2.  In the absence of such investments, the quality and/or quantity of the 
household’s resources will deteriorate.  While not all environmental degradation in 
developing countries is linked to poverty (Reardon & Vosti 1995: 1504), those 
environmental damages that are related to poverty could be avoided if households 
were above the investment poverty line and indeed did carry out the necessary 
conservation investments instead of consuming the surplus or investing in 
something else.  The investment poverty concept is inseparably tied to 
environmental outcomes, due to which it has rightfully been called “conservation 
investment poverty” by Scherr (2000).   
 
In addition, the types of natural resources and environmental change matter in the 
poverty-environment -nexus, because they all have different dynamics.  The 
environment can be split into soil, water, biodiversity and air.  Rural households 
harvest, enhance or leave undisturbed the environmental components depending on 
what they value.  Since the household’s preferred alternative may differ from the 
society’s optimum, household action may be undesirable from the point of view of 
the society.  The consequences of household and community income and 
investment strategies can be either harmful or beneficial to the environment.  
Negative effects may include soil loss, overgrazing and clear cutting forests, while 
afforestation, improved pastures on degraded lands, sustainable extraction of forest 
products and rural manufacturing, leading to the reduction of pressure on farmland, 
may have beneficial effects on the environment.   
 
2.1.2 Household and village behaviour:  determinants of income and 
investment strategies and their environmental impacts 
 
The investment poverty framework depicts how a household allocates its resources 
and entails environmental consequences, in a conceptual two-period dynamic 
framework as depicted in figure 2.2.  In period 1 the household starts with food 
security and livelihood objectives, has access to assets, and is faced with external 
conditioning factors.  The household allocates its assets into activities and 
investments in agriculture and non-agriculture, and these have either positive or 
negative environmental consequences on-farm and via externalities, off-farm.  The 
environmental consequences in turn affect the household’s assets in the future, 
period 2, in which new allocation decisions will be made.   
 
Livelihood diversification is an important feature of rural household economies.  
Rural poor diversify their income sources to manage the high risks and losses 
inherent in agriculture, and to smoothen consumption and labour allocation.  
Incomes are sought simultaneously in the non-agricultural sector, in gathering flora 
and fauna and in farming and livestock husbandry.  Growing proportions of 
                                                 
2 Thus, intensification investments such as higher fertilizer application may be beneficial for the 
environment up to a certain point, but beyond which harmful effects may be triggered.  This will be 
discussed in chapter 5.   
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incomes are derived from off-farm sources.  But despite the high incentives to do 
so, the household’s capacity to diversify may be severely hampered by a lack of the 
necessary assets.  Indeed not all households have the same opportunities or 
interests for diversifying their incomes.  (Bebbington 1999; Barrett et al. 2004; 
Ngugi & Nyariki 2005.)   
 
Figure 2.2  Household resource allocation, simplified from Reardon & Vosti (1995: 1499). 
Household food / livelihood security objectives in period 1 
 
Available household assets in period 1: 
    natural resources, human capital, on-farm & off-farm  
    physical and financial capital 
 
Conditioning factors external to household:  policies,   
    technologies, institutional arrangements and community assets 
 
Household mult isectoral production and investment activities 
     Agriculture:  crops, livestock 
     Non-Agriculture:  extractive, commerce, etc.   
 
Environmental consequences of household and community activities 
 
New household and community assets available 
in period 2 
  
 
In fragile rural areas the poor diversify incomes and assets especially into the non-
agricultural sector.  This reduces their vulnerability to agricultural shocks and 
alleviates poverty.  Labour-intensive non-agricultural activities are most easily 
available to the poor, such as small commerce, portage, farm labour, unskilled 
construction labour and migration periods.  However there is often an inverse 
relationship between the fragility of the resource base and the availability of off-
farm activities.  The best work opportunities are in areas where agriculture is most 
dynamic or there is active urban-rural exchange, whereas the least work 
opportunities are found in fragile and less dynamic areas where their need would be 
most pressing.  In addition, the constraints and incentives fall upon different 
households with considerable heterogeneity.  For instance the high entrance costs 
that exist to enter higher-return activities such as store keeping and transport are a 
reason why non-farm income commonly exacerbates income inequality.  Such 
costs thus not only lower the profitability of certain investment choices but also 
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impede many groups from participating altogether.  The poor are often impeded 
from access to more remunerative activities due to insufficient endowments of 
productive assets, poor access to information, markets, financing or social 
groupings that condition entry into markets.  (Barrett et al. 2004.) 
 
Income diversification to non-agricultural practices may cause either harmful or 
beneficial environmental impacts.  If the poor manage to successfully diversify into 
the non-farm sector and decrease their dependence on land, they will be less 
vulnerable to land degradation and they may use the earned cash to finance soil 
conservation investments and the use of fertilizers.  However, resource 
conservation investments may not be a priority to poor households, and they may 
prefer to use their available meagre investment funds or labour to off-farm 
activities.  Off-farm opportunities thus compete with land-based investment needs 
and a dynamic growth area may see few conservation investments despite 
increased investment capacities of the households.  If the environmental 
degradation in the area is reversible without the need of investments, increased off-
farm activities may leave land to recover naturally.  But if the environmental 
degradation in the area has started a “downward spiral” of degradation, such as the 
removal of topsoil and bush cover, active investments are needed for soil recovery.  
Since the degree of degradation, the degree of poverty, the available opportunities 
and the households’ preferences matter to the environment-poverty link, non-
agricultural incomes offer no universal cure. 
 
Livestock holdings commonly increase with household income.  Thus as incomes 
rise, households can be expected to invest in more livestock and place greater 
pressure on pastures.  Rising incomes can cause environmental damage also in 
tropical forest areas where the reduction of poverty may induce more intensive 
technical changes, such as the adoption of chainsaws, and accelerate deforestation.  
This challenges the extended Malthusian argument according to which particularly 
the poor overexploit their environment, and the alleviation of poverty will alleviate 
the pressure on the environment.  On the contrary these are dimensions in which 
the rich will tend cause more environmental pressure than the poor. 
 
When land is scarce, the most direct effect of poverty is on the intensification of 
cropping because poverty influences the households’ agricultural technology and 
investment paths.  Where land has not become scarce, the poor can convert forests 
to farmlands until they reach the end of the land frontier.  Boserup (1965) identified 
two main paths of agricultural intensification:  labour-led intensification of 
increasing the labour input on a given land area, and capital-intensive 
intensification of increasing the use of other inputs such as fertilizers, organic 
matter and conservation enhancing capital.  The capital-led intensification has been 
perceived as more productive and more environmentally sustainable, while the 
labour-led path has been perceived as causing land degradation and stagnating 
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productivity.  An association with the investment poverty concept is obvious.  
Households too investment poor to make the investments required to follow the 
capital-led intensification path will end up increasing the rate of degradation and 
being ever more vulnerable to its consequences.  This problem is often exacerbated 
by the original distribution of assets, in which the poor often have the lowest 
quality of natural resources, such as the less fertile and more fragile lands to begin 
with.   
 
Investments in on-farm and off-farm activities affect crop choices and the type and 
rate of agricultural intensification.  Investments in the conservation of land, which 
is commonly depicted as the most important asset of rural poor, depend on three 
conditions.  The households must perceive incentives to carry out conservation 
investments, this perception must be matched by a capacity to carry out the 
investments, and the external conditions must be favourable.  These incentives 
depend on the returns of the investment, which in turn depend on input prices and 
yield prices, investment risks, political stability, land tenure and the household-
specific discount rate, which is commonly highest in the poorest households, 
depicting the importance of immediate survival.   
 
The second and most important condition of land improvement investments is the 
household’s capacity to invest.  This is determined by the household’s asset 
endowments; the flow of cash earned from them; and the complementary assets on-
farm, such as a well, which is needed to maintain a live windbreak.  While the poor 
may have abundant labour force, investments that are large or lumpy, or that 
require inputs other than labour are less likely to be undertaken by the poor.  The 
investment poverty line for lumpy investments is thus higher than for smaller or 
divisible investments.     
 
The third determinants of land improvement investments are the external 
conditioning variables, which contrary to the previous two are common to all 
households in a particular agro-climatic and policy context.  These include 
available technologies for production and input or output processing, which affect 
the set of available investments and their profitability and riskiness; agricultural 
and macroeconomic policies, which affect input and output prices; and the 
institutional environment, including the legal system, markets and extension 
services.  The economic and institutional environment affects households in two 
ways.  It determines the household’s choices, for instance, how much food to grow 
versus how much food to buy; and it determines the feasibility and relative 
profitability of farm and nonfarm activities, or the intersectoral terms of trade, 
because it determines output and input prices, available technology and access to 
resources.  The physical environment, which is another conditioning factor and 
includes elements such as soils, rainfall, temperature, diseases and pests, affects the 
technical feasibility of potential investments and their profitability and riskiness.  
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And the transport and communication infrastructure determines the availability of 
information, access to markets, costs and returns.   
 
2.1.3 The role of conditioning factors 
 
A broad set of variables conditions the income and investment strategies of poor 
households.  The first group of conditioning variables is the existence, structure 
and performance of markets.  They condition the prevalent type of poverty and 
determine the fungibility of assets in investment and income generation.  Markets 
also affect the farm level profitability of production and conservation technologies, 
and determine the available investment options (Shiferaw & Bantilan 2004).   
 
The second group consists of the available technologies of production and resource 
conservation.  As the markets, also these affect the substitutability among assets, 
which in turn can alter household decisions and hence environmental 
consequences.  If technologies change, for instance in agriculture, the increase in 
productivity may relieve pressures on surrounding forests.   
 
Third, the relative prices of inputs and outputs, wages and interest rates affect farm 
resource use and investments.  An increase in the price of a previously low value 
asset, such as biodiversity, may lead to a change in its use and to a reduction in 
poverty.  If the village level infrastructure improves, such as roads, schools, market 
facilities and medical services, it will affect the cost of transactions and of inputs 
and outputs.  If the infrastructure improvements include complementary assets such 
as culverts, dams and wells, this will also decrease the private investment costs of 
conservation.  Infrastructure also serves to enable development of nonfarm 
activities, commercialisation of agriculture and urban-rural links, which greatly 
affect the income opportunities of the poor.  Together land conservation 
technologies and input prices determine the cut-off point for investment poverty.  If 
local land conservation technologies require labour force and use local easily 
available materials, even a welfare poor household could make conservation 
investments and thus not be investment poor.  If, on the other hand local 
technologies require costly inputs, the labour-rich household is investment poor 
and can make no land conservation investments. 
 
Finally, both physical and social community capital condition the poor household’s 
options in a variety of ways.  Community capital affects how wealth is distributed 
and insurance against shocks is provided within the community, which in turn 
conditions the level and incidence of poverty.  The distribution of poverty in the 
community may affect the cost faced by redistribution institutions in the 
community, and their effectiveness.  If the community is forced to dedicate 
resources for insurance to the welfare poor, these resources will be diverted from 
production and investments and be used for mere survival.  These arrangements 
may however also reduce environmental pressure, if the poor would have resorted 
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to degrading mining activities in the absence of such transfers.  But shared poverty 
or unequally distributed welfare may make it difficult for a community to enforce, 
for instance, watershed management or to manage sustainably the commons.  
Community wealth also determines the level of infrastructure investments, and 
directly affects investment poverty in two ways.  Infrastructure affects economic 
opportunities of the poor by increasing demand for farm and nonfarm products, and 
community level complementary infrastructure lowers the private investment needs 
for resource conservation.  As the final dimension, community population growth 
rate determines the pressure on land, which increases rates of degradation if 
nonfarm income opportunities are few or if no technical development takes place. 
 
 
2.2. Developments of the investment poverty framework 
 
The Reardon and Vosti framework has influenced much of the subsequent 
academic discourse on the poverty-environment nexus.  The core of the investment 
poverty framework can be found as such or in a refined form in many subsequent 
theoretical analyses on poverty-environment dynamics.  Later work shares the 
investment framework’s emphasis on the central role of assets as determinants of 
household behaviour (e.g. Bebbington 1999; Shiferaw & Bantilan 2004; Ngugi & 
Nyariki 2005; Dorward et al. 2003; Barrett et al. 2004), its emphasis on the 
importance of household and village behaviour as the determinant of natural 
resource and livelihood outcomes (e.g. Holden & Shiferaw 2004; Ngugi & Nyariki 
2005; Shiferaw & Bantilan 2004; Scherr 2000) and its emphasis on the importance 
of the role of what Reardon and Vosti term conditioning factors, such as markets, 
prices and infrastructure (e.g. Barrett et al. 2004; Shiferaw & Bantilan 2004; 
Holden & Shiferaw 2004; Dorward et al. 2003; Scherr 2000).   
 
Subsequent work has separated household and village behaviour, which Reardon 
and Vosti treated as identical.  Scherr (2000) and later Shiferaw and Bantilan 
(2004) place the community or village responses separately from, but in mutual 
interaction with particular household responses, and show how community 
responses also directly affect livelihood, productivity and natural resource 
outcomes.  Unifying household behaviour with village behaviour blurs the potential 
interactions between what the community or other households do and what a 
particular household does or will do.  Eventually it is a different entity making the 
decisions, and the policy implications for influencing the behaviour of particular 
households and communities may be different. 
 
Reardon and Vosti’s concept of investment poverty is a major contribution to the 
poverty-environment -discourse, and while it has connections to the concept of 
viability as discussed by Bebbington (1999), the concept itself has no competitors.  
One aspect of the investment poverty concept can however be challenged in the 
light of recent developments.  Reardon and Vosti defined as investment poor also 
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those households who have surplus income but who have chosen to consume it or 
invest into something other than conservation.  From the environmental point of 
view the concrete action of investing in land conservation or not is the key 
question.  But in the Reardon and Vosti’s definition the distinction between the 
households who do not have the investment capacity and the households who have 
but chose to act otherwise is lost.  Ravnborg (2003a) has demonstrated that the fact 
of having money to protect the land is not sufficient, because on the contrary much 
of current environmental degradation is caused by the rich.  A farmer household 
with investment capacity has investment alternatives from which to make a rational 
choice, and conservation investments may not be the optimal choice.  If there are 
other options with higher profitability, investment capacity may lead to non-
conservation investments to be made.  Such preferences may, however, exist also 
among the investment poor households, but due to their limited capacity to invest 
these preferences have not materialized.  It could be useful to distinguish these 
households, because the resulting policy implications are divergent for the two 
groups.  The action needed to counter a lack of investment capacity is different 
from the action needed to influence a preference against land improvements of 
those households who could actually afford them.  If consumption and investment 
preferences are strongly against land improvements, even considerable surplus 
above the welfare poverty line may never lead to land improvement investments.  
The underlying assumption that there is a point of income beyond which land 
improvement investments will be carried out can be thus challenged with the 
possibility that rising incomes may not be paired with increased conservation 
investments due to antagonistic preferences of investment and consumption.  These 
preferences may stem from the local context of conditioning variables, or from a 
perception of low economic returns to land conservation investments relative to 
other options, as is often the case, due to which the preferences are neither static 
nor endless. 
 
The environmental dimension of the Reardon and Vosti framework is quite 
unelaborated.  The underlying logic of environmental change seems to be that if 
natural resources are constantly used or harvested, without conservation 
investments the natural resource base will degrade in quality and / or quantity.  
Although Reardon and Vosti’s lax definition of the environmental dimension is a 
challenging outset for a subsequent empirical study, it is better than the choice of 
some other authors to dichotomising land use or farming practices into sustainable 
and unsustainable a priori (e.g. Shiferaw and Bantilan 2004; Ngugi and Nyariki 
2005).  Empirical studies of chemical, physical and biological environmental 
changes are complex and out of scope of the typical economic research.  It is thus 
understandable that a theoretical work would prefer to approach the environmental 
degradation issue loosely.   
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But in approaching environmental degradation as a known state of the world 
calling for corrective action, Reardon and Vosti may neglect the possibility that 
environmental change may go unnoticed or be countered with actions other than 
conservation investments.  As for instance Jones (2002) has pointed out, it is not to 
be taken for granted that resource degradation, even if it takes place, would be 
perceived by farmers, nor that a possible realization would lead to corrective 
action.  Environmental changes might be slow and farmers may have many 
strategies to cope with declining yields, such as increasing fertilizer use, changing 
land use schemes or seeking off-farm employment (Scherr 2000).  Even degraded 
land with low crop productivity may be converted into pasture or some other 
productive use, and some environmental problems may end up visible very far 
from where they were caused.  Care should be taken in assuming that the farmer 
households would consider it important to counter environmental degradation with 
somewhat considerable investments especially if they cannot perceive it, and even 
if they would.   
 
Given the necessary conditions for conservation investments that Reardon and 
Vosti list, it becomes easy to see why such investments are so uncommon in many 
poor rural areas.  Households may not have investment capacity and the external 
conditions may be unfavourable.  The perhaps most important determinant is, 
however, the potential economic returns related to a possible conservation 
investment.  As Scherr (2000) has pointed out, even the most enthusiastic farmer 
with investment capacity may be deterred by the unlikeliness of economic returns.  
But a particularly problematic issue is whether households are capable of assessing 
the potential incentives related to a given investment.  Commonly an increase in 
productivity caused by a conservation investment is slow and insecure, involving 
complex interactions between the intervention and natural processes.  In practical 
situations these complications are coupled with other cyclical variations in climate, 
market prices and risks, which affect not only the possible increases in yields but 
also their profitability.  Not only do the risks thus lower the household’s incentives 
to invest in land improvements, but they also make it difficult if not impossible for 
the households to assess the net returns of the investment a priori or even in the 
process.   
 
The discourse on conservation investments could also benefit from adding the 
severity of environmental degradation as one determinant of such investments.  
Scherr (2000) claims that farmers are usually aware when the degradation process 
threatens the resources critical for their own livelihoods.  When the farmers show 
no concern, it is often because they do not yet consider degradation to be a serious 
threat, or the resources under threat are marginal for their overall livelihood 
strategy.  Life-threatening environmental damage increases the incentives to invest 
in land improvements, due to which even a poorer household may carry out land 
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conservation investments, while a wealthier household may not carry out such 
investments due to a lack of a similar urgent priority.  
 
In this respect a major contribution has been made by Jones (2002), introducing the 
concept of limiting factors.  There are four potential limiting factors or conditions 
that must be fulfilled for conservation measures to be adopted by the farmers:  the 
farmer must perceive a problem of degradation; the farmer must hold knowledge or 
understanding of the techniques to remedy the problem; the farmer must have an 
incentive to remedy the problem or to adopt the promoted measures; and finally the 
farmer needs to be capable to remedy the problem.  The capability question refers 
to investment poverty in the Reardon and Vosti framework.  The absence of any of 
these four conditions will limit soil conservation or cause for none to be adopted 
altogether.  The Jones’s (2002) limiting factors can be placed as a determinant of 
household behaviour (figure 2.3) and the external conditioning factors can be seen 
to affect the Jones’s conditions.  Limiting factors can thus be positioned between 
assets and behaviour as an essential set of conditions based on which either 
conservation measures are adopted or not.  Investment poverty is thus only one 
conditioning factor parallel to others, and overcoming investment poverty only will 
not ensure soil conservation adoption.  
 
Figure 2.3  Limiting factors in soil conservation adoption by Jones (2002) related to Reardon and 
Vosti concepts 
Perception of degradation 
Knowledge of conservation 
techniques 
Incentive for conservation 
Capacity to make 
conservation investment  
External 
variables:   
Institutions, 
markets, 
prices, etc.  Soil conservation 
investments 
Limit ing factors: 
Assets 
 
 
Whereas the framework of Reardon and Vosti depicts that conditioning variables 
affect the link between poverty and household behaviour, and the link between 
household behaviour and environmental outcomes, the theoretical works of 
Dorward et al. (2003) and Scherr (2000) show that the conditioning external setting 
can affect not only every link but also every variable in the causation chain.  The 
policy environment thus may directly affect the household or community asset 
endowment, behaviour and also environmental and economic outcomes, in addition 
to potentially influencing the links between them.  These theories also show the 
empowerment of the household and village levels to influence higher-level 
policies, unlike Reardon and Vosti who depict the households merely as passive 
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objects to the surrounding context.  In addition, Bebbington (1999) and Shiferaw 
and Bantilan (2004) emphasize the active agency of rural households in shaping the 
society.  The empowerment of farm households upwards towards state level 
decision-making takes largely place through collective action.  It is also possible to 
depict the households in a wider context of evolving global and national policies, 
and show how wider processes are transmitted to the local level depending on 
community characteristics (Shiferaw & Bantilan 2004; Scherr 2000).   
 
Another valuable contribution to the poverty-environment discourse has been made 
by Dorward et al. (2003) in demonstrating that the conditioning variables interact 
and form either a dynamic or a stagnant setting in which households and 
communities operate.  They identify a low-level equilibrium trap (figure 2.4) 
typical of many developing and particularly rural regions.  Households with little 
power, financial and social capital face high costs in accessing information and the 
enforcement of property rights, constraining their access to markets.  This in turn 
hinders market development and hence technological and economic development.  
The resultant low levels of economic activity themselves lead to thin markets, high 
transaction costs and risks, and high unit costs for infrastructural development.   
 
Figure 2.4  Institutions and the low-level equilibrium trap, adapted from Dorward et al. (2003) 
Inhibited economic and 
technological development 
Weak 
institutional 
and 
infrastructural 
environment 
Inhibited market  
access and 
development 
High cost informat ion 
access and property rights 
Low economic activ ity, 
thin markets, high 
transaction costs and 
risks, and high unit 
costs 
 
The low-level equilibrium trap illustrates the inevitable links between market and 
institutional failures, and reveals that correcting the situation would require a very 
wide approach.  The trap also depicts a typical situation in which investment 
poverty is likely to occur and be perpetuated.  As farmers and their surroundings 
are characterized by this low-level equilibrium, the rise over an investment poverty 
line is not likely to be achieved by the removal of one obstacle alone.  This aligns 
with the view of Barrett et al. (2004), emphasizing the central role of 
interhousehold heterogeneity in constraints and incentives in explaining differences 
in income diversification patterns.  Although the Reardon and Vosti framework 
might give the impression that conditioning variables affect each household in the 
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same way, in reality different households differ in their relationship with the 
surrounding context.  Households differ in how vulnerable or strong they are 
against changes in the context, how much the context affects their particular 
livelihoods, how dependent they are on markets, what opportunities they have for 
shaping the context, where they live, and so on.    
 
Altogether, the academic discourse of the past years has been highly influenced by 
the theoretical framework of Reardon and Vosti.  While many other dimensions of 
the work have been challenged and developed, the concept of investment poverty 
remains an untouched landmark.  The discourse thus invites new contributions, but 
apparently the task of producing them will be challenging.   
 
 
2.3. Empirical applications of the investment poverty framework 
 
The framework of Reardon and Vosti (1995) is amenable for empirical testing 
across distinct eco-regions and different asset levels in the rural areas of developing 
countries.  It was taken as the conceptual basis for a set of studies funded by the 
Inter-American Development Bank and conducted by the Latin American Centre 
for Rural Development (RIMISP) collaborators during 1999-2001.  The framework 
was applied in three ways: for characterizing asset levels and the distribution of 
asset types; for analysing how assets and other factors affect household activity 
choices; and for analysing the link between household activities and natural 
resource outcomes (table 2.1) (Swinton et al. 2003: 1866).  All ten case studies are 
based on farmer interviews with structured questionnaires and samples of different 
sizes, which were collected across a variety of countries.  The case studies will be 
assessed in this section, with special attention to both the operationalization of asset 
and welfare poverty measurement, and the operationalizations for estimating the 
environmental impact of household behaviour.   
 
The ten case studies share many similarities.  They employ statistical methods, 
although to different extents.  All of the studies were carried out in Latin America, 
for similar environmental problems but for a variety of local conditions.  The main 
signs of environmental degradation in the region are soil erosion, deforestation and 
overgrazing, leading to irregularity of water flows, loss of biodiversity and declines 
in fallow periods.  The resulting declines in crop yields and stocking capacities 
endanger the livelihoods of the often already poor local farmer households and 
cause losses to rural economies as well as hindering national development 
altogether.   
 
The studies differ in many dimensions.  The first major difference lies in the time 
span of the data.  While eight case studies were based on cross-sectional samples 
collected at one point in time, there were two longitudinal studies with panel data.  
Bahamondes (2003a&b) studied the same 55 households in 1991 and 1999 to 
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assess changes in natural resource characteristics and the welfare poverty of 
households.  He found a dramatic decrease in poverty levels, increases in farm 
areas, herd sizes and in the importance of salary incomes between the two 
interview rounds.  Tabasco et al. (2003) also interviewed 28 households in both 
1997 and 2001, to assess how their welfare poverty and environmental impacts had 
evolved due to their emigration from a forest area that became a reserve.  While the 
environmental impacts of households had diminished after emigrating from the 
forest area, their welfare poverty had increased and families had become more 
disintegrated.  These longitudinal studies have the benefit of enabling the study of 
the effect of changes in assets or the surrounding context to farm household 
poverty and to their environmental impacts.  If the research focus is not on any 
such major change in context, the other case studies show that well-collected cross-
sectional data is as valuable for the study of assets, of links between assets and 
activities and of the links between activities and environmental outcomes.  While 
the framework is thus suitable for both longitudinal and cross-sectional data, 
neither is essential nor necessarily superior.   
 
Table 2.1  Application of the Reardon and Vosti framework in presented case studies. 
 
Studied 
country 
Number of 
studied 
households 
Studies 
asset levels 
and types, 
“poverty” 
Studies the 
link between 
assets and 
activities 
Studies the link 
between activity and 
environmental 
outcome* 
Swinton & Quiroz 2003b Peru 265 X X X 
Proaño et al. 2003 Ecuador 134 X X X 
Baquero et al. 2003 Colombia 175 X X X 
Ravnborg 2003b Nicaragua 669 X X X 
Anon. 2003 Venezuela 146 X X X 
Escobal & Aldana 2003 Peru 140 X X X 
Vera et al. 2003 Argentina 553 X - X 
Bahamondes 2003a&b Chile 55 X X X 
Tabasco et al. 2003 Colombia 28 X X - 
Agudelo et al. 2003a&b Colombia 165 X X X 
*) This is most commonly approached by taking the environmental impact of practices as given, and the 
adoption of harmful or beneficial practices is explained by the asset or poverty levels of households.  In the 
strict sense this link as such is not empirically explored in any of the studies.  See discussion. 
 
All case studies classify the studied farm households according to their asset or 
welfare poverty level, but the methods differ.  The most common 
operationalization of asset analysis has been cluster analysis, employed by five case 
studies.  Baquero et al. (2003), Anon. (2003), Bahamondes (2003b) and Agudelo et 
al. (2003b) group households into clusters by different combinations of their farm 
characteristics, asset endowments and socio-economic variables.  Vera et al. (2003) 
instead form clusters out of sampled villages, according to the predominant type of 
farmers in the region and asset possessions.  In all these five cluster-based studies, 
the clusters divide the households or villages mainly according to the production 
schemes, such as predominant crop and/or degree of commercialisation, and in all 
studies the clusters are taken as indicators of welfare poverty level.  The formed 
clusters are then related to the farming practices of the households to study if the 
welfare poverty or asset cluster could explain the environmental sustainability or 
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harmfulness of farming.  The clusters were related to for instance vertical furrows, 
excessive use of pesticides, hunting, fertilizing, wood extraction and reforestation 
practices.  The exception is the study by Vera et al. (2003), which compared the 
poverty profiles or clusters directly to the environmental degradation measure in 
the villages.  The case studies found no patterns of relationship between the asset 
and production-based clusters and the adopted farming practices or their 
sustainability.  The clusters worked well in grouping the farmers according to their 
main farmed product, but they were not informative for the poverty-environment -
nexus.  The clusters seem to hide the possible differences within crop choice or 
animal production choice to opt for either sustainable or unsustainable practices.   
 
Out of the remaining five case studies two applied the integrated welfare poverty 
measurement method (Proaño et al. 2003; Tabasco et al. 2003).  This method 
involves combining the income poverty level of the household and the assessment 
of the household's satisfaction of basic needs to form one measure of poverty.  The 
integrated method has the benefit of bringing a time dimension to the poverty 
measure, since the satisfaction of basic needs can be seen to depend largely on the 
welfare situation of the household in past periods.  The integrated poverty measure 
ranks the studied households into four classes: chronic poverty, recent poverty, 
inert poverty and social integration.  These classes were then related to the 
households’ land use and erosion measures, but the results indicate no association 
between welfare poverty and land quality.   
 
Ravnborg (2003b) creates an alternative welfare poverty measurement system for 
calculating a poverty profile index for each household.  It is a composite index of 
many categories of assets, incomes, employment and socio-economic 
characteristics, resulting in one numerical index.  According to this index Ravnborg 
divides the households into welfare poverty groups and tests whether the poverty 
groups correlate with farm land quality or quantity, environmentally friendly or 
harmful practices, forest ownership or the use of herbicides and pesticides.  The 
results indicate no clear tendencies between the poverty profile groups and their 
environmental impacts.  
 
As an alternative welfare poverty measurement approach, Escobal and Aldana 
(2003) divide the sampled households in two dimensions; both by their income 
levels relative to a welfare poverty line, and by their possession of key assets.  The 
adoption of sustainable practices is studied relative to the households' income 
poverty level, but the modelling of selected income strategies and environmentally 
friendly practices are studied also with probit models.  In the probit models the 
explanatory variables comprise of a wide list of asset possession and socio-
economic data.  Very few variables are statistically significant; the determinants of 
environmentally friendly practices are not found.  Ultimately, Swinton and Quiroz 
(2003b) assess all household assets separately and measure the poverty of the 
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households through their satisfaction of basic needs.  They relate the asset 
endowments and poverty level, along with a number of other variables related to 
household circumstances, prices and the such to the farming practices with logit, 
probit and multiple regression models.  
 
The environmental dimension of the Reardon and Vosti framework is empirically 
challenging, and the analysis of the environmental impacts of farming has been 
approached in the ten case studies in a variety of ways.  The most direct method is 
to measure empirically environmental degradation, and the least direct method is to 
assess the farmers' perceptions of environmental degradation as indicators of 
environmental quality.  In between are the indirect methods of testing whether 
households carry out practices, which have been a priori classified as sustainable 
or unsustainable, and of quantitatively relating actual household practices to given 
recommended practices.  Empirical erosion measurements were carried out by 
Proaño et al. (2003) and Bahamondes (2003b).  Proaño et al. (2003) measured 
erosion with the Edelman method, assessing loss of material for each linear meter.  
Erosion was found most common among the households above the welfare poverty 
line, connected with their use of tractors for soil preparation.  Bahamondes (2003b) 
measured the state of natural resources by evaluating vegetative formation, 
dominant species, degree of artificialization and biomass production per hectare.  
This yielded for instance a measure of the animal carrying capacity, which could be 
related to actual uses.  The measures were however used rather as background 
variables than as main tools for the analysis.  
 
The most common way of assessing the environmental impact of farmer household 
behaviour in the case studies was through the assessment of whether the 
households had adopted given practices, often divided beforehand into 
environmentally harmful or sustainable.  The practices could be assessed in a 
binary fashion, as done by Anon. (2003) and Proaño et al. (2003) assessing for 
instance whether the household had used fertilizers or not, hunted, or used certain 
soil preparation techniques.  These studies found no relationship between the 
welfare poverty groups of households and their practices.  Most studies assessed 
the farming practices by both binary and continuous variables, for instance by 
noting the hectares under given practice, the quantity of fuelwood used, burned 
area and reforested area (Baquero et al. 2003; Ravnborg 2003b; Escobal & Aldana 
2003; Agudelo et al. 2003b; Tabasco et al. 2003b).  Bahamondes (2003) proceeded 
to forming indexes of fuelwood use and livestock husbandry, as a combination of 
several of their dimensions.  The adopted practices were related to welfare poverty 
groups by logit and probit models (Anon. 2003; Baquero et al. 2003; Escobal & 
Aldana 2003), by correlation tests (Ravnborg 2003); or by crosstabulating the 
findings without tests of statistical significance (Proaño et al. 2003; Bahamondes 
2003b; Tabasco et al. 2003; Agudelo et al. 2003b).  The findings conclude that 
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there is no consistent pattern between poverty and the adoption of environmentally 
friendly or unfriendly practices.    
 
Two case studies were able to construct levels of recommended practice and relate 
them to the actual practices of the households.  Baquero et al. (2003) used this 
method for assessing whether the household had used pesticides according to 
recommendations, slightly over or very much over the recommended dosage.  Vera 
et al. (2003) estimated sustainable animal carrying capacities, or stocking 
capacities for the studied villages, and compared them to the actual stocking rates.  
This yielded an estimate of the magnitude of degradation taking place due to over-
grazing.  Again the results find no consistent tendency between poverty and 
environmentally beneficial practices.   
 
Three studies utilized the farmers' perceptions of environmental problems as 
measures or as parts of composite measures of environmental quality.  Swinton and 
Quiroz (2003b) interviewed the households on their views of a variety of 
environmental changes during the past 20 years, such as loss of topsoil, soil 
nutrient loss and forage crop availability, and took these as environmental measures 
as such.  The perceived environmental changes were modelled with probit and 
Tobit models using as explanatory variables a number of farmer, farm, farming 
practice related and external variables.  Also Anon. (2003) took the environmental 
problems directly from farmer experiences of deforestation, loss of biodiversity and 
water pollution.  These were then explained by farmer practices such as hunting, 
livestock husbandry and use of fertilizers and pesticides in multiple regression 
models.  Ravnborg (2003b) interviewed the farmers about their soil profoundness, 
susceptibility to erosion, infiltration and water retention capacity, and on the 
presence of life forms on their lands.  The results were combined with cluster 
analysis to form land quality groups and explained by poverty levels with no 
apparent tendencies as the result.  This approach can be criticised in light of the 
prior discussion on that many farmers do not perceive environmental degradation 
even when it takes place or until it threatens their life (Jones 2002; Scherr 2000).  
Added the fallibility of memory particularly for long time spans, farmer 
perceptions may become very unreliable indicators of “true” degradation. 
 
The Reardon and Vosti framework has proved to be a valuable tool for studying the 
environment-poverty –nexus in developing regions.  The presented ten case studies 
portray well the numerous opportunities that the framework offers for empirical 
application.  It can be used for different time spans, different sample sizes and 
across different environmental problems.  The analysis of assets and poverty can be 
carried out in several ways, leading to either grouping the farmer households into 
clusters or the analysis of all households separately but with some similar measure 
of welfare poverty or assets.  The farming practices or behaviour of households can 
be related to their asset or poverty levels in a variety of ways.  Also the 
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environmental dimension of the Reardon and Vosti framework enabled different 
approaches.  The case studies also show that there are a number of different 
analysis methods that can be used in the empirical testing of the framework, 
ranging from simple correlation tests and crosstabulations to logits, probit and 
multiple regression models.   
 
As to their results, these case studies have given the environment-poverty –
discourse a multidimensional set of evidence against the conventional vicious circle 
argument.  No clear patterns of effect between the farmer household welfare 
poverty or asset level, and the environmental impacts of their activities could be 
found in the studies.  Hence the case studies offer little hope for natural resource 
conservation through the alleviation of poverty, or vice versa.  Asset endowments 
do in part affect the productive activity; for instance high levels of land or financial 
assets favour large-scale livestock production and low levels of assets point 
towards cropping for mainly household consumption.  But while the poor are more 
dependent on natural resources and on-farm incomes than the rich, this does not 
seem to lead to more degrading land use practices.  The wealthier households have 
a larger proportion of income off-farm and out of the community, which offers 
them the possibility to relieve pressure on natural resources.  The rich often have, 
however, opted to use the natural resources more intensely or to expand the 
pastures and increase the livestock herds.  The practices may often be dependent on 
social and human capital factors rather than only on wealth-related factors.  
According to the reviewed case studies poverty is not the driving causal force 
behind environmental degradation in the region, and therefore rising incomes 
should not be expected to lead to improved environmental quality in the short run.  
(Escobar & Swinton 2003.) 
 
Investment poverty, the central new concept of Reardon and Vosti (1995) was 
mentioned in many of the studies but operationalized in none, even though 
investment capacity was seen as an important determinant of the environment-
poverty nexus.  Moreover, there were no attempts to discuss which assets are 
crucial for investment capacity, or if there is such a connection at all.  This opens 
views for new research.  A concept of obvious appeal and relevance to the poverty-
environment –links, investment poverty invites empirical operationalizations and 
closer scrutiny.  The many approaches demonstrated that despite the inadequacy of 
the traditional nutrition-based welfare poverty line in explaining investment 
poverty, it is a useful tool for studying farmer household economies, and welfare 
poverty measures may serve to approach also the measurement of investment 
poverty better than upon assets alone.   
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2.4. The investment poverty framework in this study 
 
2.4.1 Operationalization of concepts 
 
Despite their key roles in the investment poverty framework, previous research has 
not made serious attempts to apply the concept of investment poverty to empirical 
data, nor to scrutinize the role of assets in generating welfare.  These two concepts 
and their empirical examination are the central focus of this study.   
 
Investment poverty is a concept of great novelty value and practical importance, 
but while it has received academic attention its operationalizations are still lacking.  
This concept invites for empirical estimation.  If there is a threshold welfare level 
above which households become more likely to make conservation investments, 
how can it be found?  The aim is to estimate the investment poverty line and relate 
it to traditional poverty lines.  Graphically, this means identifying the two lines 
depicted in figure 2.5, which defines as the theory suggests three segments:  
welfare poor, investment poor and non-poor set of the population.  This 
interpretation of the investment poverty framework suggests that defining a welfare 
poverty line is an indispensable part of the investigation of investment poverty. 
 
Figure 2.5  Investment poverty line and resulting investment poverty groups. 
Investment poor households 
Surplus above welfare poverty line is too small, due to which the 
households cannot make conservation investments 
Investment non-poor households 
Surplus above the welfare poverty line is large enough 
to enable conservation investments to be made 
Household welfare level 
Investment poverty line 
Nutrition-based 
welfare poverty line 
Welfare poor households 
Live below the nutritional minimum 
 
The necessary tool for both investment poverty research and asset analysis is a 
measure of welfare.  This measure is needed as the measure upon which to evaluate 
the contribution each type of asset has for household welfare and to situate 
households in relation to the investment poverty line.  The operationalization of the 
Reardon and Vosti theory requires a continuous and preferably monetary measure 
of welfare.  The welfare measure must be as exhaustive as possible, reflecting as 
many dimensions of the living standards and daily satisfaction of needs of the 
households as possible.  It must be divisible by the number of household members, 
and it needs to be continuous also over the welfare poverty lines.  Household 
welfare will be proxied by a money-metric measure of household consumption.  
The aim is to combine in kind consumption, cash-based expenditures and annual 
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values of housing and household durables services into an aggregated household 
consumption level, divisible by household members for a per capita-consumption 
level.   
 
To empirically scrutinize the Reardon and Vosti framework, also a nutrition-based 
welfare poverty line is needed as a reference of the traditional poverty concept.  
Extreme and moderate welfare poverty lines will be formed from empirically 
collected local food prices and non-food consumption shares.  Comparing the 
household aggregated consumption levels to welfare poverty lines will allow to 
classify households into extremely poor, moderately poor and non-poor.  Both the 
resulting monetary welfare levels measured by consumption and the poverty 
groups will allow for the investment poverty lines to be sought and the analyses of 
how assets generate welfare to the households to be carried out. 
 
The key to defining the investment poverty line is to relate households’ welfare 
levels to households’ conservation and intensification investments.  Defining these 
investments empirically is, however, very challenging.  As the case studies 
demonstrate, in lack of possibilities for long-term empirical measurement of 
environmental variables, indirect measures must be taken into use.  Farmer views 
are considered unsatisfactory indicators of environmental change, and the study of 
production schemes alone is not sufficient for estimating environmental impacts.  
This study builds on the hypothesis that if land is in constant productive use and 
not enough action is taken to compensate for the extraction of nutrients and effects 
of erosion, land will degrade in quality and its fertility and productivity will 
decline.  An activity that forestalls or reverses this degradation is considered as soil 
conservation, and it may take place as a farming practice or particular investment. 
 
Conservation investment poverty will be operationalized by relating the 
sustainability of farmer household action and conservation investments to their 
welfare levels, to reveal if there is a level of welfare above which conservation 
investments or key practices take place.  Sustainability of farmer household action 
and conservation investments will be approached by several indirect methods.  The 
first involves listing land use practices that are locally considered beneficial or 
detrimental to the environment, formed as a combination of literature views and 
local expert opinions, and studying their presence or absence on the studied farms.  
Secondly sustainable practices will be sought by relating farmer household actions 
to recommended levels of fertilizer use and efficient stocking rates.  The third 
method involves the modelling of farmer household soil conservation investments 
by their welfare levels with linear regression models.  It will be sought whether 
household welfare levels statistically explain sustainable practices or conservation 
investments, and if there is a level of household welfare below which such 
regularity ceases to exist.  If such threshold levels of welfare are found, below 
which conservation investments can no longer be explained by the household’s 
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welfare level, these thresholds could suggest a location for a locally specific 
conservation investment poverty line.   
 
Investment poverty will be further studied by comparing the investment poor 
households to the investment non-poor households.  How do the two groups differ, 
particularly in ways that could explain why some are investment poor and why 
some are not?  The results can depict paths of capital accumulation or consumption, 
income or investment strategies that help households improve their welfare levels 
and reveal if there are important conditioning variables external or internal to the 
households that facilitate or hamper such strategies. 
 
Another important dimension of the framework and weakness of previous studies 
was the inadequate treatment of assets.  While the theory suggests studying poverty 
through asset endowments, there is a need to elaborate on the relationship between 
assets and household welfare in a more scrutinized manner than done so far.  The 
role of assets must be clarified as a means to generate welfare flows.  The role of 
assets as generators of household welfare must thus be questioned empirically.  
Although many case studies used household asset endowments as direct indicators 
of household poverty level, it is imperative to separate the assets from the income, 
consumption or other types of welfare flows they produce.  There is no automation 
by which assets produce welfare for the owners.  Which are the mechanisms 
through which assets generate welfare flows for the household and how can these 
be measured and modelled?   
 
Research of the welfare-generating nature of assets will be operationalized by first 
theoretically constructing mechanisms through which chosen assets may contribute 
to farmer household welfare, and by hypothesizing which context factors may 
affect these welfare-generating mechanisms.  Then empirical data will be used in 
statistical models to test the existence of the hypothesized mechanisms and the 
potential effects of the hypothesized conditioning factors with the logic of 
elaboration.  Tests will be carried out by statistically relating the possession of 
assets to the welfare poverty groups of the farmer households.  This allows 
statistical explanation of how the possession of a given asset relates to the welfare 
poverty level of a household.  The aim will be to carefully scrutinize the welfare-
generating effect of each asset separately and of each mechanism separately.  A 
controlled introduction of variables will allow for the effects of each factor to be 
understood.     
 
2.4.2 Statistical methods 
 
Econometric modelling of both the investment poverty line and the dynamics 
between assets and household welfare will be based on linear and logistic 
regression models.  Comparison of the different poverty groups will also employ 
statistical tests of differences in distributions and means.  All analyses will be 
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cross-sectional rather than longitudinal or time series analyses, because the 
empirical data to be collected will be collected only once from each household.  
The conventional 0.05 significance level will be used as the threshold of statistical 
significance, although it is recognized that a result may be statistically significant 
but theoretically meaningless, and in some situations, the contrary.  (Neuman 1997: 
317-323.)   
  
To compare differences in mean values, medians and locations of distributions of 
given attributes between two independent poverty groups, both t-tests and Mann 
Whitney U-tests will be used.  The t-test requires at least an interval scale and a 
normal distribution of the variable3, and allows testing the difference between 
means of two groups.  The 0-hypothesis states that the means of the two groups are 
the same, or that the two groups are from the same population.  Refuting the 0-
hypothesis would mean that the two groups are not from the same population; this 
requires for the significance level of the test, or the probability of erring, to be 
under the chosen limit of significance (0.05)4.  (Ranta et al. 1994: 185-202; Muhli 
& Kanniainen 2001.)  The requirement of a normal distribution is seldom fulfilled, 
reflecting an unequal distribution of goods, characteristics and other traits typical in 
rural settings, and group means are often highly affected by a small number of 
extremely large or small values.  The mean value of a given variable is thus quite 
uninformative and an inappropriate tool for assessing different groups relative to 
one another, due to which the t-test is used in this study only in the rare cases 
where the mean is considered an interesting parameter and when the distributions 
are normal.   
 
For testing differences in the location of distributions, the Mann Whitney U-test 
(MWU) responds better in most cases to this research’s focus than the t-test.  The 
MWU ranks all the cases in ascending order of the given variable, and then tests 
the mean ranks of the compared groups.  This eliminates the problem of high or 
low values affecting the mean, because the variable’s absolute values are not 
pertinent to the analysis but rather their ranking order.  The MWU is particularly 
informative and thus suitable for this research because it positions each household 
relative to the others without allowing the magnitude of the differences to skew the 
results.  Unlike the t-test, the MWU can be applied already to ordinal scale 
variables and it poses no requirements on the shape of the distribution.  The 0-
hypothesis of the MWU is that the compared groups’ distributions are similarly 
located and equally distributed and can thus be from the same population.  The 
higher the test quantity, the lower the significance level is, and the more likely the 
groups are statistically, and practically, different.  If the significance level is under 
                                                 
3 The tests of normality easily receive low significance levels for large samples, due to which 
normality was always assessed also by looking at the distributions (Muhli & Kanniainen 2001: 36).   
4 The significance level measure of the t-test depends on whether the two groups have equal 
variances, checked by SPSS with the F-test.  This will be taken into account in the analyses.   
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0.05, the 0-hypothesis will be refuted.  (Ranta et al. 1994: 185-202; Muhli & 
Kanniainen 2001.) 
 
The Pearson Chi-Square (χ²) -test will be used for two main purposes.  On the one 
hand, it allows testing the differences in distribution of categorical variables.  On 
the other hand, while the t-test and Mann Whitney U-test concentrate on the central 
tendency of a distribution of ordinal and interval scale variables, often it is useful to 
study also other characteristics of a distribution, namely its spread, dispersion and 
variability around the centre.  The Pearson Chi-square -test is used for both cases as 
a test of goodness of fit, testing if two compared independent samples are from a 
similarly distributed population.  In the χ²-test an observed distribution of one 
group can be compared to another distribution measured elsewhere (expected 
distribution, or, in this research’s case, the other group’s distribution).  The χ²-test 
quantity measures the distance of the observed frequencies from expected 
frequencies.  The greater the difference between expected and observed 
distributions, the greater is the test quantity χ² and the more unlikely the 0-
hypothesis that the groups have similar distributions, is valid.  The χ²- test thus 
measures the strength of association between two variables.  If, for instance, a 
given characteristic is more common among one group of households than in 
another, the χ²- test calculates the statistical significance of the found relationship.  
(Ranta et al. 1994: 136-143; Muhli & Kanniainen 2001.)   
 
Two different types of regression models will be used in this research, linear and 
logistic regression.  In linear regression the dependent variable is continuous, and 
independent variables are used to explain how much a change in the independent 
variables causes the dependent variable to change, and in which direction.  For 
instance it can be used to explain how much on average a given increase in 
household income increases its agricultural investments.  On the other hand the 
logistic regression has a categorical dependent variable: such as extremely poor, 
moderately poor or non-poor, and the model explains how different independent 
variables affect the probability of belonging to one of these groups.   Both these 
types of models are applied, because they serve to produce different kinds of 
information on the research questions.  Regression inference requires random 
sampling and the absence of nonsampling errors.  Since these conditions cannot be 
fully met in this research, caution is needed in the interpretation of the results.  
Regression analysis has been commonly applied to data from complex non-random 
sample surveys, proving that a proper identification of variables that have 
influenced sample design and their inclusion in the model can protect against errors 
due to non-random sampling.  Regression analyses do not allow for extrapolation, 
due to which any results may not be used to predict outside the observed values.  
(Babbie 2001: 446; UN 2005: 427.) 
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A linear association between two variables can be modelled by linear regression.  
In the simplest situation, the association between two variables can be depicted by 
describing Y as a function of x.  This means that the values of the dependent 
variable Y can be explained in terms of variations in the values of the independent 
variable x.  More strongly stated, x causes Y, due to which the value of x 
determines the value of Y.  If the regression equation correctly describes the 
general association between two variables, it may be used to predict other sets of 
values.   
 
In multiple linear regression there are several independent variables affecting a 
given dependent variable (eq. 2.1).   
 
exbxbxbaY nn  ...21 21   (2.1) 
 
in which Y is the value of the dependent variable, a is a constant or the y-intercept, 
b1, b2, ..., bn are the coefficients for x1, x2, ... xn, which are independent variables 
and e is the residual factor representing the variance in Y that is not accounted for 
by the x variables analysed.  Values of the several coefficients (b) depict the 
relative contribution of each of the several independent variables in determining the 
final Y.  The interpretation of the coefficients is straightforward.  With a one unit 
increase in xn, Y will change on average by bn.  (Babbie 2001: 442-4; Neuman 
1997: 319.)  Utilizing linear regression requires assuming that the relationship 
between given variables is indeed linear.  The model requires in addition that every 
variable must be normally distributed, that residuals must be normally distributed, 
and that the explanatory variables must not correlate with each other nor with the 
residuals (multicollinearity).  The variation of residuals is also not to correlate with 
the explanatory variables (homoscedasticity).  (Muhli & Kanniainen 2001: 90-93.)  
The dependent variable can also be transformed into its natural logarithm, Ln(Y).  
In this case the coefficients of the linear regression model are interpreted such that 
the dependent variable Y changes by 100*(bn) percent for a one unit increase in xn, 
if all other variables in the model are held constant. 
 
Logistic regression, or logit 5, belongs to a group of models with categorical 
dependent variables, which also include for instance the linear probability model, 
the probit model and the censored regression model or Tobit model.  They are often 
used to model situations in which individuals, households or firms are faced with a 
choice between two or more alternatives and the likelihood that the subject will 
choose a given alternative is predicted on the basis of his/her/its characteristics.  
(Pindyck & Rubinfeld 1991: 248-9.)   
 
                                                 
5 Logit and logistic regression mean different things in different fields and thus may or may not 
refer to the same analyses.  While both terms are used in econometrics, this study will use the term 
logistic regression.  Its definition is given in the text.   
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In this study, however, logistic regression models are used not to predict a choice 
between alternatives, but rather the belonging to one of two or more possible 
groups, which are externally assigned.  For instance in this work households will be 
divided according to their welfare into extremely poor, moderately poor and non-
poor, according to welfare poverty lines.  Logistic regression models have in fact 
been used widely to explain membership in externally assigned groups, where the 
groups have been divided from a continuous measure by externally assigned 
thresholds.  This has been done in similar poverty studies (Rodriguez & Smith 
1994; Mok et al. 2007; WB 1999; Krishna et al. 2006; Feleke et al. 2005; Zimmer 
2008), in other farmer economics studies (Jabbar et al. 2002; Hudson et al. 2005; 
Amin et al. 2006), in environmental studies (Mertens et al. 2002; Bailey et al. 
2003; Leung et al. 2000; Wetherington et al. 2005; Grepperud 1996) and in many 
health related studies (e.g. Bender & Grouven 1998; de Belvis et al. 2008; 
Tonorezos et al. 2008; Rotenberg et al. 2008; Wilens et al. 2008; Hayano et al. 
1996; Schares et al. 2003).    
 
If the response variable to be modelled is binary, i.e. has two categories; the binary 
logistic regression model will be used.  The binary logistic regression model is 
based on the cumulative logistic probability function (eq. 2.2), which is specified 
as:   
 
exbxbxba
Py
PyLn nn 



 ...1 2211   (2.2) 
 
in which Py is the probability of event y, and (1-Py) is the probability of not-y, a is 
the constant or the y-intercept, the b’s are the coefficients of the x’s, which are the 
independent variables and e is the error term.  The ratio Py/(1-Py) is known as the 
odds ratio and it is the odds in favour of event y.  The natural log of the odds ratio 
is called the logit.  (Gujarati 1992: 423; Pindyck & Rubinfeld 1991: 258-269.) 
 
In cases where the response variable has more than two categories, the multinomial 
logistic regression model will be used.  The multinomial logistic regression model 
is specified as: 
 
exbxbxba
Po
PyLn nn 

 ...2211   (2.3) 
 
in which Py is the probability of event y, Po is the probability of event o, a is the 
constant or the y-intercept, the b’s are the coefficients of the x’s, which are the 
independent variables and e is the error term.  Po is called the baseline category, 
since the probabilities of other possible categories are compared to it.  In the 
multinomial logistic regression with r possible categories, r-1 equations are made.  
(Agresti 1990.)  The selection of the baseline category does not affect the outcomes 
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of the model, only the coefficients and their interpretation.  In fact the multinomial 
logistic regression is conceptually equivalent to fitting r-1 separate binary logistic 
models, comparing category 1 with category n, category 2 with category n and so 
on.  There is also the option of using ordinal logistic regression for a dependent 
variable with ordered polytomous categories (such as the three poverty groups).  It 
assumes that the logits can be represented as parallel linear functions of 
independent variables, that is, that the coefficients of independent variables are 
same for all logits.  However, in this research the data does not suggest that the 
effect of independent variables would be similar across different poverty levels, 
due to which ordinal logistic regression is not used. 
 
Logistic regression models guarantee estimated probabilities to lie between the 
logical bounds of 0 and 1, and it allows estimating a P for every individual case.  
Logistic regression thus allows to directly forecasting that an event y will happen.  
By default the model will assume that event y will happen if the predicted 
probability is 0.5 or greater.  SPSS estimates the coefficients with the method of 
maximum likelihoods, contrary to linear regressions, which are based on the 
ordinary least squares method.  (Gujarati 1992: 423; Pindyck & Rubinfeld 1991: 
258-269.) 
 
Figure 2.6  The cumulative logistic probability function.   
 
Source:  http://www.resample.com/xlminer/help/Lreg/lreg_intro.htm accessed 5.2.2007 
 
According to the logistic regression model the log of the odds ratio is a linear 
function of the independent variables.  The slope coefficients give the change in the 
log of the odds ratio with a one unit change in an independent variable.  The 
interpretation of the coefficients thus is, ceteris paribus, if the x1 increases by one 
unit, the logit, or the log of the odds ratio in favour of event y, changes by b1.  The 
probability of an event y does thus not increase linearly with the independent 
variables, but rather the probability approaches zero at a slower and slower rate as 
the value of an independent variable gets smaller and it approaches one at a slower 
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and slower rate as the value of the independent variable gets larger.  The slope of 
the cumulative logistic distribution is greatest at P= ½ (figure 2.6).  Changes in the 
independent variables will thus have their greatest effect on the probability of the 
event y at the midpoint of the distribution, while even large changes near the 
endpoints bring about relatively small changes in the probability.  (Gujarati 1992: 
423-5; Pindyck & Rubinfeld 1991: 258-269.)  Logistic regression poses fewer 
requirements than the linear regression model.  There is no assumption of a normal 
distribution of neither the dependent variable nor the error terms, nor does the 
dependent variable need to be homoscedastic.  Logistic regression permits even 
categorical or dummy independent variables, and allows for the independent 
variables to correlate with one another.  (Kanniainen 2000: 17-18.) 
 
Described empirical analyses based on the Reardon and Vosti framework require 
detailed farmer household level data.  The framework gives good outlines as to 
what type of themes the farmer household data must include, and the research 
methods dictate the necessary level and type of data.  Themes must include farmer 
household economics comprising at least incomes, consumption and investments; 
land use practices and farm production characteristics; information on household 
structure and on the environmental dimensions of their activities.  Thus a structured 
questionnaire will be constructed to collect farmer level data in a developing 
country to fulfil the needs of the theoretical research questions, and at such a level 
of detail that enables the statistical analyses to be carried out.  In addition there 
must be information on local conditioning variables, such as infrastructure and 
institutional setting, prices and different markets.  While many conditioning 
variables are similar for every farmer household in a given area, many conditioning 
variables are faced differently by households in specific locations, of different 
socio-economic characteristics, and so on.  Thus also supporting background data 
on the research area will be needed.   
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3. Survey of farmer households in the province of 
Herrera, Panama 
 
 
Poverty-environment –dynamics as presented by Reardon and Vosti (1995) will be 
empirically studied with new data from the province of Herrera, of the Republic of 
Panama.  Since the Reardon and Vosti framework’s emphasis is on phenomena 
related to farmer household economics of ultimately numerical nature, data 
collected for theory testing was to be household specific data suitable for statistical 
analyses.  In addition detailed knowledge of the local institutional setting was 
needed to understand the context in which the farmer households operate.  This 
chapter’s first section will present the research site and its institutional setting, 
especially in the extent to which it affects the farmer households’ economic 
opportunities, farming practices and the environment.  Section 3.2 will present the 
farmer household questionnaire developed for this study and the method of data 
collection.  An assessment of the sample in comparison with national statistics and 
a scrutiny of potential sources of error will be carried out in section 3.3, and section 
3.4 will end this chapter will concluding remarks. 
 
 
3.1 The research site 
 
3.1.1 The Republic of Panama and its Herrera province 
 
The Republic of Panama is a country located on the Central American isthmus, 
between Costa Rica to the east and Colombia to the west (figure 3.1).  It lies 
between 7º12 and 9º38 Northern Latitude and between 77º09 and 83º03 Western 
Longitude.  Panama has a land area of 75 517 km² and a sea territory of 319 824 
km².  Its shore with the Pacific Ocean stretches out 1 701 km and its Atlantic coast 
to the Caribbean Sea spans 1 288 km.  Biodiversity in Panama is exceptionally 
high6.  The country constitutes of 9 provinces and 3 provincial-level indigenous 
territories (comarcas indigenas) and is headed by a democratically elected 
president, who for the 2004-2009 period is Martin Torrijos of the social democratic 
party.  (State of the Region 1999; DEC 2004a; DEC 2002; Conservation Atlas 
1996.) 
 
In 2005 Panama had a population of 3,23 million (MEF 2005a) with an annual 
growth rate of 1,6% (HDR 2005).  The official language is Spanish and the culture 
and customs are predominantly Caribbean Spanish.  Ethnically the majority of 
Panamanians are mestizo, and the indigenous population amounted to 140 000 in 
                                                 
6 218 mammal species, 929 birds, 226 reptiles and 164 amphibians constitute more vertebrate 
species than are found in any of the other Central American countries.  Vascular plants are 
estimated around 9000 species.  (Conservation Atlas 1996.) 
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1992.  57,2% of people live in cities, and nearly half of the total population live in 
the capital province of Panama City.  As typical for developing countries, Panama 
has a large youth population and a small share of elderly people; while 30,9% of 
people are under age 15, only 4,5% are age 65 and older.  However it is possible to 
identify a demographic change; the birth rate has declined and the juvenile share of 
population has decreased since the 1980s.  (HDR 2005; DEC 2000a; State of the 
Region 1999.) 
 
Recent improvements in living conditions have contributed to high achievements in 
many demographic parameters.  Life expectancy at birth was 74,7 years, and the 
infant mortality rate was 18 per 1 000 live births in 2003.  93,1% of adults were 
literate and the net primary enrolment ratio was 100% in 2003.  The average 
Panamanian over 25 years of age has received 8,6 years of formal education.  
Indeed Panamas was positioned the world’s 56th in the Human Development 
Report of 2005, achieving a country status of “high human development”.  (HDR 
2005; State of the Region 1999; MEF 2006.)  Despite its small size, Panama is one 
of the most economically powerful and peaceful societies of the region.  
Nevertheless still more than a third of its population lives under the national 
poverty line and a fourth lives in extreme poverty (WB 1999; INDH 2002; MEF 
2005a).  Poverty is most striking in rural and indigenous areas.  Panama is among 
the most unequal countries of the world, resulting in a skewed distribution of 
assets, opportunities and access to basic infrastructure and public services (WB 
1999; MEF 2006). 
 
Figure 3.1  Map of the Republic of Panama.  Provinces and provincial-level indigenous territories 
(comarcas). 
 
Source:  Elaborated by Ville Könönen, based on a map of the Panamanian Ministry of Economy and 
Finances (MEF) available at http://www.mef.gob.pa/programadarien/inside_html/contactenos.html 
 
The currency of Panama is the Balboa (Panamanian Balboa, PAB), which divides 
into 100 cents (centésimos).  The Balboa is equal to the U.S. dollar, which is legal 
tender in Panama since the country has no notes of its own.  The United States has 
  
39 
also left another major economic legacy to Panama: the Panama Canal, which it 
handed to the Panamanian people in 2000.  In 2004 the Canal contributed 5,9% of 
Panama’s GDP, and it generates foreign currencies more than any other sector in 
the country.  (MEF 2005a; ACP 2004.)   
 
Panama’s GDP per capita (PPP USD) in 2003 was 6 854 USD, growing at an 
average annual rate of 2,4% between 1990-2003 (HDR 2005).  The country’s 
inflation has been the lowest of the region, on average 1,0% between 1997-2003 
(MEF 2006; MEF 2005a).  The national economy is based on a well-developed 
service sector, including banking, trade, insurance, ports and health care.  
Agriculture, fishing and mining contributed merely 9,0% to the GDP in 2005 and 
manufacturing and construction 14,5% (DEC 2006b).  Public expenditure has risen 
annually 3,2% between 1997-2003, arriving to 5,4 billion PAB in 2003 (MEF 
2006).  The official development assistance to Panama was 30,5 million USD in 
2003, constituting a meagre 0,2% of GDP (HDR 2005).  Panama’s balance of 
payments has been positive, because although imports exceed exports, the finance 
and capital flows are positive (MEF 2006; MEF 2005a).  The main export items are 
bananas, shrimp, sugar, coffee and clothing, and nearly half of the exports go to the 
United States (CIA 2007).  In recent years the unemployment rate has ranged from 
13,6% in 2003 to 8,9% in 2006 (MEF 2005a; DEC 2004a).  The informal economy 
accounted for 53% of all jobs in 2003, exposing workers to low salaries and no 
social security.  The government sees this as a threat to improving productivity and 
reducing poverty, since the informal jobs are commonly related to simple 
technologies, lack of accounting procedures and poor organization.  (MEF 2006.)   
 
The role of women in Panama is strong.  Panamanian women gained the right to 
vote and stand for election already in 1941 and the first female president Mireya 
Moscoso served 1999-2004.  Women’s participation in the economy has risen 
steadily; currently 44,3% of women is economically active, and women nowadays 
comprise 50% of the country’s professional and technical employees.  More than 
half of university students are women.  Panama’s gender-related development 
index was the world’s 47 highest in 2005, depicting education, life expectancy and 
incomes; but their gender empowerment measure (GEM) was even higher.  Panama 
ranked 40th in 2005, depicting the women’s high level of political participation, 
professional participation and ratio of estimated female to male earned income.  
Women’s unemployment is still more common than that of men, and despite the 
law of equality of sexes there are still differences in salaries and career 
opportunities.  (Solis JL pers.comm. 30.5.20057; HDR 2005; DEC 2000a; Pinzón B 
pers.comm. 30.5.2005.) 
 
                                                 
7 References for personal communications are in chapter 10. 
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The province of Herrera was chosen as the location of this study due to it being the 
middlemost of the nine Panamanian provinces8 in its incidence of extreme poverty 
(table 3.1), in its poverty depth and in the income distribution (INDH 2002: 87, 40, 
91-92).  Herrera thus represents well the “average” poverty situation of the country.   
 
Table 3.1  Ranking Panamanian provinces according to extreme poverty incidence in 2000.   
Rank Province Percent of households with income under the national 
extreme poverty line in 2000 (525,60 PAB/capita/year) 
1. Panamá (capital province) 10,7 % 
2. Colón 21,1 % 
3. Chiriquí 22,9 % 
4. Los Santos 27,0 % 
5. Herrera 29,1 % 
6. Coclé 33,4 % 
7. Bocas del Toro 39,0 % 
8. Veraguas 45,2 % 
9. Darién 53,0 % 
National average 34,3 %  (or 40,5% of total population) 
Source:  INDH 2002: 87. 
 
The province of Herrera is situated between 7º32’10’’ and 8º08’42’’Northern 
latitude and 80º23’24’’ and 80º57’50’’ Western longitude on the peninsula of 
Azuero, in the central region of Panama.  It is the smallest province of the country 
with its area of 2 341 km².  It has 17,5 km of coastline to the Pacific Ocean, and its 
highest peak is the Cerro Los Ñopos, at 1 060 m in the Los Pozos district.  Herrera 
neighbours with the provinces of Coclé, Veraguas, and Los Santos (figure 3.2).  
The distance from the province capital Chitré to the country’s capital Panama City 
is approximately 225 km.  The climate is dry tropical, with precipitations below 1 
500 mm annually and mean temperatures from 28º to 34º with little variation 
throughout the year.  There is a 7-month rainy season, while the dry season lasts 5 
months from December to April.  (DEC 2002.)  Merely 4% of the Herrera province 
is covered by forest, most of which is located in the protected forest reserve of El 
Montuoso in the Las Minas district. The history of forest loss in Herrera is 
exceptionally long; Herrera had lost 85% of its forests already by the inventory of 
1947.  Local views associate forest loss with diminishing rainfall, lowering of 
water sources, lack of organic material and susceptibility to erosion.  (DEC 2002; 
Conservation Atlas 1996; ANAM 2000; Herazo A pers.comm. 26.5.2005; Kajifusa 
H pers.comm. 24.5.2005.) 
 
The province of Herrera is headed by a governor and it has three democratically 
elected legislators representing the province in the unicameral National Assembly.  
Herrera divides into seven districts as depicted in table 3.2 and figure 3.2.  Each 
district has a democratically elected major (alcalde), who collects taxes.  The 
districts further divide into a varying number of municipalities (corregimiento)9.  
                                                 
8 Excluding the three provincial-level indigenous territories. 
9 Municipality is here defined as an administrative local area composed of a clearly defined territory 
and commonly referring to a city, town or village government.  In most countries municipalities are 
the smallest administrative subdivision to have its own democratically elected representative leader.  
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Every municipality has its own democratically elected representative leader 
(representante de corregimiento), who is given an annual budget for projects in the 
municipality.  The municipalities comprise of various villages (lugar poblado) with 
distinctive names but without administrative or political functions.   
 
Figure 3.2  Administrative division of the Herrera province into districts.  Also district centres and 
main roads. 
 
Source:  Elaborated by Ville Könönen, based on a map by the Cartographic Section of the Bureau of 
Statistics and Censuses of the Panamanian Comptroller’s Office. 
 
The Herrera province had 102 465 inhabitants in 2000 (table 3.2), estimated to 
have risen to 109 371 inhabitants in 2004 (DEC 2004b).  Urban dwellers 
constituted 47,0 % of the Herreran population in 2000.  While on average illiteracy 
and unemployment affects one in every ten Herrerans, there are significant 
differences within the province (table 3.2).  The average household size is 3,7 
persons, and approximately one in every five households is headed by a woman.  In 
2000 only 0,4% of the Herreran total population were indigenous.  People 
predominantly live in privately owned individual houses, while apartments 
constitute less than 4% of all dwellings and are mainly located in the Chitré centre.  
                                                                                                                                       
There is no convention on how to translate the political subdivisions of Panama.  The author 
apologizes for any possible confusion caused by the selected translations. 
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Renting is not common in the province nor is having a mortgage for the house.  
(DEC 2002.) 
 
Table 3.2  Population characteristics of Herrera and its districts. 
District Population Women % Illiteracy % 
*  
Unemployed 
% *  
Household 
size 
Households with 
female head % 
Chitré, capital 42 467 51,9 4,3 10,4 3,7 26,6 
Las Minas 7 945 45,6 24,8 7,8 4,0 13,4 
Los Pozos 7 827 46,6 22,3 9,0 3,7 16,1 
Ocú 15 936 47,3 15,3 7,1 3,8 17,3 
Parita 8 827 48,4 8,9 10,1 3,7 19,4 
Pesé 12 471 48,0 11,3 10,4 3,8 16,8 
Santa Maria 6 992 48,6 9,6 11,9 3,8 20,6 
Total Herrera 102 465 49,3 10,4 9,7 3,7 21,2 
*) Of population over age 10.  Source:  DEC 2000a.   
 
Although the demographic structure of the province depicts a large proportion of 
young people (annex 1), particularly in the capital district Chitré a transition may 
be taking place in the form of a decline in natality.  And although the population 
shows a steady increase from 20 000 in 1911 to 100 000 in year 2000, in recent 
years the population has been growing at a rate of less than 1 per 100 inhabitants 
(figure 3.3), depicting not only a low natality but also emigration of its population 
to other provinces (DEC 2000a). 
 
Figure 3.3  Population growth rates 1920-2000 for the Herrera province and the Panama country 
total.   
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Herrera accounted for a mere 2,0% of the nation’s GDP in 2004.  The main 
contributors to the Herreran economy are agriculture, livestock husbandry, hunting 
and forestry with 18,2%, public government with 13,0% and transport, storage and 
communications with 12,9% of the provincial GDP.  The importance of the 
agricultural sector demonstrates a declining trend, although it still employs a 
significant share of the province’s economically active population (25,7%).  17% 
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of the employed work in commerce and services and 11% in the manufacturing 
industry.  Herrera is a major sugarcane production region of the country, and 
prominent industries include dairy, cattle, alcohol, ceramics and cement.  Herrera’s 
capital Chitré is a significant economic growth centre of the country. (DEC 2006a; 
DEC 2002.)   
  
The Herrera province is internally heterogeneous in numerous respects.  While the 
bustling province capital presents opportunities for employment, offers high quality 
infrastructure and services, the remote areas of Herrera provide a very rudimentary 
setting for human life.  The welfare differences can even be observed in national 
statistics; the district of Chitré has the country’s lowest share of population under 
the extreme and moderate poverty lines, while Las Minas and Los Pozos districts 
are nationally among the most affected (table 3.3).  And for instance whereas 31% 
of households in Las Minas lack access to potable water, the share in Chitré is only 
0,1%.  (INDH 2002; MEF 2005a&b; DEC 2002.)   
 
Table 3.3  Heterogeneity among the Herrera province’s constituent districts. 
 Area km² Population 
density / km² 
Distance 
to Chitré 
km 
Population 
in extreme 
poverty in 
2003 * 
Population 
in general 
poverty in 
2003 ** 
Mean 
consumption 
per capita 
PAB/a 
Chitré, capital 91,1 466,2 0 3 % 19 % 2 184 
Las Minas 436,7 18,2 57 20 % 60 % 1 024 
Los Pozos 382,8 20,4 45 18 % 57 % 1 045 
Ocú 624,9 25,5 48 6 % 28 % 1 767 
Parita 364,1 24,2 12 9 % 37 % 1 548 
Pesé 283,6 44,0 23 11 % 43 % 1 319 
Santa Maria 157,5 44,4 34 12 % 44 % 1 353 
TOTAL PROVINCE 2 340,7 43,8     
*) Consumption < 534 PAB/capita/year **) Consumption < 953 PAB/capita/year, includes the extremely poor 
Source:  DEC 2002; MEF 2005b. 
 
The capital district of Herrera, Chitré, is without doubt the most advantaged and 
advanced district of the province.  The city hosts a great variety of commercial and 
public services, ranging from educational facilities and health care to banking and 
entertainment.  The districts located along the road from Chitré towards Panama 
City, namely Parita and Santa Maria have benefited from their strategic location 
and flat lands, and currently host large milk farms and sugar, rice, milk and meat 
industries that employ considerable amount of workers.  With these opportunities, 
however, social problems particularly related to seasonal unemployment have 
arisen.  Among the well-off districts is also Ocú, Herrera’s largest district.  
Although relatively far from the province capital, Ocú is connected to the 
Interamerican highway directly to the North.  There are both plains and mountains, 
hosting many types of agricultural production, and a lively commercial centre.  
Pesé is another relatively prosperous district, not only because of its good 
accessibility from Chitré and its plain lands, but because it is home to Panama’s 
most important alcohol distillery and large sugarcane plantations.  The success of 
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the Hermanos Varela distillery has had a great effect on the economic and also 
cultural development of the district.   
 
The remotest districts of Las Minas and Los Pozos have been the disadvantaged 
ones, marked by poverty and lack of opportunities.  They are both located on the 
mountainous Southern part of the province, and much of their rugged territories 
have such poor roads that they are not accessible by motorized vehicles.  Los Pozos 
has only recently received a paved road to Chitré.  There are considerable shortages 
of basic infrastructure in these two districts, such as electricity and water provision.  
But such concerns are not unique to Las Minas and Los Pozos; despite apparent 
prosperity in the centres, also other districts lack basic services in their remote 
areas.  Schools lack school buses, health centres lack materials and police stations 
have few if any vehicles.  All districts have also petitioned for better roads and 
improved waste and wastewater management (community consulting council 
22.1.2005).  Even the province capital Chitré lacks a waste water system in most of 
the city, and the solid waste management system is deficient in most of the 
province.      
 
3.1.2 Agricultural production conditions in Herrera 
 
Land tenure in Panama is mainly based on private ownership.  Of the Herrera 
province’s 234 100 hectares, 190 062 hectares or 81,2% is privately owned and 
farmed (99,5% of farms).  In the whole country, only 0,2% of farms are owned by 
companies, 0,2% by the state, and 0,1% by farmer organizations.  There are two 
types of ownership status:  a legal title (título de propiedad) and the possessing 
right (derecho posesorio).  The possessing right is the traditional land ownership 
scheme, for which there is no official document.  Legally the land remains property 
of the State, and the farmer is the occupier without need to pay rent.  Boundaries 
are recognized by neighbouring farms and there are seldom disputes.  Land with 
possessing right is inherited and can be rented equally to titled land and land cannot 
be confiscated nor squatted on the basis of having no title.  The possessing right is 
very strong and it is currently the most common land ownership status in Herrera.  
If the land is officially titled, it is legal property of its owner.  The official title is a 
common requisite for obtaining a loan, because in most financial institutes only 
titled land is accepted as collateral.  According to the agricultural census of 2000, 
45,9% of Herreran farms were titled10, covering 59,7% of farm area.  Due to recent 
titling programmes the current figure is higher but unavailable.  (Gallardo J 
pers.comm. 9.5.2005; DEC 2001.) 
 
Land titling can be carried out by the landowner at the land register in Chitré, but 
unless subsidized by a titling project it can be costly and slow.  Titling requires the 
                                                 
10 41,1% had no title and 1,9% was acquired by rent (for which ultimate ownership status was not 
recorded). 
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elaboration of a map, priced at minimum 150 PAB, an inspection, and making a 
payment for the land (0,25-1,00 PAB/m²).  The aggregate cost of land titling 
without subsidize for a 10 hectare farm, for example, would be at least 25 150 
PAB11 in central areas, not including other possible transaction costs such as edicts.  
Land value can increase up to 50% due to titling, but sometimes land value doesn’t 
increase at all.  Due to the high costs rural households seldom title land without 
titling programmes, which in recent years have been numerous.  For example the 
cost of titling with the PRONAT (Programa Nacional de Administración de 
Tierras) was 6 PAB/ha.  Also some cooperatives offer titling assistance for its 
members at lower prices.  (Gallardo J pers.comm. 9.5.2005; Press release, 
Ministerio de Economía y Finanzas 24.1.2005; Rodriguez M pers.comm. 
26.5.2005.) 
 
In Herrera land prices range considerably from 0,10-250 PAB/m², depending on for 
instance location.  According to Panamanian law, male and female heirs receive 
equal treatment in land inheritance.  Land confiscation in Panama happens only in 
the case of debt arrears, and involves long legal procedures; no other types of 
confiscation are known of.  Land may be rented, on long term, seasonally or for 
shorter periods.  According to the census of 2000, in Herrera 3,5% of total farm 
area was acquired through rent (DEC 2001).  Rent may be determined by area or in 
case of pastures by the number of grazing animals.  The common rent of pastures is 
6 PAB/animal/month, and of agricultural land is 60 PAB/ha/year.  Rental 
agreements are generally considered trustworthy by both sides.  Fields can also be 
sharecropped (a medias) where the owner lets another farmer cultivate the land and 
the harvest is divided into shares, normally in half between the farmer and the 
owner.  The received shares are commonly affected by whether the farmer or the 
owner pays for the inputs.  (MIDA Ocú pers.comm. 10.2.2005; Moreno E 
pers.comm. 31.3.2005; Gallardo J pers.comm. 9.5.2005; Batista G pers.comm. 
26.1.2005.) 
 
In Herrera land use is not planned nor controlled by authorities, due to which 
industry and residences may be located side by side and houses may be built on 
land not suitable for human settlement (Rivera R pers.comm. 26.5.2005).  For 
Herreran lands there is no available statistic of land use shares.  What is known of 
the Herreran 234 100 hectares is that 4% is forest cover and 81,2% is private 
farming land.   
 
The land use shares on Herreran farms are depicted in table 3.4.  Different types of 
pasture together constitute 67,9% of all farmland, while crops occupy a mere 
15,9%.  Of the total farm area, 94,2% is farmed by farmer households, 5,5% by 
companies and only marginal shares by cooperatives, farmer organizations and the 
                                                 
11 For reference, the average studied farm of 10 hectares generates annual net incomes of 6 500-6 
900 PAB. 
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state.  The majority of the Herreran farms are small: over half of the farms are 
smaller than one hectare, and the smallest 52,1% of farms together own only 0,7% 
of the total farm area (annex 2).  Farm fragmentation into several parcels is not the 
rule; most of the farms consist of one parcel only (77,4%).  Absentee-owners are 
rare in Herrera, in 2000 only 1,5% of farms greater than 0,5ha were managed by 
other than the farmer him/herself.  24 % of farms in Herrera are female headed.  
The importance of farm production for the household’s home consumption 
increases with farm size; whereas only 2% of households with less than 0,5 
hectares of land depend completely on the farm for their subsistence, the share 
among farmers with one hectare of land or more is 43% and among farmers with at 
least 10 hectares is 53%.  (DEC 2001.) 
 
Table 3.4  Land use on the farms of Herrera.  
 Thousands of hectares 
in Herrera 
Percentage of farm area 
in Herrera 
National average 
Temporary crops 24,0 12,6 % 8,8 % 
Permanent crops 6,2 3,3 % 5,3 % 
Fallow 15,6 8,2 % 11,0 % 
Traditional pastures 85,5 45,0 % 36,0 % 
Improved pastures 15,2 8,0 % 8,8 % 
Natural pastures 28,4 14,9 % 10,6 % 
Forests and shrubs 10,7 5,6 % 15,0 % 
Other land uses 4,7 2,5 % 4,6 % 
Total 190,1 100 % 100 % 
Source:  DEC 2001. 
 
The basic staples of Herreran farmer households are rice, beans, corn and tubers.  
They can even be cultivated on remote hillsides and have low technical 
requirements.  The importance of rice as a home consumption crop is depicted by 
the fact that it contributes to 27,2% of people’s daily energy needs (WB 1999), and 
only 6,7% of all Herreran rice farmers sold any rice in 2000/2001.  Rice is 
commonly dehusked at small local mills, but there are still households dehusking 
rice at home manually in a pilón.  Rice is easily also bartered in local shops for 
other food items.  Corn is the most common crop on Herreran farms, found on 
33,8% of all farms and in addition to being consumed by household members and 
animals, it is also sold more often than rice.  Of Herreran corn growers, 39,4% had 
sold a total of 47,4% of the annual harvest.  Commercially other important crops 
include yam, sugarcane, pumpkin and melons.  Melon, watermelon and sugarcane 
are on large-scale cash crops and highly input intensive, due to which they are 
farmed mainly by the wealthiest farmers.  Permanent crops in Herrera include 
coffee and a great variety of fruit trees.  The sale of these products is marginal, with 
the exception of coconut, papaya and pineapple.  (DEC 2001.) 
 
Yields per hectare in Herrera are among the lowest of the country, and differences 
in yields between small and large farms are considerable.  For instance, while small 
rice farms produce on average 2 060 lbs/ha, large farms produce 7 510 lbs/ha (DEC 
2001).  Input prices have risen considerably in the past years, for instance the price 
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of a 100 lbs sack of urea went up 40% from 13,00 PAB to 20,00 PAB during the 
season 2004-2005 (Agrolucho, pers.comm. 16.5.2005).  Producer prices of 
agricultural crops have, however, raised only slightly in past years and there are 
products such as tubers, coffee and vegetables, which have experienced declining 
prices (DEC 2003a).  Technically most agricultural production in Herrera is simple 
and low-input.  Most farmers use native seeds from their own crops, only 7,6% of 
farmers had purchased certified seeds and 5,1% other commercial seeds in 
2000/2001.  In the same period irrigation systems were present on 5,5% of 
Herreran farms, and were used mainly for corn, watermelon, rice, melon and 
sugarcane.  The rarity of irrigation systems is explained largely by costs; for 
instance for 11 hectares of yam, a drip irrigation system would require a minimum 
investment of 11 400 PAB excluding the pump, or for one hectare of watermelon 
the investment in machinery alone costs 3 800 PAB (Riegos de Chiriquí 
pers.comm. 30.5.2005).  Fertilizers were used in 2000/2001 by more than half of 
rice and corn farmers, and every fourth farm used machinery for sowing.  The 
ownership of major machinery is minimal; of the 18 842 farms in the province only 
150 had tractors, 20 had harvesters, 38 milking machinery and 77 pasture cutters.  
Aspersion backpacks are the most common machinery, found on one in every six 
farms, and trapiches used to squeeze sugar syrup, found on 567 farms.  (DEC 
2001.) 
 
Livestock is more numerous than human population in Herrera; in 2003 there were 
146 700 heads of cattle, 28 600 pigs and 375 300 chicken.  Chicken can be found 
on two thirds of all farms, and they are a major source of protein for rural 
households.  Both chicken meat and eggs can be sold and bartered even in small 
scale, offering additional incomes especially to women.  Cows were present on 
roughly one in four farms, and they are mainly bred for commercial purposes and 
milk production.  Cows can be found on small and large farms, and milk 
production can be either very simple and small scale, or highly technological and 
large scale.  Pigs can be found on one in six Herreran farms, and they are mainly 
produced either on very small scale for household consumption, or in very large 
units.  Household pigs are commonly fed food leftovers and self produced tubers.  
Purchased pig feed is costly and its sole use would lead to unprofitable production.  
Small-scale pig producers sell their excess meat directly to neighbours or a local 
kiosk, and large-scale producers sell directly to the slaughterhouse.  Horses are 
mainly used for transportation and they have little if any resale value.  (DEC 
2003b.)  
 
The cattle market peaks in November and December, when the rainy season is 
ending and cattle is fat.  Farmers prepare for the coming dry months by selling off 
animals they cannot maintain or find it unprofitable to maintain by supplemented 
feeding.  Cattle can be sold at an auction, to the slaughterhouse or directly to a 
buyer (annex 3).  Generally farmers are aware of the value of their animals and the 
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variation in cattle prices throughout the year is small.  (Servicio de Carne de 
Panamá pers.comm. 8.6.2005; Peralta A pers.comm. 23.5.2005; Subasta Ganadera 
de Guararé pers.comm. 27.1.2005 and 2.6.2005; DEC 2003b.)   
 
Insufficient management of pastures in Herrera is commonly reflected in the health 
and growth of cattle.  Herreran soil itself is deficient in nutrients, and thus grows a 
deficient pasture, leading to animal malnourishment.  The protein content of the 
pastures is low, and they are seldom fertilized, rains wash the nutrients and some 
farmers graze excessive animal loads relative to the quality and quantity of their 
pastures.  It is common for farmers to neglect the need to supply the animals with 
mineral salts, vitamins, vaccines and anti-parasite medicine, and even those who do 
give insufficient dosages.  These all add up to reproductive problems, deter growth 
and reduce the incomes of the farmer.  The Herreran soils could be suitable for 
farming other animals than cow, but the consumption habits of people reflect the 
culture of preferring beef to other meats.  (Peralta A pers.comm. 23.5.2005; Rivera 
R pers.comm. 31.1.2005.) 
 
Milk can be sold to various milk processing companies in the area (e.g. Estrella 
Azúl, Nestlé, Prolacsa) or produced into traditional cheeses for an increased profit.  
The quality requirements for milk are, however, quite restrictive (annex 4), due to 
which the highest quality and value milk can only be produced with high 
technology milking machinery present at very few farms.  Most farms rely on hand 
milking, increasing the bacterial contents of the milk and leading thus to lowest 
prices.  Producers pay the transportation of milk from the farm to the processing 
company, although the buyer organizes the routes.  (Perez V & Perez R pers.comm. 
24.5.2005.) 
 
Agro-industry in Herrera is scarce.  The main actors are Nestlé producing tomato 
paste and milk derivatives, Santa Rosa refinery producing sugar and Hermanos 
Varela producing liquors.  Possibilities for exporting agricultural products from 
Herrera are numerous, but the requirements of international markets are very high.  
Their fulfilment not only increases production costs but also poses an 
unsurpassable obstacle for the small farmers.  During March of 2005, Panama was 
in the 8th round of negotiations with the USA over the bilateral Free Trade 
Agreement, concerning the trade of many crop and livestock products important for 
Panama, such as sugar, coffee, melons, pumpkin and yam.  The treaty is seen to 
clarify rules for both sides and protect against sudden changes in policies and 
taxation.  (Herazo A pers.comm. 26.5.2005; Mirones S pers.comm. 5.3.2005; 
Navarro G pers.comm. 5.3.2005; Perez V & Perez R pers.comm. 24.5.2005.) 
 
For farmers, the possibility of getting their products on the retail market depends 
on their access to transport and connections to other market actors.  Street vending 
is not common in Herrera, due to high prices charged for sales lots, poor 
transportation opportunities and intense competition from small supermarkets.  
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Most farmers are also unable to sell products to supermarkets in the district centres 
or in the capital province, because they have highly centralized supply channels.  
80-90% of Herreran supermarkets are run by families of Chinese descent, which 
have their own supply chains closed from the majority of farmers, and the bigger 
stores rely on national whole sales chains.  Some farmers with connections are able 
to sell their products to national markets in high quantities but low prices (e.g. 
cassava at 2 PAB/100 lbs), of which the high transportation costs are further 
deduced.  In remote areas of the province roads are in a bad state, due to which 
products cannot be transported to centres without major damage.  Although 
intermediary buyers touring the countryside are blamed for taking a lion’s share of 
the profit and paying the farmer too little, in many areas the intermediaries 
represent the only market route for farmers.  In many remote areas, no buyers 
arrive, and since it is extremely rare to own vehicles, these areas are virtually 
unconnected to the markets.  (Noriega C pers.comm. 13.5.2005; Kajifusa H 
pers.comm. 24.5.2005; Alvarado M pers.comm. 16.5.2005; Rivera R pers.comm. 
26.5.2005; Herazo A pers.comm. 26.5.2005.) 
 
The organizational setting giving technical assistance to farmers in Herrera is 
dominated by the government.  Agricultural production12 is promoted mainly by 
governmental agencies, namely the Agricultural Ministry (MIDA) giving training, 
the Agricultural Development Bank (BDA) offering financing, the Agricultural 
Research Institute (IDIAP) carrying out research, the Agricultural Marketing 
Institute (IMA) promoting market access to farmers and the Institute of 
Agricultural Insurance (ISA) offering crop and cattle insurances.  They have a 
strong emphasis in the technical aspects of agricultural productivity and in farmer 
health, and give less attention to farmer household economics, poverty or the 
environmental consequences of agricultural production.  The National 
Environmental Authority (ANAM), on the other hand, works for environmental 
protection in urban areas and in protected areas, but its jurisdiction does not include 
agricultural land use or its environmental consequences.  According to national 
statistics very few Panamanian farmers, however, receive technical assistance.  In 
2003, only 3,8% of non-indigenous rural farmer households received any technical 
assistance in the past 12 months (MEF 2006: 190). (De Gracia J pers.comm. 
23.5.2005; MIDA Ocú pers.comm. 10.2.2005; Carrasco LA pers.comm. 16.5.2005; 
Herazo A pers.comm. 26.5.2005.) 
 
There are 15 cooperatives in Herrera with a total of 4 336 members (=4% of 
population), of which 54,8% are male.  Most of the Herreran cooperatives are for 
savings and credit, and only two are for agricultural production.  Membership fees 
in cooperatives are on average 5 PAB/month, which is added to the member’s 
                                                 
12 This work used the English sense of the word ”agriculture” to cover both crop and livestock 
production.  This differs from the local use of the Spanish word agricultura, which in Panama only 
denotes crop production.  In Panama producción pecuaria denotes livestock production and 
producción agropecuaria includes both crop and livestock production. 
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account as a seed for obtaining a future loan.  Cooperatives could offer imported 
inputs and machinery to members at attractive prices because they are exempt from 
national taxes, apply for international aid and incentives, and for instance give 
inexpensive legal counselling for members for the titling of land.  Very few 
however do.  The whole sector has received mistrust from the people due to bad 
management and frauds in the area’s cooperatives.  (Quintero E pers.comm. 
26.5.2005; Rodriguez M pers.comm. 26.5.2005; Cooperativa de Servicios 
Multiples Unión Agrícola pers.comm. 9.2.2005.)  Other organizations in the area 
are few.  There are rural projects funded by international cooperation (including 
Japan, China, Denmark and Spain) and by Panamanian NGOs (e.g. Patronato de 
Nutrición and ADEMIP) and there are a few Peace Corps volunteers in Herrera.  
These projects often have an integral scope, targeting both poverty and 
environmental sustainability of farming, but they are less visible and work on a 
shorter term or/and a smaller extent than governmental agencies. (Kajifusa H 
pers.comm. 24.5.2005; MIDA Ocú pers.comm. 10.2.2005; Marciaga C 23.2.2005.) 
 
Lack of farmer participation in technical assistance and other organizations may for 
one part be due to their low supply, but another possible contributor may be the 
individualist spirit of much of Herreran farmers.  Many experts in the region view 
the local farmers as highly independent and inert to getting organized despite the 
available benefits of doing so.  There is a widespread lack of trust, as much towards 
governmental agencies and banks, as towards other farmers.  Partly this is assigned 
to a culture of pride in working alone without needing anyone’s help; partly it may 
be conservatism, which stems from failures in farmer associations in the 1970s and 
80s.  Local experts perceive unaffiliated farmers vulnerable to increasing 
international competition, but efforts for organization have been futile.  (Perez V & 
Perez R pers.comm. 24.5.2005; Peralta A pers.comm. 23.5.2005; Kajifusa H 
pers.comm. 24.5.2005; Herazo A pers.comm. 26.5.2005; Quintero E pers.comm. 
26.5.2005; Rodriguez M pers.comm. 26.5.2005; Solis JL pers.comm. 30.5.2005; 
MIDA Ocú pers.comm. 10.2.2005.) 
 
Of the environmental concerns related to farming in Herrera, erosion of agricultural 
soils is a major economic and environmental problem in the Herreran province.  
With the exception of fertilizer use and eventual rotation and fallow periods, soil 
improvements are virtually nonexistent.  Local researchers have observed on high 
resolutions maps a correlation between poverty of the farmers and the low quality 
of their soils (Gordon R, Gonzalez A & Quiroz E pers.comm. 31.5.2005).  While 
the poor are likely to a priori have the most inclined and remote lands, soil 
conservation’s unit prices are highest on inclined terrains and the poorest are most 
unlikely to have the resources to carry them out.  A vicious circle can be identified.  
Land improvements are also widely unknown to the farmers, and the economic 
incentives are low.  Terraces are not used in the province, farmers have not adopted 
leguminous plants, buffer strips around the fields are rare, stables are seen as too 
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demanding to manage, organic fertilizer use is uncommon and zero-till was a 
“fashion that passed”, according to a local expert.  An additional obstacle to soil 
conservation is that banks do not finance land improvements.  And although there 
is a strong cultural appreciation of cattle in Herrera, most interviewed local experts 
perceive cattle ranching in the region highly damaging to the environment.  When 
crop yields decline, land is sold for pasture, but the resulting tradition of free 
grazing is seen as “the worst production system there is”.  (Rivera R pers.comm. 
26.5.2005; Kajifusa H pers.comm. 24.5.2005; MIDA Ocú pers.comm. 10.2.2005; 
Solis T pers.comm. 31.1.2005; Barrios G pers.comm. 26.1.2005; Gordon R, 
Gonzalez, A & Quiroz E pers.comm. 31.5.2005.) 
 
Another major problem related to agricultural production in Herrera is the exposure 
of farmers and commonly also other rural dwellers to agrochemicals.  The vast 
majority of Herreran farmers spray insecticides, pesticides and fungicides with 
backpack sprayers, but the use of adequate protective garments is rare.  The 
agrochemicals are absorbed to the body not only through respiration, but also 
through all exposed tissues, causing numerous cases of poisoning, infertility, 
cancer and even deaths in Herrera each year.  Farmers that are aware of the 
problem externalise the health risks onto paid workers if they can afford it, but the 
problem remains unsolved.  Workers are lured by the higher daily wage related to 
spraying, but they do not purchase the complete set of protective gear (minimum 
100 PAB).  Agrochemicals eventually end up in food and contaminate also rivers, 
subterranean waters and the soils.  While there are stringent controls for exported 
crops, there is no agency controlling the level of agrochemicals in foodstuffs sold 
and consumed nationally.  (MINSALUD 2000; DEC 2004a; Agrolucho 
pers.comm. 16.5.2005; Cedeño C pers.comm. 5.3.2005; Moraís J pers.comm. 
17.5.2005; Gordon R, Gonzalez A & Quiroz E, pers.comm. 31.5.2005; MIDA Ocú 
pers.comm. 10.2.2005; Rivera R pers.comm. 26.5.2005; Guisado N pers.comm. 
31.1.2005.)   
 
Pasture and farm land burning is a common practice in Herrera.  It is viewed as a 
strategy to eliminate ticks and weeds without need of chemicals, and to improve 
seed development with the heat of the biomass.  Burning, however, has also malign 
consequences.  It destroys organic material and microorganisms, leads to soil 
compacting and carbon dioxide emissions.  Annually numerous fires escape to 
undesired areas destroying neighbours’ crops and even housing.  According to 
some views, most of the burning is unnecessary, but it is a common habit.  (DEC 
2004a; Rivera R pers.comm. 31.1.2005; Herazo A pers.comm. 26.5.2005.) 
 
A notable weakness in the Panamanian case is the fragmented roles of different 
actors to combat soil degradation or other environmental problems related to 
agriculture.  The MIDA is the ministry responsible for the development of the 
agricultural sector, and its emphasis is on the economic profitability of and 
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technical assistance to farming.  The role of their small environmental department 
is marginal, and environmental considerations are not crosscutting in MIDA’s 
work.  On the other hand the National Authority of the Environment (ANAM) is 
responsible for the “environment” but its jurisdiction does not include agricultural 
lands or farming practices.  While soil quality is included in the environmental law 
(Law 41), it relates only to waste disposal and the pollution caused by excessive 
quantities of agrochemical substances (ANAM 2001); and the latter is not in the 
jurisdiction of the ANAM.  In Herrera ANAM is mainly in charge of the small 
remaining forest area and other protected areas, and of tree cutting permissions.  
The IDIAP and other research agencies have strong environmental emphasis, but 
they have a weak presence in the practical implementation field.  (Rivera R 
pers.comm. 31.1.2005 and 26.5.2005.) 
 
3.1.3 Infrastructure and markets in Herrera 
 
Health care in Herrera is managed by both public and private health care facilities.  
The Ministry of Health (MINSALUD) operates two hospitals, 15 health care 
centres and 15 medical sub-centres among the different districts and offers also 
dental care.  The services are priced at 1 PAB/medical and 5 PAB/dental visit to 
allow even the poor to attend.  In addition the ministry carries out control of 
disease-spreading vectors through province-wide fumigation, inspects food-
handling installations, and supplies latrines and water ducts to disadvantaged areas.  
Work has been particularly successful in the vaccination of newborns and in the 
eradication of the most dangerous vectors, while the problem of limited access to 
health services by people living in remote areas remains.  To combat the associated 
risks to health and hygiene, the Ministry of Housing (MIVI) has subsidy 
programmes to improve the currently inadequate housing conditions.  Many 
Herreran households live in houses made of wattle, daub, soil and zinc, with palm 
rib roofs and un-covered floors, and even with no latrine or toilet.  Unsurprisingly, 
housing subsidies reach few, and are largely out of reach of rural households.  
(Moraís J pers.comm. 17.5.2005; DEC 2002; MINSALUD pers.comm. 10.6.2005; 
de Rodriguez M pers.comm. 9.5.2005.) 
 
Also education is offered in both public and private facilities in Herrera, ranging 
from pre-schools to universities.  Education is obligatory from the age of five to the 
completion of the ninth grade.  Schools follow national state curricula, and the 
educational system is financed by both a separate educational tax levied on every 
working Panamanian and by the government allocating a share of the national GDP 
(6% in 2005) to education.  In 2000 Herrera had 182 primary education schools 
with a wide geographical coverage enabling attendance even in remote areas, 
contrary to the situation of secondary education.  There are merely 16 secondary 
education schools in the province offering high school diplomas and professional 
degrees, and three regional university centres.  (DEC 2004a; DEC 2002.) 
  
53 
 
Pupils of all ages pay 15 PAB/year for inscription fees, although there is a law 
prohibiting the expulsion of students on the grounds of not having paid.  Other 
materials costs are carried by the student alone, impeding the poorest children from 
attending school.  These include uniforms, books, other materials and 
transportation to school.  There are various scholarship programmes for high-
achieving low-income pupils.  There are four boarding schools in the province for 
children from remote locations, but their monthly fees are not within the reach of 
every family.  (Miguelena de León pers.comm. 9.5.2005.) 
 
According to the census of 2000, 94,3% of Herreran households had access to 
potable water (DEC 2002).  There are two main water provision systems in 
Herrera: the IDAAN (Institute of national aqueducts and sewer system) and 
communal rural aqueducts.  IDAAN has aqueducts in every district, and covers 
most of the province’s households, but their services do not reach far beyond the 
centres.  Therefore there are approximately 280 rural aqueducts in the province, run 
independently by locally elected boards.  Whereas the water provided by IDAAN is 
priced according to consumption and can be quite costly, the communal rural 
aqueducts have a fixed price of 0,50 PAB/month to cover the expenses of chlorine 
and electricity.  The initial investments of communal rural aqueducts are financed 
by the FIS (Social Investment Fund) and installed by the Ministry of Health, since 
potable water is seen as the single most efficient tool for eliminating diarrhoea and 
poisonings and promoting public health and hygiene.  (Perez M pers.comm. 
25.5.2005; Moraís J pers.comm. 17.5.2005; Moreno L pers.comm. 30.5.2005.) 
 
Of Herreran households 18,6% had no electricity in 2000, again with great 
inequality of the Las Minas district being most affected (70% of homes without 
electricity), and Chitré least affected (1,5%) (DEC 2002).  Since the census, there 
has been progress and for instance Chepo, one of the largest municipalities of Las 
Minas, received electricity in 2001.  Electricity in the province is supplied by the 
half-private half-public EDEMET-EDECHI of the Union Fenosa, and investments 
to the electricity infrastructure are made by the FIS.   (DEC 2002; Garcia I 
pers.comm. 16.5.2005.) 
 
Telephone was the least common communications appliance in Herreran 
households in 2000; whereas 76,5% of households had a television and 85,8% had 
a radio, only 35,1% of households had a telephone line (DEC 2002).  This can have 
changed in recent years due to the rapid increase in relatively inexpensive mobile 
telephone connections.  The fixed telephone network is operated by the privately 
owned Cable&Wireless Panama, which together with the monopoly has been given 
a social mission by law to maintain public telephones even in zones of difficult 
access and low profitability.  Therefore there is an extensive network of public 
telephones in even remote areas.  (Delgado D & Gonzalez D pers.comm. 9.5.2005.)  
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In areas of difficult access and limited or no telephone coverage, people 
communicate through the radio station Radio Reforma (Olarte J pers.comm.  
26.1.2005).  There is no public mail delivery service in the country.  Post offices 
offer post boxes and poste restante services, but only in some district centres.  
Money transfers take most commonly place by public transportation routes.  The 
buses charge a commission of 1-1,50 PAB per money transfer depending on the 
distance, paid by the sender.  Also parcels of goods can be sent at the same price.  
   
In Herrera there were 1 656 km of roads in 2000, of which 971 km had no coating.  
Improving the roads has been among the priorities of all districts in recent years 
and progress has taken place, though outside the centres roads are still bad 
especially in the rainy season.  The number of cars in Herrera was 8 476 in 2003, 
amounting to one vehicle per 12 Herrerans, due to which public transportation is of 
great importance.  (DEC 2002; DEC 2004a; Solis JL pers.comm. 30.5.2005; 
Moreno L pers.comm. 30.5.2005.)   
 
Herrera’s inadequate infrastructure for both solid waste and wastewater 
management causes risks to both human health and the environment at large.  
There is a sewage system only in certain parts of the centres of Chitré and Pesé, but 
the province’s only oxidation lagoon built in 1968 has insufficient capacity and it 
overflows several times a year.  Wastewater runs in open sewages between houses 
and alongside roads, exposing especially children to direct contact.  The rivers 
around Chitré are severely polluted and have caused the beaches to become 
unusable for recreation.  Households living outside the public sewage may have 
septic tanks, but few do.  Those who have made the required 1000 PAB investment 
seldom care of their septic tanks causing local spill over problems.  The main toilet 
type in the countryside is a latrine.  There is solid waste collection only in certain 
areas of the district centres, elsewhere trash is either dug underground or burned 
causing respiratory problems.  The main dumpsite in Llano Bonito, district of 
Chitré, is located on the banks of a mangrove swamp next to a river.  The 
uncontrolled fires, smells and mosquitoes threaten the inhabitants of the several 
settlements located right at the dump’s edges and the river is polluted.  There are 
also other less official dumpsites in the province, based on little or no planning.  
The important La Villa River has been polluted due to illegal waste dumping 
especially in the city.  (Moraís J pers.comm. 17.5.2005; De Gracia O pers.comm. 
16.5.2005; Rivera R pers.comm. 26.5.2005.)  
 
Households in rural areas buy most of their daily needs in small local kiosks, found 
in every village of the province.  Kiosks are run by local families and generate 
relatively low profits.  Many of the interviewed microentrepreneurs were incapable 
of estimating their profit margin.  In district centres there are supermarkets with a 
larger variety of goods, where also people from distant areas come to shop when 
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they monthly arrive to pay their electricity and/or telephone bills.  Kiosks accept 
bartering and allow some households credit.   
 
The availability of agricultural employment opportunities varies within the 
province of Herrera and depending on the season.  Permanent jobs are rare in 
agriculture, and limited mostly to milking, guards and administrative jobs.  Wage 
working on a daily wage is common, wages ranging from 2 to 13 PAB/day.  The 
median wage is 5 PAB/day, received by 47,7% of all interviewed wage-earning 
households (n=155).  Wages vary by area, reflecting differences in the availability 
of work and in the supply of workers, and by required skills.  The median 
availability of work faced by the farmers of this research was 3 days/week.  While 
24,5% found wage work for 5 days or more, nearly a half (49,7%) found work only 
for an average of 2,5 days per week13.  Thus one worker may earn an average of 
annual 780 PAB (=5 PAB/day*3 days/week*52 weeks), enough only to maintain 
merely 1,5 people above the national extreme poverty line (519 PAB); not even to 
consider a family.  The seasonal variations of job availability are, however, 
dramatic and may lead in practice to much lower annual incomes.  Farmers unable 
to pay each other wage operate a workday exchange system called peón por peón.  
The normal exchange rate is one day’s work for one day’s work, but special high 
skill workers such as carpenters can gain two farmer workdays in exchange for one 
day of specialized work.  The exchange system may involve a complex web of 
“debts” and “gains” but the farmers seem unconfused.  Some farmers migrate 
seasonally to work in different provinces.  The daily payment may or may not be 
higher than in Herrera, adding up to 180-270 PAB/month, but work is available for 
every day of the week for the migrant period (e.g. 3 months).  Although travel costs 
and food deductions may take a considerable share of the wage, migrant working 
can offer a means to pay for major costs such as children’s education.  Although 
women participate in the household’s own farm works, very few women work as 
daily workers on other farms.  Women’s daily wage works include cooking and 
cleaning, but very few such opportunities exist in Herrera.   
 
Non-farm work in Herrera is available mainly in the centres, in manual jobs and 
services.  Entrepreneurship is common, especially in transportation, retail, and 
repair.  There are kiosks, shops, hairdressers, car mechanics and such in all district 
centres and often also in smaller settlements.  According to local authorities, in 
2001 there were 2 446 registered enterprises in Herrera (Gonzalez A & Diaz C 
pers.comm. 9.5.2005).  Despite these opportunities, unemployment and 
underemployment are common in Herrera.  It is quite common for youth to migrate 
to Chitré or Panama City and to send their small children back to the countryside 
for the grandparents to rear.  There are also few job opportunities in Herrera for 
people with a high degree of education.  On the one hand this diminishes the 
                                                 
13 Caution with interpretation:  this includes only farmers who have worked for wage, and for some 
part reflects preferences of working off their own farm.   
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incentives to study, but on the other hand professionals migrate to the capital and 
send a share of their incomes back to the countryside.  (Solis JL pers.comm. 
30.5.2005.) 
 
The banking sector is of great importance for the Panamanian economy.  There are 
two state banks, the National Bank (Banco Nacional de Panama, BNP) and the 
Agricultural Development Bank (Banco de Desarrollo Agropecuario, BDA), and a 
great number of private banks and finance companies (annex 5).  Also many 
cooperatives work as savings and loan granting institutions.  All banks require a 
potential debtor to demonstrate payback capacity with a declaration of regularity 
incomes, capital for collateral, and a favourable reference from the national 
authority regulating all loans.  Not any capital can be accepted for collateral; land 
must be titled and both houses and land must be located in central areas.  For 
agricultural credits, insurance from the national institute of crop and cattle 
insurance ISA is officially required, though few farmers in practice have it (in 2004 
in Herrera 184 farms were insured with ISA).  In past years arrears have been high 
and farm confiscations have been common.  Nowadays most banks have very 
detailed selection processes to ensure the payback capacity of the potential debtors 
(Nieves J pers.comm. 26.5.2005).  The commercial banks mainly manage large 
loans and have lower interest rates, while the small debtors are commonly clients of 
cooperatives and face higher interest rates.  The state subsidizes 3,5% of interest on 
agriculture and cattle husbandry loans and house loans have preferential rates.  The 
purpose is to boost investments by giving people access to lower interest rates.  
According to the living standard measurements study in 1997 (WB 1999), only 
4,4% of Panamanian rural farmers have loans.  Many interviewed Herreran farmers 
expressed a dislike for debts.  They appreciate being independent, “not owing 
anyone anything”, and they know of bad experiences of others.  Farm confiscation 
would be the doom for many households, and farmers feel they cannot generate 
sufficient profit to pay back the interests, which they deem high despite subsidies.  
In spite of governmental control to curtail excessively high interest rates, many 
furniture and electronics shops sell for credit with monthly payments and monthly 
interests, notarial expenses and the like, often leading to doubling the initial price 
of the purchase.  (Noriega C pers.comm. 13.5.2005.)   
 
 
3.2 Farmer interviews 
 
To test the Reardon and Vosti theory (1995) and answer the research questions, 
new empirical data was collected.  The analyses of this research are based on the 
402 structured farmer interviews conducted between January and May 2005 in the 
province of Herrera, Panama.  The collection methods of these interviews will be 
described in more detail in this section.  In addition many other types of empirical 
data were collected at the research site:  local food prices, price research at cattle 
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auctions and market places for agricultural products, loan market information, 
personal interviews with local companies, organizations, governmental and local 
authorities, and so on (for a complete list of personal interviews see chapter 9).  
The collection and results of the food price research are described in chapter 4.  
The other types of data were to serve as background information, and were carried 
out with questions elaborated particularly for each interview without sampling the 
respondents.  Much of this background information has already been presented in 
the previous section 3.1. 
 
3.2.1 Design of the farmer household questionnaire 
 
Since farmer households themselves were seen as the experts on their life, 
livelihoods and farming practices, personal farmer interviews were perceived as the 
best method to collect information on the farmer household economy.  Mail 
surveys were not a feasible option in Panama, because there is no public mail 
service, literacy is not universal, and the farmers may be unfamiliar with filling out 
forms.  Because the aim was to collect detailed information on farming practices 
and household economy that was to be analysed with statistical methods, structured 
interviews based on detailed questionnaires were considered the most appropriate 
tool for data collection.  Interviews were thus to be carried out by field researchers 
personally with each farmer household and the results recorded on the 
questionnaires by the interviewers.   
 
In questionnaire construction it was considered important to receive meaningful 
answers of direct relevance to the farmer household.  Thus care was taken to 
include only questions that the respondents may be competent to answer and to use 
wording familiar to the respondents.  Taking into account that good behaviour is 
often exaggerated and deviant behaviour underreported, questions regarding 
normative or value-laden dimensions and future dimensions were avoided.  And, 
acknowledging the effect question ordering has on answers and on the entire 
interview process, easy and non-threatening questions were to be placed first.  
Questions were to progress in logical order and such that prior answers would 
facilitate latter phases of the interview, enabling the interviewer to probe in suitable 
situations.  (Babbie 2001; Bailey 1994; Neuman 1997.)   
 
The questionnaire for this research was constructed in three phases.  First, the 
researcher formulated questions into an early questionnaire draft.  At this stage, 
decisions on question items, order and interview length were made.  In the second 
phase, the early draft was revised with questionnaire experts of the Panamanian 
Bureau of Statistics and Censuses of the provinces of Herrera and Los Santos.  At 
this stage the questionnaire was refined with local information on farming 
conditions, local characteristics and local terminology and words.  In the third 
phase, the questionnaire was pre-tested with one farmer of crops and livestock from 
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the Pesé district.  At this stage final corrections to the questionnaire were made by 
changing wording and adding answer categories, where necessary14. 
 
The final questionnaire was 4 pages long (legal size paper, 356mm x 216mm) and 
comprised of 57 items, many of which included several items or dimensions.  It 
had the following main sections:  Land possessions and uses, crop production, crop 
inputs and investments, livestock production, livestock inputs and investments, 
other property, affiliations, credits and loans, household investments, household 
economy (incomes and expenditures), farming characteristics and general 
information of the farmer household.  The original Spanish versions of the 
questionnaire and the English translations are in annex 6.  The early questions of 
land and land uses facilitated subsequent questions on farming.  Sensitive questions 
about incomes and consumption were towards the end of the questionnaire, when 
the respondent had become familiar with the context of the study.  Since a person’s 
concentration declines with time, questions requiring more pondering, such as 
input use, were in the beginning, while the “easy” questions of family composition 
were as last.  The questionnaire did not include any information of the respondent’s 
name, identification or exact location of the farm, in order to guarantee anonymity 
and hence confidentiality in the respondents.  Farmers’ explanations of answers and 
commentaries within and outside the questions were recorded on the margins of the 
questionnaire.   
 
The questionnaire was modified once during the interview period.  The aim was to 
add some categories of suggested inputs or investments due to them being very 
often mentioned by respondents and to remove some irrelevant items, without 
threatening the comparability of the results collected with the different 
questionnaire versions.  The changes are described in annex 6.  Ultimately 62,7 % 
of the interviews were carried out with the first version of the questionnaire and 
37,3 % were interviewed with the second or modified version.  While the minor 
changes of “default” answer fields were not expected to have changed the answers, 
the added or completely removed items between the first and second version will 
not be analysed due to uneven representation.   
 
3.2.2 Sampling, data collection and processing 
 
Although the ideal sample for statistical research is the random sample for its well-
known benefits (e.g. Bailey 1994: 89-97; Babbie 2001), social research is often 
conducted in situations that do not permit probability sampling.  A notable 
challenge is obtaining the required exhaustive sampling frame or list of elements in 
a population, in the absence of which non-probability sampling is needed.  While 
non-probability sampling is much less complicated and less expensive than random 
sampling, the disadvantage is that since the probability of a person being selected is 
                                                 
14 e.g. separation of male and female calves due to their different values 
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not know, the researcher generally cannot claim that the sample is representative of 
the larger population.  In Herrera it was impossible to obtain an exhaustive list of 
farmers or landholders, despite several written and spoken attempts with the 
statistical and census bureau of the comptroller’s office, which would have been 
the only potential instance to possess such a list.  Random sampling was thus not 
possible to carry out.  And since this research aims at studying the relationships 
related to poverty rather than the absolute extent of poverty, a perfectly 
representative random sample was not considered essential.   
 
It was postulated that there are major differences in the poverty phenomenon 
between the different areas of the province, due to different living and farming 
conditions and hence different opportunities.  It was thought that the best way to 
cover all different welfare or poverty groups of farmer households was to cover 
each geographical area of the province in a representative manner.  For such an 
emphasis, the most suitable non-probability sampling method is quota sampling, 
which is the non-probability sampling equivalent to stratified sampling since it also 
addresses the issue of representativeness.  The first requirement is to know of the 
proportions of each group or stratum in the population, and the second is to ensure 
that each stratum is represented in the sample in the same proportion as in the 
entire population.  (Bailey 1994: 89-97; Babbie 2001.)  Regional differences in the 
distribution of population characteristics in developing countries have been deemed 
important also in previous works, due to which explicit strata based on 
administrative regions and urban and rural areas within these administrative regions 
as basis of sampling have been advised for (UN 2005: 13).   
 
The research aimed at a sample of 400 farmer households, distributed evenly 
among the province of Herrera.  There is no rule on how large a sample is 
sufficient or “correct” for any given research (Bailey 1994: 97-103) and the 
quantity of 400 interviews was considered realistic given the limits of available 
time and budget.  The purpose was that farmers of each municipality and district 
are proportionately represented in the final sample.  Quotas were based on the 
number of agricultural farms in the province of Herrera according to the census of 
2001, specified by the distribution of the farms among districts and municipalities15 
(table 3.5).  In 2001 there were 9 824 farms of one hectare or larger in the province 
of Herrera, and given the aimed sample size, 400 farmer households, the ratio for 
sampling was 1 interview per 24,56 farms.  This ratio, relative to the number of 
farms in each municipality and district, resulted in the final aimed sample depicted 
in table 3.5.    
                                                 
15 Division of districts and municipalities are official political divisions as valid during the sampling 
moment in September 2004.  After the election of the new president and government in 
October/November 2004 these boundaries were slightly changed, some larger municipalities were 
divided and thus the number of municipalities increased.  However the only available basis of 
sampling were the latest agricultural and land use censuses, which were based on the old political 
division, and which were thus used also for this research. 
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Table 3.5  Planned and actual sample by districts and municipalities in the Herrera province.   
District Municipality Farms ≥ 1,00 
ha in year 
2000 * (x) 
Planned 
sample ** 
(x/24,56) 
Planned 
total sample 
in district 
Actual 
final 
sample 
District total 440 17,91 18 18 
Chitré (district capital) 83 3,38  3 
La Arena 170 6,92  7 
Monagrillo 115 4,68  5 
Llano Bonito 15 0,61  1 
Chitré 
San Juan Bautista 57 2,32  2 
District total 1 633 66,49 67 68 
Las Minas (district capital) 312 12,70  13 
Chepo 317 12,91  14 
Chumical 137 5,58  6 
El Toro 169 6,88  7 
Leones 258 10,50  10 
Las Minas 
Quebrada del Rosario 440 17,92  18 
District total 1 719 69,99 70 70 
Los Pozos (district capital) 420 17,10  17 
Capurí 103 4,19  4 
El Calabacito 159 6,47  7 
El Cedro 122 4,97  4 
La Arena 117 4,76  6 
La Pitalosa 354 14,41  13 
Los Cerritos 212 8,63  9 
Los Pozos 
Los Cerros de Paja 232 9,45  10 
District total 2 743 111,69 111 111 
Ocú (district capital) 995 40,51  41 
Cerro Largo 429 17,47  18 
Los Llanos 511 20,81  21 
Llano Grande 254 10,34  10 
Peñas Chatas 369 15,02  15 
Ocú 
El Tijera 176 7,17  6 
District total 958 39,00 39 39 
Parita (district capital) 269 10,95  11 
Cabuya 165 6,72  8 
Los Castillos 94 3,83  3 
Llano de la Cruz 69 2,81  3 
París 99 4,03  4 
Portobelillo 148 6,03  7 
Parita 
Potuga 114 4,64  3 
District total 1 630 66,37 66 67 
Pesé (district capital) 74 3,01  3 
Las Cabras 268 10,91  13 
El Pájaro 188 7,65  8 
El Barrero 164 6,68  6 
El Pedregoso 202 8,22  8 
El Ciruelo 182 7,41  7 
Sabanagrande 309 12,58  12 
Pesé 
Rincón Hondo 243 9,89  10 
District total 710 28,91 29 29 
Santa María (district capital) 92 3,75  3 
Chupampa 154 6,27  6 
El Rincón 202 8,22  8 
El Limón 187 7,61  8 
Santa Maria 
Los Canelos 75 3,05  4 
TOTAL  9 824 400 400 402 
*) Figures from the Panamanian agricultural census of April 2001, Volume 1, Table 6.  (DEC 2001)   
**) The total number of farms (≥1,00 ha) in the province (9 824) was divided by the aimed sample (400) to 
obtain the ratio:  1 interview for every 24,56 farms.   
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In the field, sampling was carried out with the list of aimed sample sizes for each 
municipality, and with a detailed provincial map on scale 1: 95,000, printed on 
scale 1:8016.  It was decided to divide each municipal sample among as many 
smaller villages as possible, to further improve the representativeness of the 
sample.  The final sample’s coverage of the province’s municipalities and villages 
is depicted in table 3.6 and details of each village are in annex 7.  Interviews were 
limited to areas reachable by a 4-wheel drive car in the dry season, excluding thus 
the areas of the province where cars cannot enter.  It is not known how large a 
percentage of Herreran farms are located in these areas of limited access, due to 
which the selectivity bias due this limitation has caused cannot be assessed.  In 
Panama, 3% of the total population reside in remote areas of difficult access, and 
the poverty rate in remote areas is higher than in the rest of the country (WB 1999).  
To be eligible in the sample, the farmer household must possess at least one hectare 
of land in Herrera, considered a suitable limit for assessing that a farm can be a 
meaningfully contribute to the subsistence of the household.  Both female and male 
family members were eligible as respondents, given they had knowledge of the 
household’s farm.   
 
If a farmer household lived on and farmed one parcel of land, the farm was 
assigned to the sample of that municipality and village.  Many farmer households, 
however, had several parcels of farmland, often in different municipalities.  In 
these cases, the farm was assigned to the sample of the municipality where the 
farmer household had their house.  And in case a farmer household had parcels for 
agricultural production, and a house elsewhere with no accompanying farming, 
such as an urban dwelling, the farmer was assigned to the sample where most of 
the farmland was located.  All different parcels possessed by one farmer household 
constitute one farm, regardless of the parcels’ location, title or size.  The farmer 
household was defined to constitute all people living from the same resources, 
including for instance dependent students residing elsewhere.   
 
Table 3.6  Summary of the sample’s coverage of the Herrera province. 
District Number of municipalities, all 
represented in sample 
Number of villages where 
interviews were carried out 
Number of interviews 
1  Chitré 5 10 18 
2  Las Minas 6 28 68 
3  Los Pozos 8 33 70 
4  Ocú 6 53 111 
5  Parita 7 18 39 
6  Pesé 8 35 67 
7  Santa Maria 5 16 29 
TOTAL 45 193 402 
 
Farmer interviews were carried out between 1.2.2005 and 25.4.2005 in the Herrera 
province of Panama.  There were two interviewers, M.Sc. Anni Könönen (from 
                                                 
16 Obtained from the Bureau of Statistics and Censuses of the Comptroller’s Office in Los Santos.   
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18.10.2006 Penttinen) and B.A. Clarissa Villarreal, both experienced in farmer 
interviews in developing countries.  Interviews took place mainly from Monday to 
Friday, between 7:00 am and 3:30 pm.  Interviewers arrived to previously selected 
villages by car, and sought eligible farmer households mainly at their homes.  To 
minimize selection bias, interviewers did not only stop at village centres, but also 
along the roads stopping at dispersed houses or at farmers walking to/from the 
fields, and entering on paths outside the main roads.  The interviewers carried 
project identification and after greeting the people, introduced the project as a study 
of farming practices and livelihoods in the province.  The households were also 
informed that this was a study of a Finnish university, easing out the prejudice felt 
towards local governmental agencies.  No mention of a particular poverty study 
was made, in order not to direct the answers towards an exaggeration on the 
poverty-dimension.  The households were encouraged to participate by stating that 
the interview would not record people’s names or other identification to guarantee 
anonymity and confidentiality.  Care was taken not to raise unjustified expectations 
of gains from participation, such as economic gain.   
 
Participation resistance was minimal, nearly every eligible household agreed on 
being interviewed.  The main reasons for a household not participating in the 
interviews were having less than a hectare of land, or none, and that the person 
present at the house was not aware of the farm production’s details and did not 
consider her/himself capable of answering the questions.  Participation was still 
completely voluntary and if in a rare case a household seemed unwilling to 
participate the interviewer could easily walk along.  Numerical data on 
participation refusal was not collected because in the search for respondents it 
became impossible to distinguish whether an encountered person genuinely 
refused, was not eligible, asked for a later visit or did not participate in the 
interview at the given moment of time for some other reason.  The overall 
atmosphere was very welcoming and the people seemed familiar with structured 
face-to-face interviews due to the different censuses carried out annually in the 
province.   
 
The interviews were carried out face-to-face, as is done in the majority of similar 
studies in developing countries (UN 2005: 177).  The interview language was 
Spanish, the respondents’ mother tongue, and no interpreters were used.  
Interviews lasted from 25 to 60 minutes, depending on the farmer’s variety of 
activities, and on her/his disposition to conversation.  Presence of other people 
during the interview was not controlled for, which may have biased the answers.  It 
was, however, seen preferable to maintain as “natural” a situation as possible, and 
set out no rules for the interview setting.  Men and women were both as keen on 
participating, and in some cases both spouses participated in the interview.  
Uniformity of the two different interviewers’ work was sought by constant training, 
revision and discussion about the interviews.  The questionnaire also included 
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proposed probes or explanations, such that there would be minimal difference 
between the interviewers’ wording.  (UN 2005: 180.) 
 
The farmer household data collected with the questionnaires was inserted into and 
analysed with the statistical software SPSS version 12.0.1.  This required assigning 
codes and classes for the non-numerical data, calculation of percentage values of, 
for instance, titled share of all land, and also the conversion of the numerical data 
given in a variety of local measures into common measures, such as local crop 
volume measures into the pound (lb).  The expenses or incomes that were reported 
in weekly, monthly or other periods were multiplied into annual values, and some 
aggregated variables were formed from the questionnaire information, such as the 
number of household members contributing toward the household’s cash incomes.  
The aim was to feed all data as un-processed and un-aggregated as possible in the 
initial insertion, to allow more possibilities for analysis. 
 
The conversion of local weights and volumes merit a detailed description, since 
harvest sizes, sales and consumed quantities of crops are a central part of many 
calculi in this research.  Due to lack of weighting devices in rural Herrera, farmers 
use a great variety of local measures, which are not based on westernised pound, 
kilogram or volume standards.  Conversion tables were thus needed to convert 
farmers’ responses into unified measures.  No official or published conversion 
tables for Panamanian agricultural weights and measures were however found, and 
it was necessary to construct conversion tables for the purposes of this study out of 
the data itself.  During the interviews farmers were asked to convert the measures 
they used in their answers, because it was known from conversations with the staff 
of the Bureau of Statistics and Censuses that there are no uniform standards of 
conversion.  Conversion factors presented in table 3.7 are thus rather 
approximations than absolute truths, because there were many versions of every 
measure and its convertibility into others.  The table thus depicts the most 
commonly reached results of the conversion chains, which in local logic proceed 
for instance in this way: 
 
“One anega of rice consists of twelve almuds, and each almud consists of ten 
manotadas.” 
 
But since the manotada, handful, varies according to the size of a person’s hand, 
the end quantity, e.g. anega, is also variable.  If the volume measures are based on 
using containers for measuring, as are the cubo, tambucho and saco, the actual 
quantity varies according to how large every farmer’s containers are.  Some 
measures are also applied differently to different crops, due to which their 
conversion was even more troublesome.  The main complication of these measures 
is that the local system is based on the volume rather than the weight of the crop, 
whereas precisely a conversion to weights was needed for the analyses.  Whether or 
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not the rice is dehusked or not affects its volume and weight by up to 27%, as does 
the weight and volume of corn depending on whether the kernels have or have not 
been separated.  It was possible for a farmer to mix these units, for instance, to 
convert such that “One anega (equivalent to approximately 600 lbs) yields 18 latas 
(approx. 450 lbs) of rice” where clearly the first measure refers to the gross 
quantity, with husks, and the second refers to the net quantity, after dehusking.   
 
Table 3.7  Conversion table for local measures. 
Local measure Type Common approximation of 
its equivalence  
Observation 
1 acarreo / carrao /cartaje Volume 35 sacos ≈ 3 500 lbs  
1 almud Volume 50 lbs  
1 anega  Volume 600 lbs (with husks, if rice) = 500 lbs of dehusked rice 
1 caja / 1 cajón Volume  Entirely variable 
1 cubo / cubado Volume 25 lbs  
1 lata Volume 25 lbs  
1 manotada Volume 5 lbs  Depends on size of hand, mano 
1 motela Volume 35 lbs  
1 palo, mata, planta Quantity 10 lbs Weight depends on plant, palo 
1 quintal Weight 100 lbs Exact measure 
1 saco Volume 100 lbs Depends on size of sack, saco and 
product, may also be e.g. 50 or 75 lbs 
1 tambucho Volume 25 lbs Depends on size of tambucho 
1 tonelada Weight 1 000 lbs Exact measure for sugarcane 
For liquids:    
1 botella Volume 0,757 litres  
1 galón Volume 3,7854 litres = The US Gallon 
1 tanque Volume 250-275 lbs or 208,2 litres Depends on the size of the tank 
 
Some farmers measure their tuber production in the number of plants, especially if 
the production is on small scale.  They knew how many tubers, such as cassava, 
they would extract on average from one plant, but not their size or weight.  
Ultimately a conversion factor was estimated also for the plant measure, to yield 10 
lbs of the corresponding tuber, but its accuracy cannot be assessed.  And fruit is 
often sold by the hundred, although it is unclear if this hundred is estimated by 
sight or actually counted.  It is not a case that the Herreran people would be 
unaware of the western system of measures and weights, on the contrary.  Food in 
shops is commonly sold by the pound, libra, as are agricultural inputs, such as 
fertilizers sold by the quintal (100 lbs).  In practical conditions, however, people 
have no scales to weight their products, and the volume quantities, such as sacks, 
are easy to visually observe and count.   
 
This great complexity of conversion measures causes complications not only to 
research but also partly to local trade (Yiridoe 2005).  It is possible that this 
research has not been able to correctly estimate the true weight of each farmer’s 
crop harvest due to this confusion of conversion measures.  It is possible that 
farmers have given the unprocessed measures of some, and the dehusked, kernelled 
or processed measures of other crops, even though care was taken in the interviews 
to separate the two.  But it is also possible that local farmers trade their products at 
“incorrect” conversion rates, giving too much product for too small price, or the 
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contrary.  It is also difficult for the farmers to compare retail prices of crops at their 
local shop, which are in western measures, to their own products, which are not in 
western measures, since few farmers had any idea how to convert their local 
measures directly into western quantities.  In a purely subsistence economy this 
matter would have little importance, but in Herrera all farmers are tied to the 
markets and still have no means to verify the real weight of their crops or thus the 
unit prices.   
 
Insertion of the data into SPSS also required the valuation of household production 
into monetary units, in order to allow subsequent analysis on the economic 
contribution of agricultural production.  Crops and livestock products of 
households were valued at two prices:   
a) Sales prices.  The sales value was given to sold crops and livestock 
products according to the farmers’ own sales price declaration. 
b) Retail prices.  The retail unit price, or price at the local shop, was given to 
those crops and livestock products consumed by the household.  The retail 
price is the true quantity of money that the household is able to save, when 
it obtains the product from its own farm instead of having to purchase it 
from the shop.   
The overall value of agricultural production is the sum of the sales value and the 
home consumption value (a+b).  The decision to value household consumption at 
retail prices gives a different value for one same product depending on whether it is 
consumed by the household or sold at the market.  For instance, one quintal of corn 
(100 lbs) can be worth 9 PAB if sold at the market (sales price), but worth 25 PAB 
if consumed by the household itself (retail price at local shop).  This can be 
considered a bias in favour of household consumption, but it is believed that this is 
one actual justification of the rationality of household production for home 
consumption.  Having produced for instance a sack of rice and having many 
mouths to feed, it is more rational for a household to keep the rice and consume it 
rather than to sell it.  Crops and livestock products yield a higher value to the 
household if consumed than if sold.  Some households were not able to estimate the 
quantity of a certain item’s household consumption, but stated that it satisfied their 
annual needs, for instance, in milk, eggs or chicken meat.  In these cases the annual 
consumption quantity per person was taken from the average Panamanian 
nutritional pattern as depicted in table 5.1 (chapter 5) (WB 1999) and multiplied by 
the number of household members.  Although this may be an over- or under-
estimate of reality, it is the only uniform way to approach this type of lack of data.   
 
 
3.3 Sample description  
 
Although this study does not aim at generalizing the sample’s findings about the 
commonness of found phenomena to the total population, a comparison between 
the sample of this study and the total Herreran farmer household population may 
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reveal sampling biases or other particularities which must be known when the 
results are later discussed.  It must be taken into account that the Panamanian 
Agricultural Census of 2001 (DEC 2001) to which this sample is compared dates 
some 4 years prior to the sampling of this research, due to which some changes 
may have taken place.  This is the reason why some characteristics, such as land 
titling which has seen major changes in the past years, will not be assessed in this 
section.  It must also be taken into account that this research included only farms of 
1,0 ha or larger, while in the province 47,9% of all farms are smaller than 1,0 ha in 
size (DEC 2001).  The census also visited every single farm and village of the 
province, while the sample of this research excluded the areas inaccessible by 
motorized vehicles17.  The sample thus excludes a considerable proportion of all 
Herreran farms by choice, which in some cases makes comparisons with the census 
data difficult due to lack of disaggregated national data for different farm sizes. 
 
3.3.1 Selected indicators 
 
Because it was the basis of sample stratification, spatially in respect to the 
province’s districts this study’s sample represents perfectly the province’s total 
farm population of 1,0 ha and larger (table 3.5).  Each district’s farms were 
represented in the sample in the same proportion as they exist in the province, 
excluding farms under 1,0 ha.  The sample’s farm size distribution also 
corresponds very closely to that in the census of 2001 (table 3.8).  The similarity is 
surprising in that farm size quotas were not specifically aimed for during sampling.  
Altogether the sample thus represents well the Herreran farms in size and spatial 
distribution. 
 
Table 3.8  Comparison of farm sizes in Herrera: census of 2001 and the sample of this research.  Including 
only farms of one hectare or larger.   
 Agricultural Census 2000-2001* The sample of this research 
Farm size Number of farms Share of farms Number of farms Share of farms 
1,00-4,99 ha 4 291 43,7 % 175 43,5 % 
5,0-9,99 ha 1 464 14,9 % 63 15,7 % 
10,0-19,99 ha 1 657 16,9 % 67 16,7 % 
20,0-49,99 ha 1 622 16,5 % 60 14,9 % 
50,0-99,99 ha 507 5,2 % 24 6,0 % 
100,0-199,99 ha 194 2,0 % 9 2,2 % 
200,0-499,99 ha 68 0,7 % 4 1,0 % 
500,0-999,99 ha 12 0,1 % 0 0 
1 000,0-2 499,99 ha 8 < 0,01 % 0 0 
> 2 500,0 ha 1 < 0,01 % 0 0 
TOTAL 9 824 100 % 402 100 % 
*) Source:  DEC 2001 
 
How well the sample of this research corresponds to the census data in respect to 
presence of crops on the farms is difficult to assess, because the national statistics 
do not disaggregate crop data between farms of different sizes.  The census data 
                                                 
17 There is no data on the proportion of Herrerans living in such areas, for whole Panama it is 3% of 
households (WB 1999).   
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can thus be used to calculate the percentage of all farms on which given crops were 
cultivated, but not for farms of 1 ha or larger as is the sample of this study.  
However, notable in table 3.9 is the larger share of sampled farmers having 
cultivated corn and rice on their farms, relative to their respective shares in the 
census.  It is possible that rice and corn planting is seldom practiced on the smallest 
farms or in distant locations, due to which the census figures could be lower than 
the sample figures.  Another possibility is that this research had a bias in favour of 
rice and corn planting farms for some other unknown reason. 
 
Table 3.9  Presence of crops on Herreran farms:  comparing census and the sample. 
 Present in % of farms, Agricultural 
census 2001 (all farm sizes) ** 
Present in % of farms, the sample of 
this research 2005 (only farms ≥ 1,0 ha)  
Corn 33,8 % 60,0 % 
Cassava 27,9 % 28,9 % 
Rice 27,2 % 50,2 % 
Guandú bean * 23,9 % 23,6 % 
Yam * 13,2 % 19,7 % 
Taro (otoe) 3,3 % 5,7 % 
Pumpkin 2,9 % 2,5 % 
Sugarcane 1,1 % 1,7 % 
Watermelon 1,3 % 1,7 % 
Other melons 0,9 % 1,7 % 
N 18 842 402  
*) The definitions of these crops differ between sample and census due to which the figures are not 
comparable as such.  **) Source:  DEC 2001. 
 
Livestock presence is easier to compare because unaggregated data was available 
for different farm sizes of cow and pig rearing (table 3.10).  Nevertheless every 
type of livestock was found more often on the sampled farms than on the whole 
province’s farms.  There are a variety of possible explanations: livestock tenure 
may have increased between 2001 and 2005, livestock presence may be less 
common in areas of difficult access, livestock owners may have been more likely to 
be at home during the interview time than farmers without livestock, or the sample 
may be biased in favour of livestock owners for some other reason.  The census 
data disaggregation for the exclusion of farms under 1,0 ha however reveals how 
much more common livestock rearing is on larger farms than on all farm sizes.  
Altogether the variety of crops, livestock varieties, pasture types, fruit trees and 
such found on the studied farms is great, depicting the various farming 
opportunities existing in the province (table 3.11).   
 
Table 3.10  Presence of livestock on Herreran farms:  comparing census and the sample. 
 Agricultural census 2001* The sample of this research 
 All farm sizes Farms ≥ 1,0 ha Farms ≥ 1,0 ha 
Cows 24,4 % 45,6 % 48,3 % 
Chicken 67,7 % n.a. 86,3 % 
Horses 22,9 % n.a. 53,0 % 
Pigs 16,1 % 24,8 % 30,8 % 
Ducks 6,0 % n.a. 7,7 % 
Turkeys 1,9 % n.a. Included in the above cat. 
Donkeys, goats, lambs, quails <0,1 % n.a. n.a. 
N 18 842 9 824 402 
n.a. = not available  *) Source:  DEC 2001. 
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Table 3.11  Agricultural products found on the studied farms. 
Crops Livestock Pasture types Fruit trees continued 
“Natural” pasture 
Pasture faragua 
Improved pasture for cutting 
Improved pasture for grazing 
Sugar cane for cattle 
Stubbles for cattle 
Pasture monita 
Pasture paleta 
Sorghum for bales 
Derivatives for sale 
Cattle 
Pig 
Horse 
Deer 
Chicken 
Duck 
Fighting cock 
Wichichi 
Turkey 
Goose 
Pigeon 
Quail 
Squirrel 
Rabbit 
Mule 
Traction bulls 
Fish clusoma 
Cheese 
Duro (home made ice cream) 
Cocada (candy) 
Ice 
Tamarindo juice 
Tree plantations Collected products 
Fish 
Shrimp 
Fruit trees  
Rice 
Corn 
Cassava (yuca) 
Taro (otoe) 
Yam diamante 
Yam baboso 
Bean frijol 
Bean guandú, de palo 
Bean bejuco 
Bean poroto 
Bean javita 
Corn cob 
Sugar cane 
Sorghum 
Cucumber 
Tomato 
Onion 
Chilli pepper 
Sweet pepper 
Pumpkin 
Vegetable pear 
Melon cantaloupe 
Watermelon yellow & red 
Melon galia 
Honey melon 
Pineapple 
Coffee 
Pine 
Eucalyptus 
Caoba 
Melina 
Cedro amargo 
Teak 
Pineapple 
Grapefruit 
Star apple (caimito) 
Níspero 
Plantain 
Banana 
Mango 
Orange 
Noni 
Tamarind 
Lemon 
Guava 
Coconut 
Mamey or zapote 
Avocado 
Soursop (guanábana) 
Nance 
Granadilla 
Cherry 
Cashew tree (marañón) 
Papaya 
Peach palm fruit (pixbae) 
Achiote 
Apple 
Malay apple (pomarosa) 
Mandarine 
Mamón 
Naranjilla 
Passion fruit 
Peterpan 
 
In respect to farmer household’s socio-economic characteristics, there was a bias 
against women-headed farms in the sample of this research.  In the agricultural 
census of 2001, 9,4% of Herreran farms of 1,0 ha or larger were headed by women 
(DEC 2001) whereas the corresponding figure for this sample was 5,0%.  There are 
several possible reasons for this difference, the first of which may arise from 
differences in definition.  In this research the household head gender was coded 
based on the presence or absence of working age males, while the census defines 
household head as the person who makes the major decisions and manages the 
farm.  Had the household members been asked who they consider the household 
head, they could have respected a possible elderly widow in the household and 
named her the household head even though she would not be actively managing the 
farm.  Other possibilities for explaining the difference are that female headed 
households are more common in remote areas (of this we have no information), 
that female farmers were either more often working off farm at the time of this 
research’s interviews and thus not available, or that female farmers felt more often 
intimidated to participate.  The experience with the interviewed women however 
does not confirm the latter hypothesis. 
 
The educational level of the farm household head was higher in this sample than in 
the agricultural census of 2001.  On farms of 1,0 ha or more, 17,2 % of household 
heads had received no formal education in the census, while in the sample the share 
was 9,7%.  In the census, 47,9% of household heads had studied 6 years or more, 
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whereas in the sample the share was 60,8%.  This can be caused by higher 
educational levels in better accessible areas or a bias in favour of better-educated 
farmers for some other reason.  While it could have been possible that a 
generational change could have taken place on the farms between 2001 and 2005, 
resulting in younger and better-educated farmers, table 3.12 suggests that this is not 
the case.  The sample has on the contrary on average older farmers than the census. 
 
Table 3.12  Age distribution of farmer household heads:  comparing census and the sample. 
 Agricultural census 2001* The sample of this research 
Under 21 0,8 % 0 % 
21-24 2,1 % 0,7 % 
25-34 14,7 % 6,7 % 
35-44 21,8 % 20,4 % 
45-54 22,4 % 23,9 % 
55-64 19,2 % 27,1 % 
65 and over 19,1 % 21,1 % 
N ** 18 269 402 
*) Source: DEC 2001.  **) The census excludes here the farms managed by a contracted manager due to 
which the total number of farms appears lower than the total number of farms in the province, 18 842.   
 
For other socio-economic characteristics, the illiteracy level of the sampled farmer 
household heads of this research exceeds the general illiteracy level of the 
province’s population (table 3.13).  The province figure however includes all 
population over age 10, whereas the sample has only farmer household heads who 
are on average considerably older people and can be expected to be more often 
illiterate than the general population.  The household size in this research’s sample 
are also on the average larger than in the total population, possibly caused by a 
tendency for farmer households to be more numerous than non-farmer households.  
The census figure here is from the general population census and includes all 
households in the province, not only farmers.  The share of rural dwellers is also 
higher in the sample than in the total population, which may cause part of both 
differences.      
 
Table 3.13  Population characteristics of Herrera and its districts: comparing census and the sample. 
 Illiteracy % Household size 
District Population census 2000*  This sample Population census 2000 This sample 
Chitré, capital 4,3 5,6 3,7 4,2 
Las Minas 24,8 20,6 4,0 4,6 
Los Pozos 22,3 20,0 3,7 3,9 
Ocú 15,3 17,1 3,8 3,8 
Parita 8,9 5,1 3,7 3,9 
Pesé 11,3 7,5 3,8 3,8 
Santa Maria 9,6 24,1 3,8 3,9 
Total Herrera 10,4 15,4 3,7 4,0 
*) Of population over age 10.  Source:  DEC 2000a.   
 
In conclusion, the sample of this research may be considered a relatively good 
sample of the farmer household population it was drawn from.  The sampled 
households were in many respects similar to the results of the agricultural census of 
2001 (DEC 2001) and many of the observed differences can be caused by the 
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difference in coverage between the sample and the census.  Still it is vital to 
acknowledge that this research is not based on a random sample, and it is thus to be 
expected that the sample will not be a perfect representation of the farmer 
households of the Herrera province. 
 
3.3.2 Error analysis 
 
Methodologically this research has many potential sources of error.  In this section 
the errors related to the interviews, sampling and ethics of the research will be 
assessed to consider the ultimate reliability and validity of the research’s results.   
 
Although interview surveys are a very old research technique, they are of necessity 
based on a stimulus-response theory of cognition and behaviour, which might be 
deemed unrealistic (Babbie 2001: 258).  There is no guarantee that interviewing 
people would produce truthful data, due not only to a number of error sources but 
to the outset of the logic as well.  The alternative could for instance be long-term 
residence with the researched people and their observation.  Such approaches were 
not possible in this research due to time and budget limitations, and they would 
have not yielded the quantity of data required for the desired analyses.  The only 
recourse in the given situation is thus to conform to the quality of data achieved by 
the interview approach and interpret the results accordingly.   
 
The wording of the questionnaire, the order and type of questions affect the 
responses.  The question order and wording was tested to minimize errors and to 
enable fluency of thought, but in practice several questions were difficult for the 
respondents to comprehend due to the remoteness of some phenomena from the 
daily lives of the farmers (e.g. land improvements).  It is possible to question 
whether a meaningful answer can be given to a question one does not fully 
understand or considers irrelevant.  Measurement errors are possible due to the 
abundance of local weights and measures and their ambiguous use among the 
farmers.  It is unavoidable that question clarification has also biased the responses, 
a problem which was aimed to be controlled by writing question clarifications on 
the questionnaire to be read identically to each respondent.   
 
The interviewer’s presence affects responses.  This effect was intended to be 
minimized through inconspicuous dress, cordial behaviour, and a neutral but 
interested speech of the interviewers.  These precautions do not, however, remove 
the fact that for the farmer the interviewers were unknown and represented a 
foreign institution of higher education, which could have a considerable albeit 
subconscious effect on the answers through what the respondent would believe the 
interviewers “want to hear”.  It is also possible that interviewers may have omitted 
questions, recorded wrong answers, misunderstood the respondents, or failed to 
probe for answers when necessary.  The respondent’s appearance or living situation 
may also have influenced interviewers’ expectations.  These problems were 
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acknowledged prior to beginning the interviews, due to which they were actively 
controlled for.  (UN 2005: 231-233; Neuman 1997.) 
 
Respondents may intentionally or unintentionally give unreliable answers due to 
forgetting, misunderstanding or lying.  The questions were modified to minimize 
these sources of error, and the respondents were allowed to respond in the extent or 
time period, which they felt most comfortable or familiar with.  Anonymity was 
granted to minimize intentional untruthful answers but ultimately little can be done 
to recognize such or correct them.  And while it is believed that the presence of 
other people during an interview may influence the answers, this research took the 
position that not much of the questionnaire information is highly confidential 
within family members, which normally were the only other people present, if any.  
It was considered to cause more disturbance and unease to the interviews to isolate 
the person from their social setting for the time of the interview than the benefits 
that might have been achieved with such a decision.  The coding of the answers 
was intended as unaggregated as possible not to cause further errors in the data.  
The coded answers were however subject to a variety of calculations and 
conversions which for sake of the analyses were necessary, but simultaneously 
change the quality of the data.  (Neuman 1997; UN 2005: 231-233.) 
 
Sampling errors are an important concern regarding this research, although not 
much could ultimately be done about them.  Sampling errors are most severe for 
studies aiming at producing estimates of population totals, means, ratios and other 
parameters, which are not aims of this study.  But nevertheless most of the analyses 
carried out assume a random sample, and the considerations are thus relevant.  The 
adopted stratified sampling method may lead to differences between estimates 
based on this sample and the corresponding population values that would be 
obtained if a census was carried out using the same methods of measurement.  The 
sample did consciously exclude many farmer households from the outset, but it 
may have also unwillingly caused some households to have a lower probability of 
being sampled than others.  This source of error was minimized by not sampling 
only in village centres but rather touring around as much as possible.  Households 
with both spouses working fulltime off farm had less probabilities of being 
sampled, but therefore some such farmers were interviewed in the centres, in 
evenings and on weekends.  The assessment of the sample vis-à-vis census data 
carried out in this section demonstrates that although there have been some 
sampling biases, on the whole the sample can be seen to satisfactory represent the 
defined farmer population in the selected dimensions.  (UN 2005: 231-233, 391, 
447.) 
 
Care was taken to minimize possible sources of error prior, during and after the 
interviews, sampling and analyses.  Despite best intentions, error and imprecision 
will be inherent in the data and in the results.  This leads to the questions:  is the 
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research valid and reliable?  The dimension of validity can be assessed to the extent 
to which the chosen empirical measures adequately reflect the real meanings of the 
concepts under consideration.  Can the true essence of the different forms of 
poverty be grasped by the statistical analysis of farmer interviews?  While they are 
not the only or necessarily best ways to understand poverty, the chosen methods 
have the potential to yield new insights to the concepts of welfare poverty, asset 
endowments and investment poverty, within their own limits.  And in respect to 
reliability, would the chosen techniques, if applied repeatedly to the same object, 
yield the same results each time?  As acknowledged, the interviews may have 
produced unreliable results due to the approach itself and due to interviewer and 
respondent errors.  If the interviews were repeated today with a different team of 
interviewers, the results would be likely to be inconsistent with these results, not 
only because of the time specific nature of the information, but also due to the 
numerous other error sources discussed in this section.  While this may hold true 
for every interview research, efforts were made to minimize such errors.  
Nevertheless the results must be interpreted as products of this given methodology, 
time and particular visited farmer households; further extensions lack justification.  
(Babbie 2001: 140-145.) 
 
 
3.4 Conclusions 
 
Altogether Panama is an economically and politically stable country, relative to 
many of its neighbours.  The research site, the Herrera province, well represents the 
situation in Panama in that amidst the apparent prosperity of some, poverty remains 
a major problem for a great proportion of the population.  While the province 
capital Chitré offers numerous opportunities of education, health care, 
entrepreneurship and access to credit, employment and markets, the opportunities 
for earning a living in the remote areas are meagre.  Distance may represent a 
major obstacle for access to agricultural markets, job markets and loans.  
Furthermore the power of farmers is weakened by the farmers’ poor organization, 
and by the scarcity of extension services offered by the government agencies.  Crop 
growing in Herrera is mainly based on low-input technologies and gives low yields, 
and the insufficient care of pastures is causing soil degradation and impeded 
development of animals.  Current environmental threats in Herrera do not arise 
from population growth or excessive population density; rather they are caused by 
insufficient waste management infrastructure and insufficient work against the 
degradation of agricultural soils.  Forest covers a mere 4% of the province’s area 
and is mainly confined to protected areas.  Since most of the deforestation was 
carried out over half a century ago there is currently no major dynamics of forest 
destruction in Herrera.   
 
The farmer interview questionnaire was formed to correspond to the data type 
needs of the Reardon and Vosti framework and made specific to the circumstances 
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of the Herreran households.  A non-probability quota sample of 402 farmer 
household interviews was collected in January-May 2005, with a sampling frame 
of regional representativeness.  Data was inserted into and analysed with the 
statistical software SPSS, involving somewhat problematic conversion of the local 
weights and measures to unified measures.   
 
An assessment of the sample was carried out by relating the sample to statistics 
from the Panamanian agricultural census of 2001.  The assessment revealed that the 
sample represented well the general Herreran farm sizes and locations, but the 
sampled households had more livestock and education than the censual population.  
The error analysis highlighted many potential sources of error, related in large part 
to general problems of interview data reliability and sampling.  Best intentions 
were made to minimize any such errors but their complete elimination was not 
possible, due to which the results must be treated with respective care.           
 
This farmer household data from Herrera will allow empirical testing of the 
Reardon and Vosti framework as defined by the research questions.  The first tool 
required for this testing is a money-metric continuous measure of welfare for each 
farmer household.  In the following chapter the collected farmer household data 
will thus be used to measure the welfare situation of each interviewed household.  
That measure will enable the empirical study of investment poverty and assessment 
of the contribution of assets to household welfare in later chapters.  Also, the 
collected information on Herreran living and farming conditions presented in this 
chapter will be helpful for interpreting the results of the analytical chapters.  Not 
only does the surrounding context in which farmer households operate affect the 
behaviour of individual households, but it may also serve to explain possible 
differences in welfare across different areas. 
 
  
74
4. Measuring welfare in the province of Herrera 
 
 
Investment poverty concepts are built upon traditional measures of welfare.  Thus, 
an empirical welfare measure is an essential tool for the examination of both the 
proposed investment poverty threshold and the contribution of assets to household 
welfare.  This chapter applies two traditional welfare measurement methods to 
farmer household data from the province of Herrera in Panama.  The aim is to form 
a comprehensive and continuous measure of household welfare that allows a wide 
scope of further analyses.  Discourse on different welfare measures will be 
presented in section 4.1, with particular focus on household consumption and 
income measures.  Consumption and income aggregates will be empirically 
calculated for the studied farmer households in section 4.2.  In section 4.3 the 
formed consumption and income aggregates will be related to one another and 
modelled with household structure.  Conclusions will be presented in section 4.4. 
 
 
4.1   Consumption and income as measures of welfare 
 
Measures of household-level welfare are needed for modelling many phenomena in 
society, but every available measurement method has been found to have its share 
of shortcomings.  Welfare measures aim at depicting a household’s standard of 
living comprehensively and in a way that allows for households to be compared to 
each another.  Current practice relies mostly on aggregated monetary indexes, 
which involve measuring welfare through one or several welfare-indicating 
household variables measured in money or converted into money prior to their 
aggregation.  The most notable aggregated monetary welfare indexes are the classic 
income and consumption aggregates (e.g. WB 1999; Woolard & Klasen 2005; 
Wodon et al. 2001; Gibson & Rozelle 2003; Shah & Sah 2004).  Critics of money-
metric indicators have proposed, for instance, using social indicators as welfare 
measures, such as life expectancy, infant mortality and literacy (discussed in 
Ravallion 1996: 1330-1), or constructing multidimensional welfare indexes (e.g. 
Finan et al. 2005).  Any such alternative measure, however, requires value-
judgements over which dimensions to include, how to measure them and which 
weights they are given.  These choices then affect the validity of such a measure; 
perhaps this is one reason why such alternative welfare measures have not become 
predominant.  Rather the trend has been to make income and consumption 
measures as comprehensive as possible, including also home production and 
imputed values of non-monetary welfare dimensions (Ravallion 1996; Gibson & 
Rozelle 2003).  The controversy over welfare measurement is intrinsically tied to 
the understanding and measurement of poverty, because by common definitions the 
less welfare a household has, the poorer it is.  Welfare poverty definitions and other 
proposed measurement methods will be discussed in detail in section 5.1. 
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Within the mainstream practice, much debate has been surrounding the choice 
between income and consumption as the best measure of household welfare.  
Income has been seen to best depict the availability of resources for leading a 
decent life, portraying the opportunities of a household or individual (INDH 2002; 
Mejia & Vos 1997).  While low income may not be sufficient alone to cause 
hardship, it is at least a necessary element of poverty (Förster & Pearson 2002).  
Income data is commonly used for welfare measurement in developed countries 
(e.g. Förster & Pearson 2002), but it also constitutes the economic welfare 
component of the globally used Human Development Index (INDH 2002; Kanbur 
2003) and has been used in developing countries also (e.g. Woolard & Klasen 
2005).  Often income is preferred for practical reasons, because income data is 
collected for more countries and at greater frequency than consumption data (Mejia 
& Vos 1997).   
 
However, income measurement is challenging particularly in developing countries.  
Incomes vary considerably throughout the year due to cycles of agricultural 
production and seasonal variations in the availability of work.  Also self-
employment, rental and other non-wage incomes tend to be lumpy and sporadic.  
Hence the extrapolation of annual averages from short reference periods used in 
household surveys becomes problematic.  As a result, household surveys tend to 
substantially underreport incomes and lead to lower income figures than through 
national accounts estimates.  (Deaton & Zaidi 2002; Mejia & Vos 1997; Karshenas 
2003; Finan et al. 2005.)  Income has also been seen as a poor indicator of a 
household’s long-term welfare level, because households may smoothen 
experienced income shocks through borrowing, saving and mutual insurance.  In an 
effort to maintain their standard of living, low-income households may consume 
more than their incomes momentarily permit.  Again, the resulting income figure 
would underestimate the household’s standard of living.  (Slesnick 1993; Finan et 
al. 2005.) 
 
Consumption on the other hand is more stable throughout the year.  Since 
households tend to smoothen consumption over time by saving and dissaving, it 
has been seen relatively feasible to extrapolate from for instance 2-week 
consumption levels to annual figures (Mejia & Vos 1997; Deaton & Zaidi 2002).  
Indeed, Karshenas (2003) has empirically demonstrated that household surveys do 
not systematically underestimate average consumption relative to national accounts 
estimates.  Also theoretically consumption has been perceived a suitable indicator 
of household welfare, since according to the standard argument “welfare is best 
defined as the utility an individual gets from consuming goods and services” 
(Mejia & Vos 1997), although utility itself has resulted a contested concept.  
Household consumption has been used as a welfare indicator in many survey-based 
studies in developing countries (e.g. Mukherjee & Benson 2003; Shah & Sah 2004; 
Woolard & Klasen 2005), even in nation-wide surveys for instance in Panama 
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(ENV 1997; ENV 2003; DEC 2000a; WB 1999; MEF 2006) and Nicaragua (INEC 
2002).   
 
However, even consumption is a problematic measure of welfare.  Since negative 
shocks to a household’s economy are mitigated by consuming assets, a 
consumption level at one moment may not depict a long-term welfare situation.  
Only after assets and savings are eaten up and borrowing sources have been used, 
will income shocks result in households reducing consumption.  Consumption may 
thus reflect a distribution of resources of the past.  Even if this is the case, 
consumption can still be theoretically seen a more satisfactory indicator of a 
household’s daily welfare level, which indeed is likely to be more stable than 
income.  Ultimately, also a low level of consumption may not be a consequence of 
a lack of resources but of a choice.  (Mejia & Vos 1997; Dercon & Krishnan 2000.) 
 
Despite efforts to include as many dimensions of welfare into the measures as 
possible, both income and consumption measures continue to be deficient.  For 
instance, there is still no solution how to reflect access to public health and 
education services in welfare measures (Ravallion 1996).  People in different 
countries face different infrastructure, and governments may provide some services 
without charge, which in other countries would require purchase (Förster & 
Pearson 2002).  A given level of income or consumption may thus support a 
different standard of living in different countries.  International comparisons of 
income or consumption measures are therefore not justified (Mejia & Vos 1997).  
In practice the choice between income and consumption is driven by either data 
availability or data reliability (Mejia & Vos 1997).   
 
Whichever welfare measure is selected, challenges continue.  To derive a per capita 
welfare level, should adjustments be made according to household size and 
composition?  Are there economies of scale achieved in larger households?  Adult 
equivalence scales have been proposed and used in many studies to adjust for 
differences that adults and children may have in their needs (Woolard & Klasen 
2005; Szekely et al. 2004), but others warn against such adjustments since they 
lower the transparency of the results (Quisumbing et al. 2001; WB 1999).  It has 
also been argued that a per capita welfare of smaller households might need to be 
achieved with more resources per capita than in larger households.  Welfare 
measures would thus not be comparable across households of different sizes. 
(Quisumbing et al. 2001; Szekely et al. 2004; Mejia & Vos 1997.)  Some studies 
have made adjustments for positive economies of scale: for instance Förster and 
Pearson (2002) divide household income by the square root of the number of 
persons in the household; and Woolard and Klasen (2005) raise the number of adult 
equivalents to the power of 0,9.  But again, adjustments lower the 
comprehensiveness of the results and the adjustment factors are debatable.  Finally, 
current per capita welfare measures fail to demonstrate within-family disparities in 
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welfare distribution.  In practice, family members tend to differ in the amount of 
consumption or income they benefit from.  Although this inadequacy has long been 
recognized, viable solutions for its correction have not been yet developed.  
(Förster & Pearson 2002; Bourguignon & Chakravarty 2003; Ravallion 1996; 
Bastos et al. 2004.) 
 
Weaknesses of and criticism towards the monetary reductionism involved in the 
chosen approach is acknowledged.  It is true that the consumption or income of 
households may not reflect their grade of political or social empowerment, nor do 
even relatively high levels of money in the household economy guarantee that 
household members are healthy, free or happy.  But money-metric welfare 
measurement has many advantages for the purposes of this study.  Consumption 
and income, if measured with a wide array of attributes, reveals the daily welfare or 
living standard of the household, and the availability of resources they have for 
eating sufficiently and fulfilling many of the other basic needs in their daily life.  
Higher consumption and income levels per person indicate more food security, 
better possibilities for participating in education and better possibilities in getting 
health care in case of need.  Lower consumption or income levels depict a more 
vulnerable state, where the probability of someone in the household having 
unsatisfied basic needs increases, and the possibilities of the household to improve 
its living conditions declines.  Much of the political power, social network and 
insurance against shocks of the farmer households are reflected in their 
consumption and income level, because it reflects how much work, aid, loans, 
business and other opportunities the households has or has had in the recent past.   
 
 
4.2   Measuring household welfare in the province of Herrera 
 
Empirical application of the Reardon and Vosti (1995) framework calls for a 
continuous welfare measure that allows a quantitative assessment of farmer 
household economics.  Household welfare will be empirically measured in the 
province of Herrera through consumption and income, described in detail in the 
following sections 4.2.1 and 4.2.2.  Although both measures have deficiencies as 
discussed in the previous section, attempts were made to collect such detailed data 
that allows for consumption and income to be measured as comprehensively as 
possible.  Household level data yields poorly to alternative welfare measures such 
as approaches focused on life expectancy and other macro-level phenomena, and 
welfare indexes that require value-decisions not justifiable from household level 
data.  Consumption and income measures have the added advantage that the 
Panamanian Bureau of Statistics and Censuses regularly collects household 
consumption and income data in the studied region, providing a point of 
comparison for the results.   
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Income and consumption data was collected from 402 farmer households in the 
Herrera province through structured interviews, as described in section 3.2.  The 
questionnaire used in these interviews is in annex 6.  Interviews were carried out in 
as short a time span as possible (3 months) so that seasonal variations would affect 
the data as uniformly as possible (Baulch & Hoddinott 2000).  The aim was to 
calculate "multidimensional" income and consumption aggregates, including as 
much cash as in-kind incomes, consumption involving purchases, consumption of 
household's own production, the use value of housing, consumer durables, and so 
on.  The contents and calculation of the income and consumption aggregates are 
described in detail in later sections of this chapter.   
 
In an attempt to include access to health and educational services, the questionnaire 
included such items.  During the interviews it however became clear, that both the 
services themselves and access to them are problematic to define in a way that 
allows their measurement and inclusion into the welfare measures.  Education is 
problematic for many reasons: should one account for primary or secondary 
schools, should households with no school-aged children be assigned a value of 
having access to education even when they do not need it, and how near does a 
school need to be for it to be “accessible”?  Also, how can it be taken into account 
that education incurs costs for the household even if it is nominally free of charge?  
If a household cannot afford to cover these costs, does it have “access” to 
educational services?  Concerning health services, how near must a household live 
for the distance to be accessible, and if they have a vehicle or there is public 
transport, is an accessible distance longer?  What if there is a health centre nearby, 
but necessary health care is not provided due to queues, insufficient supplies, lack 
of specialist physicians, and so on?  Health centres fees are low (approx. 1 
PAB/visit) but transportation, medication and medical procedures may raise costs 
significantly.  Households with private health insurance also reported to not 
receiving treatment due to difficulties with required paper work.  How can this be 
taken into account in the valuation of the health services for household welfare?  
Due to these challenges, access to education and health care could not be valued 
into the welfare measures in money-metric terms, although their contribution to 
household welfare cannot be dismissed (Deaton & Zaidi 2002: 21-22).   
 
Despite some recommendations in favour of using adult equivalence scales, the 
empirical household level welfare figures will be divided directly by the number of 
household members to derive per capita levels.  There is no information on what 
weights children, elderly, women and so on should be given vis-à-vis to male 
adults in deriving “more accurate” estimates of per capita welfare, or on whether 
such adjustments are justified.  Also no adjustments will be made for possible 
economies of scale, because there is no knowledge on how large such effects in 
Herrera are, if they exist.  Finally, within-family disparities in welfare distribution 
will not be taken into account, because the analyses of this research require one per 
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capita welfare measure for each studied household.  Although intra-household 
distribution issues are important, they are not pertinent to the upcoming analyses. 
 
4.2.1   The consumption aggregate in Herrera 
 
Consumption is defined in this study as the utilization of goods and services during 
the period of one year, regardless of whether the goods and services have been 
purchased, produced by the household or received as gifts.  This distinguishes the 
consumption concept from pure expenditure, which involves only the spending of 
money or other tradable resources.  The aim was to include all welfare-enhancing 
goods and services that households actually access in their daily lives, including 
food, housing, recreation, transportation and so on.  Data was collected in farmer 
interviews through a number of questions, some of which were already monetary 
and some, which were given monetary values in the coding phase of the research.  
All consumed goods and services were ultimately valued and aggregated in 
monetary terms of the local currency Panamanian Balboa (PAB), such that the end 
value of the consumption aggregate is quantitative.  Money-metric welfare 
measures were originally designed for settings where households obtain their goods 
and services through the money market, and make the best choices that their 
incomes permit.  Therefore the use of monetary consumption aggregates in peasant 
subsistence economies has been criticised (Deaton & Zaidi 2002: 19).  In the 
Herreran economy even farming for home consumption is connected to market 
mechanisms and no households live in a “non-monetized setting”.  The monetary 
measurement of consumption in the Herreran economy does thus not imply a 
distortion of their life reality.   
 
The composition of the household consumption aggregate is depicted in table 4.1.  
It is identical to the composition of the consumption aggregate of the Panamanian 
Living Standards Measurement Study (LSMS) of 2003 (reported in MEF 
2006)(annex 8, table A8.1).  The first group of items in the consumption aggregate 
is the consumption of crop and livestock products that were produced by the 
household itself.  In the interviews households reported the quantities of crops and 
livestock products they took from the farm to household consumption.  These 
consumed quantities were valued at market retail prices, depicting the quantity of 
money the household has saved (or has not had to spend) to receive the same 
welfare effect of food as they would have received had they purchased the food 
from a local shop with cash.  This valuation gives farm products the same value as 
the equivalent quantity of purchased food; a bag of rice is as valuable for household 
welfare whether it has been purchased or produced by the household.  This 
approach differs from some recommendations, according to which consumption 
from home production should be valued at farm-gate, not market prices (Deaton & 
Zaidi 2002: 18).  Market or retail prices often include transportation and 
distribution costs, and home produce may be of lower quality.  But the valuation of 
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home production at market prices is justified from the nutritional and welfare point 
of view, in respect to which home products are as valuable as market products.  
The same valuation method has been applied by the Panamanian LSMS (MEF 
2006: 150).  The list of consumption or retail market values used in the calculi and 
adjustments made to the data are described in annex 9.   
 
Table 4.1  Contents of the household consumption aggregate. 
The consumption aggregate of a household is the annual sum, in Panamanian Balboas (PAB), of: 
 consumption of crops produced by the household, valued at retail prices  
 consumption of livestock products produced by the household, valued at retail prices 
 expenditure on food 
 expenditure on electricity, water, gas and telephone 
 expenditure on clothing 
 expenditure on education 
 expenditure on health (including insurance costs) 
 expenditure on public transportation 
 expenditure on recreation, hobbies, parties 
 expenditure on lottery 
 expenditure on vehicle fuels consumption up to 1500 PAB/year*  
 other monetary expenditures for personal and household goods and services 
 rent of housing, if household lived on rent 
 
 imputed value of annual housing services, if household lived in an own house 
 imputed value of annual use of telephone, if household had a telephone 
 imputed value of annual use of television, if household had a television 
 imputed value of annual use of computer, if household had a computer 
 imputed value of annual use of vehicles, if household had a vehicle(s) 
*) The excess is considered as business related and thus either deduced from work incomes or business 
profits, if the household had some, or added to the agricultural or livestock transport input expenditures. 
 
The second group of items in the consumption aggregate is the household’s 
monetary expenditure as detailed in table 4.1.  In the interviews households 
estimated their average expenditure to each item in the time span of their 
preference.  The reported values were then counted to annual expenditures.  Some 
items in the list raise the question of “regrettable necessities”, of goods and services 
that yield no welfare in their own right but have to be purchased for example in 
order to earn income, such as transport to work (Deaton & Zaidi 2002: 20).  In the 
same line it is possible to question whether medicine, lottery, alcohol consumption 
or public transport increase welfare either, and should they be excluded.  It is 
problematic to determine whether the consumption of these is voluntary or 
obligatory, and would the household welfare increase or decrease if these goods 
and services were not purchased.  In the absence of a criterion for when these 
problematic items should be included or excluded, they were included in the 
consumption aggregates of all households.   
 
The third group of items in the consumption aggregate is the imputed value of 
annual services from housing and consumer durables.  They were included, as they 
essentially form a part of the household’s welfare even though they would not be 
paid for every year.  If a household owns its house, living in the house is a welfare 
flow towards the household.  The contribution of a house to welfare is the same, 
whether or not the household has to pay rent for it.  In other words, household A 
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that lives in its own house experiences the same welfare as household B that pays 
rent for the same quality housing.  Since rent is included in consumption, also the 
value of own housing was imputed and included for households who owned their 
house, for equal treatment.  The imputation was carried out by asking respondents 
how much rent they would have to pay for their house, if it were not their own.  For 
most households the question was too difficult, due to the near inexistence of house 
renting in rural areas of Herrera.  Most households were, however, able to estimate 
the value of the house in itself.  Therefore an average rental value was calculated 
for different price categories of houses, and such an imputed use value then 
assigned to households unable to estimate the rental values of their housing.  
Consumer durables and vehicles were given imputed use values by estimating the 
lifespan of the items in the local conditions, and dividing the average purchase 
price of the item by its lifespan.  Calculus details of these imputed values are in 
annex 10.   
 
The value of access to public services such as health care, education or road 
infrastructure are not included in the aggregates due to significant valuation 
challenges, as discussed previously.  The costs faced by households for the use of 
these services, such as school materials, enrolment fees, transportation, 
expenditures on medical care, and so on, are however included, as can be seen in 
table 4.1.  The consumption aggregate also excludes expenditure on loan payback 
or interests, hypothetical land rents and free meals or drinks children receive at 
school, the last of which there was insufficient data for.  Hentschel and Lanjouw 
(2000) have warned against including consumption of publicly provided services, 
such as electricity, water, sewage and gas into consumption aggregates since they 
both reflect and determine a household’s welfare.  They see that since prices paid 
for these services are often subsidized, their inclusion will bias the resulting 
welfare measures.  In Herrera, expenditure in electricity and gas, for instance, was 
highly variable, suggesting that prices would be subsidized among the poorest 
households.  However, interviews with corresponding agencies revealed that such 
subsidies do not exist (Garcia I pers.comm. 16.5.2005; Pérez M pers.comm. 
25.5.2005).  Rather differences in expenditure depend on consumed quantities, 
which tend to increase with welfare.  The exception is water, where pricing 
depends on whether households belong to communal or state-owned aqueducts 
with prices being highest and consumption-based for the latter.  Nevertheless, use 
of these expenses in the consumption aggregates was seen justified. 
 
There were several methodological challenges that may have affected the reliability 
of the consumption measure.  In general respondents could relatively easily report 
consumption, as it has many fixed or regular dimensions, and was not considered a 
sensitive topic.  Still among the seasonal fluctuations typical of agricultural 
economies, Herreran households reported to adjusting most of their consumption 
according to the availability of cash, even food purchases.  The recorded “typical” 
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consumption level will thus not represent the consumption level at all times.  
Another significant and likely source of inaccuracy is the underreporting of what is 
thought of as deviant behaviour, such as alcohol consumption, smoking or drug 
abuse.  While this may constitute a significant expenditure, respondents were 
unwilling to report it even when probed.  Farmers shared the comment that “it’s the 
others that drink in the bars, not me”.  Nevertheless, bars are abundant even in 
small villages, liquor is readily available and the authorities know of addiction 
problems among a significant share of farmer households (de Rodriguez M pers. 
comm. 9.5.2005; Pinzón B pers. comm. 30.5.2005).  Conversely, benevolent 
behaviour such as spending on education may be over-reported.  Another source of 
inaccuracy was the failure to ask about meals that daily workers often have the 
opportunity to purchase during workdays, and that are deduced from their wage.  
And, the lack of reporting of birthday celebrations, other gifts, haircuts and many 
other services was noticed during the interviews.  However, being probed, farmers 
told that such expenses are not typical to their lifestyle.  Due to the fallibility of 
memory, also all other components of the consumption aggregate incur 
inaccuracies.  Best efforts were made to control for under- and over-reporting, but 
the interview method gives little opportunity to assess how reliable every 
component ultimately is. 
 
Table 4.2  Consumption aggregates in Herrera:  basic descriptives. 
 Mean  Minimum Maximum 
Standard 
deviation Median N 
Consumption aggregate per 
household (PAB/year) 
4 009,67 453,86 37 267,62 3 144,72 3 255,49 402 
Consumption aggregate per 
capita (PAB/year) 
1 137,04 125,20 12 422,54 992,60 896,67 402 
 
Results of annual household consumption aggregates in the studied Herreran 
households are in table 4.2.  To obtain a consumption aggregate per capita, 
household consumption aggregates were divided by the number of household 
members.  The mean consumption value per capita in this research is 1 137,04 
PAB/capita/year, which is higher than the median consumption per capita 897,67 
PAB/capita/year.  This difference depicts a skewed distribution where some very 
high values affect the mean significantly.  Indeed neither of the consumption 
aggregates proved to be normally distributed by normality tests of Kolmogorov-
Smirnov and Shapiro-Wilk, as can also be observed in figure 4.1. The mean per 
capita consumption among the studied households is higher than that in the LSMS 
of 2003, which in Herrera was 704 PAB (MEF 2006: 48-50).   
 
Great differences in minimum and maximum consumption values (table 4.2) depict 
the great inequalities in welfare in Herrera, typical of many developing countries.  
Comparison of mean consumption levels of the richest and poorest deciles of 
households reveals that on average the value of consumption per capita of the 
richest decile (3 260,48 PAB/capita/year) is over ten-fold the value of consumption 
of the poorest decile (322,75 PAB/capita/year).  In national studies even larger 
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disparities have been observed, with the poorest decile consuming on average less 
than four percent the consumption value of the richest decile, per capita (MEF 
2006: 52).   
 
Figure 4.1  Consumption aggregates per capita in the studied households.  Figure excludes one 
outlier case with consumption per capita 12 422,54 PAB/a. 
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Table 4.3  Consumption shares:  descriptives.  (N=402) 
 Mean  Minimum Maximum Stand. dev. Median 
Food ,55 ,06 ,93 ,17 ,56 
    - Of which purchased ,31 ,00 ,70 ,14 ,31 
    - Of which self produced ,23 ,00 ,87 ,20 ,18 
Education ,05 ,00 ,48 ,08 ,00 
Health ,03 ,00 ,89 ,07 ,02 
Transportation ,07 ,00 ,38 ,08 ,05 
Electricity, gas, telephone, water ,07 ,00 ,23 ,05 ,06 
Other services and goods ,09 ,00 ,61 ,08 ,07 
Imputed value of housing ,11 ,00 ,53 ,07 ,10 
Imputed value of household durables ,02 ,00 ,24 ,04 ,01 
 
Table 4.4  In-kind shares of consumption (N=402) 
 Mean  Minimum Maximum Stand. dev. Median 
In-kind share of consumption ,37 ,02 ,93 ,20 ,32 
 
Consumption shares into different categories vary considerably among studied 
households (table 4.3).  Food constitutes the most significant share of consumption, 
on average over half of total consumption.  A slightly larger share of food is 
purchased than produced on the farm, although differences between households are 
considerable.  The next most important item in the consumption aggregate is the 
value of housing, comprising an average 11% of consumption.  More than half of 
studied households have no expenditure in education, but for some households 
  
84
education constituted a major expense, as did health for others.  On average 37% of 
households’ consumption comprised of in-kind items, namely consumption of self-
produced agricultural products, imputed values of housing and household durables 
(table 4.4).  Conversely, as 63% of consumption is based on money transactions, it 
is clear that Herreran farmers operate in a highly monetized setting. 
 
4.2.2   The income aggregate in Herrera 
 
Income is defined in this study as the sum of all net welfare-enhancing money, 
product and in-kind welfare flows received by a household during one year.  
Income data was thus collected in the household interviews to form comprehensive 
income aggregate, including monetary and in-kind income flows.  Income data was 
collected not for a specific reference period as is common, but rather trying to form 
a meaningful annual value from different sources, accepting their particular nature: 
irregularity, seasonality, lumpiness, etc.  As with the consumption aggregate, 
forming the income aggregate also involved both income flows that were money-
metric by nature and income flows that were given monetary values in the coding 
phase of the research.  The resulting income aggregate is therefore monetary, 
expressed in Panamanian Balboas (PAB).  
 
Table 4.5  The contents of the household income aggregate. 
The income aggregate of the household is the annual sum, in Panamanian Balboas (PAB), of: 
 net value of crop production (total value of production minus inputs) 
 net value of livestock production (total value of production minus inputs) 
 total income from daily/farm work 
 salaries 
 income from service work as an independent  
 retirement payments 
 remittances 
 help, financial support 
 scholarships 
 sales of edible products (not mentioned in agricultural production) 
 sales of other products 
 profit from business 
 profit from buying and selling 
 received rents of apartments and the such 
 other income (e.g. winning the lottery) 
 received land rent 
 
 imputed value of annual housing services, if household lived in an own house (valued 
as in the consumption aggregate) 
 imputed value of annual use of telephone 
 imputed value of annual use of television 
 imputed value of annual use of computer 
 imputed value of annual use of vehicles 
 
Contents of the household income aggregate are listed in table 4.5.  This 
composition is similar to the income aggregate used in the Panamanian LSMS of 
2003 (annex 8, table A8.2) (MEF 2006) with the exception of the imputed value of 
services from housing and household durables, which the LSMS did not include.  
These imputed values were included in this study’s income aggregate, because they 
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represent an incoming in-kind welfare flow.  Their inclusion also increases 
symmetry with the consumption aggregate, since households receive these service 
flows without needing cash income for them, but receiving the same welfare as 
someone who does have to pay rent for them.   
 
The first group of items in the income aggregate is net values of crop and livestock 
production (table 4.5).  These are calculated as the sum of sales, valued at sales 
prices, and home consumption values, valued in the same way as for consumption 
aggregates (annex 9), deduced by the cost of inputs used for their production.  The 
second group of items are cash incomes from different types of employment, 
received donations, entrepreneurship and rents.  These items were relatively 
problematic to collect data for due to their variability, and due to lacking 
accounting procedures.  Underreporting is thus likely to have taken place.  The last 
group of items in the income aggregate were imputed value of annual use of 
housing and household durables, measured as described in annex 10. 
 
During the interviews it was observed that income was more difficult for 
households to estimate than consumption.  While regular incomes were easy to 
recall, the majority of incomes are irregular and for instance migrant working and 
other lumpy income was often not mentioned if not specifically drilled for.  One 
problem was the under-reporting of seasonal incomes related to daily wage work 
on farms, bartering of chicken and pig meat for food at local kiosks, small scale 
trading profits and remittances.  All of these are sporadic, and may be intensified in 
response to sudden shocks.  Since they come to the farmer in very small sums at a 
time, the households found it hard to elicit their total amount.  Profit estimation 
was difficult for most households that participate in business, regardless of how 
small or large scale it was, since few kept book of costs and revenues.  In addition 
migrant working was seldom reported unless probed for, or unless tied to the 
question on how the family finances larger expenses.  While the net value of 
agricultural production, scholarships, rents and imputed values may have been 
relatively accurately recorded, most other items in the income aggregate may be 
over- or underreported.  Income is often also a sensitive topic due to which 
underreporting may occur in all income groups.  In addition, since the income 
aggregate includes net agricultural production values, possible under-reporting of 
input use will cause the net production value to be over-estimated.  And as with 
consumption, genuine forgetting imposes additional limits to how accurately 
variable incomes can be reported even if willed.  As a result, the income aggregate 
is considered less reliable than consumption.   
 
Table 4.6  Income aggregates:  basic descriptives.  (N=402) 
 
Mean  Minimum Maximum 
Standard 
deviation Median 
Income aggregate per 
household (PAB/year) 
9 687,95 199,00 230 243,34 19 657,79 4 677,38 
Income aggregate per capita 
(PAB/year) 
2 738,62 66,33 78 360,00 5 976,67 1 308,11 
  
86
 
Figure 4.2  Income aggregates per capita in the studied households.  Excludes 7 highest cases with 
incomes between 21 000-78 360 PAB/capita/a. 
0 3 000 6 000 9  000 12 000 15  000 18  000 21 000
Incom e per capita (PAB/a)
0
10
20
30
40
50
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
 
Table 4.7  Income strategies.  (N=402) 
 Mean income 
share of all 
households % 
Participating 
% 
Mean income share of 
participating 
households % 
Crop income (net) 20,0 84,3 23,8 
Livestock income (net) 17,7 93,8 18,8 
Self-employment income (net) 7,4 28,6 26,0 
Daily wages 13,1 42,0 31,1 
Regular employment income 20,4 41,8 48,7 
Retirements and pensions 4,9 12,9 37,9 
Donations and remittances 4,9 40,3 12,3 
Rents 1,9 15,9 11,9 
Imputed values of housing & consumer durables 9,7 100,0 9,7 
Total 100,0   
 
Results of income aggregates among the studied Herreran households are in table 
4.6.  To derive the per capita income figures, household income aggregates were 
divided by the number of household members.  The median income (table 4.6) is 
significantly lower than the mean, due to a skewed distribution where the very high 
income cases have great effects on the mean.  The distribution in figure 4.2 indeed 
depicts a very uneven income distribution, far from a normal distribution.  The very 
low minimum values point towards the methodological difficulties of income 
measurement; under-reporting of incomes can be assumed to be considerable in 
many cases.  Income inequalities are even larger than those of consumption; the 
richest 10% of households receive over 40-fold the income of the poorest decile 
(14 088,32 PAB and 335,69 PAB/capita/year, respectively).  The relatively lower 
inequality in consumption than in income suggests that there are fewer limits to 
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income than there are to consumption.  On average 22% of income is received in-
kind, leaving 88% of incomes received in cash. 
 
A look at the income strategies of studied households reveals that regular 
employment incomes are competing with crop and livestock incomes for being the 
most important income source in Herrera (table 4.7).  Although agriculture is the 
most common income source received by nearly all households, incomes from 
regular employment and retirements are of central importance to those households 
who manage to have such incomes.  Self-employment contributes at best a fourth 
of income to entrepreneurs, presenting thus complementary incomes rather than 
entire livelihoods.  Similarly, many receive daily wages, but their contribution to 
total incomes is less than a third.  Altogether Herreran farmer households draw 
simultaneously from many income sources, depicting low opportunities to gain 
livelihoods from single sources but also protecting them from dramatic income 
shocks, would they depend on a single source. 
  
 
4.3   Explorations in household welfare 
 
This section will scrutinize how the consumption and income aggregates relate 
empirically to one another and how they can be understood in relation to household 
structure and investments.  Since a detailed analysis of the contribution of 
household assets to welfare will be carried out in chapter 7, they will not be 
assessed here. 
 
Table 4.8  Differences between income and consumption aggregates  (N=402) 
 Mean  Minimum Maximum Stand. dev. Median 
Income aggregate – 
consumption aggregate per 
household (PAB/a) 
5 678,28 - 25 212,85 222 735,00 18 631,96 1 304,50 
Income aggregate – 
consumption aggregate per 
capita (PAB/a) 
1 601,58 -8 404,28 74 908,00 5 664,20 355,27 
 
By definition, and in sight of their different compositions, income and consumption 
aggregates yield different estimates of household welfare.  If incomes are higher 
than consumption, saving and capital accumulation could take place, and if 
consumption is greater than income, dissaving, borrowing or eating up of capital 
may occur.  Contrary to common notions, Slescnick (1993) has demonstrated that 
even the poorest manage to save and dissave to maintain their standard of living.  
Among the studied households differences between income and consumption 
aggregates were indeed considerable (table 4.8).  On average each household’s 
income aggregate was 5 678,28 PAB greater than their consumption aggregate, or 1 
601,58 PAB greater per capita.  However, the mean is not very informative of the 
differences, which again have a skewed distribution.  The median difference is 
merely 355,27 PAB/capita.  Most notably, however, the value was negative for 
24,6% of studied households, suggesting that nearly one in every four households 
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would have consumed more than their incomes permit.  Differences between 
incomes and consumption cannot, however, be interpreted directly as savings 
capacity or as annual deficit, since the aggregates include different components and 
lead to incompatible results. 
 
Income and consumption correlate; when explaining per capita consumption, the 
coefficient of income is ,065 and significance ,000 (R2=,150; N=402).  A strict 
interpretation is that for each additional 100 PAB of income, consumption 
increases by merely 6,50 PAB.  The regression line is nearly horizontal; hence an 
increase or decrease in income will have a very small effect on consumption.  
Conversely, the propensity to save or invest would be significant.   
 
Figure 4.3  Relationship between consumption and income per capita.  Figure includes the linear 
regression line and a reference line depicting a “one to one” relationship between consumption and 
income. 
 
 
Figure 4.3 however suggests that such interpretations are not entirely justified.  
Particularly on the lower end of the income and consumption distributions, 
consumption seems to increase more steeply nearly along the reference line 
(coefficient 1,00) that portrays the situation where a one unit change in income 
would result in a one unit change in consumption.  As could be expected, in the 
lowest welfare levels additional income seems to translate most directly into 
increased consumption.  On the other side of the continuum, saving becomes more 
likely the higher the income.  Lifestyles may be relatively low-consumption by 
choice among the higher income levels, or perhaps consumption patterns change 
more than the absolute quantity or value.  In rural areas of Herrera also the 
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opportunities for consumption may be limited – or for some behaviour, 
underreported.  On the other hand, cases above the reference line could be 
dissaving, and surprisingly they are not always the poorest.  However, as discussed 
above, due to different structures of the consumption and income aggregates such 
deductions must be made with caution.  And, as figure 4.3 suggests, the regression 
line including the entire sample may be a poor indicator of the relationship between 
income and consumption at the lowest levels.  Due to great inequalities in the 
distribution of welfare, analyses including all households simultaneously are likely 
to be affected by the highest income cases to such extent that the results are not 
informative of the relationship among the poorest households18. 
Household structure may shed light on differences in farmer household welfare, as 
measured by their consumption and income aggregates.  One could assume that 
household consumption and income are connected to the age of the household 
head, to the size of the household, to the share of dependent members, to whether 
the household is headed by a man or a woman, and to the economic activity of 
women in the household.  Effects of these structural characteristics on consumption 
and income were thus modelled with linear regression.  Since the aggregates are 
not normally distributed, consumption and income per capita were transformed into 
their natural logarithms to improve the models (annex 11).    
Results in table 4.9 suggest that the larger the household, the lower both 
consumption and income per capita.  For each additional household member, 
consumption tends to be 11% and income 13,7% lower.  Additional members 
increase the divider and hence lead to lower per capita welfare levels, while their 
positive contribution is often minimal.  Typically half of household members 
contribute, while the other half is dependent.  Although negatively associated with 
consumption, the dependency rate’s coefficient seems small.  However its 
interpretation reveals its importance: while in the typical household of 4 members 
roughly half contribute, in a same size household where only one contributes 
consumption tends to be 10% smaller.  Interestingly enough, the dependency rate 
does not explain household per capita income levels at a statistically significant 
level.  It seems that incomes are large or small regardless of how many people 
participate in their generation.  The divergence of these two findings again 
suggests, that consumption is a more stable proxy of household welfare than 
income.   
 
On the other hand, the economic participation of women in households has a very 
significant effect on both income and consumption; households with a working 
woman consume on average 22% and earn an average 63,3% more per capita than 
households with a housewife.  On average the woman is working outside the farm 
                                                 
18 The effect of the case with greatest difference between income and consumption was tested by 
excluding it from a new model.  Regression coefficient changed little with this elimination (B: ,087 
Sig. ,000), suggesting that the case was not highly influential. 
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in less than one in every three households, suggesting that it is not yet the norm in 
rural Herrera.  Interestingly enough, women’s economic participation improves not 
only income, but raises consumption significantly.  Such a trend may contribute to 
improved nutrition and education.  On the other side of the coin, being a female-
headed household predicts inferior consumption levels.  Interestingly enough, 
female-headed households do not have lower incomes than male-headed 
households.   But since only 5% of studied households were female-headed, these 
coefficients must be interpreted with caution.  Ultimately, welfare levels are 
independent of the household head’s age.  Neither do younger consume more nor 
do the older earn better.  On the whole, these structural variables together account 
for 20,5% of variation in consumption and merely 16,9% of the variation in 
incomes.  Although they thus do not dictate a great part of household welfare, 
structural questions matter.   
 
Table 4.9  Consumption and income relative to household structure.  Linear regression coefficients with OLS19.   
  Dependent variable 
  Ln (Consumption per capita) Ln (Income per capita) 
Independent variable Mean value 
or share 
Coefficient Sig. Coefficient Sig. 
Age of household head (years) 53,5 ,001 ,521 ,001 ,754 
Household size (members) 4,0 -,110 ,000 -,137 ,000 
Share of dependents (%) 52,6 -,004 ,002 -,003 ,123 
Household is female-headed 
(dummy) 
5,0 % -,436 ,001 -,307 ,134 
Number of female contributors ,29 ,220 ,000 ,633 ,000 
Model 
   N 
   Adjusted R2 
 
402 
,205 
 
402 
,169 
 
Household welfare could also be reflected with the productive investments 
households have made.  In principal, investments are made to improve welfare in 
the long run, but all investments are risky and can take time before they translate 
into higher consumption or income levels.  In the short run it is even possible that 
consumption is reduced in order for investments to be made.  The effect of 
different types of agricultural investments on consumption and income per capita 
was studied with linear regression modelling.  Although clearly productive, 
educational investments were excluded from the analyses because education takes a 
particularly long time to produce additional welfare, and the data covered only the 
past year.  The contents of each investment category are listed in annex 32. 
 
The results (annex 12, table A12.1) suggest that higher levels of agricultural 
investments are indeed associated with higher levels of consumption and income.  
These investments are positively associated with welfare, suggesting that 
agricultural investments increase both consumption and income.  With the data of 
this research, however, one can seriously question such straightforward 
                                                 
19 SUR models were also run, since the residuals of the two models correlate strongly (B: ,620 Sig 
,000).  However, SUR produced identical results to OLS, possibly since the two models share all 
variables. 
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interpretation of the coefficients.  Particularly for investments other than fertilizers, 
returns are unlikely to materialize within the same harvest year.  Rather, current 
welfare may be product of investments made years ago to, for instance, irrigation 
systems or cattle.  Since the data covers only one year, deductions on the welfare 
effects of past year’s investments are not justifiable.  The argumentation over the 
welfare effects of investments is however problematic also for a more fundamental 
reason.  This research is based on a cross-sectional sample, and if in one moment of 
time investments and welfare correlate, it is challenging to say which causes the 
other.  Indeed the establishment of causality requires more than what has been done 
here; it requires theoretical foundation and adequate data.  However, the farmer 
household data was not collected for the purpose of studying how productive 
investments contribute to household welfare, due to which further such 
mechanisms cannot be analysed.  Also the theoretical foundation is contrary to this 
cause; the data was collected to study the theories of Reardon and Vosti (1995), 
which on the contrary focus on how welfare affects investment behaviour.  
Although regression coefficients may permit interpretations involving causality, 
without theoretical foundation and appropriate data regression coefficients are 
reduced to measures of association.  Ultimately, technically it is possible to study 
both the effects of investments on welfare and the effects of welfare on investments 
with one cross-sectional dataset.  But the validity and acceptability of such 
procedure can be questioned, given the methodological limitations imposed by the 
data.  With this data and theory context, thus, the welfare effects of productive 
investments cannot be meaningfully studied.   
 
 
4.4   Conclusions 
 
An empirical and continuous welfare measure was needed for the studied Herreran 
households as a tool, which will allow for investment poverty lines and the 
welfare-enhancing effects of assets to be studied in the ensuing chapters.  The 
measurement of welfare is, however, problematic, whichever method is selected.  
Consumption and income remain the most common money-metric welfare 
measures, despite their shortcomings.  Income has the advantage of depicting the 
availability of resources in a household, but its empirical estimation proved 
challenging.  During the interviews farmer households found income questions not 
only sensitive but also difficult due to their sporadic and piecemeal nature.  
Consumption, on the other hand, has the advantage of portraying a household’s 
daily utility of the goods and services it consumes.  It tends to be more stable 
throughout the year, and it was indeed easier for farmer households to report during 
the interviews.  Still, both measures were subject to over- and under-reporting, 
which despite best efforts could not be completely eliminated. 
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Both income and consumption aggregates were formed from the Herreran farmer 
household data, to represent the households’ situation as comprehensively as 
possible.  The money-metric annual consumption aggregate included consumption 
of agricultural products consumed in the household, expenditures on food, 
electricity, clothes, transport, education, and other goods and services, and the 
imputed values of housing and household durables.  The mean value of household 
consumption was 4 009 PAB/year, or 1 137 PAB/capita/year, but the distribution 
was very unequal.  Over half of consumption comprised of food, and the lowest 
consumption category was health (3%).  Nearly two thirds of consumption was 
based on cash transactions, suggesting that Herreran farmers operate in a monetized 
economy.  The money-metric income aggregate was calculated as the annual sum 
of net value of agricultural production, salaries, remittances, profits, rents, imputed 
value of housing and household durables and other incomes.  The mean income 
aggregate was 9 688 PAB/household/year, or 2 739 PAB/capita/year.  Again, 
disparities were great, but for income they were even more dramatic than for 
consumption.  Wages and regular salaries constitute nearly the same share of 
incomes as agricultural incomes, both comprising over 30% of aggregated 
incomes.  Retirement payments are also of importance to those who receive them, 
as is self-employment income for the entrepreneurs.   
 
Comparisons of consumption and income suggested that the propensity to save or 
invest in capital accumulation is significant, since differences in income translated 
to small changes in consumption.  Nevertheless, one in every four households had 
higher consumption than income, and is either falling into debt or eating up savings 
and assets.  Household structure affects welfare; lower welfare levels are related to 
larger household sizes and female-headed households, while higher welfares can be 
predicted if women work outside the farm. 
 
Because the consumption aggregate is both theoretically justified and 
methodologically relatively satisfactory, it will serve as the welfare measure for the 
following chapters.  This empirical household per capita consumption aggregate 
will enable studying welfare poverty, investment poverty and the welfare-
generating effects of household assets as suggested by the theoretical framework of 
Reardon and Vosti.  First this continuous welfare measure will be employed to 
assess the distribution of welfare poverty in the Herrera province.  Below which 
level of welfare could a household be considered welfare poor, and how should 
such thresholds be established?  In the following chapter, locally specific welfare 
poverty lines will be calculated for the Herrera province from empirical data.  With 
two money-metric welfare poverty lines and according to the continuous welfare 
measure of consumption, the studied households can be divided into three poverty 
groups.  This will allow comparing the poverty groups to one another, in order to 
understand the different conditions in which different welfare level households 
operate.  What separates the extremely poor from the moderately poor, which 
  
93 
characteristics associate with higher welfare or what may be the key out of poverty 
altogether?  The consumption aggregate will also allow for many other dimensions 
of welfare poverty to be studied, and for the poverty lines’ accuracy to be assessed.  
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5. Welfare poverty in the province of Herrera 
 
 
Welfare poverty lines are needed as the reference level of a traditional 
understanding of poverty, against which the investment poverty line can be 
developed.  Also households need to be divided into welfare poverty groups in 
order to assess the contribution of assets to household welfare poverty level.  This 
chapter applies one traditional welfare poverty measurement method to data from 
the province of Herrera in Panama.  The aim is to form an extreme poverty line as 
the cost of a basic nutrition in Herrera and a moderate poverty line that includes an 
empirically estimated non-food consumption share in Herrera.  By these welfare 
poverty lines households can be divided into extremely poor, moderately poor and 
non-poor, according to their welfare levels as measured by consumption.  
Theoretical foundations and formulas of traditional welfare poverty measurement 
will be introduced in section 5.1.  Calculi will be empirically applied to food price 
and farmer household data from Herrera in section 5.2 for forming empirical 
welfare poverty lines and grouping the households into three welfare poverty 
groups according to their consumption levels.  The three poverty groups will be 
compared to one another in respect to a variety of asset category and behavioural 
characteristics in section 5.3 to study possible differences between welfare poverty 
groups, and conclusions will be presented in section 5.4. 
 
 
5.1 Measurement of welfare poverty 
 
The discourse on poverty definitions and measurement dates back over a century, 
and the recent debate has been influenced by, for instance, works of Anthony 
Atkinson (e.g. 1987), Amartya Sen (e.g. 1976) and Foster, Greer and Thorbecke 
(1984).  The abundant literature demonstrates that there is no single correct 
definition of poverty or one universally accepted method for its measurement.  
However there is a wide agreement that poverty is a multidimensional 
phenomenon, including elements such as material deprivation, isolation, alienation, 
dependence, insecurity, vulnerability to external shocks; and lack of assets, 
opportunities, empowerment, freedom, capabilities, social and political capital; and 
lack of access to them.  These indicators can in principal relate to either causes or 
outcomes of poverty, or often both.  Consensus also holds that poverty is unevenly 
distributed through regions, gender and ethnicity, and on the urban-rural axis.  
Poverty is most commonly viewed relative to physically and socio-culturally 
acceptable norms associated with the minimum level of livelihoods, although 
particularly in developed countries poverty is often measured as a relative 
phenomenon rather than as an absolute state of deprivation.  Despite emphasis is 
often on economic measures, it is recognized that social, structural and cultural 
dimensions are as important.  The underlying thought is that there is “a good life”, 
which is possible to both identify and measure.  (Devendra & Shantalakhana 2002; 
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IFAD 2001; WB 2001; Rajbhandari 2001; Zeller et al. 2006; Kotzé 2003; Ellis & 
Freeman 2004; Abul Naga 2004; Osmani 2005; Wagle 2005; Santibañez 2005; 
Zeller et al. 2006.)   
   
5.1.1   Basic welfare poverty measurement methods 
 
The general understanding of poverty is very similar in the wide array of poverty 
studies around the world.  But different studies in one given region often lead to 
highly diverging results; depending on the measurement method the amount of 
people classified as poor is very different (Ruggeri Laderchi et al. 2003).  This may 
be attributed to differences between the available measurement methods, which 
reflect the different possible “working definitions” or operationalizations of the 
poverty concept.  Poverty may be measured with longitudinal or cross-sectional 
data, on the household or the national statistics level, and relative to either one or 
many different attributes, and relative to one or many different poverty thresholds.  
Because the data used in this study is cross-sectional, the wealth of longitudinal 
poverty measurement methods will not be discussed in detail.   
 
Cross-sectional data allows measuring poverty with monetary poverty lines, with 
aggregated non-monetary indexes, and with unaggregated multidimensional 
approaches.  Monetary poverty line approaches measure poverty by relating a 
household’s aggregated monetary welfare measure, most typically income or 
consumption as discussed in chapter 4, to a monetary threshold or poverty line to 
determine whether the household is categorised as poor.  The most notable 
aggregated monetary poverty line was first introduced by the World Bank (e.g. WB 
1999; Woolard & Klasen 2005; Wodon et al. 2001; Gibson & Rozelle 2003; Shah 
& Sah 2004).  Monetary poverty lines allow one to study, for instance, poverty 
head count indexes, poverty gap indexes and household poverty incidence rates.  
Poverty lines imply the existence of a discontinuous change as one crosses the 
poverty line.  This can be seen as an advantage or as a weakness, depending on 
whether one believes such a jump really exists (Ravallion 1996).  Although the 
money-metric poverty line has also been criticised as an arbitrary construct without 
any behavioural foundation (Carter and Barrett 2006: 191), it remains the most 
commonly used poverty measure for as much international, national as smaller 
scale purposes.   
 
Aggregated non-monetary indexed approaches take a variety of household 
variables and aggregate them to a single measure.  This aggregation often requires 
problematic choices concerning which variables to include, how to quantify them 
and how to weight them.  One of the most quoted aggregated non-monetary 
poverty measure is the human development index (e.g. UNDP 2002), which is 
constructed by indexing income, literacy and life expectancy of regions or 
countries relative to others and as their weighted sum positioning the region or 
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country relative to others.  Other aggregated non-monetary indexes include the 
human poverty index that combines deprivations in income, literacy and life 
expectancy (e.g. HDR 2005), the unsatisfied basic needs approach that classifies 
households according to their critical lack of basic needs (e.g. Rios 2002; Tabasco 
et al. 2003), and the welfare index of Finan et al. (2005) only to mention a few.  
However, the aggregation of different dimensions of poverty into a single number 
or index of poverty is conceptually strictly equivalent to the money-metric method 
(Bourguignon & Chakravarty 2003).  The unaggregated multidimensional methods 
have been developed much as a critique to the aggregation of different dimensions 
of poverty.  They aim at assessing poverty in relation to each individual attribute 
separately, and often involve defining poverty limits for every attribute.  Examples 
of multidimensional unaggregated approaches are sustainable livelihoods 
approaches (e.g. Ellis & Freeman 2004), the counting method of Bourguignon and 
Chakravarty (2003) and the multidimensional poverty measure of Atkinson (2003).  
Multidimensional methods are still not free of arbitrariness, since as much the 
choice of attributes as the assigned poverty thresholds are as arbitrary as in 
aggregated measurement methods.  Eventually every alternative welfare poverty 
measurement method involves value-laden choices that will affect the resulting 
categorization of certain people as poor and others as non-poor.   
 
The empirical application of the Reardon and Vosti (1995) framework calls for 
traditional welfare poverty analysis as a reference for the other analyses.  This 
study will therefore assess welfare poverty of farmer households in the province of 
Herrera with the monetary poverty line method.  Locally specific monetary poverty 
lines will be formed from empirical data collected purposively for this study, and 
households will be related to these poverty lines according to their monetary 
consumption aggregates.  The problems inherent in the money-metric poverty line 
method are acknowledged and best efforts will be done to minimize these problems 
and discuss the required value-decisions.  While welfare was measured in chapter 4 
through both income and consumption aggregates, the analyses of this chapter and 
the following chapters will take consumption as the standard welfare measure due 
to the methodological challenges of the income aggregate.  Nevertheless, welfare 
poverty lines will be constructed for income as well.  The method and results of 
income poverty measurement are in annex 13.   
 
5.1.2 Definitions of poverty lines 
 
An extreme poverty line will be constructed as the annual cost of filling minimum 
nutritional requirements, as is common practice.  Caloric requirements of people of 
different age, gender and occupation are different, due to which an average caloric 
requirement weighted by the population structure is needed for the studied area.  
The price of a daily diet depends on its composition, which must be derived from 
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local nutritional patterns.  The extreme poverty line (EPL) as the annual cost of a 
daily diet will be calculated by equation 5.1:  
 



n
i
ii PQEPL
1
)365**(    (5.1) 
 
in which Q is the quantity of calories of food item i needed in a local typical 
average daily diet and P is the local price per calorie of food item i.  
 
Whereas the extreme poverty line depicts the cost of obtaining only a minimum 
diet, the moderate poverty line includes also a share of essential or customary non-
food consumption.  The moderate poverty line thus includes an allowance for 
clothes, electricity, housing, schooling, and other non-food consumption, which 
can also be seen as necessary for leading a decent life.  Since the value of a 
“necessary” level of non-food consumption cannot be derived with any objective 
measure, this non-food share is customarily derived from observing the non-food 
consumption (or income) shares of those households near the extreme poverty line.   
 
The food share of total consumption (or originally of income) is known as the 
Engel coefficient (eq. 5.2), and the moderate poverty line can be calculated by 
dividing the extreme poverty line by the mean Engel coefficient of those 
households near the extreme poverty line (eq. 5.3) (Aguirregabiria 2006)20.  In this 
study, households with consumption at +/- 20% of the extreme poverty line will be 
taken as the Engel population.   
 
The Engel coefficient (EC) of a household x can be calculated by:  
 
x
x
x CAH
FCH
EC     (5.2) 
 
in which FCHx is the value of food consumption of household x (including the 
values of consumed agricultural products produced by the household and 
purchased food) and CAHx is the monetary consumption aggregate of household x.   
 
The moderate poverty line (MPL) can be calculated by: 
 
meanEC
EPLMPL     (5.3) 
                                                 
20 The original Engel population poses a difficulty, since according to Aguirregabiria (2006) the 
Engel coefficient should be studied for people with income equal to a poverty line.  This poverty 
line includes not only extreme poverty but the share of other consumption as well.  Such poverty 
line cannot be calculated without a priori knowing the non-food consumption share of those 
households with income equal to the poverty line, and conversely it is impossible to know which 
households to include in the estimation of the Engel coefficient, because the resulting poverty line is 
not a priori known.     
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in which EPL is the extreme poverty line and ECCmean is the average Engel 
coefficient of the consumption Engel population. 
 
The poverty lines are typically used to calculate headcount indexes, stating the 
shares of household or people who are below the poverty lines.  However, the 
headcount index fails to identify many other characteristics of the distribution of 
poverty.  For instance, when a poor person becomes poorer the headcount index 
will not increase; indeed, if a person dies, the index will fall.  As a response, 
distribution sensitive poverty depth measures were developed, based on ideas of 
Amartya Sen.  (Ravallion 1996; Zheng 2000.)  Poverty depth is the distance 
between a household’s consumption level and the poverty lines.  It is stated in the 
chosen measure of welfare, in this case in the value of consumption in monetary 
measures (PAB) and it can be calculated either as a household’s per capita distance 
to the poverty line or as aggregated for the entire household.  If the household’s 
poverty depth value is negative, the household is below the poverty line, and the 
value depicts the shortage of consumption, or the amount of additional 
consumption that the household would need in order to reach the extreme or 
moderate poverty line.  If the household’s poverty depth value is positive, the 
household is above the poverty line by the given amount (PAB).  Poverty depth 
measures are calculated using equations 5.4 and 5.5: 
 
Extreme poverty depth per capita (EPDcapita) is calculated as: 
 
EPLCAEPD xcapita     (5.4) 
 
in which CAx is the consumption aggregate per capita of household x and EPL is 
the extreme poverty line.  The extreme poverty depth per household (EPDhousehold) 
is achieved by multiplying EPDcapita by the number of household members in 
household x.  
 
Moderate poverty depth per capita (MPDcapita) is calculated as: 
 
MPLCAMPD xcapita     (5.5) 
 
in which CAx is the consumption aggregate per capita of household x and MPLC is 
the moderate poverty line of consumption.  The moderate poverty depth per 
household (MPDhousehold) is achieved by multiplying MPDcapita by the number of 
household members in household x. 
 
Welfare poverty lines will allow for dividing studied households into three welfare 
poverty groups according to their consumption aggregates as depicted in figure 5.1.    
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Figure 5.1  Welfare poverty lines and welfare poverty groups. 
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Extremely poor households consume per capita less than the cost of a nutritional 
minimum.  Moderately poor households have a per capita consumption above the 
cost of a nutritional minimum but below the sum of the nutritional minimum and a 
customary non-food consumption share.  Non-poor households are above both 
poverty lines, and thus consume more than the sum of the minimum nutrition cost 
and the customary non-food consumption share. 
 
  
5.2   Poverty lines for the province of Herrera 
 
In this section, empirical welfare poverty lines for the province of Herrera will be 
constructed and studied Herreran farmer households will be related to these poverty 
lines by their consumption aggregates, as calculated in chapter 4.  In addition the 
depth and regional dimension of poverty among households will be studied.  
Empirical income poverty lines and income poverty calculi for the Herreran 
households are presented in annex 13. 
 
5.2.1   The extreme poverty line 
 
The extreme poverty line will be constructed as the annual cost of fulfilling the 
caloric requirement of an average Panamanian, weighted by the population 
structure.  Such an estimate is available from previous studies from Panama, which 
arrived at a weighted average energy need of 2 280 calories per day per person 
taking into account the population gender and age structure (INCAP and the 
Bureau of Statistics and Censuses of the Panamanian Comptroller’s Office, 
reported in World Bank 1999: Vol. 2: App.2: 4)21.  The price of this 2 280 calorie 
daily diet depends on its composition, which must be derived from local nutritional 
patterns.  Panamanian food consumption patterns have been observed in the Living 
Standards Measurement Study (henceforth LSMS) in 1997 for the lowest 10-40% 
                                                 
21 In the Living Standards Measurement Study of Panama in 2003 a new average caloric 
requirement of 2 305 cal/day/capita was calculated, reflecting a changed population structure (MEF 
2006).  This new data was not available at the time of the planning of this study. 
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consumption level households, and the resultant local typical food consumption 
pattern for obtaining a 2 280 calorie diet is depicted in table 5.1 (LSMS 1997, 
reported also in WB 1999: Vol. 2: App.2: 5).  The food item table depicts included 
items and the relative contribution or importance of each item as a source of 
energy.  Noteworthy is the pronounced importance of rice, contributing towards 
27,2% of daily energy needs.   
 
Taking the Panamanian weighted average diet of 2 280 daily calories composed of 
the observed local nutritional patterns, a locally specific extreme welfare poverty 
line can be calculated for the province of Herrera with local food prices.  For this 
purpose food price information was collected from six of the seven districts of the 
province in May 2005 according to the food item list of the LSMS of 1997 (table 
5.1).  One shop in each district centre was visited on 20.5. or 25.5.200522.  In 
Panama food and beverage prices have been reported to vary monthly very little, 
for instance in 2003 the monthly variation a maximum of –0,7% and +0,5% 
relative to the previous month (DEC 2003c), due to which it was considered that 
food prices collected in one month can be used to estimate the average nutrition 
costs of a whole year.  Up-to-date empirical data from local shops was seen as the 
most accurate source of price information, rather than the alternative practice of 
using assumed prices derived from household interviews (Gibson & Rozelle 2005).   
 
For each food item prices were collected for different package sizes, product types 
and trademarks.  In the coding phase, the lowest unit price per pound was selected 
for use in the calculus.  In aggregate items, such as “juices and sodas”, the average 
of the lowest juice and lowest soda price was used.  All food prices were converted 
into prices per pound, which in many cases required conversion from volume to 
weight, as in liquids, or from unitary price to price per pound, such as in fruit and 
eggs sold by the piece.  In these cases the best available estimates of weight were 
either measured in situ or sought from milk and soda companies.  If some item was 
not available in some district’s shop, the average of the other districts’ price was 
used instead.  Several fruit, fish and seafood items could not be found in any of the 
visited shops.  Their prices were taken from street vendors in the province capital 
Chitré and used for every district.  It is not common for Herreran households to 
purchase fruit in shops due to the abundance of fruit trees on households’ 
properties.   
 
                                                 
22 The only district where no food prices were collected is Ocu. 
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Table 5.1  Food prices in the district of Las Minas, Herrera and figures of LSMS 1997 for comparison.   
Establishment:  Minisuper Melisa
Location:  Las Minas Herrera Province
Date: LSMS 1997
Item
Price 
PAB / lb
*, 
**)
Calo-
ries
 / lb
Contributio
n to daily 
energy 
needs
Calories of 
this item in a 
2280 cal/day 
diet
Price 
per calorie 
(PAB)
Annual cost 
of this item in 
target 
diet(PAB)
Annual cost of 
this item in 
target diet 
(PAB)
Consump-
tion 
Lbs/year 
/person
Rice 0,30 1634 27,2 % 619,2 0,000184 41,49 43,36 138,32
Oil 0,91 4013 9,1 % 207,3 0,000227 17,16 16,32 18,85
Sugar 0,30 1725 8,5 % 192,6 0,000174 12,23 12,99 40,75
Corn grain 0,25 1725 7,3 % 165,4 0,000145 8,75 8,92 35,00
Bread 0,45 1279 4,1 % 93,2 0,000355 12,08 20,48 26,60
Flour 0,40 1819 3,6 % 81,3 0,000220 6,53 5,36 16,31
Beans frijol 0,50 1559 2,5 % 56 0,000321 6,56 6,72 13,11
Pasta 0,62 1684 2,4 % 54,8 0,000368 7,36 6,61 11,88
Chicken 1,00 625 2,4 % 54,7 0,001600 31,94 35,18 31,94
Cereals and creams 0,84 1643 2,3 % 52,6 0,000511 9,82 10,40 11,69
Powder milk 2,72 1618 2,3 % 52,1 0,001681 31,97 30,88 11,75
Beef meat 1,40 673 2,3 % 51,8 0,002080 39,33 42,20 28,09
Beans porotos 0,60 1562 2,1 % 47,5 0,000384 6,66 9,67 11,10
Lentils 0,55 1544 2,1 % 47,3 0,000356 6,15 7,29 11,18
Plantains 0,23 389 2,0 % 46 0,000591 9,93 7,60 43,16
Liquid milk 0,31 261 1,7 % 39,3 0,001188 17,04 17,29 54,96
Pork meat 0,60 970 1,4 % 31,2 0,000619 7,04 16,94 11,74
Processed corn 0,52 699 1,3 % 29,7 0,000744 8,06 6,66 15,51
Peas, legumes 0,50 1557 1,3 % 28,7 0,000321 3,36 3,76 6,73
Margarine 0,80 2916 1,2 % 27,2 0,000274 2,72 4,33 3,40
Eggs 0,82 1020 1,2 % 26,9 0,000804 7,89 9,24 9,63
Cassava 0,20 374 1,2 % 26,4 0,000535 5,15 3,86 25,76
Cookies 1,49 2111 1,1 % 25,6 0,000706 6,60 6,90 4,43
Evaporated milk 1,07 608 1,1 % 24,3 0,001760 15,61 15,20 14,59
Cheese 2,20 1209 0,9 % 20,2 0,001820 13,42 12,51 6,10
Sausages 1,05 1004 0,8 % 18,7 0,001046 7,14 12,92 6,80
Yam 0,60 409 0,7 % 16,6 0,001467 8,89 6,04 14,81
Sardines and tuna 1,47 591 0,7 % 15,6 0,002487 14,16 8,30 9,63
Bananas 0,11 299 0,7 % 14,9 0,000368 2,00 4,96 18,19
Potatoes 0,35 307 0,6 % 14,6 0,001140 6,08 6,61 17,36
Fish 1,25 ** 296 0,6 % 13,3 0,004223 20,50 14,01 16,40
Taro (otoe) 0,37 * 414 0,4 % 9,7 0,000894 3,16 3,43 8,55
Soups 2,33 1518 0,4 % 9,5 0,001535 5,32 5,88 2,28
Tomato paste&sauce 1,40 427 0,3 % 7,4 0,003279 8,86 8,74 6,33
Sodas, juices 0,57 194 0,3 % 6 0,002938 6,43 13,10 11,29
Avocados 0,33 ** 378 0,3 % 5,9 0,000873 1,88 3,72 5,70
Mangos 0,10 ** 121 0,3 % 5,7 0,000826 1,72 3,58 17,19
Pineapple 0,25 ** 139 0,2 % 4,3 0,001799 2,82 2,67 11,29
Garlic 1,02 608 0,2 % 4,4 0,001678 2,69 3,26 2,64
Carrots 0,50 168 0,2 % 4,1 0,002976 4,45 3,55 8,91
Peppers 0,60 162 0,2 % 3,8 0,003704 5,14 3,68 8,56
Seafood 1,50 ** 165 0,1 % 2,9 0,009091 9,62 10,39 6,42
Orange 0,10 ** 131 0,1 % 2,8 0,000763 0,78 3,25 7,80
Tomatoes 0,80 93 0,1 % 2,4 0,008602 7,54 4,77 9,42
Apple 0,76 209 0,1 % 2,5 0,003636 3,32 3,27 4,37
Cabbage 0,50 127 0,1 % 2,3 0,003937 3,31 3,21 6,61
Pumpkin, veget.pear 0,15 90 0,1 % 2,1 0,001667 1,28 2,63 8,52
Lemons 0,67 ** 67 0,1 % 1,9 0,010000 6,94 2,30 10,35
Sugar cane 0,40 * 126 0,1 % 1,6 0,003175 1,85 2,34 4,63
Lettuce 0,50 64 0,1 % 1,1 0,007813 3,14 3,69 6,27
Papaya 0,33 ** 107 0,1 % 1,2 0,003084 1,35 4,84 4,09
Cucumber 0,20 52 0,0 % 1,1 0,003846 1,54 2,72 7,72
Celery 0,60 73 0,0 % 0,8 0,008219 2,40 2,53 4,00
Onion 0,40 100 0,0 % 0,9 0,004000 1,31 5,70 3,29
Melon 0,15 * 76 0,0 % 0,6 0,001974 0,43 1,80 2,88
Total calories 2280 Total 1997
TOTAL COST OF MINIMUM NUTRITION IN LAS MINAS:  PAB /capita /year 480,90 518,56
*)  Value has been taken from the mean of other establishments, because this establishment did not have this item
**)  Value has been taken from street vendors, because none of the establishments had this item
Source: Calories/lb, Contribution to daily energy needs (%) and Calories of this item needed...:  LSMS 1997 (WB 1999: Annex 2)
Other figures:  Own data and calculi
25.5.2005
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The food item prices measured in Panamanian Balboas (PAB) per pound of 
product were added to form the total local lost of a nutrition of 2 280 calories per 
person per year in each district, as calculated according to equation 5.1.  Table 5.1 
presents the food prices from the district of Las Minas while the other five district’s 
food prices are in annex 14.  The differences in food prices between the districts 
were small and largely due to available package sizes or brands.  Providers do not 
seem to add transportation costs to remoter areas to prices.  Food item prices in the 
LSMS 1997 from Panama City are included in table 5.1 for comparison, revealing 
that food prices have changed little between 1997 and 2005.     
 
The data yields six different costs of a minimum daily diet, or six extreme poverty 
lines, one for each district of the Herrera Province where food prices were 
collected.  A common province-wide extreme poverty line was calculated as the 
weighted average of the 2 280 calorie diet prices from all seven districts.  The 
annual cost of the minimum daily diet in each district was weighted with the 
population sizes of the districts (table 5.2).   
 
Table 5.2  Calculation of the extreme poverty line for Herrera, weighted by district populations. 
District 
Annual price of a 2 280 
cal/day diet in local shop in 
May 2005 (PAB) 
Population in 
census 2000 
Price * population = 
weighted price 
Chitre 491,48 42 467 20 871 681,2 
Las Minas 480,90 7 945 3 820 750,5 
Los Pozos 514,31 7 827 4 025 504,4 
Ocu * 495,97 15 936 7 903 777,9 
Parita 484,92 8 827 4 280 388,8 
Pese 486,36 12 471 6 065 395,6 
Santa Maria 517,87 6 992 3 620 947,0 
Total Herrera province  102 465 50 588 445,4 
 
Weighted extreme poverty line = sum of weighted prices / population = 493,7144 PAB/capita/annum 
 
*) The price of the 2 280 cal/day diet for Ocu is the arithmetic mean of the other six districts due to lack of data.   
 
The weighted average of diet prices together constitute the annual cost of one 
average Herreran person obtaining a diet of 2 280 calories per day (eq. 5.6).   
 
yearcapitaPABEPL //71,493   (5.6) 
 
The extreme poverty line for Herrera in 2005 is thus 493,71 PAB/capita/year.  It is 
lower than both the LSMS of 1997, in which the extreme poverty line based on the 
same nutritional combination cost 519,00 PAB/capita/year (of also 2 280 cal/day), 
and that of the LSMS of 2003, in which the same nutritional combination but of a 
higher total caloric need of 2 305 cal/day cost 534,00 PAB/capita/year (LSMS 
1997 reported in World Bank 1999; LSMS 2003 reported in MEF 2006).  The 
reason for the differences can be only speculated due to the lack of information on 
the brands, package sizes and quality of products for which the prices were 
collected in the LSMS studies.  It is possible that the LSMS has taken a higher 
quality of, for instance, pork meat, such as a certain cut rather than the least 
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expensive type that was used in this study.  The unit prices could be higher also if 
smaller package prices were used, or the prices can generally be higher in the 
capital province than in Herrera.  Most of the prices of the LSMS 1997 and the data 
of this research from 2005 are, however, strikingly similar as can be appreciated in 
table 5.1. 
 
It is possible to empirically challenge the accuracy of the food basket’s 
composition for the Herreran setting.  The used diet composition is no absolute 
measure of nutritional sufficiency, but an agreed convention based on food 
consumption pattern observations in Panama’s capital.  Such a diet structure might 
not be a relevant basis for assessing nutritional sufficiency in poor or rural regions, 
since rural people may be expected to consume on average less processed food and 
eat more basic staples and simpler diets.  A household living under a poverty line 
that is based on this urban consumption structure may be sufficiently nourished on 
another less expensive diet composition.  Empirically this can be studied by 
calculating the food consumption value of each household and relating it to the 
used cost of a minimum nutrition in Herrera, or the local extreme poverty line.  The 
value of food consumption was calculated in the data as a sum of the value of home 
produced and purchased food items consumed in the household.  Of all the studied 
households who were above the extreme poverty line and thus could afford to 
consume food worth 493,71 PAB/capita/a, only 55,6% actually did consume food 
worth the extreme poverty line.  In other words, of all households that could afford 
a sufficient nutrition, 44,4% ate food worth less than the “nutritional minimum”.  
Still there is no reason to believe that these households live voluntarily in hunger; 
rather they can be expected to satisfy their daily nutritional needs on a less 
expensive diet composition23.   
 
These results suggest that the extreme poverty line is too high in that it is based on 
a diet composition that is more expensive than the typical diets in Herrera.  There 
was however no consumption pattern data available for Herrera nor other rural 
provinces and its collection was out of the scope of this study, due to which there is 
no opportunity for correcting for such a possible difference.  The food consumption 
pattern does not constitute an ideal diet either, since it does consider need of 
vitamins or other nutrients to guarantee a healthy life.  It also excludes the 
preparation costs of the food, such as water, gas or spices.  The used food item list 
has, however, become the landmark upon which all subsequent Panamanian 
poverty line calculations have been based (listed in INDH 2002: 85).  The 
Panamanian government uses a different food basket composition to follow the 
consumer price index (described in annex 15) but its quantities are based on 
consumer package sizes rather than observed shares in local nutrition, due to which 
it does not serve for this study. 
                                                 
23 For instance a 2 280 calorie daily diet could be satisfied with only 153 PAB/capita/year, if the 
only consumed food item was rice. 
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Another major empirical difficulty of the food price study was the fruit component 
of the average diet.  Most of the fruit included in the typical Panamanian diet (table 
5.1) were not sold in Herreran shops.  This meagre supply of fruit on the market 
corresponds to low consumer demand.  Fruit is abundant on farms; the average 
studied Herreran household has more than 5 different species of fruit trees on-farm, 
and only 2,5% of all households had no fruit trees.  Most likely diet fruit 
consumption needs are fulfilled in greatest part by farm’s own fruit trees, or those 
of relatives.  This constitutes a welfare flow of products from trees to households, 
with little or no cost to the household, which should be taken into account in the 
average diet price and/or consumption aggregates.  If the fruit cost is included in 
the price of the basic diet, as it is in this research, its equivalent should be included 
as a free in-kind welfare flow into the consumption aggregate.  This would best 
resemble the reality of rural households in Herrera; fruit are consumed free of 
charge.  Another corrective alternative would be to remove fruit costs from the 
basic diet cost, and hence from the extreme poverty line, because it is a quantity of 
money that does not need to be earned nor spent to obtain the given welfare flow.  
 
The arithmetic mean of the fruit consumption value in Herrera in an average diet is 
32,54 PAB/capita/year (annex 16).  This is the assumed cost of purchasing fruit, 
and its equivalent is the quantity that could be used in the consumption aggregate 
as the “assumed value of consumed fruit from own trees per capita”.  Such an 
adjustment to the data would greatly affect the household consumption aggregates 
and the data gives no means to verify which households actually purchase fruit and 
which don’t.  If the assumptions are correct, in neglecting the role of household 
fruit trees the consumption of households is under-estimated and their poverty is 
over-estimated.  Such an adjustment has not been suggested in any previous studies 
and it would render the results incomparable to other research, due to which the 
adjustment was not made.  This would, however, be an important issue to take into 
account in future research.   
 
5.2.2 The moderate poverty line and resulting poverty groups 
 
Since the moderate poverty line consists of adding a customary non-food 
consumption share to the extreme poverty line, a local Engel coefficient is needed 
in order to construct a local moderate poverty line for Herrera.  Again consumption 
is taken as the main welfare measure, and the income-based moderate poverty line 
calculus is in annex 13.   
 
The consumption aggregates of the studied households as calculated in chapter 4, 
allow the estimation of a locally specific non-food consumption share for Herrera.  
To derive the non-food consumption share, the food share of consumption or the 
Engel coefficient of consumption, is measured for the households with 
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consumption per capita within +/-20% of the extreme poverty line, called here the 
Engel population24.  In this research, they are the 54 households with a per capita 
consumption between 394,97 and 592,46 PAB/capita/year (13,4 % of households).  
The food share of consumption, or Engel coefficient, of the Engel population was 
calculated according to equation 5.2.   
 
Table 5.3  The Engel coefficient of consumption of the Engel population:  basic descriptives. 
 Mean  Minimum Maximum 
Standard 
deviation Median N 
Engel coefficient of 
consumption of the Engel 
population 
0,5635 0,21 0,88 0,151 0,5970 54 
 
The results (table 5.3) yield a mean Engel coefficient of consumption of 0,5635.  
That is, food accounts for an average of 56,4% of the total consumption value of 
the households with consumption per capita within +/-20% of the extreme poverty 
line.  This result is in line with the results of the Panamanian LSMS of 1997, in 
which the Engel coefficient of consumption was 0,573 among the lowest 10-40% 
consumption households (WB 1999) and with the LSMS of 2003 in which it was 
0,554 (MEF 2006).  Variation of the food share of consumption within the Engel 
population was considerable.  The Engel coefficients in the data correspond to the 
common notion that the food share of consumption decreases with increasing 
consumption levels, since the average Engel coefficient among all households with 
consumption above the extreme poverty line was 0,537 and of all households with 
consumption under the extreme poverty line 0,608.     
 
The moderate poverty line can now be calculated using equation 5.3. 
 
yearcapitaPABMPL //16,876   (5.7) 
 
Hence, the moderate poverty line of consumption is 876,16 PAB/capita/year for 
Herrera (=493,71/0,5635).  In the Panamanian LSMS of 1997 the moderate 
consumption poverty line was 905,00 PAB/capita/year, higher than in this research 
mainly due to higher food prices and 953,00 PAB/capita/year in 2003, due to both 
higher caloric requirements, higher food prices and the correction index of 8,6% 
they used to raise the non-food share of 1997 to the 2003 level without involving 
new data on Engel coefficients (MEF 2006).   
 
Based on these locally specific poverty lines and household per capita consumption 
aggregates, studied households can be divided into three welfare poverty groups.  
With the extreme poverty line and the moderate consumption poverty line, 
                                                 
24 According to the Panamanian Living Standards Measurement Studies, the Engel coefficient 
should be calculated for people within +/-10% of the extreme poverty line, but both studies from 
1997 and 2003 have in practice measured the Engel coefficient of the lowest 10-40% population in 
consumption (ENV 2003: 3; MEF 2006: 158).  In this study the +/-10% limit would have led to a 
small sample of 25 households due to which the 20% limit was considered better. 
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households can be placed into three exhaustive and exclusive consumption poverty 
groups:  below the extreme poverty line are the extremely poor, above the extreme 
poverty line but under the moderate consumption poverty line are the moderately 
poor, and above the moderate consumption poverty line are the non-poor 
households (figure 5.2).  This division into poverty groups will be the basis of 
many of the analyses in this and following chapters.   
 
Figure 5.2  Welfare poverty lines and resulting welfare poverty groups for the studied Herreran 
households. 
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Ext reme poverty line (EPL) 
= 493,71 PAB/capita/a 
Moderate poverty line (MPL)  
= 876,16 PAB/capita/a 
Non-poor households  
205 households = 51,0 % 
Moderately poor households 
135 households = 33,6 % 
Extremely poor households  
62 households = 15,4 % 
 
Over half of studied Herreran farmer households are above both poverty lines.  Of 
all interviewed 402 households, 62 had a per capita consumption below the 
extreme poverty line, comprising 15,4% of sampled households.  They constitute 
the group of the extremely poor.  135 households had a per capita consumption 
over the extreme poverty line but under the moderate poverty line.  They represent 
33,6% of all studied households and are the moderately poor households.   Hence, 
51,0% of all households had a per capita consumption above both poverty lines and 
can be termed non-poor (figure 5.2).   
 
The incidence of consumption poverty in these groups is depicted in table 5.4.  On 
average the poorer households are larger, due to which the extremely poor 
proportion of covered population is higher than the extremely poor proportion of 
covered households.  Large household size is however no absolute determinant of 
poverty, since even large households can be above the poverty lines.   
 
Table 5.4  Incidence of poverty in Herrera and household size. 
 Frequency 
of 
households 
Percent of 
households 
Percent of all 
household 
members 
Average 
household size 
(members) 
Minimum 
household 
size 
Maximum 
household 
size 
Extremely poor 62 15,4 % 19,7 % 5,05 1 11 
Moderately poor 135 33,6 % 35,8 % 4,22 1 11 
Non-poor 205 51,0 % 44,5 % 3,45 1 9 
Total 402 100,0 % 100,0 % 3,96   
   N= 1590    
 
These results differ from Panamanian national poverty rates; by which 18,5% of 
people had their consumption under the national extreme poverty line and 18,5% 
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were between the extreme and moderate poverty lines in 1997.  The corresponding 
figures for 2003 were 16,6% and 20,2%.  The studies find that 84% of the 
extremely poor households and 66,8% of the moderately poor households live in 
rural areas, which would explain the higher incidence of poverty in the rural 
Herrera province than in the country as a whole. (MEF 2006:  43-46.)  However, 
according to the LSMS of 2003, only 4,4% of Herreran people were found 
extremely poor and 25,4% moderately poor (MEF 2006: 46).  This major 
difference in results is interesting, since the consumption aggregates of the LSMS 
and this study were nearly identical and the poverty lines were very similar.  The 
difference can arise from the difference in sampled households.  Whereas the 
sample of this research included only farm households with over one hectare, the 
national poverty studies included every household of the province.  Although the 
sampled farms were found to represent quite well all Herreran farms of the same 
sizes, poverty is commonly lower in urbanized households, and among households 
with little or no land because they rely on non-agricultural livelihoods.  In addition 
the average household size in this sample (3,96) is higher than that found in the 
LSMS 2003 in Herrera, which was 3,5 (MEF 2006: 111).  Larger households tend 
to be poorer and poorer households tend to be larger, often due to having many 
small children.   
 
5.2.3   Poverty depth, regional considerations and error analysis 
 
Different types of poverty depth measures were studied for the Herreran farmer 
households using equations 5.4 and 5.5.  The poverty depth results (table 5.5) 
indicate that extremely poor households have an average shortage of 677 
PAB/household/year in their consumption to reach the extreme poverty line, or 126 
PAB per person.  To cover this household shortage with purely farm labour days 
would require over 200 additional workdays on a low 3 PAB daily wage, or over 
130 additional work days on a 5 PAB daily wage, which was the median wage in 
Herrera.  In sum the total shortage of all extremely poor households, nearly 42 000 
PAB, is dismal compared to the nearly 760 000 PAB surplus that all the 
interviewed non-poor households have above the extreme poverty line.  The 
average shortages to the moderate poverty line are naturally larger.  The average 
extremely poor household would need to increase its consumption by over 2 600 
PAB/year, or 509 PAB per person, to reach the moderate poverty line.  The average 
shortage of the moderately poor is 809 PAB/household or 183 PAB/person.  Again 
the non-poor have such high consumption levels that if their consumption sum was 
divided equally to all households, all households could be lifted above the 
moderate poverty line. 
 
These welfare poverty gaps are large enough to discourage hope; shortages are so 
severe that they cannot be filled with farm labour wages or petty trade.  This 
prospect discourages also hope for overcoming poverty in the long run through 
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investments.  Since the poorest households cannot even reach the basic welfare 
poverty lines with their own means, their rise above possible investment poverty 
lines becomes even more challenging.   
 
Table 5.5  Poverty depth among the welfare poverty groups. 
 
Extremely poor  
Moderately 
poor Non-poor 
Extreme poverty depth per capita (PAB) 
    Minimum * 
    Maximum 
    Mean 
    Median 
 
-368,51 
-,13 
-126,15 
-108,82 
 
2,34 
381,59 
199,02 
206,13 
 
384,29 
11 928,83 
1 168,65 
801,92 
Extreme poverty depth per household (PAB) 
    Minimum * 
    Maximum 
    Mean 
    Median 
    Sum 
 
-2 282,00 
-,78 
-677,03 
-515,94 
-41 975,73 
 
11,70 
2 491,11 
808,11 
715,18 
109 094,8 
 
384,29 
35 786,49 
3 706,20 
2 887,49 
759 771,10 
Moderate poverty depth per capita (PAB) 
    Minimum * 
    Maximum 
    Mean 
    Median 
 
-750,96 
-382,58 
-508,60 
-491,27 
 
-380,11 
-,86 
-183,44 
-176,35 
 
1,84 
11 546,38 
786,20 
419,47 
Moderate poverty depth per household (PAB) 
    Minimum * 
    Maximum 
    Mean 
    Median 
    Sum 
 
-5 871,01 
-422,30 
-2 607,78 
-2 422,26 
-161 683,00 
 
-3 459,53 
-3,44 
-806,68 
-648,76 
-108 902,00 
 
1,84 
34 639,14 
2 387,21 
1 478,93 
489 378,90 
N  valid 62 135 205 
When value is positive:  surplus over poverty line.  When value is negative:  shortage under given poverty line.   
*) Minimum and maximum are lowest and highest values, and are inverse to the concepts of smallest poverty 
depth or largest poverty depth.   
 
The regional distribution or economic geography of poverty cannot be overlooked 
in rural settings.  It is typical to find thriving centres where wealth concentrates in 
the same province with poverty-stricken remote areas.  While the Herrera province 
is not large in area, distances from remote areas to centres are long and in many 
parts difficult and expensive to travel.  They effectively separate different regions 
of the province and form a very different setting for life and livelihood formation of 
the people.  The more remote, mountainous districts of Las Minas and Los Pozos 
were identified as the poverty hot spots of the region by all interviewed local 
experts.  Indeed this notion finds support in the data of this research (table 5.6).   
 
The differences in poverty incidences among the province’s districts are great.  
Extreme poverty is more common in Las Minas and Los Pozos than in rest of the 
province, while the vast majority of farmer households in the capital Chitré, in 
Santa Maria and Parita are non-poor25.  Ocu also has a relatively low share of non-
poor households and a high share of moderately poor households.  The causality 
between poverty and location can move both ways; being poor drives a household 
                                                 
25 The figures must be treated with caution because the N in the different cells and their expected 
counts in table 4.7 are small.  
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to live in distant, less productive areas with lower land prices, and living in a 
generally poor and marginal area with poor infrastructure makes the improvement 
of livelihoods difficult for all households (Ravallion 1996).  The rural poverty bias 
in Panama has been described in a variety of studies, finding higher poverty rates in 
rural areas relative to central areas (MEF 2006: 140; INDH 2002; WB 1999: ix).   
 
Table 5.6  Regional distribution of poverty in the province of Herrera.  Share of households in different welfare 
poverty groups among the seven Herreran districts. 
District 
Extremely poor 
(EP) 
Moderately 
poor (MP) 
Non-poor (NP) Total N 
(households) 
2-tailed significance of 
Pearson Chi-Square 
Chitré ,0 %  22,2 % 77,8 % 18 
Las Minas 29,4 % 41,2 % 29,4 % 68 
Los Pozos 24,3 % 32,9 % 42,9 % 70 
Ocú 14,4 % 36,0 % 49,5 % 111 
Parita 10,3 % 28,2 % 61,5 % 39 
Pesé 6,0 % 34,3 % 59,7 % 67 
Santa Maria 3,4 % 20,7 % 75,9 % 29 
Total 15,4 % 33,6 % 51,0 % 402 
EP-MP ,082  
MP-NP ,021 
N valid 62 135 205 402 
 
In addition to Pearson Chi-Square tests, the regional inequality in the distribution 
of poverty can be studied with another method.  The decomposable poverty 
measure developed by Foster, Greer and Thorbecke (1984) can be used to estimate 
how much each district contributes to the total poverty measure of the province of 
Herrera.  By this method a total measure of extreme poverty and of moderate 
poverty is calculated for the data, taking as its weights the actual distance between 
a household’s consumption and the poverty lines (i.e. poverty depth) rather than the 
number of households lying under the poverty lines.  Decomposability allows 
dividing the studied households into any number of subgroups and quantitatively 
assessing the contribution of each population subgroup to the overall poverty 
measures.  The decomposed poverty measure is more informative than the poverty 
rate of each district alone, since it is sensitive to the severity of deprivation in each 
district.  The results will allow a quantitative assessment of the effect of changes in 
subgroup poverty on total poverty.  A complete elimination of poverty within a 
subgroup would lower total poverty precisely by the given percentage.  Calculus 
details are in annex 17 and results are collected in table 5.7.   
 
The results indicate that the districts of Las Minas and Los Pozos contribute to the 
extreme and moderate poverty measures of the province more than corresponds to 
their population share (table 5.7), while all other districts contribute less to the 
poverty measures than their population shares would suggest.  For instance the Las 
Minas district contributes to 37,2% of the total extreme poverty of the province, 
although it has only 19,5% of the covered population, and while Santa Maria 
district houses 7,1% of covered population, it accounts for only 3,3% of the total 
moderate poverty of the province.  The results offer numerous interpretations.  If 
all extreme poverty could be eliminated from Los Pozos, the overall extreme 
poverty measure of the province of Herrera would decrease by 25,9%.  These 
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results further support the notion of the imbalance of opportunities within the 
province of Herrera.  The districts of Las Minas and Los Pozos are not considered 
marginalized poverty hot spots without foundation; their more rudimentary settings 
are apparent in the collected data, in the higher poverty of their inhabitants. 
 
Table 5.7  Poverty measures of Foster, Greer and Thorbecke 1984 decomposed by the districts of Herrera. 
District Household 
members in 
interviewed 
households 
(nj) 
Share of all 
household 
members = 
100*(nj/n) 
Extreme 
poverty 
measure 
EPM 
Percentage 
contribution to 
total extreme 
poverty measurea  
Moderate 
poverty 
measure 
MPM 
Percentage 
contribution to 
total moderate 
poverty 
measureb 
Chitre 76 4,8 % ,000 ,0 % ,003 0,2 % 
Las Minas 310 19,5 % ,040 37,2 % ,156 32,9 % 
Los Pozos 271 17,0 % ,032 25,9 % ,121 22,3 % 
Ocu 419 26,4 % ,015 19,0 % ,089 25,4 % 
Parita 150 9,4 % ,011 5,1 % ,070 7,2 % 
Pese 251 15,8 % ,013 9,8 % ,052 8,8 % 
Santa Maria 113 7,1 % ,009 3,1 % ,043 3,3 % 
TOTAL 1 590 100,0 % ,021 100,0 % ,093 100,0 % 
a  I.e. 100*(nj/n)*EPM(c(j); ze)/EPM (c; ze) 
b I.e. 100*(nj/n)*MPM(c(j); zm)/MPM (c; zm) 
 
The division of households into poverty groups made it possible to further study 
possible errors or inconsistencies in the data.  In addition to the error sources 
related to sampling, questionnaire and farm household interviews as discussed in 
section 3.3.2, and to the confusion of measures, weights and their conversion as 
discussed in section 3.2.2 that have all affected the data, two irregularities were 
found among the poverty groups that need consideration.  There was an imbalance 
among the poverty groups in respect to the gender of the household informant and 
in respect to the interviewers.  The share of female respondents among the 
extremely poor households is higher than in the other poverty groups (table 5.8).   
 
Table 5.8  Poverty groups and gender considerations. 
 Extremely 
poor (EP)  
Moderately 
poor (MP)  
Non-poor 
(NP)  
2-tailed significance of 
Pearson Chi-Square  
Female- headed households 
N valid 
11,3 % 
62 
4,4 % 
135 
3,4 % 
205 
EP-MP ,072 
MP-NP ,628 
Gender of household informant(s) 
    Female 
    Male 
    Both female and male 
N valid 
 
48,3 % 
50,0 % 
1,7 % 
60 
 
22,0 % 
72,0 % 
6,1 % 
132 
 
19,7 % 
74,4 % 
5,9 % 
203 
EP-MP ,001 
MP-NP ,876 
 
This has several possible causes:  in poorest households men may be working 
during the day more often than in the other poverty groups and hence the spouse 
could have been more often interviewed in the absence of the man.  The difference 
could have been caused also by a higher willingness of the women of extremely 
poor households to participate in the interviews, while the women in moderately 
and non-poor households can have more often refused due to, for instance, not 
knowing enough about farm production.  Another possible explanation is that 
women gave lower estimates for their incomes, consumption or harvest, or all, than 
would have been given by men.  One part of the explanation may also be the higher 
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share of female-headed households among the extremely poor households, in 
which cases the household informant has been most likely to be a woman. 
 
Table 5.9  Differences between interviewer results. 
 
Interviewer 1 Interviewer 2 
2-tailed significance of 
Pearson Chi-Square 
Consumption poverty group      
     Extremely poor 
     Moderately poor 
     Non-poor  
10,7 % 
27,7 % 
61,6 % 
19,1 % 
38,2 % 
42,7 % ,001 
Income poverty group 
     Extremely poor 
     Moderately poor 
     Non-poor 
12,4 % 
16,4 % 
71,2 % 
7,1 % 
10,7 % 
82,2 % ,030 
Gender of household informant 
     Female 
     Male 
     Both female and male 
19,5 % 
69,5 % 
10,9 % 
29,0 % 
70,1 % 
,9 % ,000 
N valid 177 225  
 
The second irregularity was the difference in results between interviewers.  All 
possible sources of differences between results of the two interviewers were 
actively controlled for during the interview period.  Nevertheless the share of 
different poverty groups between the two interviewers is statistically significant 
(table 5.9).  There are several possible reasons.  There may have remained 
differences in how actively answers were probed for, how answers were marked on 
the questionnaire, how confident the respondent has felt with the interviewer and 
how well the interviewer has understood the answers.  The possibility cannot be 
discarded that the interviewers could have unconsciously entered different types of 
houses, i.e. they might have visited houses, which genuinely have different poverty 
levels or that the fact that the other interviewer was foreigner could have influenced 
households’ responses.  Despite best efforts, interviewer bias was thus not 
completely eradicated from this study. 
 
 
5.3   Comparisons of the poverty groups: a preliminary analysis  
 
In this section the three consumption poverty groups: extremely poor, moderately 
poor and non-poor households will be statistically compared to one another in 
respect to a variety of characteristics.  Following the theoretical framework of 
Reardon and Vosti (1995), the poverty groups will be compared in terms of the 
households’ asset components, including natural, human, on-farm and off-farm 
resources; as well as in consumption, income and investment strategies.  Because 
tests of differences in means or distributions based on cross-sectional data cannot 
reveal causation chains, differences between poverty groups cannot explain what 
has caused poverty or what has been the consequence of poverty.  But possible 
differences can help to understand the different conditions of each poverty group:  
how they live, what they produce and what they have, suggesting about their past 
and dictating for great part the opportunities they have in the future.   
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For all variables, differences will be tested pairwise, comparing extremely poor 
households to moderately poor households (denoted EP-MP), and comparing 
moderately poor households to non-poor households (MP-NP).  For continuous 
variables, the majority of differences are tested with the Mann-Whitney U-test, 
with the rare exception of some t-tests, carried out for normally distributed 
variables.  For categorical variables differences are tested with the Pearson Chi-
Square test.  Statistical significance is assessed by the conventional 0.05 level.  
Significances are two-tailed, although in many cases the one-tailed significance 
would have been more appropriate since there are often expectations about the 
direction in which tendencies move.  For many variables, however, no expectations 
exist a priori, and thus for simplicity and coherence of the tables all significances 
are reported two-tailed. 
   
5.3.1   Differences in natural, human, on-farm and off-farm resources 
 
Land is the most important natural resource of the Herreran farmers.  The results 
reveal that non-poor households have on average most land (table 5.10), and more 
commonly their lands are on more than one parcel (annex 18).  The share of titled 
land increases with rising consumption levels; while over half of the extremely 
poor have no titled land, over half of the non-poor have titles for all their land.  
Extremely poor farms are on average located most distant from district centres and 
from the province capital.  Moderately poor farms are on average as close to 
district centres as non-poor farms, but further from the province capital, i.e. often 
located near centres of distant districts.  On average all households have possessed 
their first parcels of land for 24-29 years, and while more than half of all farmers 
have received all their lands by inheritance, the non-poor have been most likely to 
also purchase additional lands.  Taking land to cultivation by renting and 
sharecropping is quite marginal in Herrera, although the share of households 
renting out their lands was highest among extremely poor households.  Land rent 
incomes are however not sufficient to raise a household out of poverty.  Although 
the non-poor have on average more flat land, the share of flat land of total land area 
does not differ significantly between the poverty groups.  It was difficult for 
farmers to estimate a value of their land, because most farmers have never sold or 
purchased land.  Nevertheless the land value estimates of different poverty groups 
differ.  Private forest ownership is very rare, and most of the tree-covered areas are 
devoted to fruit trees.  On average farmer households have a similar amount of land 
under crops (means 1,8-2,4 ha and medians 1-1,5 ha) and similar areas in fallow.  
As the non-poor have on average more land than other poverty groups, this 
difference is caused by larger pasture areas.  Non-poor are also more likely to have 
improved pasture species than the other poverty groups.   
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These findings are in line with previous nation-wide studies in Panama, according 
to which the poor have less land of lower value and less seldom have titles for their 
lands than the non-poor, and according to which the poor have primarily inherited 
their land while non-poor have more purchased land (MEF 2006; WB 1999).  The 
mean land areas differ from nation-wide studies, in which the mean land ownership 
in rural non-indigenous areas was 13,1 ha per household in 2003 (MEF 2006: 191), 
lower than the 17,8 ha per household of this study, and the titled share of this study, 
total 58,7% of lands is greater than in the national study in 2003, 40,5% (MEF 
2006: 191).  Land areas of the studies cannot be directly compared, because this 
study excluded farms with less than one hectare of land.  The higher share of titled 
lands can be at least partly explained by recent advances in land titling including 
subsidized titling programmes by the state.  The higher land value of the non-poor 
is explained in previous studies by location and titling, and less by productivity 
(WB 1999: Vol. 2: App.5: 2-3).   
 
Table 5.10  Natural resources:  comparison of consumption poverty groups. 
 
Extremely 
poor  
Moderately 
poor  Non-poor  
2-tailed significance of 
Mann-Whitney U 
Total area of land possessed by 
household (ha) 
     Mean 
     Median 
N valid 
11,1 
3,3 
62 
10,1 
4,0 
135 
24,9 
9,0 
205 
EP-MP ,972 
MP-NP ,000 
Titled land (% of total land area) 
     Mean 
     Median 
N valid 
33,7 
,0 
62 
50,5 
56,0 
134 
64,3 
100,0 
204 
EP-MP ,028 
MP-NP ,014 
Distance from main farm to district centre
(km) 
     Mean 
     Median 
N valid 
15,1 
13,5 
62 
11,0 
9,5 
133 
11,1 
10,0 
196 
EP-MP ,002 
MP-NP ,660 
Distance from main farm to province 
capital Chitré (km) 
     Mean 
     Median 
N valid 
60,0 
60,5 
62 
49,5 
54,0 
133 
43,9 
49,0 
196 
EP-MP ,001 
MP-NP ,016 
Pasture area (ha) 
     Mean 
     Median 
N valid 
4,3 
,0 
60 
7,0 
,0 
132 
20,2 
5,0 
205 
EP-MP ,100 
MP-NP ,000 
Improved pasture (ha) 
     Mean 
     Median 
N valid 
,03 
,0 
62 
,29 
,0 
135 
2,7 
,0 
205 
EP-MP ,181 
MP-NP ,000 
 
On average the Herreran farm is headed by a male of approximately 53-55 years of 
age (annex 19).  The vast majority of household heads is literate and married, or as 
is prevalent in Panama, live in a marriage-like union.  The average household has 
1,6 contributing members.  Despite most households reported belonging to the 
Catholic Church, the process of secularisation is obvious in much of the studied 
area.  In these traits, there were no statistically significant differences between the 
poverty groups (annex 19).   
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Poverty groups, however, differ in the educational level of their household head 
(table 5.11).  The average educational level of households was the higher the less 
poor the household was, and the share of household heads with no education was 
highest among extremely poor households.  Educational means are lower for all 
poverty levels than the national average 8,6 years in 2003 (MEF 2006: 72), due to 
the older age structure of the household heads than the average population and due 
to rural bias.  The central role of education in the household's poverty class has 
been identified also in nation wide studies (MEF 2006: 74).   
 
Table 5.11  Human resources:  comparison of consumption poverty groups. 
 Extremely 
poor  
Moderately 
poor Non-poor  
2-tailed significance 
of tests 
Formal education of household head  
     Mean (years) 
     With no education 
N valid 
4,2 
16,1 % 
62 
5,3 
11,2 % 
134 
6,7 
6,8 % 
205 
Mann-Whitney U  
EP-MP ,023 
MP-NP ,011 
Number of children* 
     Mean 
N valid 
4,5 
62 
3,8 
135 
3,3 
205 
Mann-Whitney U  
EP-MP ,017 
MP-NP ,083 
Number of household members 
     Mean 
N valid 
5,1 
62 
4,2 
135 
3,5 
205 
Mann-Whitney U  
EP-MP ,003 
MP-NP ,000 
Share of contributing household 
members of total household size  
     Mean % 35,7 % 42,4 % 54,2 % 
Mann-Whitney U  
EP-MP ,006 
MP-NP ,000 
Number of associations the household 
belongs to 
     Mean 
     % of households participating 
N valid 
,05 
4,8 % 
62 
,04 
5,2 % 
134 
,15 
13,2 % 
204 
Mann-Whitney U  
EP-MP ,911 
MP-NP ,008 
Contact with agricultural development 
bank BDA 
N valid 
6,5 % 
62 
5,9 % 
135 
16,7 % 
204 
Pearson Chi-Square  
EP-MP ,886 
MP-NP ,003 
Contact with agricultural development 
ministry MIDA 
N valid 
4,8 % 
62 
9,6 % 
135 
20,1 % 
204 
Pearson Chi-Square  
EP-MP ,253 
MP-NP ,010 
Contact with the National Bank of 
Panama BNP 
N valid 
1,6 % 
62 
3,0 % 
135 
22,1 % 
204 
Pearson Chi-Square  
EP-MP ,576 
MP-NP ,000 
*) Total number of children of the household head and spouse.  Not all children necessarily live in the 
household at the time of interview, for instance grown up children.   
 
Richer households tend to have less children and less household members than 
poorer households (table 5.11).  The higher consumption per capita in non-poor 
households is thus caused not only by higher welfare levels but because 
consumption is divided by fewer household members (also identified in MEF 2006: 
56-7).  A new child in the family decreases the per capita consumption parameter 
even though no immediate welfare impact would necessarily take place.  Larger 
household sizes seldom entail a higher number of contributing household members.  
The dependency share or burden thus increases, as in this data (table 5.11 and 
annex 19); there are more mouths to feed for a given number of contributing 
people.  Whereas on average over half of household members actively contribute to 
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household incomes or welfare in non-poor households, in moderately poor the 
share is lower, and among the extremely poor even lower.   
 
Most interviewed farmers identified themselves as farmer, livestock rancher, or 
both (annex 19), even if they had diversified livelihoods into other sectors as well.  
The share of full time employees and manual workers increase with higher 
consumption levels.  While it does lower the probability of being extremely poor, 
having a profession is no guarantee for rising out of poverty; many households 
headed by manual workers and even administrative employees are moderately 
poor.  The probability of being poor is increased in single mother households, 
which form 5% of the interviewed households.  This finding diverges from the 
national censuses, according to which 24,5 % of all Panamanian households are 
headed by females (DEC 2000a), and according to which poverty is more common 
in male-headed than in female-headed households (MEF 2006: 48; WB 1999: 17).  
Female-headed households may be more common in urban than rural settings, and 
the option of divorce may less life-threatening for non-farmer and wealthier 
households than for the poor.  The probability of being poor is lower for 
households in which the spouse of the household head holds a regular job (annex 
19), although also housewives hold numerous contributing roles, caring for the 
children, house, pigs and chicken.  Women's contribution to rural development is 
often overlooked (Kotzé 2003: 114; Grynspan & Perez 1993), but such is not the 
case in Herrera.  The number of contributing household members as reported by 
households themselves is uniformly higher than the number of income-receiving 
household members (annex 19), reflecting that although women seldom receive 
major incomes they are perceived as contributing members due to their numerous 
roles in the household. 
 
Statistically significant differences in institutional involvement exist in favour of 
the non-poor (table 5.11 and annex 19), depicting a bias in access to opportunities 
for technical assistance and training as also has been identified in national studies 
(MEF 2006: 190; WB 1999: Vol. 2: App.5: 5) and on the entire Central American 
scale (Arze 2002).  The non-poor are most likely to have contact with the most 
important providers of technical assistance in Herrera: the agricultural development 
bank, the ministry of agricultural development and the National Bank of Panama.  
Few households belong to cooperatives or associations, or have insurance for crops 
or livestock.  These results are in contrast to national studies, in which up to 51% 
of rural non-indigenous households were found to belong to associations in 2003 
(MEF 2006: 112).  Herreran farmers tend to favour individualism.  Development 
projects have benefited most the non-poor households of this study, a bias found 
also in national studies (MEF 2006), but it is not reasonable to assume that due to 
the development projects households have risen out of poverty since most projects 
are limited in scope.   
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As can be expected, poverty groups differ significantly in respect to many on-farm 
resources.  The poorer the household, less cattle it has (table 5.12) and the total 
value of animals depicts an average ten-fold inequality between extremely and non-
poor households.  Ownership of horses, pigs or chicken does not, however, differ 
significantly between the poverty groups (annex 20).  The vast majority of all 
households (97,8%) own the house in which they live, constituting often the most 
valuable and important on-farm asset especially of poor households (table 5.12 and 
annex 20).  Significant differences are found also in the possession of vehicles: 
while no extremely poor household has a car and few have even bicycles, over a 
third of non-poor households have a car or a pick-up.  The possession of larger 
vehicles or large farm machinery is very rare in all groups, as is the possession of 
crop deposits or silos and stockyards.   
 
Table 5.12  On-farm resources:  comparison of consumption poverty groups.   
 Extremely 
poor 
Moderately 
poor Non-poor 
2-tailed significance 
of Mann-Whitney U 
Number of bovine animals 
     Mean 
     Had bovine animals 
N valid 
2,9 
25,8 % 
62 
6,2 
42,2 % 
135 
25,4 
59,0 % 
205 
EP-MP ,014 
MP-NP ,000 
Value of bovine animals (PAB) 
     Mean 
     Median 
N valid 
802,6 
,0 
62 
1 843,0 
,0 
135 
10 162,8 
1 740,0 
205 
EP-MP ,013 
MP-NP ,000 
Value of all animals (PAB) 
     Mean 
     Median 
N valid 
1 053,5 
240,0 
62 
2 132,1 
390,0 
135 
10 639,4 
2 120,0 
205 
EP-MP ,023 
MP-NP ,000 
Value of house (PAB) * 
     Mean 
     Median 
N valid 
 
2 054,4 
450,0 
44 
 
5 866,3 
3 250,0 
104 
 
10 284,5 
6 000,0 
173 
EP-MP ,000 
MP-NP ,051 
Quantity of cars and pick-ups 
     Mean 
     Had a car or pick-up 
N valid 
,00 
0 % 
62 
,12 
10,4 % 
135 
,50 
38,5 % 
205 
EP-MP ,009 
MP-NP ,000 
*) Housing value was missing from a total of 81 households, due to their incapacity to estimate a value.  Thus 
these figures must be interpreted with care. 
 
The extremely poor face most critical deficiencies in their living conditions (annex 
21).  Nearly every tenth extremely poor household lack any type of toilet, more 
than every fourth lack electricity, and every sixth have no running water.  
Interestingly enough, not even all non-poor households count with these basic 
services.  While telephones are still a rarity in most of the households, televisions 
have been purchased even to households in areas with no electricity and run with 
batteries.  The figures for all housing conditions are higher than the national rural 
averages in 2003 (MEF 2006: 107-9).   
 
Regularity of incomes from work or retirements helps households rise above the 
poverty lines (table 5.13).  But there is a clear share of working poor, households 
that are below moderate and/or extreme poverty lines despite having permanent 
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jobs.  Poverty is also lower in households receiving retirement compensations, even 
though their households are not smaller as could be assumed.  Income 
diversification to commerce, industry and other business is more common among 
the non-poor than in the other poverty groups; not only does business increase 
incomes but the non-poor also a priori have more opportunities for starting 
businesses.  These findings are consistent with national studies (MEF 2006: 134-8).   
 
Table 5.13  Off-farm resources:  comparison of consumption poverty groups. 
 Extremely 
poor 
Moderately 
poor Non-poor 
2-tailed significance of 
tests  
Regularity of incomes: 
     No regular incomes 
     Permanent job, no retirement 
     Permanent job and retirement 
     Retirements, no job 
N valid 
 
71,0 % 
24,2 % 
1,6 % 
3,2 % 
62 
 
44,4 % 
45,9 % 
4,4 % 
5,2 % 
135 
 
47,5 % 
33,8 % 
5,4 % 
13,2 % 
205 
Pearson Chi-Square 
EP-MP ,007 
MP-NP ,034 
Household owns a company, kiosk, 
shop, or such. 
N valid 
 
1,6 % 
62 
 
6,7 % 
135 
 
13,7 % 
205 
Pearson Chi-Square  
EP-MP ,133 
MP-NP ,043 
Household has a bank account 
N valid 
14,5 % 
62 
22,1 % 
131 
46,5 % 
202 
Pearson Chi-Square  
EP-MP ,214 
MP-NP ,000 
Household has loans 
N valid 
8,1 % 
62 
10,4 % 
135 
36,6 % 
205 
Pearson Chi-Square  
EP-MP ,611 
MP-NP ,000 
Total amount of loans (PAB) 
     Mean: households with loans 
     Sum 
N valid 
3 450,0 
17 250,0 
5 
3 400,0 
47 600,0 
14 
11 252,7 
821 450,0 
73 
Mann-Whitney U 
EP-MP ,780 
MP-NP ,006 
Annual payback of loans (PAB) 
     Mean:  households with loans 
N valid 
598,3 
5 
830,6 
14 
2 108,4 
73 
Mann-Whitney U  
EP-MP ,301 
MP-NP ,004 
 
As can be expected, the poorer the household, the less likely it is to own real estate 
other than the household house (annex 22) or to have a bank account or savings 
(table 5.13).  Noteworthy are the 12,9% of extremely poor and 16,3% of 
moderately poor that have savings despite living under the poverty lines.  This 
offers them a buffer against shocks, as does the fact of having relatives who 
regularly send remittances (annex 22).  The role of remittances is however not 
central in Herreran livelihoods; remittances are on average under 200 PAB in all 
poverty groups.  The non-poor are most likely to have loans.  Most of the loans 
have been taken for livestock, agriculture, housing and land purchases.  There is a 
general reluctance towards taking loans; although a share of households responded 
to be willing to take a loan this year, few had actually applied for loans in the past 
12 months.  These findings are consistent with national studied (WB 1999: Vol. 2: 
App.5: 3-4).  Nearly half of households are given credit in local shops, poor mostly 
for food only, non-poor also for agricultural inputs (annex 22); offering short-term 
flexibility for the household economy. 
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5.3.2   Differences in household behaviour 
 
The relative contribution of crops to farmer household income is, contrary to 
expectations, similar in all poverty groups (table 5.14).  Livestock income is 
proportionately greatest among non-poor households, as is the share of self-
employment income and retirement payments.  The extremely poor are most 
dependent on daily wages received from irregular work, received by two thirds of 
households, and on rents.  Many extremely poor households rent out land to obtain 
cash and to save in input costs.  Incomes from regular employment constitute a 
significant share of those households that have regular jobs, but such employment 
is least common among the extremely poor.   
 
Table 5.14  Income strategies: comparison of consumption poverty groups. 
 Extremely poor Moderately poor Non-poor 
 
Mean 
income 
share of 
all 
house-
holds % 
Partici-
pating 
% 
Mean 
income 
share of 
partici-
pating 
house-
holds % 
Mean 
income 
share of 
all 
house-
holds % 
Partici-
pating 
% 
Mean 
income 
share of 
partici-
pating 
house-
holds % 
Mean 
income 
share of 
all 
house-
holds % 
Partici-
pating 
% 
Mean 
income 
share of 
partici-
pating 
house-
holds % 
Crop income 
(net) 21,6 90,3 24,0 19,3 83,0 23,3 20,1 83,4 24,1 
Livestock 
income * (net) 11,8 96,8 12,0 14,5 95,6 15,1 21,6 91,7 23,5 
Self 
employment 
income (net) 1,0 8,1 12,0 6,3 26,7 23,5 10,2 36,1 28,2 
Daily wages 25,5 66,1 38,6 14,1 45,9 30,6 8,7 32,2 27,0 
Regular 
employment 
income 14,8 25,8 57,4 25,0 50,4 50,0 19,0 41,0 46,4 
Retirements 
and pensions 1,2 6,5 19,2 3,6 9,6 37,4 6,9 17,1 40,1 
Donations and 
remittances 6,8 46,8 14,5 6,1 44,4 13,7 3,6 35,6 10,2 
Rents 
 3,6 16,1 22,5 1,5 13,3 10,9 1,7 17,6 9,5 
Imputed 
values**  13,7 100 13,7 9,6 100 9,6 8,2 100 8,2 
Total 
N 
100,0 
62   
100,0 
135   
100,0 
205   
*) Including poultry. **) Annual value of housing and consumer durables. 
 
Cultivation of rice and corn is common in all poverty groups, and to a lower degree 
also cassava and beans are important crops (annex 23).  While these basic staples 
are slightly more common among poorer households, it is notable that prevalently 
the non-poor have harvested pumpkin, sugar cane and melons, all of which require 
considerable investments, irrigation and other inputs.  This phenomenon 
corresponds to findings of the Panamanian Living Standards Measurement study of 
1997 (WB 1999: Vol. 2: App.5: 1-2) according to which non-poor tend to be 
specialized in higher value crops of higher input requirements.  The results also 
correspond to the work of Weller (1993) in Panama, Costa Rica and Honduras, in 
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which two types of crops were distinguished according to their technological 
requirements: crops without specific requirements such as tubers, and crops with 
very specific requirements, such as fresh fruit and vegetables (annex 24).  The poor 
are often limited by scarcity of land, capital, technology and market access, and 
cannot cultivate the more lucrative crops.  In Herrera there is exportation of 
melons, watermelons, yam and taro with high quality requirements and thus high 
production costs, to which only the non-poor have access.  Although many poor 
households also cultivate yam and taro, it is with traditional low input technologies 
for household consumption and not of exportation quality.  As can be expected, 
extremely poor households sell fewer crops than the other poverty groups (annex 
25) but on average moderately poor households do not sell fewer crops than the 
non-poor.  Perhaps contrary to common perceptions, the value of crops consumed 
in the household is highest among the non-poor households, and the total crop 
production value rises with the household welfare level.  The poorer the household, 
the lower expenditure it has on crop inputs.   
 
The poverty groups differ significantly in their livestock production.  Expenditure 
in livestock inputs increases with household’s welfare level and milk sales are 
highest among non-poor households, leading consequently to a higher value of all 
livestock sales (annex 25).  The home consumption value of livestock products did 
not significantly differ among poverty groups, but due to higher sales the overall 
value of livestock production increased with household welfare level.  The 
importance of cattle to non-poor households has been identified also in previous 
studies in Panama (WB 1999: Vol. 2: App.5: 1-2).   
 
Farming for household consumption is of central importance on all Herreran farms; 
contrary to expectations there were few differences between poverty groups (annex 
26).  The vast majority of crops is consumed in the households rather than sold, and 
very few households are dedicated to commercial crop production only.  For much 
part, sales barely cover the overall input costs of crop production, suggesting that 
crops are sold for obtaining cash for purchasing inputs.  Livestock production is 
also mainly consumed in the households among the poor households, but the 
importance of commercial production increases with household welfare level.  On 
the whole, the poorer the household, the less of its farm output is sold in the 
market.  Although many farmers shared the idea that they were “farming at loss”, 
in fact only a marginal group of farm households spend more on inputs than what 
their agricultural production is worth.  A great deal of farm households need to 
finance their crop and livestock input needs with work incomes, because their 
agricultural sales are lower than their input expenditures.  Nevertheless the 
household consumption component of production is of great value and importance, 
raising the overall profitability of their agricultural production to the positive side.   
 
Calculating the total agricultural production value for each hectare of land in 
productive use, the aggregated results show no statistically significant differences 
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between the poverty groups (annex 27).  But breaking the overall production value 
figure down to crop and livestock production, differences arise.  In both crop 
production and livestock production, gross and net production values per hectare 
significantly increase with household welfare level (table 5.15).  The similarity of 
overall production value per hectare of farmland is thus caused by the combination 
of the findings that livestock productivity per hectare is lower than crop 
productivity per hectare and that wealthier households have on average more area 
dedicated to livestock production.  Reflecting these findings with national estimates 
of net incomes per hectare for different crops and recommended input uses (annex 
28), input use of all welfare poverty groups are on average clearly below 
recommended levels and yields also thus clearly below the national estimates 
except for the lowest producing basic staples.   
 
Table 5.15  Value of production of each farmed hectare: comparison of consumption poverty groups. 
 Extremely 
poor 
Moderately 
poor Non-poor 
2-tailed significance 
of Mann-Whitney U 
Gross value of crop production per hectare 
of crop land (PAB/ha) 
     Mean 
     Median 
 N valid * 
 N missing      
 
433,4 
328,0 
55 
7 
 
696,5 
528,9 
113 
22 
 
1 145,9 
664,3 
171 
34 
EP-MP ,001 
MP-NP ,005 
Net value of crop production (value of 
crops-inputs) / crop area (PAB/ha) 
     Mean 
     Median 
 N valid * 
 N missing      
 
382,2 
281,7 
55 
7 
 
562,8 
432,0 
113 
22 
 
864,2 
476,3 
171 
34 
EP-MP ,032 
MP-NP ,028 
Gross value of livestock production per ha 
of pasture (PAB/ha) 
     Mean 
     Median 
 N valid ** 
 N missing 
 
149,4 
26,6 
21 
41 
434,6 
76,3 
65 
70 
 
843,7 
142,2 
125 
80 
EP-MP ,023 
MP-NP ,042 
Net value of livestock production (livestock 
production value-inputs) / pasture area 
(PAB/ha) 
     Mean 
     Median 
 N valid ** 
 N missing 
 
138,5 
9,9 
21 
41 
 
407,6 
51,9 
65 
70 
 
770,7 
108,6 
125 
80 
EP-MP ,017 
MP-NP ,042 
*) Only households that grow crops were included.  **) Only households that have pasture area were included. 
Note:  livestock production includes poultry and pigs.  Households with no pasture were excluded from the 
tests even if they had poultry and/or pigs.   
 
The consumption patterns of the studied Herreran households resemble those of all 
rural non-indigenous households in Panama (annex 29).  Over half of the value of 
consumption comprises of food, most of which is purchased in all poverty groups.  
The proportions of consumption going into education, health, electricity, water and 
the such basic services are similar in all poverty groups, but the share of transport, 
imputed annual value of consumer durables and other services and goods for 
personal use increase with higher consumption levels.  Because consumption 
shares are similar and consumption values different among poverty groups, the 
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resulting absolute consumption in each item is higher in the less poor groups.  For 
instance in education, despite the general average consumption share of 4,7%, the 
resulting expenditure ranges considerably: in national studies from 76 
PAB/student/year in the lowest quintile to 974 PAB/student/year in the highest 
quintile (MEF 2006: 77).  The in-kind share of consumption, comprising home 
produced crops and livestock products and the imputed annual value of housing 
and consumer durables, is highest among the extremely poor (annex 30).  
Nevertheless in all poverty groups, more than half of the consumption is based on 
cash interactions. 
 
Investments in crop production, including fertilizers, tools, machinery, deposits and 
irrigation systems, increase with rising consumption levels (table 5.16; contents of 
investment categories listed in annex 32).  The vast majority of these investments 
are made in fertilizers.  Beyond fertilizer investments, crop investment level is 
minimal particularly among the extremely poor (annex 31).  Also investments in 
maintenance and construction of fences increase with rising welfare levels.  
Extremely poor invest least in new animals.  Moderately poor are as likely as non-
poor households to invest in new animals, but they make clearly fewer other 
livestock investments, such as in tools, machinery, irrigation and stocking yards.  It 
is possible that among the moderately poor new animals are purchased even on the 
expense of daily consumption.  Investments into household housing, furniture, 
electronics, vehicles and other household durables are more common than 
productive investments (annex 31 and table 5.16), although the invested sums are 
smaller.  The total amount of household investments increases as welfare levels 
rise, and the most common investment item is in electronics and furniture.  It is 
noteworthy that 36,1% of the extremely poor has made investments in housing, 
electronics and/or furniture, while they are living under the nutritional minimum.  
Decomposition of the household investments into the different categories yield the 
only significant difference that moderately poor make on average larger 
investments in housing than extremely poor.  The studied households make 
considerable investments into education, i.e. to school materials, transportation, 
fees and uniforms26.  Educational investments are at a similar level as investments 
into household durables and housing, constituting a particularly large share of all 
investments among the extremely poor.  The largest absolute educational 
investments are made by non-poor households.   
 
                                                 
26 Educational expenditure is also included in the consumption aggregate unlike other investment 
categories.  This was to ensure comparability with other studies, in which education has been 
included in consumption.  However education is also a major investment into a possible future 
improvement of the household economy.  Consumption and investments are never aggregated in the 
analyses, thus education is not doubly represented. 
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Table 5.16  Investments: comparison of poverty groups.   
 Extremely 
poor 
Moderately 
poor Non-poor 
2-tailed significance 
of Mann-Whitney U 
Investments in crop production (PAB) 
     Mean 
     Have made crop investments 
N valid* 
40,0 
80,0 % 
55 
97,4 
85,0 % 
113 
452,6 
89,5 % 
171 
EP-MP ,004 
MP-NP ,024 
Investments in fences (PAB) 
     Mean 
     Have made fence investments 
N valid 
8,0 
30,6 % 
62 
25,7 
42,2 % 
135 
104,5 
58,0 % 
205 
EP-MP ,048 
MP-NP ,000 
Investments in new animals (PAB) 
     Mean 
     Have made animal investments 
N valid* 
1 413,8 
14,3 % 
21 
1 501,0 
41,5 % 
65 
5 582,4 
47,2 % 
125 
EP-MP ,047 
MP-NP ,337 
Investments in livestock production 
excluding new animals (PAB) 
     Mean 
     Have made livestock investments 
N valid* 
9,1 
14,3 % 
21 
31,0 
24,6 % 
65 
367,9 
36,0 % 
125 
EP-MP ,306 
MP-NP ,043 
Household investments (PAB) 
     Mean 
     Have made household investments 
N valid 
177,9 
36,1 % 
62 
263,0 
48,9 % 
135 
763,3 
56,9 % 
205 
EP-MP ,022 
MP-NP ,007 
Educational investments (PAB) 
     Mean 
N valid** 
253,6 
30 
242,4 
67 
774,6 
94 
EP-MP ,802 
MP-NP ,000 
Total investments (PAB) 
     Mean 
     Have made investments 
N valid 
826,0 
88,7 % 
62 
1 228,1 
94,8 % 
135 
5 292,2 
95,6 % 
205 
EP-MP ,001 
MP-NP ,000 
*) Including households who participate in the activity (crop area>0 or pasture area>0).  **) Including 
households with educational investments > 0 PAB. 
 
Aggregating all investments made into crops, fences, livestock, household and 
education, the differences between the poverty groups are considerable and 
statistically significant (table 5.16).  The share of households having made no 
investments in the past 12 months was highest among extremely poor households, 
although even among these households who have shortages in their daily 
nutritional needs 88,7% have invested.  These findings offer hope; even households 
living below the poverty lines have been able to invest into the future.   
 
 
5.4  Conclusions 
 
There is a great wealth of research on welfare poverty and the possibilities for its 
measurement are numerous.  This study measured the welfare poverty of Herreran 
farmer households with the monetary poverty line method.  Locally specific 
poverty lines were empirically constructed from locally specified food 
consumption patterns, local food prices and observed non-food consumption 
shares.  The extreme poverty line was based on the price of obtaining a sufficient 
daily diet, and the higher poverty line, the moderate poverty line included also a 
non-food component in addition to the nutritional requirements.  The consumption 
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aggregates of interviewed households were related to these poverty lines, and three 
welfare poverty groups were formed:  extremely poor households, moderately poor 
households and non-poor households.  Consumption inequalities among the 
households were considerable, and the outlook for the poorest households were 
dim.  Their consumption shortages or poverty depths were so significant that they 
cannot be overcome with farm labour wages or petty trade.  Poverty is unequally 
distributed also among the different districts of the province, and the results of 
decomposable poverty measures indicate that there are clearly two districts with 
great concentrations of poverty.   
 
Welfare poverty groups were compared in a number of characteristics using Mann-
Whitney U-tests, t-tests and Pearson Chi Square-tests.  Results portray the 
extremely poor households as farming very remote lands, having least education, 
most children, largest households and the highest dependency rate in the 
household.  Extremely poor have also least cattle, lowest value housing, least 
vehicles and most critical needs in their basic housing conditions.  In addition the 
extremely poor are unlikely to have regular incomes, due to which they depend on 
daily wages.  They cultivate basic crops with low input technologies and produce 
least value on each hectare of land.  Extremely poor also find it hardest to make 
investments, as could be expected.  Nevertheless, surprisingly many extremely 
poor households manage to invest in housing or household durables despite living 
under the nutritional minimum.   
 
On the other end of the spectrum, non-poor households possess the most land, 
closest to the province capital.  Their lands are most likely to be titled and used as 
pasture.  Non-poor have the smallest households, and the largest share of 
contributors in the household, belong to most associations and have most contact 
with extension providing agencies.  The non-poor have most cattle and most 
vehicles, businesses, bank accounts and loans.  They consume more in 
transportation and personal goods and services, and receive more income from 
livestock than the other poverty groups.  In addition the non-poor are most likely to 
have special cash crops with high input-intensity, or to produce milk for sale, and 
generate most production on a given area of land.  The non-poor make most 
investments into every investment category. 
 
In between are the moderately poor households, who resemble the extremely poor 
households in that also they have little land, little pasture, belong to few if any 
associations and have little contact with extension providing agencies.  Like the 
extremely poor, the moderately poor are also unlikely to own businesses or have 
bank accounts or loans.  The moderately poor, however, resemble the non-poor 
households in the more central location of their farms, in their lower number of 
children, and in making as many investments into new animals.  In many respects 
the moderately poor are in between the extremely and non-poor households, having 
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on average education, household members and a contributing share of household 
members above that of the extremely poor but below that of the non-poor 
households.  They also still have some deficiencies in their housing conditions and 
have a production value per hectare between that of the extremely poor and non-
poor households.   
 
The results are largely in line with previous studies of poverty in Panama, and 
correspond also well to common theoretical perceptions of, for instance, the 
importance of livestock, education, income diversification, extension services, 
household size and market access to farmer households.  Welfare poverty is not 
only a question of money or lack of it; there are inequalities in nearly every sphere 
of life, making it hard for poor households to ever rise out of poverty.  The 
empirical operationalization of welfare poverty measurement was not without its 
challenges or potential sources of error, and some improvements for future research 
were proposed.  It would be valuable to study the food consumption patterns of 
rural areas and contrast them to urban consumption observations, in order to form 
poverty lines that suit better the rural settings.  Also new in-kind welfare flows 
such as fruit from household’s own trees should be included in the consumption 
aggregates to make them correspond better to reality.    
 
These results provide support to using traditional welfare poverty measurement in 
the study of farmer household economics.  Differences between the formed three 
poverty groups are informative not only about their welfare poverty level, but also 
of their assets, behaviour and opportunities that condition their future action.  
Welfare poverty groups reveal such differences in the assets and behaviour of 
farmer households that may condition their behaviour also in what is relevant for 
environmental sustainability or the lack of it.  The results also suggest that the traits 
separating the extremely poor from the moderately poor are different from the traits 
separating the moderately poor from the non-poor households.  This finding 
strongly indicates that analysis methods in the upcoming chapters must take into 
account for these non-linear regularities between assets and welfare.  It also shows 
that there is no miraculous stairway out of poverty or one single characteristic 
dominating the divide.  Strategies of welfare improvement and capital 
accumulation change, as households move upwards in the welfare continuum.  
These results thus suggest that the constructed welfare poverty measure and the 
division of households into the three welfare poverty groups may be used in the 
further analyses on investment poverty and asset dynamics. 
 
The empirical welfare measure, notably the household consumption aggregate that 
was formed in chapter 4, and the two empirical welfare poverty lines formed in this 
chapter were constructed to serve as tools in the search of an investment poverty 
line and in the study of the contribution of assets to household welfare in later 
chapters, as inspired by the work of Reardon and Vosti (1995).  Now the next task 
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will be to scrutinize the concept of investment poverty.  With the continuous 
welfare measure it will become possible to search for a level of welfare that is 
sufficiently above the welfare poverty lines to allow for land conservation 
investments to be made.  And now that the locally specific extreme and moderate 
poverty lines have been located, it will be possible to see how close to the welfare 
poverty lines the possible investment poverty line lies.  In other words, how much 
surplus above welfare poverty lines is necessary to allow for conservation 
investments to be made?  If such a level of welfare above which conservation 
investments are made is found, the threshold price for a more sustainable future 
will be known.  Obviously environmental sustainability and the eradication of 
poverty in Herrera requires for households to overcome more than barely the 
nutritional minimum. 
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6. Investment poverty in the province of Herrera 
 
 
The concept of investment poverty provides a possible solution to the mixed 
evidence on the poverty-environment -link in developing countries.  Rather than 
measuring households' ability to buy a daily diet as traditional welfare poverty 
measures do, the investment poverty line was defined as the capacity to make 
investments to maintain or enhance the quality and quantity of the resource base.  
The concept has received attention in subsequent discourse, but no attempts have 
been made to its empirical measurement.  In this chapter, a conservation investment 
poverty line will be first theoretically and then empirically studied with farmer 
household data from the province of Herrera, Panama.  Taking the emphasis of the 
theoretical framework, this chapter focuses on land conservation investments, 
because land is commonly the most important natural resource of rural households, 
also in Herrera.  And since agriculture is commonly the dominant land use in 
developing countries, agricultural sustainability can be largely equated with 
environmental sustainability of land use altogether (Byerlee & Murgai 2001).  The 
first section 6.1 presents a review of the definition of conservation investments, 
followed by a discussion on the difficulties in their measurement both theoretically 
and with the Herreran data.  In the second section, empirical data will be presented 
on the conservation investments made by Herreran farmers.  Section 6.3 
concentrates on the investment poverty line, first with a theoretical discussion and 
then with several empirical attempts to locate it.  With the empirical investment 
poverty line, the investment poverty level of studied households can be assessed 
according to their welfare.  In the fourth section the formed investment poverty 
groups will be compared to one another particularly to explore the behaviour of 
those households who are not extremely poor but who are too investment poor to 
invest in the maintenance of their natural resource base.  The chapter ends with 
conclusions in section 6.5.   
 
 
6.1 Conservation investments: definition and measurement issues 
 
In order to measure land conservation investments, it is necessary to have a 
definition of what land conservation investments are.  In their investment poverty 
theory, Reardon and Vosti look at conservation investments as “investments in 
resource improvements to maintain or enhance the quantity and quality of the 
resource base, to forestall or reverse resource degradation” (Reardon and Vosti 
1995: 1496).  An attempt to look for further refinements to this quite broad 
definition in literature offered little help.  While the conservation investment 
behaviour of farmer households has been studied in many empirical works, they 
have approached conservation investments through shopping lists of what are 
considered beneficial land use or farming activities, without presenting definitions 
of what counts as conservation and why (e.g. Clay et al. 1998; Gebremedhin & 
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Swinton 2003; Byiringiro & Reardon 1996; Shiferaw & Holden 2000; Holden et al. 
2006; Hoogeveen & Oostendorp 2003; Shiferaw & Holden 2001; Thurow et al. 
2004).   
 
The general lack of defining land conservation investments may be caused by an 
implicit thought of conservation as anything that improves the environmental 
sustainability of land use or more specifically farming.  And here, the literature 
base is extensive.  There are tens if not hundreds of definitions and attributes 
proposed in literature for the evaluation of the environmental sustainability of 
agriculture (López-Ridaura et al. 2005; Rasul & Thapa 2003).  The environmental 
objectives of sustainable agriculture may be related to input use, emissions and 
qualities of the system itself (van der Werf & Petit 2002).  Some, for instance, 
argue that sustainable agricultural intensification requires the minimization of the 
use of external inputs, such as fertilizers and other agrochemicals (Adegbidi et al. 
2004; Pretty et al. 2003), while others (e.g. Reardon et al. 1999) see that fertilizers 
are central to soil productivity, preventing expansion of farm area, and are thus 
required in sustainable systems.  Hence, economic considerations may condition 
environmental sustainability. 
 
Assessment of the environmental sustainability of agriculture has taken two main 
directions; either concentrating on the means or on the effects of farming (van der 
Werf & Petit 2002; von Wirén-Lehr 2001).  The means-approach assesses the 
sustainability of farming activities (e.g. tillage practices), while the effect-approach 
studies the outcomes of farming by measuring selected indicators (e.g. soil 
microbial biomass).  Looking at Reardon and Vosti’s (1995) work on conservation 
investments through this perspective, their original definition was effect-based, 
emphasizing the quantity and quality of the resource base.  However, they assessed 
agricultural sustainability through its means, i.e. farmer activities, supposing that 
desired effects would take place as a result of desired means.  This seems to be the 
standard approach, shared by the previously listed conservation investment studies. 
 
It is therefore quite expectable that in addition to investments, Reardon and Vosti 
(1995: 1504) accept that key land use practices are also central to maintaining or 
enhancing the natural resource base.  The mentioned empirical conservation 
investment studies have also included environmentally sustainable practices 
alongside true conservation investments.  Indeed, in this context, it could be 
problematic to separate conservation practices from conservation investments, 
since both investments and sustainable practices generally entail more work than 
conventional farming, and may or may not require purchases of special inputs.  To 
mention examples of activities listed in these studies, terraces, soil bunds, grass 
strips, ditches, hedgerows and mulching, can be seen in differing degrees as 
investments in the traditional sense of involving spending (of money), but also as 
conservation activities requiring labour.  The financial investment may thus be 
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small relative to the invested work time or sacrifice in production (if, for instance, 
farm area is reduced for grass strips).  Consequently, this study will build on the 
hypothesis that if land is in constant agricultural use and not enough action is taken 
to compensate for the extraction of nutrients and effects of erosion, land will 
degrade in quality and its fertility and productivity will decline.  An activity that 
forestalls or reverses this degradation is considered as land conservation, and it 
may take place as a farming practice or particular investment. 
 
Although clearly defined in the Reardon and Vosti theory, the empirical 
identification of land conservation investments is problematic.  First, it is typical 
for a rural setting to have many environmental problems simultaneously.  Should 
all of them be taken into focus; should a farmer household correct all 
environmental problems that can be avoided at the farm level?  If not, it becomes a 
value choice which particular environmental problems to consider most important, 
i.e. relative to which will conservation investments be measured.  Second, it is 
challenging to identify those key corrective activities or investments that are 
needed to remedy the selected environmental problems.  There is little evidence 
that a given activity will automatically benefit the resource base.  For instance an 
intensification activity may relieve pressures on surrounding areas, but only if not 
accompanied by a simultaneous expansion of farm area.  Or the use of 
agrochemicals may be beneficial, unless used excessively or without necessary 
precautions.  And third, defining a sufficient level of these investments or key 
activities is complicated.  How many trees must be planted, for the activity to count 
as a conservation investment?  When are enough nutrients replaced by fertilizer use 
to forestall soil degradation?  Answers to these challenges are additionally site-
specific and change over time (Lefroy et al. 2000; Reardon & Vosti 1995), making 
it impossible to find general instructions.  Due to these difficulties it is challenging 
to empirically locate a level of conservation investments, which would guarantee 
that a farmer household’s natural resource base is maintained or enhanced as the 
consequence of the given activities or investments.  
 
In the province of Herrera, land conservation investments and practices are needed 
particularly to combat the low productivity of crop production and the degradation 
and expansion of pastures.  Although there are environmental hazards related also 
to insufficient waste management and farmer exposure to and excessive use of 
agrochemicals, these will not be focused on in the analyses.  Farmers themselves 
can do little to improve the waste management situation and the appropriateness of 
the use of agrochemicals could not be estimated from the data.  To combat 
declining land productivity, Herreran farmers have a number of possibilities for 
land conservation investments and key practices that maintain or enhance their 
resource base.  In order to prevent erosion, farmers may adopt terrace farming, 
establish buffer strips, rotate crops, establish live fences or tree plantations, fertilize 
at sufficient levels, extend fallow periods and farm without tilling the land.  Terrace 
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farming prevents runoff of water and soil, and buffer strips additionally prevent 
fertilizers and agrochemicals from flowing into waters.  Crop rotation prevents 
nutrition depletion and pathogen and pest build-up.  Live fences contribute to 
erosion control by tying soil and humidity, protect crop fields from unwanted 
entering of grazing animals and serve as property demarcations.  Tree plantations 
also tie up soil and humidity; and contribute to improved shade, nutrients and 
biodiversity.  The fertilization of land at sufficient levels replaces extracted 
nutrients and thus maintains soil productivity, extended fallow periods enable 
nutrient repletion and no-till practices protect soil structure and may offer better 
conditions for plants to grow.  
 
To improve the sustainability of livestock husbandry farmers may build stables for 
cattle, rotate pastures and increase stocking rates by supplemented feed and 
improved pastures.  Stables make it possible to prevent cattle from compacting 
pasture lands as they do in free grazing, offer cattle shade from the sun, and 
facilitates care for animal health.  Pasture rotation enables pasture to regenerate in 
between grazing sequences, as pastures are divided into smaller sections that are 
used in turns.  And by the use of supplemented feed and improved pastures, the 
same size herd can be maintained with much less pasture area, alleviating pressure 
on land.  In addition there are investments such as in irrigation systems that are 
predominantly motivated by improved yields, but may simultaneously alleviate 
pressure on natural resources through improved livelihoods.   
 
In fact available conservation investments and key practices bring also different 
degrees of productivity gains, which may become stronger incentives for a given 
activity than conservation itself.  Conservation investments and practices may 
increase yields or lower production costs, or both. Figure 6.1 suggests a possible 
classification of selected land-based investments and key practices for the research 
site, according to their conservation and productivity dimensions.  The vertical axis 
depicts the conservation dimension and the horizontal axis the productivity 
dimension of the investments and practices.  Hence, in the upper left-hand corner 
are the investments and practices with greatest contribution to conservation and 
least to productivity, and in the lowest right-hand side are those with most direct 
effect on productivity and least on conservation.  In the middle of the figure the 
investments and practices contribute to both goals in varying degrees.  One might 
agree, that the stronger the productivity gain, i.e. the more on the right the activity 
is in figure 6.1, the more likely it is adopted by the farmer household.   
 
The measurement of these activities and investments is, however, still problematic.  
How should their quantity be measured?  In previous studies, conservation 
structures have been measured in meters of structure per hectare of farmland 
(Byiringiro & Reardon 1996; Holden et al. 2006; Gebremedhin & Swinton 2003; 
Clay et al. 1998), as a binary adoption variable (yes/no) (Hoogeveen & Oostendorp 
2003; Gebremedhin & Swinton 2003; Thurow et al. 2004) and in absolute costs of 
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the investment in question (Shiferaw & Holden 2001).  It is obviously challenging 
to quantify these environmentally friendly practices and investments with a 
continuous measure.  First, cash expenditure does not necessarily reveal the total 
costs of the activity or investment in question, if own labour is used and its quantity 
cannot be estimated.  Second, measuring the given activities by absolute farm area 
under the given activity is seldom interesting for subsequent analyses.  It depends 
on how much total farm size a household has, and is also inappropriate for, for 
instance, live fences.  Third, the metric measure per hectare of farmland may work 
for bunds and terraces, but cannot be used for many others, such as fallowing or 
crop rotation.  But the remaining binary adoption variable yields poorly to many 
interesting analyses, and actually tells very little about how much the land is 
conserved as a consequence of the given activity.    
 
Figure 6.1  Conservation and intensification investments and key practices in Herrera. 
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All of the measurement approaches to conservation activities and investments 
listed above concentrate on the means, rather than on the end results.  Any selected 
measure of these conservation activities and investments, therefore, cannot 
guarantee that the farm’s resource base would be maintained or enhanced as a 
result, or that degradation is reversed or forestalled.  In order to make inferences of 
the resulting resource quality and quantity, it would be necessary to carry out 
repeated measurements on soil properties, tree cover, water properties and so on.  
These measurements are beyond the possibilities of this study, as they seem to have 
been for many previous studies, due to which they are not pursued. 
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6.2 Conservation practices and investments in Herrera 
 
To study their conservation investment behaviour, the interviewed 402 Herreran 
farmer households were asked both about their key land use practices that could 
halt environmental degradation, and about their investment behaviour in the past 
year.  The aim was to approach conservation investment behaviour with as a wide 
approach as possible, but taking into account local farming customs and conditions.  
As discussed above, there is no certainty that the studied practices or investments 
will halt or reverse environmental degradation, but they are the nearest proxy 
available for this study. 
 
In order to know of their participation in key land conservation practices, 
respondents were asked whether they practice the listed activities and if so, on how 
large areas and at what establishment cost.  The included activities, shown in table 
6.1, were discussed with local experts, but still most practices were virtually 
unknown to the farmers.  The results indicate that the most common 
environmentally friendly land use practice among studied Herreran households is 
having live fences on-farm (92,7% of households), followed by restraining from 
burning land (68,9%) (table 6.1).  Live fences are a central part of Herreran farms; 
they demarcate the farm perimeter, keep cattle out of croplands and are less 
expensive than other types of fences.  The environmental benefits of live fences did 
not seem to be a major motivation for farmers.  Although burning of land has 
caused many problems of escaped fires in the area, many farmers still perceive fires 
as effective pest and weed control.  All other environmentally beneficial practices 
were followed by a minority of households, of which most common were no-till, 
related to the traditional practice of corn and rice production, and crop and/or 
pasture rotation.  In addition to live fences, farmers plant relatively few trees 
despite the virtual inexistence of forests in the province.  Mostly planted trees are 
fruit trees, with additional benefits in the form of producing food.  Fallow land was 
left either for land improvement, or by necessity because of lacking the necessary 
inputs to keep farming the land.  The use of organic manure is marginal in Herrera, 
despite high fertilizer prices and its ready availability on farms.   
 
For most respondents, the concepts of buffer strips, terraces, leguminous plants, 
stables, organic manure and drainage were new.  Few farmers had heard of them, 
less alone heard or seen them practiced.  It is obvious that information is still one 
limiting factor against land improvements in Herrera.  Those households that had 
practiced the given activities had difficulties reporting the costs of these activities.  
For many of the listed activities there are no direct costs, rather there may be 
changes in productivity, but this cannot be estimated.  For others, the main cost is 
labour and this was also difficult for respondents to estimate.  Altogether, with the 
exception of irrigation these practices are not investments in the typical sense of the 
term, and their profitability could not be estimated during the interviews.  Also the 
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idea of measuring affected area was found poorly functional during the interviews, 
as in fact few of the listed items render well to area considerations.     
 
Table 6.1  Land use practices among Herreran households.   
 Share of participating households N valid 
Live fences 92,7 % 397 
Not burning land * 68,9 % 395 
No-till 33,1 % 396 
Crop or pasture rotation 30,4 % 398 
Tree planting 26,6 % 395 
Fallow land 26,3 % 396 
Improved pasture 15,8 % 398 
Buffer strips 8,8 % 398 
Irrigation 8,5 % 398 
Terraces 5,0 % 398 
Leguminous plants 4,3 % 398 
Stables 2,8 % 397 
Organic manure  1,5 % 398 
Drainage 0,8 % 398 
*) Wording is inverse to allow logical comparison of beneficial and harmful activities. 
 
Since Herreran farmers make few explicit conservation investments, it might be 
useful to know of their investment behaviour more generally.  Respondents were 
asked about investments they had made in the past year into agricultural 
production, some of which have an environmental dimension and others that do 
not, and other investments.  The studied agricultural investments included their use 
of fertilizers for crops and pastures, other crop and livestock investments including 
for instance purchases of new animals, machinery and tools; and investments into 
constructing and maintaining live fences.  To study other possible investment 
alternatives households were asked about investments into household durables, 
vehicles and housing; and about their investments into education.  A detailed 
description of the contents of each category of investments is presented in annex 
32.   
 
Data shows that nearly 95% of farmer households had made investments in crops, 
livestock, fences, household durables and/or education in 2005 (table 6.2).  While 
the mean amount of investments is high due to some very large values, the median 
investment level depicts that half of the households have made investments worth 
355 PAB or less in the last year.  If it is believed that this depicts the investment 
capacity of farmer households, conservation investments cannot be very costly if 
they are to be independently financed and adopted by the majority of households.  
The most common investments are crop investments followed by household, 
educational and fence investments.  The least common but largest in sum are 
livestock investments, constituting the greatest proportion of the total sum of 
investments.  These investment shares depict that Herreran households invest in the 
continuous agricultural production but also to improve the life of their children 
through education and the standard of living of the whole household through 
investments in housing and household durables.  While some could argue that 
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purchasing household durables is less productive than many other alternatives, 
clearly households perceive great welfare benefits in them.   
 
Table 6.2  Investment shares of Herreran households. (N=402) 
 All households 
Total investments: crop, livestock, fences, household and 
education (PAB) 
     Mean 
     Median 
     Minimum 
     Maximum 
     Share with no investments 
3 238,6 
355,5 
,0 
184 028,0 
5,7 % 
Crop investments’ share of total investments 
     Mean 
     Median 
     Share having made crop investments 
,28 
,12 
71,9 % 
Livestock investments’ share of total investments 
     Mean 
     Median 
     Share having made livestock investments 
,13 
,0 
30,7 % 
Fence investments’ share of total investments 
     Mean 
     Median 
     Share having made fence investments 
,09 
,0 
46,0 % 
Household investments’ share of total investments 
     Mean 
     Median 
     Share having made household investments 
,23 
,0 
50,2 % 
Educational investments’ share of total investments 
     Mean 
     Median 
     Share having made educational investments 
,22 
,0 
47,5 % 
Sum of investments among all households (PAB) 
     Crop investment sum 
     Livestock investment sum 
     Fence investment sum 
     Household investment sum 
     Education investment sum 
1 301 909,6 
90 605,9 
886 253,5 
25 381,1 
203 010,6 
96 658,5 
 
But can investment behaviour be understood as a function of the welfare level of 
the household, as proposed by theory?  Differences in per household and per capita 
consumption levels between those households that have made investments and 
those that have not invested are statistically significant (annex 33).  Results suggest 
that low levels of consumption make investments less likely but are no absolute 
obstacle for investing; there are households consuming as little as 150 
PAB/capita/year but that still have made investments.  On the other hand high 
levels of consumption make investments more likely but offer no guarantee.  
Among non-investors there are households with per capita consumption levels as 
high as 2 225 PAB/year.  These results, however, suggest that the welfare level of a 
household is in general a meaningful parameter in the modelling of investment 
patterns for the needs of further analyses.  It can be expected that if welfare levels 
rise, investments will become more common.   
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Table 6.3  In what would the household invest, if given 1 000 PAB as a loan? (N=401) 
 Share of households 
Cattle husbandry:  animals or pasture 27,7 % 
Housing 27,2 % 
Crop production 10,2 % 
Improve the farm 3,7 % 
Buy land 3,7 % 
Start a shop 3,5 % 
Poultry production 3,2 % 
Save it 3,0 % 
Would not accept the loan 3,0 % 
< 3,0 %:  Both housing and production, buy pigs, pay back existing loans, buy a car, give 
children or invest in education, buy food, consume, does not know, travel, buy a wife.   
 
Table 6.4  In case of surplus money from sales, what does the household do? (N=394) 
 Share of households 
Save 38,3 % 
Invest in production 26,1 % 
Consume in clothes, food, medicine, education 18,0 % 
Never have surplus 4,6 % 
Pay back loans 3,6 % 
< 3,0%:  Give children, buy land, lend to other people 
 
Households were also asked about their investment preferences, to suggest where 
future investments may concentrate if welfare levels rise.  The stated investment 
preferences of Herreran households (table 6.3) reflect the widespread appreciation 
for cattle husbandry in the province.  Not only does cattle serve as store of wealth 
and a status symbol, it is also perceived as a profitable investment target.  
Simultaneously the stated preferences depict needs in housing of a great share of 
households.  Cyclical changes throughout the year explain why surplus from sales 
is mainly saved for future needs and input expenditures or investments (table 6.4).  
The divided nature of the Herreran economy into the advantaged and the 
disadvantaged households is apparent also here. 
 
 
6.3 The investment poverty line 
 
Investment poverty is defined as a household’s lack of  "ability to make minimum 
investments to maintain or enhance the quantity and quality of the resource base – 
to forestall or reverse resource degradation" (Reardon and Vosti 1995: 1497-8).  
The concept tries to identify the proportion of households in the developing 
countries that are not welfare poor by the traditional welfare poverty measures, but 
who are still too poor to make key conservation or intensification investments 
necessary for their land use practices not to damage the resource base.  This 
investment poverty concept can thus be called, as proposed by Scherr (2000), 
conservation investment poverty.  In this section, after outlining the determinants 
of the conservation investment poverty line, an empirical conservation investment 
poverty line will be sought as a level of welfare above which the surplus is large 
enough for the household to make investments to or to follow key land use 
practices that forestall or reverse resource degradation.  There are many possible 
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ways to estimate an investment poverty line: through modelling sustainable land 
uses by different methods, and through modelling productive conservation 
investments as a function of household welfare.  Since the investment poverty line 
has not been previously measured in empirical studies, the use of several methods 
for its estimation is considered valuable.  The empirical estimation is carried out 
with farmer household data from the province of Herrera, Panama. 
 
6.3.1 Determinants of the conservation investment poverty line  
 
As for any investment, investing in land conservation requires that a household has 
cash flows, assets or other savings that can be transformed into cash or the capacity 
and willingness to take a loan (figure 6.2).  The investment capacity of farmer 
households in a given area is for one part affected by the functioning of loan 
markets and the households’ access to these loans.  In a setting where loans have 
limited supply, conditions are stringent and interests high, even possibly profitable 
investments will not be carried out.  Investment capacity is also affected by the 
functioning of markets of agricultural products and other goods and services that a 
household produces; if the markets are characterized by a low-level equilibrium, 
the opportunities of creating cash flows are meagre and investments also stagnate.  
Many of the farmer households’ assets have no market, have a low value or are of 
such vital importance to the household that they cannot be disposed of.  In such a 
setting, assets will contribute little to household investment capacity.  If all three 
paths to investment capacity are blocked, the only way to finance investments are 
through cutting daily expenditures.  Such a saving strategy may require 
compromising daily welfare level for long periods of time.  On the contrary in a 
favourable institutional setting even the welfare poor may invest if they 
compromise their daily expenditures in order to make an investment, sell assets or 
manage to obtain a loan.   
 
Figure 6.2  Investment capacity. 
Cash flows Sales of assets and savings Taking a loan 
Investment capacity 
Different investment alternatives: land improvements, 
production, household durables, etc. 
 
  
136
Having any of the above can make a household investment non-poor in a setting 
where the supply of the investment inputs is not limited and provided that the funds 
exceed the costs of the daily diet.  Even if the household is above the welfare 
poverty line, it may still be investment poor if the supply of investment inputs is 
limited, or the required investments are lumpy or too expensive, or if the household 
prefers to consume the available “surplus” money.  In addition a household may 
have investment capacity but have severely unstable income, which makes it more 
averse to particularly risky investments.  (Reardon and Vosti 1995: 1497-8.)  The 
investment capacity of a household is thus a broader phenomenon than purely 
having income or consumption “surplus above the minimum diet line” (Reardon 
and Vosti 1995: 1497-8).   
 
In addition to having investment capacity, households must perceive incentives and 
have a favourable external setting in order for conservation investments to be 
carried out (figure 6.3).  Of particular relevance are economic incentives, which for 
many conservation investments may be very long term – and in some cases not 
even accrue to the investor household (Winters et al. 2004; Shiferaw & Holden 
2001).  Even households that have investment capacity and access to suitable 
technologies may not invest in conservation or intensification unless its economic 
returns are attractive (Scherr 2000; Thurow et al. 2004).  The propensity to invest 
particularly in land conservation investments may also be influenced by the relative 
importance of land as a source of livelihoods, though the effect may be mixed.  If 
land is unimportant to household livelihoods, either land may be less intensively 
used or fallowed with potentially beneficial environmental impacts and more cash 
may be available from off-farm sources for land conservation investments; or land 
investments may alternatively rank low among other possible investments.  If land 
is important for the household’s livelihood, incentives to land conservation 
investments may be higher and thus they may receive higher priority, but on the 
other hand the capacity to sacrifice land to less intensive uses may not exist. 
 
Figure 6.3  Determinants of land conservation investments according to Reardon and Vosti (1995).  
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There are however many types of investment alternatives available for rural 
households, and land conservation investments are only one of them.  Depending 
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on preferences, households could invest in household durables or in enhancing 
their production, possibly at even lower levels of surplus than what is required for 
conservation investments.  The priority of investments varies across different 
settings, different livelihood and household preferences, and depends on the 
characteristics of different investment alternatives relative to others.  Particularly in 
a setting where environmental degradation is not especially threatening and there 
are still shortages in housing conditions and production technologies, conservation 
investments are not likely to rank high in investment priorities.  It can be assumed 
that in such a setting productive investments may rank higher than conservation 
investments, and that households may prefer to invest in education and household 
durables before opting for conservation investments.  Eventually, however, these 
may lead to off-farm incomes that in turn facilitate conservation investments (Jones 
2002).  Large lumpy investments, such as purchase of machinery or vehicles, are 
less likely to be undertaken by the poor, whereas small investments, such as sacks 
of fertilizers, may be purchased piecemeal even by the poor households.  Thus with 
rising levels of welfare and solvency, hence increasing opportunities to invest, it is 
possible that other types of investments are pursued before conservation 
investments.   
 
As there are a great variety of conservation investment and key practice alternatives 
as described in the previous sections, the estimation of an investment poverty line 
will necessarily involve taking several of these investments and activities into 
consideration.  The investment poverty line will be sought as the level of household 
welfare above which several conservation and productivity investments become 
significantly more frequent or conversely as the level below which many 
conservation or productivity investments become significantly less common.  
Following the theoretical outlines of Reardon and Vosti (1995), farmer households 
in a region may then be divided into three groups according to their investment 
poverty level, as presented in chapter 2 (figure 2.5).  Whereas extremely poor 
households are too poor to fulfil even their nutritional requirements, investment 
poor households are above the extreme welfare poverty line but still too poor to 
make key conservation or intensification investments to maintain or enhance their 
resource base.  Above the investment poverty line are those investment non-poor 
households with enough surplus over the extreme poverty line that allows them to 
make conservation investments.  The investment poverty line (IPL) can be 
described by equation 6.1: 
 
SEPLIPL     (6.1) 
 
in which EPL is the extreme poverty line and S is the surplus above the extreme 
poverty line needed for households to become able to make conservation or 
intensification investments to forestall or reverse resource degradation.   
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Of particular interest will be the investment poor households, to identify what type 
of farmers they are and how they spend their surplus above the extreme poverty 
line since they do not invest in conservation investments.  As discussed in chapter 
2, it is problematic to define as investment poor those households who actually 
have investment capacity or surplus even beyond the investment poverty line but 
prefer to consume it, as Reardon and Vosti have decided to do (1995: 1498).  
Therefore this research departs from Reardon and Vosti’s definition by treating all 
households who are above the investment poverty line as investment non-poor, 
whether they have decided to invest or consume the surplus.  These households are 
seen not to be investment poor, since they have the necessary investment capacity, 
and whether they do invest or not is another topic worth of discussion.    
 
6.3.2   Measuring investment poverty through land use sustainability 
 
The search for an empirical investment poverty line will begin with relating 
household welfare levels to sustainable land uses.  As could be expected, many of 
the studied environmentally friendly practices as listed in table 6.1 are indeed 
related to the households’ welfare (table 6.5 and annex 34).  The practices listed in 
table 6.5 relate positively to consumption levels with the sole exception of no-till, 
which has a negative relationship.  A comparison of average consumption levels 
does not, however, yield any investment threshold level, as can be seen from the 
variation in the results.  Key land use practices, due to the complexity of the 
rationale for their use and the mixed evidence, thus do not provide an investment 
poverty line. 
 
Another approach to locate an investment poverty line is to study the household’s 
use of fertilizers in crop production, relative to recommended levels.  Fertilization 
is an activity that maintains the productive capacity of the lands long term, and is 
central for avoiding soil degradation.  The assumption is that if more nutrients are 
extracted from the soil in form of harvests than what is replaced by fertilization, the 
soil’s fertility will decline.  As fertilizers are a divisible input, it is possible that 
even the poor households use fertilizers, but at levels below the rate of nutrient 
replacement needs.  Fertilizers are not a lumpy investment, and indeed even the 
poorest households purchase them (annex 35).  Thus it is not sufficient to approach 
fertilizer use simply by whether it is used or not.  On the contrary, the insufficient 
fertilization rates typical of developing regions have adverse implications to the 
productivity of farmlands, farmer poverty and the environment (Barbier 2000).   
 
In order to assess whether the household fertilizes the land sufficiently to prevent 
soil fertility from declining, each household’s fertilizer use needed to be compared 
to a farm-specific recommended fertilizer usage level, calculated as described in 
annex 36.  The results indicate that the vast majority of farmers fertilize their crops 
under the recommended level (table 6.6).  On average, only half of the 
recommended dosage is used, although there were also cases of heavy over-
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fertilizing.  It is, however, possible that low fertilizer use is paired with low yields 
and small harvests, resulting in a sustainable nutrient balance.     
 
Table 6.5  Comparison of consumption between practitioners of environmentally friendly practices. 
 
Practiced 
Did not 
practice 
2-tailed significance 
of Mann-Whitney U 
Farming without burning land * 
     Mean consumption per capita (PAB) 
     Median consumption per capita (PAB) 
N valid 
1 187,4 
913,3 
272 
1 020,0 
824,2 
123 ,030 
No-tillage 
     Mean consumption per capita (PAB) 
     Median consumption per capita (PAB) 
N valid 
961,3 
780,8 
131 
1 203,6 
935,3 
265 ,004 
Crop or pasture rotation 
     Mean consumption per capita (PAB) 
     Median consumption per capita (PAB) 
N valid     
1 366,1 
1 118,0 
121 
1 035,5 
814,6 
277 ,000 
Tree planting 
     Mean consumption per capita (PAB) 
     Median consumption per capita (PAB) 
N valid 
1 228,6 
1 059,4 
112 
1 101,7 
844,2 
290 ,026 
Improved pasture species 
     Mean consumption per capita (PAB) 
     Median consumption per capita (PAB) 
N valid 
1 900,9 
1 342,1 
63 
992,1 
836,3 
335 ,000 
Irrigation 
     Mean consumption per capita (PAB) 
     Median consumption per capita (PAB) 
N valid 
1 909,4 
1 297,4 
34 
1 063,7 
845,2 
364 ,000 
Stables 
     Mean consumption per capita (PAB) 
     Median consumption per capita (PAB) 
N valid 
1 613,4 
1 600,2 
11 
1 122,8 
870,3 
386 ,003 
Organic manure 
     Mean consumption per capita (PAB) 
     Median consumption per capita (PAB) 
N valid 
1 886,5 
1 513,1 
10 
1 117,9 
884,6 
392 ,034 
*) Wording is inverse to allow logical comparison of beneficial and harmful activities. 
 
Households that have fertilized sufficiently differ statistically significantly in per 
capita consumption levels from households that have fertilized below 
recommended levels (table 6.7), such that the probability of fertilizing sufficiently 
increases with rising consumption levels.  The binary nutrient balance groups also 
differ in a number of other farm and household traits (annex 37), depicting the 
sufficiently fertilizing households as wealthier, better connected and having more 
entrepreneurial drive in their production.  But the binary logistic regression model 
explaining the sufficiency of fertilizer use in crop cultivation by per capita 
consumption of farmer households obtains no statistically significant coefficients, 
not even when adjusted for the most important possible context variables (table 
6.8)27,28.  The binary sufficiency of fertilizer use thus cannot be explained by the 
                                                 
27 A binary logistic regression model was constructed also for income per capita as the explanatory 
variable (annex 38) but the coefficients were not statistically significant.   
28 The method of adjusting for context variables (elaboration) is explained in detail in chapter 7. 
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welfare level of farmer households, proxied by their consumption.  This finding is 
robust, indicating no predictable pattern between soil nutrient balance and 
household welfare level.   
 
Table 6.6  Fertilizer need, actual use and balance.  Including only households that cultivate crops. 
Farm specific fertilizer need per hectare of cultivated land (quintales*/ha) 
     Mean 
     Median 
     Minimum 
     Maximum 
N      
6,43 
5,98 
2,00 
13,00 
326 
Actual fertilizer use per hectare of cultivated land (quintales/ha) 
     Mean 
     Median 
     Minimum 
     Maximum 
N 
3,30 
2,00 
,00 
28,00 
326 
Fertilizer balance: actual use -  need (quintales/ha) 
     Mean 
     Median 
     Minimum 
     Maximum 
N  
-3,13 
-3,89 
-10,98 
20,91 
326 
Balance  
   Negative:  fertilize less than recommended 
   Positive:  fertilize as recommended or more 
85,9 % 
14,1 % 
*) 1 quintal = 100 lbs = 45,36 kg (the common unit of fertilizer sale).  
 
Table 6.7  Comparison of consumption among nutrient balance groups. 
 Negative nutrient 
balance: fertilize less 
than recommended 
Positive nutrient balance: 
fertilize as recommended 
or more 
Significance 
of Mann-
Whitney U 
Consumption per capita PAB 
     Mean 
     Median 
     Minimum 
     Maximum 
N valid 
    Missing 
1 055,37 
840,22 
125,20 
12 422,54 
280 
0 
1 281,32 
1 098,93 
419,70 
4 990,83 
46 
0 ,012 
 
Table 6.8  Binary logistic regression model explaining nutrient balance by the consumption per capita of farmer 
households.   
 Coefficient of 
consumption 
Significance of 
consumption 
Significance of 
added variable 
N 
Consumption per capita (PAB) ,000 ,162 - 326 
Consumption per capita + regularity of 
income 
,000 ,074 ,570 325 
Consumption per capita + distance to 
district centre 
,000 ,189 ,313 316 
Consumption per capita + education ,000 ,292 ,011 325 
Consumption per capita + crops’ 
share of income 
,000 ,148 ,548 326 
 
In order to verify whether a surplus cash figure would have been more informative 
than aggregate consumption levels on the fertilizer investing behaviour of farm 
households, a net cash income figure was calculated for each household (annex 39).  
When this was related to the sufficiency of crop fertilization, no statistically 
significant models could be built nor were the distributions different.  
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Sustainability of crop farming cannot be explained by households’ welfare poverty 
levels.  The recommended fertilizer use levels may be too high to be economically 
justified.  The investment poverty line must thus be sought elsewhere.   
 
Conservation investment poverty can also be approached by assessing how 
intensive or extensive a household’s livestock production is.  On average cattle 
stocking rates in Central America are very low, in Panama the average stocking 
rate is 0,9 animals per hectare of pasture (Perez 2002).  Cattle husbandry requires 
fewer inputs than crops and poses fewer requirements on land quality, due to which 
pastures tend to spread while crop areas stagnate.  Extensive grazing causes many 
adverse economic and environmental consequences and represents a land use 
scheme of very low productivity (table 5.15).  Thus an efficient and sustainable 
intensification of cattle production would produce both economic and 
environmental benefits.  While uncontrolled over-grazing is a severe environmental 
threat (Steinfeld 2002), there are sustainable ways to intensify cattle production.  
Better technologies, such as production of fodder, supplementation of feed, 
adequate care of pastures and improved animal health care could easily double the 
production or halve the area that is currently used for grazing.  (Perez 2002; 
Pomareda 2002; Argel 2002; ANAM 1999c.) 
 
The efficiency of cattle production in Herrera can thus be used as another measure 
of the environmental sustainability of farming.  The threshold for an intensive or 
efficient stocking rate for the province of Herrera was formed as the combination 
of a number of expert views listed in annex 40, resulting in 2,5 animal units/hectare 
of pasture.  The current stocking rates of the households was measured for 
households that have both cattle and pasture lands29.  To adjust for different feeding 
needs of different animal sizes, the number of different types of cattle was 
converted into equivalent animal units (AU) by equation 6.2 (MAG 2004): 
 
Animal units (AU) = number of male and female calves*0,33 + number of heifers 
and young bulls*0,775 + number of cows*1,00 + number of bulls*1,20         (6.2) 
 
Table 6.9  Stocking rates.  Cases with stocking rate > 10,0 AU/ha are excluded.   
Stocking rate = Animal units per hectare of pasture 
     Mean 
     Median 
     Minimum 
     Maximum 
N valid 
    Missing 
1,268 
,953 
,08 
6,60 
175 
0 
 
While the median stocking rate (0,95 animal units/ha of pasture) is close to the 
national average, the mean stocking rate found in the sample (1,27 AU/ha) is 
                                                 
29 Cattle ranchers dedicated to buying and selling cattle without keeping animals for more than a 
couple of days in between were excluded from the analyses.  Also the households with stocking 
rates > 10 AU/ha were excluded (4 cases). 
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higher (table 6.9).  Of the interviewed 175 farmer households practicing cattle 
husbandry, 18 had a stocking rate of 2,5 or more animal units per hectare (10,3%).  
Comparing the consumption levels of households with low and high stocking rates, 
however, reveals no statistically significant differences (table 6.10).  The 
comparison of other farm and household traits yield some significant differences 
(annex 41), but no clear patterns of association.  Households with a high stocking 
rate spend nearly seven-fold the amount of money on livestock inputs per hectare 
of pasture than the households with a low stocking rate (annex 41, table A41.1).  
This seems to suggest they have a more input-intensive production scheme, but 
testing for input expenditure per animal, there is no difference (annex 41, table 
A41.2).  The binary regression model explaining stocking rates (high or low) with 
consumption per capita levels achieve no statistically significant coefficients, not 
even when adjusted for possible intervening context variables (table 6.11).   
 
Table 6.10  Comparison of consumption relative to stocking rates.  Includes only households that have both 
pastureland and cattle. 
 Low stocking rate < 
2,5 AU/ha 
High stocking rate 
≥2,5 AU/ha 
Significance of Mann 
Whitney U 
Consumption per capita PAB 
     Mean 
     Median 
     Minimum 
     Maximum 
N valid 
    Missing 
1 332,00 
1 088,20 
149,41 
6 301,33 
157  
0 
1 811,71 
1 206,42 
383,33 
12 422,54 
18 
0 ,517 
Share of households 
N valid 
89,7% 
157 
10,3 % 
18  
 
Table 6.11  Binary logistic regression model explaining stocking rates (under/over 2,5 AU/ha) by consumption 
per capita of farmer households.  Includes only households that have both pastureland and cattle. 
 Coefficient of 
consumption 
Significance of 
consumption 
Significance of 
added variable N 
Consumption per capita ,000 ,163 - 175 
Consumption per capita + education ,000 ,276 ,059 175 
Consumption per capita + regularity of 
income 
,000 ,158 ,984 174 
Consumption per capita + livestock 
production’s share of income 
,000 ,137 ,316 175 
Consumption per capita + number of 
animal units 
,000 ,072 ,107 175 
 
The same Mann Whitney U and logistic regression analyses were carried out to 
explain stocking rates with the net cash incomes (annexes 39 and 42), but still no 
coefficient was statistically significant.  Analyses were also not sensitive to the 
used threshold level.  Levels of 2,0 AU/ha and 3,0 AU/ha were tested for, with no 
significant results (annex 43).  Results from all analyses in this respect indicate that 
the welfare poverty level of farmer households is not associated with how intensive 
or extensive the household’s cattle stocking rates are.  In much of Herrera intensive 
grazing may be carried out by poor households in an unsustainable way, and 
contribute to environmental degradation rather than environmental improvement.  
There is no indication that households with high stocking rates would have adopted 
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sustainable technologies.  Also in this dimension, the welfare poverty level of a 
household is not associated to the environmental sustainability of its land use.    
 
6.3.3 Measuring investment poverty though productive conservation 
investments  
 
Investments in live fences, fertilizers and improved pasture species are all 
investments with both environment- and productivity-enhancing effects.  Live 
fences not only retain water and tie the soil, but also keep cattle off crop fields and 
on pastures.  Fertilizers replace extracted soil nutrients and improve yields, even if 
not used at recommended levels.  Improved pasture species increase the 
productivity of a given area of pasture greatly, leading to the opportunity of 
decreasing pasture areas for reaching the same yields.   
 
Even minor investments into live fences, fertilizers and improved pasture species 
are possible due to their divisibility.  Any threshold level of a “significant” amount 
of these investments would be arbitrary, due to which it is not meaningful to study 
these investments as binary 0-1 –variables.  The selected research method is linear 
regression analysis to determine how much the farmer household’s consumption 
level per capita explains the value of these three investments or activities.  The 
underlying assumption thus is that the relationship is linear; for rising consumption 
levels the investments will increase steadily.  Looking at scatterplots non-linear 
associations seemed unlikely, due to which the analysis will be carried out with the 
linearity assumption, although the effect of such an assumption must be 
acknowledged.  If linear relationships are found in the entire sample, it will become 
possible to study if there is a threshold level below which consumption ceases to 
explain the investment.  Such a level would suggest that an investment poverty line 
exists, i.e. below that level of welfare households no longer invest in the given item 
in a linear fashion.   
 
Linear regression results on fence investments indicate that they are statistically 
significantly associated with consumption levels (table 6.12).  The linear 
association exists even when the wealthiest households are included in the models, 
indicating that there is no upper limit to fence investments.  The coefficient (B) 
however increases as upper cases are filtered out, suggesting that proportionately 
the less wealthy households invest slightly more to fences than their wealthier 
counterparts.  When filtering out upper cases step-wise, it is possible to find a level 
of consumption below which the identified linear relationship disappears.  As can 
be seen in table 6.12, between consumption levels of 1 000 and 850 
PAB/capita/year, the consumption level of the household loses its significance in 
explaining the fence investment level of a household.  Additional tests identify that 
the precise location of the change takes place between 950 PAB (B ,039; Sig. ,043; 
N 218) and 900 PAB/capita (B ,039; Sig. ,058; N 204).  When cases with a 
consumption level exceeding 900 PAB are filtered out of the analysis, fence 
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investments can no longer be linearly explained by the household consumption 
level.   
 
The linear regression results on fertilizer use indicate that also it is statistically 
significantly associated with consumption levels (table 6.12).  As upper cases are 
filtered step by step, the coefficient (B) gradually increases, indicating that again 
the poorer households purchase more fertilizers relative to their consumption level 
than the richest, as can be expected.  When cases with a per capita consumption 
level of 1 000 PAB are filtered out, the linear relationship disappears.  Even though 
the linear relationship re-appears at the level of 650 PAB, there is an area where the 
relationship does not exist.  This indicates that below the consumption level of 1 
000 PAB, the fertilizer use of households can no longer be linearly explained with 
their consumption levels.   
 
Improved pasture area was used in the linear regression model rather than the past 
year’s investments into improved pasture species, because improved pasture 
investments are very long-term and found in the past 12 months on very few 
households.  Linear regression results on the improved pasture area suggest that 
also improved pasture areas can be linearly associated with household per capita 
consumption at statistically significant levels (table 6.12).  The relationship 
remains linear until households with a per capita consumption exceeding 1 000 
PAB are filtered out.  Below this level the improved pasture area of households 
cannot be explained by their consumption per capita levels. 
 
The results suggest that investments into live fences, crop fertilizer use and 
improved pasture areas are linearly associated to household consumption levels, 
when all relevant households are included in the analyses.  However, a step-by-step 
filtering of wealthier households revealed thresholds below which these linear 
associations disappeared.  Below the per capita consumption levels of 900 PAB 
and 1 000 PAB, investments into live fences, crop fertilizer use and improved 
pasture areas can no longer be linearly explained by the household’s welfare level.  
These thresholds suggest an investment poverty line, a level below which 
investments into natural resource conservation are no longer made.  The surprising 
observation is that these found thresholds are very close to the moderate poverty 
line of 876,16 PAB/capita, as formed in chapter 5.   
 
Selecting the per capita consumption threshold of 1 000 PAB/capita (eq. 6.3) as the 
investment poverty line for Herrera, it is possible to solve equation 5.1.  The result 
(eq. 6.4) shows that the surplus above the extreme poverty line that is necessary for 
households to become able to make conservation or intensification investments is 
506,29 PAB/capita/year.  Thus, households must have a consumption level that is 
roughly double the cost of a basic nutrition, i.e. the extreme poverty line, in order 
to rise above the investment poverty line.   
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yearcapitaPABIPL //1000   (6.3) 
 
yearcapitaPABS //29,506   (6.4) 
 
Figure 6.4  Investment poverty line and investment poverty groups in the province of Herrera, 
Panama.   
IPL 
EPL 
EXTREMELY POOR 
Consumption < 493,71 PA B 
/capita/year 
N=  62 households (15,4 %) 
INVESTMENT POOR 
Consumption 493,71 - 1 000 PAB 
/capita/year   
N= 170 households (42,3 %) 
INVESTMENT NON-POOR 
Consumption > 1 000 PAB/capita/year  
N= 170 households (42,3 %) 
Consumption/capita  
Investment poverty 
line 1 000 PAB 
/capita/year 
Ext reme poverty 
line 493,71 PAB 
/capita/year 
 
 
With the investment poverty line it is also possible to divide the households into 
extremely poor, investment poor and investment non-poor as depicted in figure 6.4.  
While the extremely poor cannot even satisfy their minimum nutritional needs, the 
investment poor are above this extreme welfare poverty line but their surplus above 
the extreme poverty line is too small to allow them to make key conservation 
investments into their natural resource base.  In the per capita consumption range of 
493,71-1 000 PAB/year the surplus above the extreme poverty line does not allow 
for the households to invest in maintaining or enhancing their natural resource 
base.  Above the investment poverty line 1 000 PAB/capita/year, the surplus above 
the welfare poverty line is large enough to allow for key conservation investments 
to be made.  This proposed investment poverty line and the resulting two 
investment poverty groups, namely the investment poor and the investment non-
poor, will be used in the following analyses of this chapter.  The investment poor 
and investment non-poor will be compared to one another in the asset category and 
behavioural variables as specified by the theoretical framework of Reardon and 
Vosti (1995).  
  
146
Table 6.12  Linear regression model results for investments in live fences, fertilizer use and area of improved pasture.  Explanatory variable: consumption per capita (PAB/capita/a).  
Upper cases are filtered step-by-step.   
  
 
Upper limit of consumption per capita, filtering out upper cases 
Dependent variable  No limit 
2000 
PAB 
1900 
PAB 
1800 
PAB 
1700 
PAB 
1600 
PAB 
1500 
PAB 
1400 
PAB 
1300 
PAB 
1200 
PAB 
1100 
PAB 
1000 
PAB 
850 
PAB 
750 
PAB 
650 
PAB 
530 
PAB 
400 
PAB 
                   
Fence investments (PAB) B ,048 ,046 ,052 ,061 ,064 ,076 ,066 ,067 ,072 ,115 ,122 ,072 ,022 ,045 ,105 ,052 -,004 
(incl: all households) Sig ,000 ,014 ,010 ,005 ,004 ,002 ,009 ,014 ,015 ,002 ,004 ,008 ,271 ,102 ,009 ,173 ,915 
 N 402 361 354 349 346 335 323 312 301 274 250 232 192 152 111 72 37 
                   
Fertilizer use (sacks)* B ,004 ,008 ,008 ,006 ,006 ,006 ,006 ,007 ,007 ,009 ,011 ,005 ,006 ,005 ,015 ,022 ,011 
(incl: if crop area > 0 ha) Sig ,000 ,000 ,000 ,003 ,003 ,010 ,007 ,006 ,015 ,005 ,004 ,098 ,079 ,255 ,046 ,025 ,037 
 N 339 305 301 297 295 285 279 270 259 236 217 200 164 132 96 62 32 
                   
Improved pasture area (ha) B ,002 ,006 ,005 ,006 ,006 ,007 ,002 ,002 ,002 ,002 ,002 ,001 ,001 ,003 ,001 ,000 ,000 
(incl: if pasture area > 0 ha) Sig ,031 ,009 ,039 ,033 ,026 ,019 ,005 ,035 ,040 ,026 ,020 ,389 ,372 ,060 ,288 ,859 ,940 
 N 211 178 175 174 172 166 158 152 146 126 112 101 83 64 45 26 12 
 
*) In standard 100 lbs sacks (≈45,36 kg).  B = coefficient of the explanatory variable (consumption per capita in PAB/household member); Sig = 2-tailed statistical significance of the 
coefficient B; N= number of cases in the model.   
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6.4 Comparison of the investment poor and investment non-poor  
 
A comparison of investment poor and investment non-poor farmer households can 
be informative on the determinants or consequences of investment poverty.  How 
do the two groups differ from one another?  It will be interesting to study whether 
results could help explain why the surplus above the extreme poverty line is “too 
small” to make conservation investments and how the surplus is used, or how on 
the contrary having sufficient surplus above the extreme poverty line allowing for 
conservation investments to be made changes the household’s behaviour also in 
other respects.  Results could suggest how upward spiral strategies are sought.  As 
in chapter 4, the investment poverty groups will be compared to one another in the 
asset groups and behaviour characteristics as listed by Reardon and Vosti (1995). 
 
In respect to their natural resources, investment non-poor have more land than 
investment poor (table 6.13 and annex 44, table A44.1), mainly due to having 
significantly more pasture.  Investment non-poor have purchased more land than 
investment non-poor, as can be expected, and their lands are closer to the province 
capital.  The investment non-poor’s lands are thus also slightly more valuable.  
These differences are all in line with findings in chapter 5 in which the moderately 
and non-welfare-poor households were found to differ in the same respects.  The 
only difference is that while the welfare poverty lines divided the households in the 
share of titled land, the investment poverty line does not; the share of titled land is 
not higher among the investment non-poor than among the investment poor.  This 
indicates that titling propensity greatly increases between the moderate poverty line 
876 PAB/capita/year and the investment poverty line 1 000 PAB/capita/year.  A 
lack of a land title is thus not currently causing investment poverty in Herrera. 
 
Table 6.13  Natural resources:  comparison of investment poverty groups.   
 Investment poor Investment non-
poor 
Significance of Mann-
Whitney U 
Total area of land (ha) 
     Mean 
     Median 
N 
11,1 
4,8 
170 
27,0 
10,0 
170 ,000 
Titled land (% of total) 
     Mean 
     Median 
N 
55,0 
95,5 
168 
62,6 
100,0 
170 ,142 
Distance to province capital (km) 
     Mean 
     Median 
N 
48,6 
53,5 
167 
43,6 
48,0 
162 ,040 
Estimated land value (PAB/ha) 
     Mean 
N 
1 417,0 
141 
1 672,4 
148 ,001 
Crop area (mean ha) 
Pasture area (mean ha) 
Improved pasture area (mean ha) 
Fallow area (mean ha) 
N 
1,9 
8,0 
,3 
,3 
170 
2,4 
21,9 
3,1 
,2 
170 
,148 
,000 
,000 
,139 
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As to their human resources, the investment non-poor have more education, a 
smaller household size and a greater share of contributors in the household than the 
investment poor (table 6.14).  Since the absolute number of contributors, the 
number of children and the household head’s age are similar (annex 44, table 
A44.2); it is likely that investment poor house more commonly family elders, 
grandchildren or dependent children than investment non-poor.  There are no 
differences in literacy, civil status, religious affiliation, or among the gender or 
profession of the household head.  A major difference exists in that the investment 
non-poor household head’s spouse is more commonly employed or practices 
entrepreneurship than the spouses of the investment poor household’s heads.  This 
may be a considerable explanatory factor in understanding the higher welfare level 
of the investment non-poor and their capacity to invest. 
 
Table 6.14  Human resources:  comparison of investment poverty groups. 
 Investment 
poor 
Investment 
non-poor Significance of tests  
Education of household head (years) 
     Mean 
N 
5,2 
169 
7,0 
170 
Mann-Whitney U 
 ,000 
Household size (members) 
     Mean 
N 
4,1 
170 
3,5 
170 
Mann-Whitney U 
,000 
Share of contributors (of household size) 
     Mean % 
N 
45,4 
170 
53,7 
170 
Mann-Whitney U 
,003 
Occupation of household’s spouse 
     Without spouse 
     Housewife 
     Manual worker 
     Administrative employee or entrepreneur 
N 
19,5 % 
70,4 % 
3,6 % 
6,5 % 
169 
18,9 % 
55,6 % 
4,1 % 
21,3 % 
169 
Pearson Chi-Square 
,001 
Membership in cooperatives (number) 
     Mean 
     % belonging to cooperatives 
N 
,07 
7,1 % 
170 
,2 
17,8 % 
169 
 
Pearson Chi-Square 
,003 
Membership in associations (numbers) 
     Mean 
     % belonging to associations 
N 
,05 
4,7 % 
169 
,2 
14,8 % 
169 
Pearson Chi-Square 
,002 
Has contact with 
     BDA (Agricultural Development Bank) 
     MIDA (Ministry of Agricultural Development) 
     BNP (National Bank) 
N 
8,2 % 
8,8 % 
5,3 % 
170 
16,6 % 
23,1 % 
23,7 % 
169 
Pearson Chi-Square 
,020 
,000 
,000 
 
Has an insurance for crops and/or livestock 
N 
1,2 % 
170 
5,9 % 
169 
Mann-Whitney U 
,018 
 
Again in the social involvement dimension wealthier households are clearly more 
active (table 6.14).  Investment non-poor are only not more likely to belong to 
cooperatives and associations, but they are also in a favourable bias in receiving 
extension and credit services from governmental agencies.  A comparison with the 
results of chapter 5 reveals that for most human resources, the investment poverty 
line divides the households similarly than the moderate welfare poverty line.  The 
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differences are that the investment poverty line manages to distinguish the 
households in their probability to belong to cooperatives and have insurances, 
unlike the welfare poverty line.  This suggests that between the consumption levels 
of 876 and 1 000 PAB/capita/year the likelihood of membership in cooperatives 
and taking insurance may increase.    
 
Investment non-poor have managed to collect considerably more on-farm resources 
than investment poor households (table 6.15).  They have more cattle, are more 
likely to own cars and have a higher value housing (annex 44, table A44.3).  The 
basic living conditions also effectively separate the investment poverty groups 
(annex 44, table A44.4), showing that investment poor households still have many 
needs in their housing conditions.  These results support the investment poverty 
line’s location as meaningful, since these on-farm resources and living conditions 
are largely results of past investment behaviour.  However the statistical 
significance levels of the differences are very similar to the differences between the 
welfare moderately poor and non-poor households, as depicted in chapter 5; 
suggesting that the investment poverty line divides the households in these 
dimensions in a similar way as the moderate poverty line. 
 
Table 6.15  On-farm and off-farm resources:  comparison of investment poverty groups. 
 Investment 
poor 
Investment 
non-poor Significance of tests 
Number of bovine animals 
     Mean 
N 
7,4 
170 
28,1 
170 
Mann-Whitney U 
,000 
Total value of all animals (PAB) 
     Mean 
N 
2 541,0 
170 
11 982,0 
170 
Mann-Whitney U 
,000 
Cars and pick-up trucks owned by household 
     Mean 
     % having a car or pick-up 
N 
,15 
14,1 % 
170 
,54 
40,6 % 
170 
Mann-Whitney U 
,000 
Value of house (PAB) 
     Mean 
N 
5 499,3 
132 
11 471,8 
145 
Mann-Whitney U 
,002 
Owns a company, kiosk, shop, etc. 
N 
6,5 % 
170 
15,3 % 
170 
Pearson Chi-Square 
,009 
Has a bank account 
N 
26,7 % 
165 
47,0 % 
168 
Pearson Chi-Square 
,000 
Has loans 
N 
15,9 % 
170 
36,5 % 
170 
Pearson Chi-Square 
,000 
Amount of loans (PAB) 
     Mean (incl. only households with loans) 
     Sum 
N 
6 725,9 
181 600,0 
26 
11 457,5 
687 450,0 
60 
Mann Whitney-U 
,018 
 
In respect to their off-farm resources, the investment non-poor households are more 
likely to have loans, bank accounts and own companies than the investment poor 
(table 6.15 and annex 44, table A44.5).  In lack of longitudinal data it is impossible 
to determine the ultimate cause and consequence –order of loans and investment 
capacity, but most likely both the higher welfare level and higher asset endowment 
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facilitates loan approval and payback, and loans further improve the asset and 
income opportunities of the investment non-poor households.  Also these 
differences in off-farm resources are the same as were between moderately and 
non-welfare-poor households, presented in chapter 5. 
 
As to their consumption patterns, there differences between the investment poverty 
groups are not very large (annex 44, table A44.6) and thus do not serve to explain 
why the investment poor are less likely to invest, rather than consume their surplus 
above the extreme poverty line.  The investment poor households consume a 
slightly larger share of their total consumption in food, as can be expected, but 
rather than from household production, the difference arises from purchased food.  
And while the investment non-poor consume more on personal goods and services, 
the transportation expenditure share of the investment poor is larger.  In the income 
patterns it is obvious that livestock and self-employment are more important 
income sources for the investment non-poor, while the investment poor rely more 
heavily on daily wages and donations (table 6.16).  These findings suggest that the 
higher educational level of the investment non-poor lead to higher incomes of 
entrepreneurship in both livestock and other types, rather than necessarily higher 
share of salaries.  Having regular employment incomes does not necessarily raise a 
household above the investment poverty line.  In the regularity of their incomes, 
however, the two investment poverty groups do not differ, among both the share of 
households having regular incomes is approximately 54% (Sig. of Pearson Chi-
Square ,706; N=339).   
 
Table 6.16  Income patterns:  comparison of investment poverty groups. 
 Investment 
poor 
Investment 
non-poor 
Significance of 
Mann-Whitney U 
Mean income shares from: 
     Crops 
     Livestock 
     Self-employment 
     Daily wages 
     Regular employment incomes 
     Retirements and pensions 
     Remittances, donations, scholarships 
     Rents 
N      
,20 
,15 
,07 
,14 
,24 
,04 
,06 
,01 
170 
,20 
,23 
,11 
,07 
,19 
,07 
,04 
,02 
170 
,731 
,042 
,017 
,000 
,159 
,058 
,044 
,177 
 
 
A look at their livestock production reveals that the investment poverty groups 
differ significantly in their likelihood to practice livestock husbandry.  While 43,5 
% of the investment poor have cattle, the share among the investment non-poor is 
61,2 % (Sig. of Pearson Chi-Square ,001; N=340).  Investment poverty groups also 
differ significantly in the productivity of each hectare of their farmland (table 6.17), 
in both crops and livestock.  Investment non-poor are able to generate much higher 
production value on each hectare of crops and pasture than investment poor.  The 
difference does not seem to rise from a considerably higher input use, but rather 
from the investment non-poor’s possibly higher value crops and higher milk sales. 
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Table 6.17  Production value per hectare of farmed land:  comparison of investment poverty groups. 
 Investment 
poor 
Investment 
non-poor 
Significance of 
Mann-Whitney 
U 
Mean crop production value PAB/ hectare of crops 
N * 
843,7 
145 
1 095,8 
139 ,001 
Mean crop production net value PAB/hectare of crops 
N * 
655,7 
145 
836,7 
139 ,006 
Mean livestock production value PAB/hectare of pasture 
N ** 
646,1 
80 
745,7 
110 ,011 
Mean livestock production net value PAB/hectare of pasture 
N ** 
584,1 
80 
691,9 
110 ,011 
*) Includes households with crop area>0.  **) Includes households with pasture area>0 
 
As can be expected the investment non-poor have invested considerably more than 
the investment poor in the past year (table 6.18), altogether over three-fold the 
amount of money.  The major difference in the share of investments is that the 
investment non-poor dedicate a larger share of their total investments into livestock 
and fences.  The probability of livestock investments is also considerably higher 
among the investment non-poor.  In all categories, even though the share would be 
similar, the overall higher level of investments implies that the investment non-
poor invest larger amounts into every category.     
 
Table 6.18  Investment strategies:  comparison of investment poverty groups. 
 Investment 
poor 
Investment non-
poor 
Significance of 
Mann-Whitney U 
Total investments  
     Mean (PAB) 
     % having no investments 
N 
1 658,3 
7,1 % 
170 
5 698,7 
2,4 % 
170 ,000 
Mean investment shares 
     Crops 
     Livestock 
     Fence 
     Household 
     Education 
N 
28,2 % 
12,5 % 
8,1 % 
24,1 % 
20,0 % 
170 
25,8 % 
17,5 % 
10,8 % 
24,1 % 
19,5 % 
170 
,694 
,007 
,017 
,212 
,809 
 
Crop investments * 
     Mean (PAB) 
     % having no investments 
N 
105,2 
16,6 % 
145 
526,2 
7,9 % 
139 ,001 
Livestock investments * 
     Mean (PAB) 
     % having no investments 
N 
2 288,6 
43,8 % 
80 
6 120,8 
22,9 % 
110 ,099 
Fence investments 
     Mean (PAB) 
     % having no investments 
N 
35,4 
57,1 % 
170 
111,0 
39,4 % 
170 ,000 
Household investments 
     Mean (PAB) 
     % having no investments 
N 
327,3 
52,9 % 
170 
802,0 
40,0 % 
170 ,000 
Education investments * 
     Mean (PAB) 
N 
280,9 
78 
808,9 
83 ,000 
*) Including only participating households (for crops: if crop area > 0, for livestock: if pasture area > 0, for 
education: if educational expenditure > 0).   
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The findings suggest that the investment poverty line is useful for identifying 
differences in the asset endowments and behaviour of the farmer households, with 
particular relevance to their income, production and investment strategies.  While 
the extremely welfare poor households living under 493,71 PAB/capita/year cannot 
invest in the conservation of their resource base due to critical needs even in the 
fulfilment of their nutritional requirements, there is an area of consumption per 
capita above the extreme welfare poverty line, around 900 and 1 000 PAB after 
which conservation investments become much more common.  After this threshold 
investment poverty line there are clear divides between the resulting two 
investment poverty groups of households, since the investment capacity of the 
investment non-poor has is paired with owning more land, cattle and vehicles; 
having higher educational levels, better quality housing conditions, higher 
production values per land area, larger loans and more contact with extension-
providing agencies than the investment poor, who have not had the same 
possibilities.  The beneficial repercussions of being investment non-poor are 
obvious on nearly every sphere of farmer household life.   
 
 
6.5 Conclusions  
 
Investment poverty is a concept of great appeal, but although it is straightforward 
to characterize, its empirical measurement involves several challenges.  Investment 
poverty may be defined as having too little surplus above the extreme poverty line 
to make conservation investments or to follow key practices to maintain or enhance 
the natural resource base.  The investment poor households are thus better off than 
the extremely poor households, but they have less surplus than the investment non-
poor, who are able to make conservation investments.  But in order to explore 
conservation investment poverty, it was necessary to define what are understood by 
conservation investments.  This task proved challenging; there is no universally 
accepted method to assess which practices and investments maintain or enhance the 
resource base.  Additionally, when some such practices were proposed, their 
empirical measurement was challenging.  The empirical difficulties stem from a 
necessity to define which local environmental problems should used as the 
benchmark, what activities or investments respond to those particular problems, 
and how to measure a sufficient level of those activities, guaranteeing that the 
degradation is forestalled or reversed as a consequence of these activities.   
 
A conservation investment poverty line was first sought with studying the presence 
of key land use practices on the sampled 402 Herreran farms and by comparing 
their nutrient balances and stocking rates to local recommended levels.  Results of 
these analyses suggest that there is no clear pattern of association with household 
welfare levels and adoption of environmentally sustainable land use practices.  The 
next approach was to study the presence of investments with mixed conservation 
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and productivity gains, namely investments in live fences, absolute crop fertilizer 
use, and the area of improved pasture species.  Contrary to the purely 
environmental practices, all of these variables that contribute also to productivity 
were linearly associated to the welfare of farmer households.  When the wealthiest 
households were filtered out of the analyses step by step, there were thresholds 
after which the consumption level of the household ceased to explain these 
investments.  In the case of investments in live fences, the linear association 
disappeared when households with per capita consumption of 900 PAB or higher 
were filtered out; for crop fertilizer use it was 1 000 PAB and for improved pasture 
it was also 1000 PAB.  These thresholds were thus indicating a level of welfare 
below which these given investments become unrelated to household welfare.  
Above these threshold welfare levels the households invest in soil conservation at a 
linearly increasing rate.  These thresholds were thus used to select an investment 
poverty line of 1 000 PAB/capita/year measured in the consumption aggregate of 
the household.   
 
This investment poverty line allowed to divide the studied households into three 
groups:  the extremely poor, who consume less than 493,71 PAB/capita/year, the 
investment poor who consume between 493,71 PAB and 1 000 PAB/capita/year 
and the investment non-poor who consume over 1 000 PAB.  The gap between the 
extreme poverty line of 493,71 PAB/capita/year and the investment poverty line of 
1 000 PAB/capita/year is the necessary step for overcoming poverty in the long 
run.  Although investment poor and extremely poor households would be interested 
in environmentally sound practices and investments, their delicate economy 
precludes them from making such investments.  As the results of comparing the 
investment poor to investment non-poor households indicate, above the investment 
poverty line households are able to begin upward spiral-like strategies of capital 
accumulation, allowing them to improve housing conditions, access higher 
education, buy cars and gather livestock herds.  It also allows them to cultivate 
more input-intensive crops, get loans from financing institutes, receive more 
extension services and purchase more land.  Investment capacity is for one part 
contributed to by the investment non-poor’s smaller household sizes, higher share 
of economically active spouses and higher self-employment and livestock based 
incomes.  Not only do the investment non-poor have more land, but they are also 
able to generate higher production values on each farmed hectare.  The investment 
capacity of the two groups is used in very similar proportions to the different 
available alternatives, with the exception that the investment poor invest in smaller 
shares in livestock and fences than their wealthier counterparts.  The overall level 
of investments of the investment non-poor is however over three times higher than 
that of the investment poor, and in absolute terms the investment non-poor invest 
more into every given investment category than the investment poor.   
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In relation to the welfare poverty lines, reaching the investment poverty line thus 
requires surpassing and moving beyond the moderate welfare poverty line of 
876,16 PAB/capita/year.  Investment capacity is achieved only after the household 
consumption level over doubles the extreme poverty line, or the nutritional 
minimum.  Particularly for extremely poor households, reaching the investment 
poverty line is thus a faraway goal requiring substantial improvements in welfare.  
The eradication of extreme poverty is thus alone not sufficient for environmentally 
sustainable rural development.  Before conservation investments are offset, 
households need to have satisfied not only their nutritional needs, but also a 
considerable share of other needs and aspirations of higher standards of living.   
 
There are also wider implications of the results.  In Herrera investments and 
activities with purely conservationist goals are very rare.  The measured practices 
and investments provide at best partial ailment to degradation, but it is perhaps not 
realistic to see that as a consequence of these actions the resource base is 
maintained or improved.  Rather, gradual degradation is taking place due to 
insufficient protection measures and yields decline.  Generally the level of welfare 
is not high enough for conservation priorities to gain ground, and a true investment 
poverty line level cannot thus even be located.  The improvements needed in 
household welfare for even those investments with mixed productivity and 
environmental dimensions to become more common are substantial.  It is difficult 
to imagine a way for households to gain such welfare levels in the near future by 
the currently existing means.  For Herreran households to surpass a conservation 
poverty line, welfare levels or their distribution would need to be dramatically 
altered, and this is not likely to happen soon.  Thus the transition into more 
sustainable farming must come from elsewhere; it must be possible to affect the 
location of the investment poverty line.  For conservation investments to be 
undertaken at already lower welfare levels, improved extension services, economic 
incentives and land titling projects could be examples of helpful measures.   
 
Although rising welfare levels in Herrera mostly lead to more intensive and higher 
producing land use practices that for great part have beneficial environmental 
impacts, the rising importance of livestock investments can also be a concern for 
environmental degradation in the future.  Unless coupled with investments into 
better yielding pastures or other more intensive livestock production schemes, 
growing herds may lead to even further expansion of pastures of very low 
productivity.  Eventually the scarcity of land and declining profitability should act 
as impetus to improve the current extensive grazing practices, but particularly in 
the short run the high preference of livestock investments paired with increasing 
investment capacities may lead to further degradation, as predicted also by Reardon 
and Vosti (1995).    
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The empirical findings of this chapter suggest in line with theory that higher 
welfare levels translate to a capacity to invest allowing households to pursue capital 
accumulation strategies.  Higher welfare levels are associated with larger 
investments into both physical and human assets.  A new question arises, though.  
Do these assets generate even higher welfare levels to the households?  Although it 
is a common implicit assumption inherent in the idea of a virtuous circle of assets 
and welfare, the welfare-generating nature of assets has lacked empirical 
examination.  Assets can generate welfare to households, but how could it be 
empirically studied if they actually do?  Meeting this challenge is the task of the 
next chapter.  It tackles the problem both theoretically to form hypotheses on the 
mechanisms through which assets might contribute to household welfare, and 
empirically, by testing these hypotheses with empirical farmer household data.   
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7. Poverty and assets:  welfare-generating mechanisms of 
farmer household assets in the province of Herrera 
 
 
Assets are commonly seen as major determinants of rural households’ welfare 
poverty level in developing countries (Reardon & Vosti 1995; Freeman et al. 2004; 
Carter & Barrett 2006).  Investments into assets have been believed to raise 
households out of poverty, participating in an upward spiral of capital 
accumulation and rising welfare levels.  Despite this, the actual dynamics of how 
assets produce welfare to households are rarely studied empirically.  This chapter 
proposes a mechanism-oriented and context-sensitive approach to studying the role 
of assets to household welfare.  The aim is to study the mechanisms through which 
assets may or may not generate cash or product welfare flows to the rural 
households.  The first section of this chapter will introduce the theoretical 
approach, including hypotheses on the welfare generating mechanisms of diverse 
assets.  Section 7.2 will present the elaboration tools by which the statistical 
analyses will be carried out to test the hypotheses.  The results of the empirical 
tests will be presented and discussed in section 7.3 and section 7.4 will end the 
chapter with conclusions. 
 
 
7.1 Welfare-generating mechanisms of assets:  theory and hypotheses 
 
In rural livelihoods the importance of assets does not arise from their possession as 
such, but from their potential to generate flows of product and/or cash income.  The 
level of that income determines whether a household is poor and how poor it is 
(Reardon & Vosti 1995: 1497).  Therefore a study of the asset endowments of 
households requires an accompanying study on the generated income or welfare 
flows by these assets, if the welfare poverty level of the households is to be 
understood as a function of the assets it possesses.  The mechanisms through which 
assets may produce income flows to the household are conditioned by a number of 
factors, including for instance capital, labour and input markets, a household’s 
possession of complementary assets and access to markets. 
 
In empirical studies there has been a temptation to seek strongest correlations 
between the possession of given assets and household poverty levels without 
consideration of how these assets - if at all - generate welfare to the household and 
under which conditions.  For instance one study in Latin America used, inter alia, 
the household’s floor type to explain the poverty level of the household (Escobal & 
Torero 2005), although no causal mechanism was proposed by which the floor type 
would cause poverty or wealth.  There is a risk that with such methods the results 
may have no causal explanatory power despite their high statistical predictive 
power (Irzik 1996: 261).  The causality may actually be reverse: welfare may 
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enable households to have a better floor type, or other assets.  Therefore the choice 
of explanatory variables in asset-poverty-studies should be based on causal 
considerations rooted in an understanding of the nature of each asset, their potential 
local uses, local markets and other institutional circumstances.   
 
7.1.1 The basic welfare-generating mechanisms of assets 
 
This study proposes that there are four key mechanisms through which assets may 
generate product or cash income flows, and thus increase the welfare level of the 
household, their investment capacity, or both.  Assets may contribute to household 
welfare if they are sold off, if they generate income flows, if they are exchanged for 
other assets, or if they are used as collateral for loans (figure 7.1).  Each mechanism 
is conditioned by a variety of context or conditioning factors, which can either 
enhance or inhibit the assets’ welfare generating effect.  To understand the welfare 
enhancing effect of assets, it is necessary to also know whether the context is 
favourable and whether the household fulfils other conditions to make the assets 
productive.   
 
Figure 7.1  The mechanisms through which assets generate consumption and investment capacity. 
Assets 
May serve as 
collateral for 
loans 
May be 
exhanged for 
another asset 
May generate 
income flows 
May be 
sold off 
Cash or in -kind   
Welfare (consumption)  
and investment capacity 
 
The first mechanism through which assets can contribute to household welfare is 
selling an asset for cash.  The selling of assets is typical when assets are used for 
storing wealth, i.e. as savings, and used in case of shocks such as illness or in case 
of cyclical changes (Freeman et al. 2004; Gonzalez de la Rocha 2001).  The 
liquidity of assets is conditioned by the market, and some assets have virtually no 
markets such as housing in very remote areas.  The liquidity of assets also depends 
on how vital these assets are to the household’s subsistence.  For instance, a 
household largely dependent on household production of crops cannot sell its land 
without risking its livelihood.  According to the second mechanism, assets may 
generate cash income or product flows.  For instance cattle produces milk, hens lay 
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eggs, land yields crop harvests and household labour force obtains wages.  The 
income generating properties of assets are conditioned by a number of factors, such 
as input use, which affects agricultural productivity; educational level, which may 
affect the wages or employment opportunities of labour force and increase 
productivity; or the distance of the household to markets, affecting their potential 
for selling products or finding work.   
 
Third, if markets are functioning an asset may be exchanged to another preferably 
more productive asset, which can then produce a larger income flow, serve as 
collateral for loans or be later sold off.  Such a sale or exchange of assets in 
sequence can consist of, for instance, trading up lower value livestock such as pigs 
gradually to cattle.  (Freeman et al. 2004; Carter & Barrett 2006; Dolberg 2001; 
Grier 2002.)  The fourth mechanism through which assets can enhance household 
welfare is by serving as collateral for loans.  Local conditions vary, but seldom is 
one asset possession sufficient for loan approval; rather a list of conditions may 
need to be fulfilled.  For instance, using land as collateral may require for the land 
to be titled and located in certain valuable areas, or regular sources of income may 
be requested in addition.  In the short run a household may compromise daily 
consumption to pay back for the loan, while the welfare-enhancing effect may take 
time to materialize.   
 
There is a balance to how many assets a household of a given welfare level can 
maintain.  Most assets require maintenance and thus entail costs on a regular basis.  
For instance livestock survives only if adequately cared for and land requires 
maintenance even if it would not be in productive use.  One interviewed family, for 
instance, had a refrigerator but could not use it because of its high electricity costs 
(#151, male age 42, Los Pozos).  A household may compromise its welfare 
enhancing expenditure to cope with asset related maintenance costs, or neglect 
maintenance and risk asset losses.  Assets are subject to risks and shocks, such as 
livestock illnesses, forest fires and theft (McPeak 2004).  Assets are neither endless 
nor static, and households need to balance between the benefits, costs and risks 
related to each type of asset.  Taking into account also the costs and risks facilitates 
understanding household decision-making concerning asset purchases, sales and 
maintenance.   
 
The assets of the interviewed 402 Herreran farmer households can be listed 
according to the groupings of Reardon and Vosti (1995) (annex 45)30.  The table 
presents also mechanisms through which each asset may produce welfare to a 
household, together with the particular type of welfare, assumed levels of 
maintenance costs and the relative associated level of risks to sudden conditions.  
The list suggests that few assets of Herreran households are liquid in the market, 
                                                 
30 The list includes assets that were measured in the household interviews, lacking thus community 
level factors and others that do not render to quantification. 
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and very few assets may be used as collateral for loans.  The predominant paths 
through which assets produce welfare to Herreran farmers are income flows, which 
acquire a number of different forms.  Most cash incomes are generated by natural 
and human resources and on- and off-farm enterprises, whereas especially assets 
related to housing and household appliances generate mainly in-kind welfare flows.  
Although household appliances cause considerable maintenance costs and face 
large risks, their welfare benefits are likely perceived by households to exceed 
these costs and be worth the sacrifice.  On the other hand many human resources 
require low maintenance and face low risks, but may produce considerable incomes 
to the household.  The exception is a larger labour force or household size, which 
involves high maintenance costs and to which returns are not guaranteed. 
 
This chapter examines the welfare-generating effect of four chosen household 
assets:  land, livestock, education and labour force (table 7.1).  These assets were 
selected, because they have received attention in academic discourse as important 
resources of rural households.  In addition, all of these assets can be assumed to 
have causal mechanisms through which they might produce welfare to the 
household.  Another criterion in selecting these focal assets was their natural 
rendering to quantification necessary for the statistical methods that will be 
employed.  While many other resources such as health, housing, local infrastructure 
and social capital are also important factors in the formation of household welfare 
poverty level (Davies & Shorrocks 2005), they do not render easily for measuring 
and can thus not be used in this study.   
 
Table 7.1  Focal assets of Herreran households and their characteristics as generators of welfare.  
 Can be 
sold in the 
market 
Can be used as 
collateral for loans 
Type of income flow 
generated 
Mainte-
nance cost 
level 
Risk 
level 
 
Natural resources 
     
Land  
     in centres 
     in peripheral areas 
Yes  
Not easily 
Yes if titled 
Not even if titled 
Rent, sales, in kind 
Rent, sales, in kind 
Medium 
Medium 
Low 
Low 
 
Human resources      
Education No No Salaries, sales, in kind Low Low 
Labour force size No No Salaries, sales, in kind High Low 
 
On-farm resources      
Livestock Yes Yes if bovine In kind, sales High High 
 
7.1.2 Focal assets and their postulated impacts 
 
The welfare-generating effect of four household assets: land, livestock, education 
and labour force will be empirically tested with data from 402 farmer households 
from the province of Herrera, Panama.  Table 7.1 presents how these focal assets 
are hypothesized to generate welfare to households. 
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Focal asset 1:  Land 
 
Land has been perceived as the most important natural resource available to poor 
rural households (Reardon & Vosti 1995: 1501); it is the basis of agricultural 
production for both home consumption and sales.  Land is also possible collateral 
for loans, gives security towards shocks as a store of wealth, and is a place for 
housing.  (WB 1999; Freeman et al. 2004; Agudelo et al. 2003a; De Janvry & 
Sadoulet 2000.)  The relationship between poverty and land ownership is not 
necessarily linear.  In Panama poverty has been found to be more common in land 
owning households than in households with no land (MEF 2006: 140-141), but 
among the land owning households the poorest possess less land than the rich (WB 
1999).  Since this research includes only land owning households, there should thus 
be a positive relationship between land ownership and the welfare level of a 
household.   
 
Figure 7.2  The mechanisms through which the focal asset land is hypothesised to produce welfare 
to the household, and the hypothesized context variables that affect the mechanisms31.  
FOCAL VARIABLE 
MECHANISMS 
(interpretation) 
Test variables: 
CONTEXT & 
CONDITIONS 
(specification) 
Test variables: 
RESPONSE 
- Titled land 
- Stable incomes 
- Distance to 
province capital 
- Inputs 
- Education 
- Topography 
- Vehicles 
- Distance to 
province capital 
 
LAND 
Collateral for loans 
Crop sales 
Crop&livestock 
household 
consumption  
Livestock 
sales Consumption = Welfare 
level 
Rent 
- Inputs 
- Education 
- Topography 
 
 
In Herrera land is a relatively risk-free asset, regardless of whether the household 
has an official title.  Maintaining land in productive use requires constant inputs of 
agrochemicals, labour and fence maintenance.  Land is not a very liquid asset for 
most Herreran households, and due to low demand land is seldom sold particularly 
in remote areas.  Land is hypothesized to contribute to household welfare through 
                                                 
31 The terms specification, interpretation, focal variable and response are terms of the employed 
statistical method, elaboration, presented in section 7.2.2. 
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five different mechanisms: serving as collateral for loans, producing crops for sale, 
producing livestock products for sale, producing crops and livestock products for 
household consumption, and generating rent incomes32 (figure 7.2).   
 
Each of these mechanisms is assumed to be affected by a number of context 
variables or conditions, which may either promote or suppress the functioning of 
these mechanisms.  The use of land as collateral for loans is conditioned on 
whether the land is titled or not, since in Panama a title is commonly required for 
using land as collateral, and on the stability of incomes from either regular salaries, 
retirement benefits or considerable milk sales, which are also required for obtaining 
loans (annex 5; WB 1999: App.8: 4).  Crop and livestock sales may depend on the 
distance from the farm to markets, most importantly to the province capital, and 
crop and livestock harvests may depend on used inputs, which affect yields.  
Education can affect both production technologies and market access, topography 
can affect soil productivity or suitability for crop farming or pasture, and the 
possession of vehicles can facilitate household's market access.  Inputs require 
cash, however, which may also decrease household's other consumption and thus 
their welfare.  The use of crop and livestock products for household consumption 
may be conditioned by the use of inputs, such as fertilizers; the educational level of 
the farmer; and the land’s topography.  And finally, the opportunities to rent out 
land may depend on the land’s location, with lands closer to the province capital 
having perhaps more demand for rent.   
 
Focal asset 2:  Livestock  
 
Livestock is another important asset in rural settings.  While livestock is important 
to the poorest households, its absolute importance tends to rise as incomes rise 
(Reardon & Vosti 1995: 1500).  The richer the household, the more it can be 
expected to invest in livestock.  (Freeman et al. 2004; Agudelo et al. 2003a; De 
Janvry & Sadoulet 2000.)  Livestock not only provides status to its owner and is a 
common store of wealth, but also may contribute to household welfare by serving 
as collateral for loans, by producing tradable products, and by generating product 
flows for household consumption (figure 7.3).   
 
These mechanisms may be conditioned by a number of different context variables, 
which affect how much livestock in effect generates welfare to the household.  
Livestock sales may be conditioned by access to markets, of which both the 
distances to province capital and district capital may be relevant particularly in 
milk production; and by ownership of vehicles, which may facilitate market access.  
The quality and quantity of livestock production’s output in itself may be 
conditioned by input use, education and improved pasture, all of which may lead to 
                                                 
32 Land could also be sold off, but none of the interviewed farmers reported having sold land in the 
past year due to which this mechanism cannot be tested.   
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higher productivity of cattle production.  The use of livestock for home 
consumption is assumed to be affected by the same conditioning factors.   
 
Figure 7.3  The mechanisms through which the focal asset livestock is hypothesised to produce 
welfare to the household, and the hypothesized context variables that affect the mechanisms. 
FOCAL VARIABLE MECHANISMS 
(interpretation) 
Test variables: 
CONTEXT & 
CONDITIONS 
(specification) 
Test variables: 
RESPONSE 
- Distance to 
province capital 
- Distance to 
district capital 
- Vehicles 
- Inputs 
- Education 
- Improved pasture 
 
LIVESTOCK 
Collateral for loans 
Livestock 
sales 
Livestock 
household 
consumption  
Consumption 
= Welfare 
level 
 
Focal asset 3:  Education  
 
Education has been perceived as a crucial human resource in poverty alleviation.  It 
is an important complement to labour and yields higher incomes.  In Panama each 
year of education has been found to yield a 5% increase in hourly earnings, 
although the returns vary significantly by educational level.  Primary school, which 
has a fairly equitable coverage, generates much lower returns than secondary or 
higher education.  (WB 1999.)  Education can be expected to affect also farm 
productivity, the propensity to become an entrepreneur and to increase 
opportunities of finding regular employment (Freeman et al. 2004; Agudelo et al. 
2003a; De Janvry & Sadoulet 2000).  Higher levels of education may also increase 
mobility, including permanent migration after employment.  It is hypothesized that 
education contributes to household welfare through a number of mechanisms 
(figure 7.4), and that each mechanism is conditioned by a number of context 
variables.   
 
Education can facilitate the soliciting of loans and their approval, which is 
conditioned by having land for collateral and having stable incomes.  Also, 
education can lead to higher crop and livestock sales by enhancing farm 
productivity, enabling better contacts in the market and giving better capabilities to 
market the products.  The conditioning factors include the household’s distance to 
the province capital, possession of vehicles and input use.  Education can lead to 
higher entrepreneurial and job incomes (wages, salaries or retirement benefits), 
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both of which may be conditioned by the remoteness or centrality of the 
household’s residence.  Moreover, education can lead to smaller households, and 
the smaller the household, the higher the consumption level per capita, ceteris 
paribus.  Finally, by increasing productivity, education can lead to more efficient 
crop and livestock production.  Agricultural products provide higher home 
consumption and reduce the need of expensive purchase foods, which in turn 
improves household welfare.      
 
Figure 7.4  The mechanisms through which the focal asset education is hypothesised to produce 
welfare to the household, and the hypothesized context variables that affect the mechanisms. 
FOCAL VARIABLE MECHANISMS 
(interpretation) 
Test variables: 
CONTEXT & 
CONDITIONS 
(specification) 
Test variables: 
RESPONSE 
- Titled land 
- Stable incomes 
- Distance to 
province capital 
- Vehicles 
- Inputs 
- Distance to 
province capital 
 
EDUCATION 
Obtaining loans 
Crop and 
livestock sales 
Entrepreneur 
incomes 
Crop&livestock 
household 
consumption  
Job incomes 
Consumption 
= Welfare 
level 
Household size 
 
Focal asset 4:  Labour force size 
 
Labour force is commonly seen as the poor’s most abundant asset (Reardon & 
Vosti 1995: 1502; WB 1999: 23).  In addition to their contribution to household 
salary and daily wage incomes, the household's labour force generates farm 
production for both household consumption and sales.  Hence, the larger labour 
force size can produce more welfare for the household in both cash and in kind.  
(Freeman et al. 2004; De Janvry & Sadoulet 2000.)  Labour force is, however, a 
high-maintenance resource, because every working person needs food, shelter, 
clothing and health care.  The high costs are not necessarily paired with higher 
incomes; rather the costs are fixed even in periods of no job opportunities.  
Therefore, an increase in a household’s labour force is expected to certainly benefit 
the household only if it does not increase simultaneously the household size.   
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Figure 7.5  The mechanisms through which the focal asset labour force size is hypothesised to 
produce welfare to the household, and the hypothesized context variables that affect the 
mechanisms. 
FOCAL VARIABLE 
MECHANISMS 
(interpretation) 
Test variables: 
CONTEXT & 
CONDITIONS 
(specification) 
Test variables: 
RESPONSE 
- Distance to 
province capital 
- Vehicles 
- Inputs 
- Cattle  
- Education 
- Inputs 
- Cattle  
- Education 
- Topography 
- Distance to 
province capital 
- Distance to 
district centre 
- Education 
LABOUR 
FORCE 
SIZE 
Crop and 
livestock sales 
Crop and livestock 
household 
consumption  
Job 
incomes 
Consumption 
= Welfare 
level Household 
size 
 
In order to eliminate the confusing effect of differences in household size, the 
welfare-generating effect of labour force will be studied such that household size is 
kept fixed.  The hypothesized mechanisms through which labour force may 
contribute to household welfare are depicted in figure 7.5 together with the 
numerous possible conditioning variables.  The nature and role of conditioning 
variables is similar as in previous cases.   
 
 
7.2 Multinomial logistic regression and the elaboration method 
 
7.2.1 Multinomial logistic regression model 
 
The hypothesized welfare-generating mechanisms of assets and their conditioning 
variables will be tested with data from the 402 farmer household interviews in the 
province of Herrera, Panama.  As described in chapter 5, households were assigned 
to poverty groups according to their consumption aggregates per capita.  The 
created three welfare poverty groups were found to diverge from one another in 
many traits at statistically significant levels.  The traits that separated the extremely 
poor households from the moderately poor households were, however, different 
from the traits that separated the moderately poor from the non-poor households.  It 
can thus be assumed that the welfare-enhancing effect of household assets is 
different among the poorest than among the richest households.  Therefore, a 
modelling technique comparing separately the extremely poor to the moderately 
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poor, and the moderately poor to the non-poor households, was chosen as the 
estimation method for this chapter.   
 
The selected modelling technique was multinomial logistic regression modelling33.  
Logistic regression models have been used in a number of farmer behaviour studies 
in developing countries (e.g. Asfaw & Admassie 2004; Herath & Takeya 2003; 
Staal et al. 2002; Bakker et al. 2005), even in Panama to explain household-level 
poverty status (WB 1999: App.5).  Multinomial logistic regression models explain 
how a given factor affects the probability of belonging to a certain group, as 
compared to a selected reference group, called also baseline category.  Since this 
research has three welfare poverty groups as the dependent or response variable, 
the multinomial logistic regression analysis builds two sets of models.  The middle 
poverty group, moderately poor, is selected as the baseline category, in order to 
assess the effect of variables on both the probability of being moderately poor as 
opposed to extremely poor (or rise out of extreme poverty) and the probability of 
being non-poor as opposed to being moderately poor (or rise out of moderate 
poverty).  Multinomial logistic regression will thus produce two distinct 
coefficients for each variable:  one to depict how the given variable affects the 
probability that the household will be moderately poor rather than extremely poor, 
and another to depict how the variable affects the probability of a household being 
non-poor rather than moderately poor.  Multinomial logistic regression model thus 
allows for the effect of variables to differ in the two models.  This approach will 
highlight the possibly different faces of poverty among the poverty groups, and 
enable to assess the relative importance of different mechanisms in generating 
welfare for households on different poverty levels. 
 
The study unit will be the farmer household.  Asset quantities surrender poorly to 
division by the number of household members, due to which assets will be treated 
per household.  Although the welfare poverty measure is per capita, it classifies the 
households into poverty classes as entire households, due to which there is no 
contradiction in measuring the effect of household assets on the household's per 
capita welfare poverty level.  In the logistic regression models, the dependent or 
response variable will be the poverty group, and the independent or focal variable 
will be the asset in question.  The hypothesized mechanism variables and context 
variables, as described in section 7.1.2 will be introduced into the logistic 
regression models as additional independent variables and their effects will be 
studied under the method of elaboration.  Thus, the focus of this study is not only 
on which assets contribute to household welfare differences and through which 
                                                 
33 Analyses were first attempted with linear regression, where the dependent variable was 
Ln(consumption per capita).  However, this method failed to show the differences in assets among 
the poorest and the richest that were seen from results in chapter 5.  Results were dominated by 
richest households, concealing the phenomenon among the poorest.  This non-linearity was sought 
with testing assets in the second and third powers, but with no help for forming thresholds from 
within the data.  The use of logistic regression for categorized continuous variables in previous 
studies and reasons for not using ordinal logistic regression are presented in chapter 2, section 2.4.2. 
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mechanisms, but also on how the conditioning factors affect the magnitude of these 
mechanisms.  The effects of intervening factors can be taken into the logistic 
regression models by the elaboration method developed by Paul Lazarsfeld and 
associates in 1946.  The elaboration model has been used in a variety of disciplines, 
including even soil science (Sah et al. 2006), ecology (Penttilä et al. 2006) and 
forestry sciences (de Chantal et al. 2006) to study the effects of test variables to 
original bivariate relationships.   
 
7.2.2 Elaboration 
 
Elaboration is an analysis method to study the relationship between two variables 
in a context of several other variables.  Technically, it takes place through the 
simultaneous introduction of additional variables into a basic model that represents 
the relationship between two variables.  It has been claimed to offer “the clearest 
available picture of the logic of causal analysis in social research” (Babbie 2001: 
416-433).  Originally elaboration was developed as a system for reading percentage 
trivariate tables (Neuman 1997: 315-316), but it can be used with any multivariate 
analysis tool, such as logistic or linear regression, to study changes in original 
bivariate relationships after the introduction of a test variable or variables.    
 
Elaboration thus begins with an observed relationship between two variables 
together with a hypothesised causal origin of the relation:  for example the 
possession of a certain asset may be the cause of the welfare poverty level of a 
household.  The independent variable will be called the focal variable and the 
dependent variable the response.  The elaboration model examines the relationship 
between the focal and the response in the context of other variables, called test 
variables.  This takes place by studying the impacts of added test variables on the 
relationship between the focal and the response.  The part of the original 
relationship that remains after the introduction of the test variable is called the 
partial relationship.  Through the introduction of differing test variables, even 
simultaneously, the mechanisms through which the causal relationship occurs may 
be studied, the conditions in which the relationship is stronger or weaker may be 
specified, or the existence of a causal relationship may altogether be disproved.  
Elaboration thus offers an understanding on the nature of the original relationship 
through the effects produced by introducing other variables.  (Babbie 2001: 416-
433.) 
 
Elaboration recognizes four situations, which may occur to the original bivariate 
relationship with the introduction of a test variable.  The first such situation is 
called replication, when the introduction of the test variable does not change the 
original relationship (figure 7.6).  The original relationship can be said to be 
replicated under test conditions, as the partial relationship is the same as the 
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original relationship.  Replication supports the genuine character of the original 
relationship as it excludes the test variable as an explanation to it.   
 
Figure 7.6  Replication:  the test variable does not affect the original relationship between the focal 
and the response. 
Focal Response 
Test variable 
 
 
The second situation is called explanation.  In this case the original relationship can 
be explained through the introduction of a test variable (figure 7.7).  Explanation 
thus reveals a spurious relationship in which the focal and response appear to 
covary, because they depend upon a common cause, the test variable.  Explanation 
requires that the test variable must be causally antecedent to both the independent 
and dependent variables, and that the partial relationship must be zero or 
significantly less than the original relationship. 
 
Figure 7.7  Explanation:  the original relationship is shown to be false through the introduction of 
the test variable.   
Focal Response 
Test variable 
 
 
The third case is interpretation, in which the test variable is discovered to be a 
mediating factor through which the focal variable has its effect on the response 
(figure 7.8).  The situation is similar to the case of explanation in that the partial 
relationship is smaller than the original relationship, but the time placement of the 
test variable in interpretation situates the test variable to be a causal mechanism 
through which the focal causes the response.  The implications that follow from 
this difference are important; interpretation does not deny the validity of the 
original relationship, it clarifies the process through which that relationship 
functions.  The test variable need not explain away all the effect; it may reveal for 
instance one of several mechanisms, due to which the magnitude in which the 
partial relationship is smaller than the original varies.   
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Figure 7.8  Interpretation:  the test variable is the mediating mechanism through which the focal 
affects the response.   
Focal Response 
Test variable 
 
The fourth situation is specification, in which the relationship between the focal 
and response is different depending on the value of the test variable (figure 7.9).  
The test variable thus identifies the classes that are homogeneous with respect to 
the effect of the focal to the response.  Specification occurs when the elaboration 
model produces different partial relationships, for instance for different subgroups 
of households or for different conditions.  The test variable may also be continuous, 
in which case specification describes how the original relationship evolves with 
changing values of the test variable.  Specification can occur together with 
explanation and interpretation.     
 
Figure 7.9  Specification:  the relationship of the focal and response is different depending on the 
value of the test variable.   
Focal Response 
Test variable 
 
Later developments of the elaboration method have identified two additional 
dimensions, suppressor and distorter variables, which are ultimately special cases 
of the abovementioned situations.  Suppressor variable is a test variable that 
conceals an original relationship.  For instance, when a test variable increases, it 
simultaneously increases the focal and decreases the response, obscuring the 
originally positive relationship between the focal and the response (figure 7.10).  
When the suppressing test variable is controlled for, the partial relationship is 
greater than the original.  Although often depicted as a separate case, the distorter 
variable is an extreme case of suppression, in which the test variable is strong 
enough to reverse the true relationship.  When controlled for the test variable, the 
partial relationship is opposite to the original relationship.   
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Figure 7.10  An example of suppressed positive association. 
Focal Response 
Test variable 
 
The elaboration model will be next used to study both the mechanisms, through 
which assets produce welfare to farmer households, and the conditions or context 
variables, which affect these mechanisms.  Although cross-sectional data cannot be 
used to establish causal priority, it does allow testing the proposed hypotheses with 
the selected statistical analysis methods.  The focal variables will be the four assets 
chosen for the study, hypothesized to be causes to the welfare poverty level of the 
household, which is the response.  The mechanisms through which the effect of 
assets are hypothesized to be mediated to household welfare poverty levels are 
studied to test the hypothesis that introduced mechanism test variables intervene 
between the focal asset and the response poverty level, and that at least part of the 
welfare enhancing effect of the asset moves through the mechanism.  The 
mechanisms are thus seen to follow the logic of interpretation.  If no grounds for 
interpretation are found in the data, it will be possible to question the existence of 
the given mechanism altogether.  The context or conditioning variables are 
hypothesized to affect the extent to which the focal asset enhances household 
welfare.  The context or conditional variables are thus seen to follow the logic of 
specification.  If the test variables would result not to affect the original bivariate 
relationships, replication would occur, indicating that the test variables are not 
causally connected to the original relationship.  The search of “explanation 
variables” is not aimed for in this study, because there are no hypotheses on which 
ultimate factors could explain both the asset endowments and the welfare poverty 
level of the farmer households.   
 
If the hypothesized mechanisms are in function, and if the focal is assumed to 
enhance the mechanism, the partial relationship between the focal and the response 
is smaller than the original relationship34.  Some part of the effect between the focal 
and the response thus “moves” through the proposed mechanism, decreasing the 
coefficient of the focal variable.  If the conditioning factors are in function, the 
partial relationship may be larger or smaller than the original relationship, 
depending on the effect of the conditioning variable.  This effect can be seen in 
changes of the coefficient of the focal variable.  For every mechanism and its set of 
                                                 
34 There is one mechanism, by which an increase in educational level is assumed to decrease 
household size.  In this case the partial relationship is assumed to be larger than the original 
relationship.     
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models, a separate coefficient is reported for the focal alone, to facilitate assessing 
changes in the focal’s coefficient with the addition of variables.   
 
 
7.3   Empirical results for the focal assets 
 
In this section the hypotheses on the relationship between the four focal assets, 
their conditioning variables and the welfare poverty level of the farmer household 
will be empirically tested with farmer household data from the province of Herrera, 
Panama.   
 
Results of the multinomial logistic regression models are compiled into tables 7.2-
7.5, one for each focal variable.  The response variable is the welfare poverty group 
of the household, measured by their consumption aggregates, namely extremely 
poor, moderately poor and non-poor.  Each table depicts both the results of models 
comparing the extremely poor to the moderately poor (in the centre column) and of 
models comparing the moderately poor to the non-poor households (in the right-
hand side column).  The cells show the logistic regression coefficients (Coeff.) and 
the statistical significance level of the coefficient (Sig.) for the focal variable, 
mechanism variable and context variable(s), and the number of valid cases or 
households included in each model (N).  Numbered on the left are the different 
model sets (MS), each of which is based on one hypothesized mechanism.  The 
first row of each set of models shows the coefficient and significance of the focal 
variable alone in explaining the response.  The next row depicts the results of a 
model including both the focal and the mechanism variable, allowing assessing the 
possible changes caused in the original relationship between the focal and the 
response due to the insertion of the mechanism variable.  The next rows depict the 
results of logistic regression models including the focal, the mechanism variable 
and the given context variable, allowing to assess whether the insertion of the 
context variable affects the coefficients of the focal or the mechanism in the model.  
The significance of focal, mechanism and context variables are tested with the 
Wald test.  The units in which the variables have been measured are listed below 
the table, and all categorical variables are marked “(dummy)” after the variable 
name. 
 
7.3.1 Welfare-generating mechanisms in the province of Herrera 
 
Focal asset 1:  Land 
 
By hypothesis, land ownership increases household welfare through a number of 
mechanisms and the larger the land area, the higher welfare level should be 
expected.  The results, however, suggest that among the extremely and moderately 
poor households land ownership may be negatively related to the household 
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welfare level (table 7.2).  This can be seen in the negative coefficients of the focal 
variable when it is alone in the models (Focal Coeff. -,042; found on the first row 
of each set of models in the column of extremely poor vs. moderately poor 
households).  It is tempting to suggest that land based expenses could compete with 
household needs for scarce cash, and rather than improving the household welfare, 
more land could worsen the household’s situation.  However, the coefficient of the 
focal has a large p-value and consequently is neither statistically significant nor 
reliable, due to which such conclusions are not justified (Focal Sig. ,671, found 
next to the corresponding coefficients).  The result is consistent with findings in 
chapter 5, where there were no statistically significant differences between the 
extremely and moderately poor groups in their possessed land area, and it is 
observable also in figure 7.11.  None of the proposed mechanisms between 
extremely and moderately poor is statistically significant.  The context variables 
however suggest that fixing the distance to the province capital, land gains a 
positive coefficient; in the sample large land areas have been located in remote 
areas and held by extremely poor households.  Fixing the distance to the province 
capital, more land will positively affect the household’s welfare level.  Since the 
focal variable was not significant between extremely and moderately poor 
households, the rest of the results in this section will be presented only for 
moderately and non-poor households. 
 
Figure 7.11  Land area among extremely and moderately poor. 
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The general assumption was that larger areas of land are associated with higher 
levels of household welfare.  This claim finds support in the results between the 
moderately and the non-poor households as could be expected from the statistically 
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significant differences in land possession found in chapter 5 and appreciated in 
figure 7.12.  According to the logistic regression model results (table 7.2, column 
of moderately poor vs. non-poor households), land does serve to explain the 
welfare differences between the moderately and non-poor households.  This can be 
seen by the positive and statistically significant coefficient of the focal variable on 
the first row of each model set (Focal Coeff. ,248; Sig. ,000).   
 
Figure 7.12  Land area among moderately poor and non-poor. 
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The first hypothesized mechanism assumed that a part of the land’s contribution to 
household welfare moves through loans.  Thus the addition of loans to the logistic 
regression model should cause the partial relationship between land and welfare 
poverty level to be smaller than the original land-welfare poverty level -
relationship.  The original coefficient of the focal variable was ,248 and 
significance ,000 (first row, model set one); with the introduction of the mechanism 
variable the focal’s coefficient diminished to ,168 (second row) and the mechanism 
variable itself was statistically significant (,012).  The introduction of loans to the 
model did thus make the original relationship smaller, indicating that loans are 
indeed one mechanism through which land generates welfare to the households.  
While surprisingly the stability of incomes did not specify this relationship (Sig. of 
context variable ,936, fourth row), having titles for the land did prove a significant 
factor affecting the use of land as collateral, as could be expected (Sig. of context 
variable ,020, third row and a further change in the focal variable’s coefficient). 
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The second and third mechanisms hypothesized that land contributes to household 
welfare through increasing crop and livestock sales.  Adding crop sales or livestock 
sales to the logistic regression model should thus cause the partial relationship 
between land and welfare poverty level to be smaller than the original land-welfare 
poverty level –relationship.  However, adding crop sales to the model did not alter 
much the focal’s coefficient nor significance (rows one and two of the second 
model set; focal coeff. ,248 sig. ,000 alone and focal coeff. ,240 sig. ,000 with the 
mechanism variable), nor was the mechanism itself statistically significant (sig. 
,094) (table 7.2).  Similarly, adding livestock sales did not cause major changes in 
the focal (first and second row of the third model set; focal coeff. ,248 sig. ,000 
alone and focal coeff. ,231 sig. ,001 with the mechanism variable), nor was the 
mechanism itself statistically significant (sig. ,139).  Contrary to the hypotheses, 
the mechanisms of crop and livestock sales thus do not serve to explain the 
differences between the moderately and non-poor households’ welfare poverty 
level.  As seen in chapter 5, there were no statistically significant differences in 
crop sales between the moderately and non-poor households, but their differences 
in livestock sales were statistically significant, in both including only practicing 
households and including all households.  This discrepancy indicates that larger 
livestock sales do not depend on the larger quantity of land owned by the non-poor 
households.  Land explains the welfare differences between the moderately and 
non-poor independently of their crop and livestock sales.  Although distance, input 
use, education and vehicle ownership are significant variables in the model, their 
contribution relative to the hypothesized mechanisms cannot be assessed because 
the hypothesized mechanisms were not found to be in action.   
 
The fourth mechanism assumed that land could explain welfare differences of 
household due to the production of crops and livestock products for household 
consumption.  The results show that household consumption of produced crop and 
livestock products is indeed a statistically significant mechanism through which 
land enhances welfare among the moderately and non-poor households (table 7.2).  
The introduction of the mechanism variable decreases land’s coefficient (from ,248 
to ,219, on the first and second row of the fourth model set) and the mechanism 
coefficient itself is significant (mechanism variable’s sig. ,021 on the second row).  
This mechanism is conditioned by the use of inputs, to the extent that the focal’s 
coefficient becomes non-significant (focal sig. ,251 on the third row of the fourth 
model set).  Input use particularly to livestock production in itself distinguishes the 
non-poor from the moderately poor households and explains their differences in the 
consumption of home produced crop and livestock products independently of the 
household’s land quantity.  This is not to be taken as the elaboration term 
explanation, however, since theoretically and causally it is not meaningful to think 
that the use of inputs explains both possessed land quantity and crop and livestock 
consumption, being placed causally prior to both variables.  The effect of input use 
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on household welfare is however strong enough to dismiss land as the main 
determinant.  Naturally the total input expenditure and land quantity are 
interlinked, but for the households that use few inputs, land will not produce as 
much household consumption products nor thus welfare as for households who use 
plenty of inputs.  Education is also a significant specificator of the relationship, 
enhancing production for household consumption (context sig. ,002, changing 
focal’s coefficient to ,215; fourth row of the fourth model set).  The topography of 
the lands, on the other hand was not a significant context variable (context sig. ,055 
on the fifth row of the fourth model set).   
 
Finally, land could promote welfare through generating land rent incomes.  
Contrary to hypothetical expectations, land renting did not prove to be a 
statistically significant mechanism contributing to the welfare differences between 
the moderately and non-poor households (focal coefficient remains similar and 
mechanism coefficient sig. ,622 on first and second row of the fifth model set).  As 
was found in chapter 5, land renting was slightly more common among the 
extremely poor households than in the others but the differences were not 
statistically significant.  
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Table 7.2  Multinomial logistic regression results for focal asset 1:  Land (quantity in tens of hectares)  Response:  Consumption poverty group. 
    Extremely poor vs. moderately poor 
 
Moderately poor vs. non-poor 
 
    Focal Mechanism Context Focal Mechanism Context 
Model 
set Focal Mechanism Context Coeff. Sig. Coeff. Sig. Coeff. Sig. N Coeff. Sig. Coeff. Sig. Coeff. Sig. N 
Land   -,042 ,671     197 ,248 ,000     340 
 loans  -,041 ,660 ,046 ,702   197 ,168 ,012 ,216 ,001   340 
  titled land (dummy) -,073 ,436 ,042 ,725 ,673 ,034 196 ,162 ,019 ,211 ,011 ,567 ,020 338 
1 
  stable incomes (dummy) -,050 ,603 ,026 ,826 1,101 ,002 197 ,161 ,016 ,218 ,001 ,019 ,936 339 
Land   -,042 ,671     197 ,248 ,000     340 
 crop sales  -,044 ,654 ,521 ,061   197 ,240 ,000 ,091 ,094   340 
  distance to prov. capital ,038 ,716 ,426 ,109 -,035 ,000 195 ,288 ,000 ,067 ,213 -,021 ,001 329 
  crop inputs -,038 ,695 -,046 ,803 4,953 ,002 197 ,224 ,001 -,023 ,764 ,560 ,075 340 
  education -,037 ,705 ,476 ,087 ,094 ,057 196 ,242 ,000 ,072 ,185 ,083 ,010 339 
  topography -,029 ,781 ,498 ,072 ,002 ,642 195 ,256 ,000 ,083 ,119 ,004 ,339 196 
2 
  vehicles -,054 ,598 ,436 ,126 1,646 ,089 197 ,170 ,019 ,050 ,319 ,258 ,000 340 
Land    -,042 ,671     197 ,248 ,000     340 
 livestock sales  -,078 ,443 ,063 ,298   197 ,231 ,001 ,024 ,139   340 
  distance to prov. capital ,034 ,753 ,027 ,568 -,036 ,000 195 ,285 ,000 ,016 ,259 -,021 ,001 329 
  livestock inputs -,107 ,259 ,018 ,633 3,604 ,020 197 ,111 ,126 ,000 ,998 1,547 ,003 340 
  education -,060 ,562 ,041 ,438 ,093 ,055 196 ,233 ,001 ,018 ,233 ,085 ,008 339 
  topography -,050 ,649 ,051 ,399 ,003 ,475 195 ,243 ,001 ,027 ,137 ,004 ,339 336 
3 
  vehicles -,072 ,484 ,032 ,514 1,690 ,076 197 ,168 ,022 ,008 ,611 ,261 ,000 340 
Land   -,042 ,671     197 ,248 ,000     340 
  -,054 ,565 ,416 ,106   197 ,219 ,001 ,325 ,021   340 
 
crop&livestock 
consumption  inputs -,215 ,047 ,514 ,079 4,469 ,000 197 ,080 ,251 ,400 ,009 ,842 ,000 340 
  education -,053 ,577 ,515 ,061 ,106 ,028 196 ,215 ,002 ,368 ,013 ,101 ,002 339 
4 
  topography -,032 ,752 ,511 ,060 ,006 ,202 195 ,245 ,001 ,392 ,008 ,007 ,055 336 
Land   -,042 ,671     197 ,248 ,000     340 
 rent income  -,026 ,798 -1,023 ,087   197 ,243 ,000 ,295 ,622   340 
5 
  distance to prov. capital ,077 ,480 -1,207 ,056 -,039 ,000 195 ,296 ,000 -,005 ,994 -,022 ,000 339 
Units of measurement:  Land: tens of hectares.  Loans: amount 1 000s PAB.  Titled land: dummy 1=has land with official title.  Stable incomes: dummy 1= has stable incomes (minimum 1 
000 PAB/year in salaries, retirement payments or milk sales).  Crop sales:  value 1 000s PAB. Livestock sales: value 1 000s  PAB.  Distance to province capital: km.  Crop inputs: 
expenditure 1 000s PAB.  Education: years of education of household head.  Topography: % of plain land.  Vehicles: value 1 000s PAB.  Livestock inputs: expenditure 1 000s PAB.  
Crop&livestock consumption:  value of household consumption of crop and livestock products 1 000s PAB.  Rent income:  land rent incomes 1 000s PAB. 
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Focal asset 2:  Livestock  
 
Livestock was assumed to improve household welfare.  The results indicate that 
livestock value correlates with household welfare levels among all poverty groups 
(table 7.3).  The focal variable’s coefficient is positive and statistically significant 
both between the extremely and moderately poor, and the moderately and non-poor 
households (first row of each model set).  This result could be expected from the 
statistically significant differences in livestock possession as reported in chapter 5 
and seen in figures 7.13 and 7.14.   
 
Figure 7.13  Value of livestock among extremely and moderately poor. 
0 5 10 15 20
Value of livestock in thousands PAB
0
250
500
750
C
on
su
m
pt
io
n 
pe
r c
ap
ita
 (P
A
B
/a
)
A
A
A
A
A
A
AA
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
AA
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
AA
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
AA
A
A
A
A
AA
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
AA
AA
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
AA
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A A
A
A
AA
A
A
A A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
AAAA A AA
494
876
Moderately poor
Extremely poor
 
As to the mechanisms by which livestock affects welfare, livestock could enhance 
welfare by serving as collateral for loans.  Hence adding loans to the model should 
decrease the focal’s coefficient.  Between extremely and moderately poor 
households, livestock does not enhance welfare through serving as collateral for 
loans (focal coefficient remains unchanged when mechanism variable is added, 
mechanism sig. ,988;  first and second row of the first model set).  This finding was 
to be expected due to the low levels of loans in both groups.  Livestock does 
contribute to welfare partly though loans among moderately poor and the non-poor 
households; the mechanism’s coefficient is statistically significant (,002) and the 
focal’s coefficient is smaller in the partial (coeff. ,079) than in the original 
relationship (coeff. ,111) (model set one).     
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The second hypothesized mechanism assumed that livestock could increase 
household welfare by generating tradable products.  Sale of livestock products does 
not explain welfare differences among the extremely and moderately poor 
households (focal remains unchanged with introduction of mechanism variable, 
mechanism sig. ,923, second row of the second model set).  Between the 
moderately and non-poor households, livestock sales are also not a significant 
mechanism (focal remains unchanged, mechanism sig. 820, second row of the 
second model set).  The latter finding is contrary to expectations, because the non-
poor on average sell more livestock products than the moderately poor (chapter 5, 
annex 25).  The sales are thus not directly dependent on the total value of livestock.  
In both cases, the distance to the province capital is significant in the model, but 
independently of the proposed mechanism.  In both models, the addition of inputs 
into the models makes the focal variable lose its significance, suggesting as in 
respect to the first focal variable land, that input use is a stronger explanatory 
variable in predicting welfare differences than the quantity of land or livestock as 
such.   
 
Figure 7.14  Value of livestock among moderately poor and non-poor. 
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Third, livestock may increase household welfare by generating products for 
household consumption.  The value of household consumption of livestock 
products did not statistically differ between the poverty groups and indeed it was 
not a statistically significant mechanism among either model (table 7.3).  Between 
the extremely and moderately poor households the addition of livestock 
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consumption did slightly lower the focal’s coefficient (from ,144 to ,120), but the 
mechanism itself is not significant (mechanism sig. ,132; third model set).  The 
same effect could be observed among the moderately and non-poor households 
(focal changed from ,111 to ,103 with the addition of the mechanism, but 
mechanism sig. ,112).   
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Table 7.3  Multinomial logistic regression results for focal asset 2:  Livestock (value in thousands PAB)  Response:  Consumption poverty group. 
    
Extremely poor vs. moderately poor 
 
Moderately poor vs. non-poor 
 
    Focal Mechanism Context Focal Mechanism Context 
Model 
set Focal Mechanism Context Coeff. Sig. Coeff. Sig. Coeff. Sig. N Coeff. Sig. Coeff. Sig. Coeff. Sig. N 
Livestock   ,144 ,037     197 ,111 ,000     340 1 
 loans  ,142 ,043 ,002 ,988   197 ,079 ,002 ,197 ,002   340 
Livestock   ,144 ,037     197 ,111 ,000     340 
  ,142 ,050 ,003 ,923   197 ,113 ,000 -,004 ,820   340 
 
livestock 
sales distance to prov. capital ,164 ,028 -,005 ,901 -,034 ,000 195 ,120 ,000 -,011 ,516 -,017 ,008 339 
  livestock inputs ,075 ,359 ,009 ,817 2,384 ,164 197 ,053 ,146 -,017 ,437 1,321 ,020 340 
  education ,139 ,055 -,005 ,884 ,089 ,065 196 ,112 ,000 -,010 ,531 ,080 ,013 339 
  improved pasture (dummy) ,130 ,080 ,001 ,982 ,678 ,400 195 ,100 ,001 -,005 ,766 ,480 ,213 336 
2 
  vehicles ,121 ,095 ,000 ,992 1,484 ,089 197 ,091 ,003 -,020 ,362 ,235 ,000 340 
Livestock   ,144 ,037     197 ,111 ,000     340 
  ,120 ,074 1,892 ,132   197 ,103 ,000 ,744 ,112   340 
 
livestock 
consumption  livestock inputs ,072 ,357 1,608 ,196 1,927 ,265 197 ,038 ,261 ,690 ,144 1,222 ,029 340 
  education ,111 ,095 2,231 ,095 ,093 ,051 196 ,098 ,000 ,804 ,094 ,081 ,021 339 
3 
  improved pasture (dummy) ,107 ,119 1,812 ,137 ,693 ,388 195 ,090 ,001 ,732 ,119 ,466 ,229 336 
Units of measurement:  Livestock:  value 1 000s PAB.  Loans: amount 1 000s PAB.  Livestock sales: value 1 000s PAB.  Distance to province capital: km.  Livestock inputs: expenditure 1 
000s PAB.  Education: years of education of household head.  Improved pasture: dummy 1=has improved pasture.  Vehicles: value 1 000s PAB.  Livestock consumption:  value of 
household consumption of livestock products 1 000s PAB. 
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Focal variable 3:  Education  
 
Education can be expected to increase household welfare via numerous 
mechanisms.  Generally the results indicate that education is a significant variable 
in predicting the differences between all three welfare poverty levels of farmer 
households (table 7.4), since the coefficients of education are both positive and 
statistically significant when education is alone in the models (first row of each 
model set).  This regularity could also be assumed from results in chapter 5 and 
from figures 7.15 and 7.16. 
 
Figure 7.15  Education among extremely and moderately poor. 
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First education might increase household welfare by facilitating the approval of 
loans.  This mechanism was not found to be in action between the extremely and 
moderately poor households (second row of first model set).  But among the 
moderately and non-poor households, one part of education’s welfare enhancing 
effect was found to move through better access to loans; the mechanism coefficient 
was significant (,000), and the focal’s coefficient decreased from ,095 to ,076 with 
the addition of loans to the model.  Having titled land was a significant condition 
affecting this mechanism, whereas surprisingly enough the stability of incomes was 
not.   
 
According to the second mechanism, education increases household welfare by 
increasing crop and livestock sales.  But the results suggest that education does not 
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affect the value of crop and livestock sales of extremely and moderately poor 
households to the extent that would explain differences in their welfare poverty 
levels (focal changes little with introduction of mechanism variable, mechanism 
sig. ,101, second model set).  Again, distance to the province capital and the use of 
inputs were statistically significant context variables but not in relation to the 
proposed mechanism.  In contrast, the results suggest that crop and livestock sales 
is one mechanism through which education generates welfare differences between 
the moderately and non-poor households.  The mechanism coefficient is significant 
(,035), and the partial relationship between the focal and response decreases with 
the introduction of the mechanism (from ,095 to ,072) (second model set, first and 
second rows).  Of the context variables, surprisingly the distance to the province 
capital does not affect this mechanism (sig. ,110), but the ownership of vehicles 
does to the extent that both the focal and the mechanism lose their statistical 
significance (row four of model set two).  The same happens with the addition of 
input use to the model (row five of model set two).  Input use and vehicle 
ownership thus distinguish the non-poor from the moderately poor independently 
of the educational level of the household head, although there are no theoretical 
grounds to assume that these conditions are causally prior to education.  But it is 
possible to see input use and vehicle ownership as causally prior to crop and 
livestock sales, due to which the result could be seen as a case of explanation, in 
elaboration terms.     
 
Figure 7.16  Education among moderately poor and non-poor. 
0 5 10 15 20
Education of household head (years)
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
7000
C
on
su
m
pt
io
n 
pe
r c
ap
ita
 (P
A
B
/a
)
A
A AA
A
AA
AA AA AA AA A
AA A A
AA
A
A A AAA AA
A A
A
A
A AAA
A
A
A AA
A AAA A A AAAA A
A AA A
AA
A
AA
AA
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A A A
A
A A
A
A
A
A
A
A A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
AA
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
AA
A
A
A
A A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
876
Non-poor
Moderately poor
 
  
182
Third, education may enhance household welfare by generating entrepreneurial 
incomes.  The results of the extremely and moderately poor households do not 
support this assumption (third model set, first and second rows).  Between the 
moderately and non-poor households, however, this mechanism can be identified: 
addition of entrepreneurial incomes to the model decreases the focal’s coefficient 
from ,095 to ,086 and the mechanism’s significance level is ,016 (first and second 
row of third model set).  Although the addition of the distance to the province 
capital does lower the focal’s coefficient further to ,072, the context variable is not 
statistically significant (sig. ,100).  Education thus enhances the welfare level of 
households through entrepreneurship regardless of their distance to the province 
capital.   
 
Fourth, education was assumed to generate household welfare through providing 
higher job incomes.  The results do not support this mechanism among the 
extremely and moderately poor households (fourth model set, rows one and two, 
mechanism’s sig. ,833) nor among the moderately and non-poor households (fourth 
model set, mechanism’s sig. ,113).  The welfare enhancing effect of education is 
not mediated by job incomes in either model. 
 
The fifth hypothesized mechanism of education was smaller household size.  The 
results between all poverty groups support this hypothesis (table 7.4, fifth model 
sets).  Contrary to prior cases the addition of this mechanism variable increases the 
coefficient of the focal variable, because an increase in the focal (education) 
decreases the household size (mechanism), and this decrease in household size 
affects the response (welfare poverty level) positively.  The other mechanisms until 
this point have all increased with increasing focals.  Education thus has a 
significant role in explaining differences in household poverty levels through the 
mechanism of leading to smaller household size. 
 
Finally, education was hypothesized to contribute to household welfare by 
increasing the efficiency of crop and livestock production for household 
consumption.  This mechanism did not result statistically significant among the 
extremely and moderately poor households (mechanism sig. ,075, sixth model set), 
but it is significant in predicting the differences between the moderately and non-
poor households (mechanism sig. ,002, sixth model set).  Interestingly enough, the 
addition of household consumption of produced agricultural products increased the 
focal’s coefficient, indicating that the mechanism functions differently from what 
was hypothesized.  While education and production for household consumption 
both enhance household welfare, i.e. have positive coefficients, education tends to 
decrease the household’s reliance on agricultural production for household 
consumption.
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Table 7.4  Multinomial logistic regression results for focal asset 3:  Education of household head (years)  Response:  Consumption poverty group. 
    
Extremely poor vs. moderately poor 
 
Moderately poor vs. non-poor 
 
    Focal Mechanism Context Focal Mechanism Context 
Model 
set Focal Mechanism Context Coeff. Sig. Coeff. Sig. Coeff. Sig. N Coeff. Sig. Coeff. Sig. Coeff. Sig. N 
Education   ,099 ,040     196 ,095 ,002     339 
 loans  ,100 ,040 ,014 ,908   196 ,076 ,019 ,244 ,000   339 
  titled land (dummy) ,101 ,041 ,008 ,943 ,601 ,058 195 ,069 ,037 ,239 ,000 ,626 ,010 337 
1 
  stable incomes (dummy) ,074 ,145 -,003 ,982 ,996 ,003 196 ,075 ,024 ,246 ,000 -,063 ,797 338 
Education   ,099 ,040     196 ,095 ,002     339 
  ,083 ,092 ,117 ,101   196 ,072 ,024 ,043 ,035   339 
 
crop&livestock 
sales distance to prov. capital ,052 ,305 ,000 ,152 -,030 ,002 194 ,060 ,074 ,000 ,051 -,010 ,110 328 
  vehicles ,075 ,148 ,050 ,383 1,467 ,108 196 ,035 ,316 ,017 ,353 ,261 ,000 339 
2 
  crop&livestock inputs ,068 ,177 ,009 ,805 4,144 ,000 196 ,062 ,065 ,007 ,595 ,867 ,000 339 
Education   ,099 ,040     196 ,095 ,002     339 
  ,098 ,043 1,407 ,050   196 ,086 ,005 ,216 ,016   339 
3 
 
entrepreneur 
incomes distance to prov. capital ,068 ,170 1,458 ,060 -,030 ,002 194 ,072 ,025 ,213 ,017 -,010 ,100 328 
Education   ,099 ,040     196 ,095 ,002     339 
 job incomes   ,078 ,925 ,182 ,833   196 ,069 ,041 ,057 ,113   339 
4 
  distance to prov. capital ,053 ,307 ,125 ,125 -,029 ,003 194 ,059 ,095 ,052 ,151 -,010 ,101 328 
Education   ,099 ,040     196 ,095 ,002     339 5 
 household size  ,128 ,014 -,241 ,003   196 ,137 ,000 -,391 ,000   339 
6 Education   ,099 ,040     196 ,095 ,002     339 
  crop&livest. 
consumption 
 ,105 ,029 ,475 ,075   196 ,105 ,001 ,439 ,002   339 
Units of measurement:  Loans: amount 1 000s PAB.  Titled land: dummy 1=has land with official title.  Stable incomes: dummy 1=has stable incomes (minimum of 1 000 PAB/year of 
regular incomes from salaries, retirement payments or milk sales).  Crop&livestock sales: value of crop and livestock sales 1 000s PAB.  Distance to province capital: km.  Vehicles: 
value 1 000s PAB.  Crop&Livestock inputs: expenditure 1 000s PAB.  Entrepreneur incomes: incomes from entrepreneurship, sales of services, buying and selling, 1 000s PAB.  Job 
incomes: wages and salaries of household 1 000s PAB.  Household size: number of household members.  Crop&livestock consumption: value of household consumption of crop and 
livestock products produced on-farm 1 000s PAB.   
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Focal variable 4:  Labour force size 
 
Labour force may be a valuable asset for rural households in that it can help to 
generate higher cash and in-kind incomes.  Because increases in the labour force 
size can simultaneously bring additional mouths to feed and blur the relationship, 
the labour force size was first adjusted by fixing the household size in the models, 
and treating the two intertwined variables simultaneously in all analyses.  An 
alternative set of models was built for the labour force without fixing household 
size simultaneously (annex 46).  The results confirm the initial assumption that 
labour force in itself may be negatively associated with household welfare if 
household size is not fixed, but the coefficient is statistically significant in none of 
the different models.  Another option was to use the contributor-share of the 
household (dividing labour force size by household size), but this approach loses 
the valuable information about the absolute labour force size or absolute household 
size (annex 47).  The selected approach, studying the labour force size changes 
with a fixed household size, emphasizes the effects that are caused when a formerly 
unemployed household member finds employment or when a child grows up to 
become a contributing member for the household, keeping household size 
unchanged.  Unfortunately, the trivariate relationship yields poorly to graphical 
representation (figure 7.17). 
 
Among the extremely and moderately poor households, labour force size did not 
become statistically significant in any of the models even though household size 
was simultaneously fixed (table 7.5).  The conclusion is that labour force size does 
not serve to predict the welfare differences between the extremely and moderately 
poor households.  The following results will thus be for the comparison of 
moderately and non-poor households only 
 
According to the first mechanism, labour force improves household welfare by 
generating crop and livestock sales.  The results support this mechanism among the 
moderately and non-poor households (table 7.5, first model set).  Adding crop and 
livestock sales however causes the coefficient of the focal variable to decrease 
minimally from ,286 to ,283, although the mechanism variable is statistically 
significant (,004).  Crop and livestock sales are thus one mechanism through which 
labour force contributes to household welfare, but contrary to expectations this 
mechanism is, although close, not conditioned by the households’ distance to the 
province capital (sig. ,050 third row of first model set).  The other context 
variables, on the other hand, were statistically significant and affect the extent to 
which labour affects the welfare level of households through crop and livestock 
sales (rows 4-7 of model set one).  Vehicle ownership affects the relationship (row 
four), and makes the mechanism lose its significance.  Input use and cattle 
ownership affect the mechanism to the extent that both the focal labour force size 
and the mechanism, crop and livestock sales, become non-significant, although 
causally they can not meaningfully be thought to be antecedent to the focal, labour 
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force size.  Education is also a significant context variable, increasing the focal’s 
coefficient.  The effect that labour force can have on the welfare level of 
households through crop and livestock sales thus varies according to the value of 
vehicles and cattle that the household owns, the inputs the household uses, and the 
educational level that the household head has achieved.  However, not all of these 
specifying effects could be explained in light of theory. 
 
Figure 7.17  Scatterplot of labour force size, household size and consumption per capita. 
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Second, labour force may contribute to household welfare by generating crop and 
livestock production for household consumption.  As assumed, agricultural 
production for household consumption is an important mechanism through which 
labour force can generate welfare differences between the moderately poor and 
non-poor households (model set two).  The mechanism’s coefficient is statistically 
significant (,000) and adding the mechanism to the model both decreases the 
focal’s coefficient (from ,286 to ,275).  With the addition of inputs and cattle 
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ownership, the focal’s coefficient becomes even less significant and smaller, 
indicating the strong influence that input use and cattle ownership have on how 
much labour force can contribute to household welfare through crop and livestock 
production for household consumption (rows three and four of model set two).  
Education, on the contrary, increases the focal’s coefficient and improves its 
statistical significance, suggesting again that education may lead to decreased 
importance of production for household consumption and affect the welfare level 
of households through other mechanisms (row five of model set two).  And 
contrary to the hypothesis, topography was found to be an insignificant context in 
how much the labour force can enhance household welfare through agricultural 
production for household consumption (row six).   
 
Finally, labour force could improve household welfare through generating higher 
job incomes.  Between moderately and non-poor households, job incomes indeed 
are a significant mechanism by which labour force generates welfare differences 
(model set three).  Adding job incomes decreases the focal’s coefficient from ,286 
to ,240 and the mechanism is significant (,003).  This mechanism is conditioned by 
neither distance to the province capital nor distance to the nearest district centre, 
contrary to expectations (rows three and four of model set three).  Education, 
however, is a significant context variable, again to the extent that its addition 
makes the mechanism statistically non-significant (row five of model set three).  
Job incomes seem to covary with the educational level of the household head due 
to which their simultaneous inclusion in a logistic regression model makes the 
other variable’s coefficient statistically non-significant.  
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Table 7.5  Multinomial logistic regression results for focal asset 4:  Labour force size (number of contributors in the household, fixing household size)  Response:  Consumption poverty 
group. 
    
Extremely poor vs. moderately poor 
 
Moderately poor vs. non-poor 
 
    Focal Mechanism Context Focal Mechanism Context 
Model 
set Focal Mechanism Context Coeff. Sig. Coeff. Sig. Coeff. Sig. N Coeff. Sig. Coeff. Sig. Coeff. Sig. N 
Labour   -,028 ,862     197 ,027 ,819     340 F 
Labour+household size*  ,180 ,316 -,267 ,003   197 ,286 ,033 -,362 ,000   340 
Labour+hh   ,180 ,316     197 ,286 ,033     340 
**  ,165 ,358 ,161 ,036   197 ,283 ,040 ,067 ,004   340 
 
crop&livestock 
sales distance to prov.capital ,217 ,236 ,139 ,057 -,035 ,000 195 ,318 ,027 ,063 ,008 -,012 ,050 329 
  vehicles ,188 ,280 ,088 ,162 1,798 ,112 197 ,313 ,030 ,030 ,153 ,321 ,000 340 
  inputs ,079 ,671 ,021 ,590 5,479 ,000 197 ,118 ,224 ,016 ,376 1,266 ,000 340 
  cattle ,131 ,467 ,075 ,238 ,165 ,044 197 ,240 ,100 ,026 ,211 ,120 ,000 340 
1 
  education ,209 ,248 ,130 ,072 ,119 ,024 196 ,318 ,024 ,055 ,015 ,126 ,000 339 
Labour+hh   ,180 ,316     197 ,286 ,033     340 
**  ,140 ,425 ,602 ,022   197 ,275 ,048 ,620 ,000   340 
 
crop&livest 
consumpt. inputs ,022 ,905 ,747 ,023 5,465 ,000 197 ,139 ,399 ,833 ,000 1,445 ,000 340 
  cattle ,102 ,564 ,843 ,005 ,206 ,011 197 ,202 ,191 ,814 ,000 ,136 ,000 340 
  education ,166 ,346 ,788 ,007 ,149 ,005 196 ,358 ,015 ,815 ,000 ,185 ,000 339 
2 
  topography ,166 ,344 ,685 ,013 ,006 ,188 195 ,283 ,047 ,664 ,000 ,005 ,225 336 
Labour+hh   ,180 ,316     197 ,286 ,033     340 
** job incomes  ,156 ,370 ,279 ,002   197 ,240 ,081 ,110 ,003   340 
  distance to prov.capital ,169 ,353 ,190 ,036 -,031 ,002 195 ,280 ,049 ,096 ,010 -,012 ,065 329 
  distance to distr.centre ,213 ,238 ,213 ,018 -,068 ,001 195 ,275 ,052 ,111 ,003 -,001 ,962 329 
3 
  education ,170 ,336 ,258 ,008 ,114 ,040 196 ,304 ,031 ,073 ,071 ,114 ,002 339 
*)  The household size was fixed against labour force size.  In this row, household size parameters are reported in the column of mechanism.  The labour force variable in the context of a 
fixed household size is referred to as “Labour + hh”.  **)  Labour force size, adjusted for household size.   
Units of measurement:  Labour force size:  number of contributing household members.  Household size:  number of household members.  Crop&livestock sales:  value 1 000s PAB.  
Distance to province capital: km.  Vehicles: value 1 000s PAB.  Inputs: crop and livestock input expenditure 1 000s PAB.  Education: years of education of household head.  
Crop&livestock consumption: value of household consumption of crop and livestock products 1 000s PAB.  Cattle: value of cattle 1 000s PAB.  Topography: % of plain land.  Job 
incomes:  incomes from salaries and wages 1 000s PAB.  Distance to district centre: km.   
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7.3.2 Contrasting the results to previous findings 
 
The results of empirical tests of the hypotheses support many literature views on 
the dynamics between assets and poverty, but also challenge some.  In this section 
the empirical results will be discussed relative to theoretical and other empirical 
studies on the dynamics between the focal assets and rural household welfare. 
 
Previous studies have reached diverging conclusions on the value of land for rural 
households.  Although in this study small holdings of land were associated with 
greater poverty as in other studies (Finan et al. 2005; WB 1999: App.8: 2), the 
empirical test results do not support the view of land as a powerful tool for poverty 
reduction (Finan et al. 2005).  Rather the findings support the views of Lopez and 
Valdes (2000) according to which land does not guarantee subsistence in Latin 
America.  In this study larger land areas did not guarantee for a household to rise 
above the extreme poverty line.  Rather the marginal welfare-enhancing effect of 
land depended on a household’s control over complementary assets and on the 
context in which land is used, as concluded also by Finan et al. (2005).  Particularly 
input use and educational level of the household head heavily specified how much 
the land would enhance household welfare.  Surprisingly land’s welfare-enhancing 
effect did not take place through agricultural sales nor land rents, but rather through 
farming for household consumption and loans.  And the results agree with previous 
works according to which registered land titles are most valuable in that they 
enable the household to use the land as collateral for loans, rather than through any 
other mechanism (Lopez & Valdes 2000; WB 1999: App.5: 10; Deininger & 
Chamorro 2004).   
 
In respect to livestock, the results of this study found livestock to be a significant 
determinant of welfare differences between all poverty groups.  However, the only 
mechanism that could be found in the data was that a part of the welfare-enhancing 
effect happens through loans, and only among the moderately and non-poor 
households.  None of the other assumed mechanisms were found to be in action to 
explain how livestock would be causing the welfare differences between poverty 
groups.  This may suggests that livestock value is mainly causally posterior to the 
welfare poverty level of the household.  In other words, households do not have a 
higher welfare because they have more livestock, but rather they have more 
livestock because they have a higher welfare.  These results support Freeman et al. 
(2004) who claim that livestock is associated to higher wealth not only because it is 
a store of value but also because it is associated with higher incomes.  These higher 
incomes are however not based on livestock; wealthier households have more cattle 
because they have more non-farm incomes, particularly from self-employment and 
business, and are able to build up herds, rather than these households would have 
become wealthier because of the herds.     
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The central role of education in poverty reduction as perceived in theory and 
previous studies found support also in the results of this study.  Not only does 
education improve labour opportunities, but also it improves the inter-sectoral 
allocation of time and inputs.  (Yang & An 2002; WB 1999: App.5: 10; WB 1999: 
App.8: 2.)  In Herrera education contributed to household welfare through greater 
loan approval, agricultural sales, entrepreneurial incomes, household size and the 
agricultural production for household consumption.  How much these mechanisms 
were in action depended on vehicle ownership, input use and the distance to 
markets.  The importance of education for household welfare was not only obvious 
from the results of education as the focal asset, but also from the results of other 
focal asset models in which education affected the extent to which other assets 
could enhance household welfare.   
 
The confusing effect of labour force size on household welfare has been found not 
only in this study, but in previous studies as well.  On the one hand, as assumed, 
the costs of a large family size are known to be high (WB 1999: App.5: 10; WB 
1999: App.8: 2, 7), and reductions in family size have been found to have a positive 
impact also on the return to assets (Escobal & Torero 2005).  Indeed, the addition 
of unproductive household members lower welfare (Finan et al. 2005) and the 
dependency ratio of the household is inversely related to income (Lopez & Valdes 
2000).  The addition of one economically active member to a household increases 
the probability of being poor least, compared to the possible addition of a child or 
elderly (WB 1999: App.8: 2).  Thus the addition of a contributing household 
member when the household size is kept fixed should improve the household’s 
welfare, but the results of this study challenge even this assumption among the 
extremely and moderately poor households.  In their case the negative effect of 
larger household sizes dominates over the positive effects of contributing 
household members.  And when the labour force can possibly enhance household 
welfare, the mechanisms are heavily influenced by complementary assets such as 
vehicles, other inputs, amount of cattle and education.  For a great deal of poor 
rural households, labour force is a burden rather than a blessing.  In a setting of few 
employment opportunities, the labour force cannot compensate with their meagre 
incomes the high maintenance costs of food and other needs.   
 
Of the mechanisms, loans are a significant mechanism through which land, 
livestock and education contribute to the welfare differences between the 
moderately and non-poor households in Herrera.  The finding is consistent with 
earlier studies finding correlation between household poverty and limited credit 
access (WB 1999: App.8: 4) pointing out rightfully that it cannot be known 
whether households are poor because they lack credit or that households do not 
have access to credit because they lack incomes and collateral.   
 
Of the context variables of particular interest were distance to centres, input use, 
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vehicle ownership and education, affecting how the welfare-generating 
mechanisms of assets function.  The distance to centres was a very persistent 
variable, gaining significant coefficients often even when the hypothesized 
mechanisms were not in function.  The finding supports numerous other works in 
which the distance factor has been seen important particularly due to the uneven 
provision of public infrastructure increasing transaction costs, which hampers 
households’ access to markets (Escobal & Torero 2005; Finan et al. 2005; Lopez & 
Valdes 2000; WB 1999: App.8: 2).  Another strong context variable, the higher use 
of inputs to agricultural production is not only a consequence of having more 
money but it also contributes to future higher incomes (WB 1999: App.5: 10).  And 
vehicle ownership that effectively divides the poor from the rich is also both an 
indication of a higher welfare level, but also an important complement to labour 
(WB 1999: App.8: 4).  These “dominating” context variables are indeed also in 
practice factors that dictate much of the economic opportunities of farmer 
households.  How distant it lives from the nearest centre conditions the household’s 
life in a number of ways: its access to education and health care, its access to buy 
inputs and sell outputs, its access to transportation, information, and so on.  This 
distance can be overcome with the possession of a vehicle, but in remote areas 
vehicles are rare.  The use of inputs conditions how much a given area of land 
produces, and the educational level of the household head influences the decisions 
made in the household regarding many aspects of life and production.  In sum the 
conditioning variables may be, as the model results suggest, even stronger 
influences to the household welfare level than the welfare-generating mechanisms 
of assets themselves.    
 
Altogether the results challenge the idea that improving asset holdings of the rural 
poor would necessarily promote equity (Rahman & Westley 2001).  Even now, 
many assets are distributed relatively equally, such as cropland and labour force 
size, and still there are great welfare differences between the households.  For the 
poor, an additional asset such as land, cow or working household member, can 
affect the daily economy negatively rather than positively, if the assets wish to be 
conserved.  But in the long run, capital accumulation seems to be a pathway out of 
poverty also in Herrera.  As an example of an upward spiral, physical capital allows 
for better educational levels, which again positively influence the physical capital 
stock (Grier 2002).  If the poor are rationed out of borrowing, as the data suggests 
that they are in Herrera, the poor must move forward slowly with an autarchic 
savings strategy requiring substantial short term sacrifice by diminished 
consumption (Carter & Barrett 2006).  Such a strategy is vulnerable to shocks and 
worsening economic conditions, since the poor tend to smoothen their assets if 
their subsistence is at risk (Zimmermann & Carter 2003; Gonzalez de la Rocha 
2001).  But the heterogeneity of asset positions supports the idea that there are 
several strategies out of poverty (De Janvry & Sadoulet 2000).  Still not all assets 
may help, if the complementary use of inputs is insufficient, if the household does 
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not possess necessary complementary assets, or if the setting is unfavourable.  As 
the results suggest, there is no automation by which assets produce welfare to rural 
households.  Mechanisms must be in function, which they often are not. 
 
 
7.4 Conclusions   
 
The role of assets in determining the welfare poverty level of rural households has 
received much attention in academic discourse, but there has been a lack of a 
systematic approach that would shed light on the possible mechanisms through 
which these assets would generate welfare to the household or under which 
conditions.  This chapter set out to develop such an approach that allows theoretical 
ideas of the welfare generating mechanisms of assets to be empirically tested with 
farmer household data.  The underlying thought was that assets may in general 
contribute to household welfare through four mechanisms:  if they are sold off, if 
they generate income flows, if they are exchanged for other more productive assets 
and if they serve as collateral for loans.  An asset can be welfare-enhancing only if 
one or more of these mechanisms is in function and if the conditions for the 
mechanism to function are favourable.  In addition to contributing positively to 
household economics, assets may be risky and cause maintenance expenses to the 
household, due to which there are limits to how many assets a household will wish 
to possess at a given time. 
 
Four focal assets, claimed in the literature to be important resources for rural 
households, were selected for empirical testing: land, livestock, education and 
labour force.  Hypotheses were formed on the mechanisms through which these 
assets could possibly contribute to rural household welfare, and on the context 
variables that may suppress or promote the mechanisms.  The existence of these 
mechanisms was tested with data from 402 farmer household interviews from the 
province of Herrera, Panama.  The analyses were carried out with multinomial 
logistic regression models, using the focal assets to explain whether a household 
belongs to the extremely or moderately poor households, or to the moderately or 
non-poor households, as measured by their consumption aggregates.  Elaboration 
was used as the method with which it was possible to study whether the 
hypothesized mechanisms were found to exist in the data, and whether the 
hypothesized context variables actually affected the functioning of the mechanisms.  
This was possible, because elaboration allows studying how the relationship 
between a focal asset and the response welfare poverty level evolves with the 
addition of the mechanism variable, and further with the addition of the context 
variables one by one.   
 
In relation to the theoretical framework of Reardon and Vosti (1995), the results 
support the idea of decomposing poverty by the assets a household has.  In the 
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Herreran setting the fungibility of assets is indeed limited, and the welfare flows 
that the assets may produce depend on a number of factors internal and external to 
the farmer household.  Some assets seem to be better for poverty reduction than 
others, and the role of a given asset may be different for the poorest than for the 
richest household.  For the poorest households, the central question seems to be 
how poor the household is in education.  For the rest, land, livestock and labour 
force have a limited capacity to lift the poorest households out of poverty by any 
identifiable mechanism.  For the wealthier households, the central question seems 
to be how much education and labour force the household has for producing 
incomes, and how much titled land and cattle it has for obtaining loans.  For the 
rest, the richest do have most land and livestock, but they do not seem to generate 
income flows by any hypothesized mechanism to the household other than 
agricultural products for household consumption, at least not to the extent that 
would explain their welfare poverty level.  These results bring an important 
addition to existing literature, in which differences between poorest and richest are 
seldom acknowledged.  The findings also suggest that a measure of household 
assets is not sufficient for knowing of the welfare level of rural households, 
although such has been suggested (Reardon & Vosti 1995).  Rather the crucial 
question is, are there identifiable mechanisms through which the assets contribute 
to household welfare, and under which circumstances do these mechanisms 
function.      
 
The introduced mechanism-oriented and context sensitive approach to studying the 
welfare-generating role of household assets has many benefits.  Firstly, it 
emphasizes the understanding of assets as generators of welfare rather than as an 
end in themselves.  This emphasis is in line with the theoretical framework of 
Reardon and Vosti (1995) that approached household assets in relation to the 
income flows they generate. Asset already as a concept has the connotation that the 
resource in question is valuable and useful to the owner.  But a resource only 
becomes an asset when there is an opportunity to put it into productive use 
(Gonzalez de la Rocha 2001) or if it truly acts as a store of wealth.  A resource 
causing only costs and risks to the household may be of little positive value to the 
household, at least in the short run.  Mechanisms through which the asset generates 
welfare to the household must thus be identified, if the resource is to be a true asset 
for the household.  Without an identifiable mechanism there is no automation by 
which a resource would make the owner household better off.   
 
Secondly the suggested approach has the benefit that it is strongly and 
systematically tied to theory.  Because the hypothesized mechanisms and the 
potential conditioning factors are articulated before the models are built, the 
approach requires a thorough theoretical understanding of what mechanisms could 
exist for assets to generate welfare and under which conditions they could work in 
the local setting.  The approach also highlights that it is not theoretically sufficient 
  
193
 
 
 
to simply state that an asset explains the welfare level of households, but rather the 
mediating mechanisms and the potential promoting or suppressing context factors 
must be identified and hypothesized a priori.  This guarantees end results that are 
theoretically meaningful, rather than mere statistical observations.  
 
Thirdly the approach offers a new method that generates informative and specific 
results on the interactions between assets and household welfare.  The approach 
offers a systematic way to empirically test the hypothesized welfare-generating 
mechanisms of assets of rural households.  The logistic regressions with 
elaboration enable to empirically test, step by step, the existence of each 
hypothesized mechanism and each conditioning factor.  This controlled step-wise 
approach is statistically sounder than the common approach of entering long lists of 
variables simultaneously to one model, because a simultaneous introduction of 
variables yields results on every variable in the context of all the other variables.  In 
other words, such a model depicts the relative contribution of each variable in the 
context of having fixed all the other variables and an absolute effect of a variable 
can never be found, because every coefficient reacts to the absence or presence of 
other variables in the model.  The proposed controlled approach has the benefit of 
avoiding such uncontrolled interactions of variables and also possible erroneous 
conclusions that are often caused by statistical coincidences that are not 
theoretically meaningful.  This approach moves thus beyond the search for mere 
statistical significance and correlation, which alone are poor indicators of 
mechanisms or the interaction between variables, and emphasizes the importance 
of theoretical and practical understanding of the issue at stake both in forming the 
hypotheses and in the testing phase.   
 
Fourthly, in a research lacking longitudinal data, this approach offers tools for 
discussing causality in the dynamics of assets and household welfare.  As was 
proposed in the beginning of this chapter, some assets may be rather indicators of a 
household’s welfare level than its causes.  The approach made it possible to test 
whether the focal assets did actually generate welfare flows to the household 
through any mechanism, when it was seen that the asset in question did statistically 
significantly explain a higher welfare level.  For instance in the data livestock 
ownership effectively correlates with rising above the extreme poverty line, 
tempting to jump to the conclusion that livestock ownership causes the higher 
welfare of the household.  But elaboration allowed searching for many 
mechanisms, through which such a welfare-enhancing effect could take place.  And 
since no such mechanisms could be identified in the data between the extremely 
and moderately poor households, the logical consequence is to state that livestock 
is not contributing to household welfare and to revert the original causal 
hypothesis.  Rather than the livestock would be causing the higher welfare level of 
the household, the data suggests that the higher welfare level has allowed the 
household to purchase more livestock.  However, such causal conjectures are not 
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entirely justified with this method or data, and in fact most assets and the 
household welfare level are in circular causation, being as much causes as 
consequences.  Poverty is thus a cause and consequence of low asset possessions; 
poor may live in remoter areas due to land prices, and the longer distances affect 
market access, employment opportunities and education, which in turn make 
income-earning more difficult, thus hindering capital accumulation.  And the 
vulnerable household economy can limit from purchasing complementary assets 
and inputs, which would enable a more productive use of the household’s assets, 
and in the absence of necessary maintenance the resource base can actually 
degrade.  (Reardon & Vosti 1995.)   
 
Additionally, the selected multinomial logistic regression model enabled to account 
for the different “faces” of poverty.  The strategies pursued by households to rise 
from extreme poverty to moderate poverty were clearly different from those 
associated with rising over the moderate poor, out of poverty altogether.  The 
selected method made it possible to show differences in the use of assets for 
welfare improvements in a way that is unaccounted for in the majority of asset-
poverty studies.    
 
Future research can benefit from the suggested approach for the several forenamed 
reasons.  In addition future research could study in more detail the possible 
negative circumstances that impede the household from using their assets 
efficiently or from maintaining them in a sustainable state.  Such factors could 
include for instance large household sizes, long distances to centres and illnesses 
and other shocks, that on the one hand compete for meagre household resources, 
and on the other hand limit the opportunities that the household has to make their 
assets truly welfare enhancing.   
  
195
 
 
 
8. Conclusions 
 
 
In many developing countries, poverty and environmental degradation has 
concentrated in rural areas.  Consequently, the poor farmers have been blamed for 
the observed loss of forest cover, erosion of soils and pollution of waters.  The 
standard argument of the vicious circle describes that poor farmers overexploit 
their environment in the struggle to survive, and the ensuing degradation 
impoverishes them further.  But research trying to grasp this poverty-environment –
link reached confusing results, leading even to question whether the welfare level 
of rural households affected the environmental impacts of their agricultural 
practices at all.   
 
Reardon and Vosti presented their influential investment poverty framework in 
1995 to provide better tools to study the poverty-environment –interactions in 
developing countries.  They introduced the concept of investment poverty to 
describe the potentially large group of households that are not poor by traditional 
nutrition-based welfare poverty measures, but that are too poor in that their surplus 
above the welfare poverty line is too small to allow them to make minimum 
investments for the conservation of their natural resource base.  This welfare 
poverty level, according to Reardon and Vosti, depends on the income flows that 
are produced to rural household by their assets.  According to the framework, the 
various assets of rural households affect their production and investment activities, 
which in turn affect components of the environment.  This positioned household 
asset possessions in a central role in understanding the entire poverty-environment 
–nexus. 
 
The Reardon and Vosti framework received wide attention in subsequent discourse, 
and was empirically tested in a number of case studies.  In these studies, however, 
the contribution of assets to household welfare levels was not examined, and the 
concept of investment poverty was not explored.  The results of the case studies 
seemed to challenge the view of poor farmers as the culprits of environmental 
degradation, but by characterizing poverty by the asset categories of households 
many of them might have still missed the relevant dynamics that could have better 
been approached with investment poverty.  Concepts of great relevance to the 
discourse, investment poverty and the welfare generating effect of assets, invited 
closer scrutiny and empirical testing.  What is investment poverty and how could it 
be measured?  Do assets by default contribute to household welfare and how could 
their welfare-generating mechanisms be empirically studied?  And finally, what 
kind of welfare poverty measure would best serve as a tool for the estimation of 
both of these novel concepts? 
 
To answer these questions, empirical farmer household data was collected in the 
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province of Herrera of the Republic of Panama.  The research questions were 
approached on the micro-level, believing that the dynamics could best be 
understood at the level of farmer households.  And considering the farmer 
households themselves experts on their own decision-making, personal interviews 
with the households were seen as the most proper data collection method for the 
study.  For a number of reasons, Panama was found to provide an amenable setting 
for the study and of the Panamanian provinces, the Herrera province was chosen as 
the precise data collection area.  A structured questionnaire was formulated, 
including questions on household assets, investments, income and consumption, 
farming characteristics and household composition.  A non-probabilistic quota 
sampling frame was used to obtain a geographically representative sample of farms 
of one hectare or larger in the province, and the face-to-face interviews were 
carried out with 402 farmer households in February-April 2005.  In comparison 
with previous statistics on the province, the sample was found to represent fairly 
well the province’s farms.  Information collected in the questionnaires was inserted 
into the statistical software SPSS, involving inter alia the somewhat challenging 
conversion of local weights and volumes to standard measures.  In addition 
information was collected on loan markets, food prices, infrastructure and 
institutions in the Herrera province to serve as supporting background information.  
The resulting data was subject to the sources of error common to interview studies, 
even though efforts were made to avoid them.   
 
The first task of this study was to form a continuous welfare measure, as a tool with 
which both an investment poverty line and the welfare-generating effect of assets 
could be estimated.  Household welfare was studied, as is common practice, 
through widely inclusive consumption and income aggregates and expressed in the 
local currency (Panamanian Balboa, PAB).  Consumption consisted of a 
household’s annual home consumption of agricultural products, expenditures and 
the imputed value of annual services from housing, vehicles and household 
durables.  Household income was measured through combining the annual value of 
farm production, income earned from off-farm sources and entrepreneurism, rents 
and imputed values of annual services from housing, vehicles and household 
durables.  These household welfare estimates were divided by the number of 
household members to derive a per capita welfare measure.  Differences between 
income and consumption aggregates were considerable, depicting not only saving, 
dissaving and asset accumulation, but also methodological difficulties involved in 
both measures.  The consumption measure was found more reliable and selected as 
the welfare measure for ensuing analyses.   
 
To study the traditional welfare poverty concept, empirical money-metric poverty 
lines were formed for the Herreran setting.  The extreme welfare poverty line was 
calculated as the annual price of purchasing a diet of 2 280 daily calories of a 
typical Panamanian nutritional pattern.  From the local food prices collected during 
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the field research period, the extreme poverty line for the Herreran province was 
located at 493,71 PAB/capita/year.  Of the studied households 15,4% had a per 
capita consumption below that value and were, hence, classified as extremely poor.  
The moderate welfare poverty line was formed as the sum of the annual cost of 
purchasing a daily diet and a customary non-food consumption share.  Deriving the 
non-food consumption share from the household data, the resulting moderate 
poverty line was located at 876,16 PAB/capita/year.  33,6% of studied households 
had a per capita consumption between the extreme and moderate poverty lines, and 
was thus termed moderately poor, yielding a non-poor share of 51,0% of studied 
households.  Poverty depth measures revealed that the shortages in consumption of 
the extremely and moderately poor households were severe, and a regional 
evaluation showed striking heterogeneity in the incidence of poverty among the 
different areas of the province.  A statistical comparison of the three welfare 
poverty groups revealed numerous and substantial differences in for instance asset 
possession, income and investment strategies.  There were also significant 
differences in the provision of basic infrastructure and access to extension services, 
with the poor being adversely affected.  However, the characteristics separating the 
extremely and moderately poor were different from the characteristics separating 
the moderately poor from the non-poor households, suggesting that household 
strategies change along rising welfare levels.  
 
The next task was to define and empirically measure the concept of investment 
poverty.  As defined in the theoretical framework, investment poor households are 
not extremely poor, but their surplus above the extreme poverty line is too small to 
permit them to make conservation investments or follow key practices for their 
land use practices not to damage their natural resource base.  Despite an apparently 
straightforward definition, the empirical operationalization of the concept was 
challenging.  A conservation investment poverty line could not be found in Herrera 
by evaluating investments or activities aiming purely at conservation, due to their 
rare presence on studied farms.  An attempt to measure investment poverty through 
the nutrient balance or the intensity of cattle production proved also futile.  But 
investments and activities with combined aims of conservation and improved 
productivity, namely investments into live fences, crop fertilizer use and area under 
improved pasture species were found to be in a linear association with the 
household’s welfare level.  With the use of linear regression models and the step-
wise elimination of cases with highest welfare levels, an investment poverty line 
was sought as a level of household welfare below which the linear association 
would cease to exist, or in other words, as a level of welfare below which the 
activities would no longer depend on the household’s welfare level.  For live fence 
investments, such a threshold was located at the household welfare level of 900 
PAB/capita/year, and for fertilizer use and improved pasture area the threshold was 
found at 1000 PAB/capita/year.   
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Selecting the threshold welfare level of 1000 PAB/capita/year as the investment 
poverty line for Herrera, it was possible to derive that the necessary surplus above 
the extreme poverty line to enable conservation investments was 506,29 
PAB/capita/year.  In other words, the welfare level of households needed to be 
more than twice the value of the nutritional minimum in order for them to 
overcome the investment poverty line.  This could be characterized as the 
necessary step for overcoming poverty in the long run.  The investment poverty 
line also made it possible to divide the households that were not under the extreme 
poverty line into two groups: investment poor and investment non-poor 
households, both comprising 42,3% of studied households.  A comparison of the 
two investment poverty groups revealed in many dimensions the same differences 
as those between moderately welfare poor and non-poor households.  The 
investment poverty line was particularly useful in identifying differences in asset 
endowments, income, production and investment strategies.  As could be expected, 
the investment non-poor had accumulated more assets and were able to generate 
higher production values on each hectare.  Despite the increased investments into 
conservation, increasing welfare levels can also lead to larger herds and hence, to 
more environmental degradation due to a high preference for livestock in Herrera.   
 
The final task was to study the welfare-generating mechanisms of assets for rural 
households.  Since no such previous studies existed, the task required formulating 
theoretical hypotheses on these mechanisms and developing a method to subject 
them to empirical testing.  It was proposed that in order to truly contribute to 
household welfare rather than merely indicate past solvency, it must be possible to 
identify a mechanism through which welfare is generated.  In addition, the welfare-
generating mechanisms were seen to be affected by conditioning variables that may 
either suppress or promote the asset’s welfare-generating effect.  Assets were 
proposed to generate welfare through four mechanisms: by being sold off, by 
generating income flows, by being exchanged for another asset and by serving as 
collateral for loans.  However, the maintenance of assets also generate expenses for 
households and assets are subject to risks, due to which there is a limit to how 
many assets a household can or will wish to maintain at a given point of time.  Four 
focal assets were selected for empirical testing of their welfare-generating effects:  
land, livestock, education and labour force.  Hypotheses were systematically 
formed to list all mechanisms through which the focal assets could generate welfare 
to Herreran households.  In addition, all the conditioning factors that could either 
promote or suppress the welfare-generating mechanisms were listed.   
 
The empirical testing of the hypothesized welfare-generating mechanisms of assets 
was carried out using multinomial logistic regression models with the method of 
elaboration.  The focal assets were used to explain the welfare poverty group to 
which a household belonged.  Multinomial logistic regression was selected as the 
analysis method, because the extremely poor were found to diverge from the 
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moderately poor in characteristics that were different from those separating 
moderately poor from the non-poor.  Rather than a linear regression that would 
have assumed a linear relationship between assets and welfare throughout all 
households, multinomial logistic regression allows for effects to be different 
between the poorest from between the richest.  Elaboration involves the scrutiny of 
the relationship between two variables in the presence of other variables.  In this 
case it made it possible to test the existence of the welfare-generating mechanisms 
of assets by observing how the addition of the mechanism variable changed the 
original relationship between the focal asset and the household’s welfare poverty 
group.  Elaboration also enabled to test whether the conditioning variables actually 
did affect the mechanisms, and thus condition the welfare-enhancing effects of 
assets.   
 
The results of the multinomial logistic regression models suggested that among the 
extremely and moderately poor households the most important asset for generating 
a higher welfare level is education.  Its main contribution takes place through its 
association with smaller household sizes.  Neither the quantity of land nor labour 
force served to explain welfare differences between extremely and moderately 
poor, and although livestock did, in the data it was not possible to identify any 
hypothesized mechanism through which a welfare-generating effect of livestock 
would take place.  Among the moderately and non-poor households, the central 
importance of land, education and labour force for generating higher welfare levels 
were identified in the data.  In addition, the context in which assets were used was 
found to affect the functioning of the found mechanisms.  Particularly input use, 
vehicle ownership, land titling, and education and cattle as complementary assets 
were significant context variables in the models.  Although the value of cattle 
increased with welfare levels and thus yielded significant logistic regression 
coefficients, the only mechanism through which cattle was found to contribute to 
welfare differences was through improving the non-poor’s access to loans.   
 
Empirical results suggest that the contribution of assets to household welfare 
should not be taken for granted.  Contrary to expectations, for instance land and 
livestock did not generate substantial welfare flows that would explain welfare 
differences between households.  Rather, their contribution to household welfare 
did not increase with quantity, but with the use of inputs that could make even 
small land areas or herds more lucrative to households than larger ones on which 
fewer inputs were used.  The proposed method of study proved to have many 
benefits. 
 
The results of this research provide support to many ideas of the investment 
poverty framework of Reardon and Vosti, but also challenges certain of its aspects.  
As proposed by theory, results suggest that a nutrition-based extreme welfare 
poverty line does not manage to distinguish households in relation to their 
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conservation investments or key intensification practices.  Rather, an investment 
poverty line is more successful in identifying the divide between households that 
can and cannot afford investments with simultaneous benefits to soil conservation 
and productivity.  Contrary to the theoretical definition of investment poverty, in 
the Herreran setting a purely conservationist investment poverty line could not be 
located.  Household welfare levels in Herrera may have not reached the level where 
purely conservation investments become more common, assuming there is such a 
hierarchy of investment preferences, or current investment preferences and lack of 
knowledge on soil conservation cause for other than conservation investments be 
carried out despite potential for conservation investments.  Data supported also the 
theory’s notion that investment poverty impedes rural households from taking the 
capita-intensive agricultural intensification path.  In Herrera wealthier households 
were found to cultivate input-intensive and high-yielding crops for sales and even 
exportation, while the poorer cultivated low-requirement crops.  The location of the 
empirical investment poverty line is, however, theoretically also interesting in that 
it is located not so far above the moderate welfare poverty line.  Thus, after the 
nutritional and the customary non-food consumption needs are satisfied, surplus 
could soon be used for conservation investments.  There are limits to how much 
household consumption is upwards flexible. 
 
As the theory proposed, investment poverty is not the only determinant of soil 
conservation activities of farmers in Herrera.  Rather, a lack of economic incentives 
and the lack of external support, particularly of extension services and loans for 
conservation investments, could be identified at the research site.  Herreran farmers 
were virtually unaware of most available conservation investments or 
environmentally less harmful farming practices, less alone would they perceive 
incentives for carrying them out.  In addition, as proposed by theory, the instability 
of livelihoods of most studied households due to a lack of permanent jobs or other 
reliable sources of income and due to a dependence on agricultural production for 
home consumption affects their risk-tolerance and may make households 
particularly averse to conservation investments of long-term or insecure returns.  
And since the importance of livestock rearing was found in the data to increase 
with income as proposed by theory, more damage to pastures can be expected if the 
Herreran households’ welfare improves.  Rising above the investment poverty line 
is not a sufficient condition for households to ease their pressure on the natural 
resource base.  As was proposed in later contributions to the poverty-environment –
discourse, in Herrera the degradation of soils is likely to be more severe in some 
areas than in others, and to affect different farmers in different degrees.  
Consequently, degradation may go unnoticed or not be threatening enough to call 
for major corrective action.  In terms of the limiting factors, lack of investment 
capacity is only one among several factors limiting soil conservation. 
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The research results supported also Reardon and Vosti’s claim that despite having 
strong incentives, the poor may have limited capacity to diversify their livelihoods.  
The Herreran poor are limited by their lesser education, fewer contacts, more 
distant residence and lack of vehicles, hampering their access to markets and work 
opportunities.  And due to the higher poverty incidence in remote areas, poor 
infrastructure and thin markets, the low-level equilibrium trap proposed in later 
literature may be identified and seen to further suppress the opportunities of the 
rural poor to diversify their incomes.  Nevertheless, as proposed by theory, rural 
livelihoods are not based on natural resources alone, not even among the poorest 
Herreran households.  Rather incomes are gained from a variety of sources of 
which land based activities may or may not be the most important ones.   
 
Finally, the theory’s views on the importance of assets for rural households were 
simultaneously supported and challenged by the empirical data.  On the one hand, 
some assets were found to contribute to household welfare in Herrera by generating 
income flows or by facilitating loan approval, as proposed by the theory.  But such 
mechanisms were sensitive to the context in which the assets were used, and for 
several assets no such mechanisms could even be identified.  Even large asset 
endowments may not contribute to household welfare, and the possession of certain 
assets may be higher among higher welfare groups due to being used as store of 
wealth, rather than for productive purposes.  The maintenance requirements of 
assets could actually even compete with other household consumption needs and 
hence lower welfare, contrary to theoretical views.  On the other hand, the theory 
proposed approaching poverty in itself through the possession or lack of certain 
asset categories.  Since the welfare-generating effects of any asset were not 
guaranteed, the research results did not support such approach.  Knowing of the 
asset endowments of a household would not alone be sufficient to know of the 
household’s welfare poverty level, yet alone their investment capacity.  Smaller 
asset endowments could yield higher welfare flows than larger asset endowments, 
if for instance paired with higher input use, and higher education of the farmer.  
The results thus suggest approaching assets through a systematic study of the 
accompanied welfare flows and resulting welfare levels, which are seen as more 
reliable measures of household welfare than asset positions alone.   
 
This study shares many similarities with the previous empirical studies having 
applied the Reardon and Vosti framework.  They were carried out in Latin America 
with farmer household interviews, for the study of similar environmental problems 
and often with cross-sectional data.  But the previous case studies had approached 
both poverty measurement and the environmental dimension differently from the 
approach adopted by this study.  The previous studies might have missed the 
poverty-environment –interactions because of the inadequacy of their poverty 
measurement method for the study purposes.  This study nevertheless shared the 
result of the other case studies in that purely environmentally beneficial practices 
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could not be explained by household welfare poverty levels.  But with the 
operationalization of the investment poverty concept, this research was able to 
examine investments with mixed conservation and productive goals, and with the 
continuous and money-metric welfare measure to locate the investment poverty 
line and locate each household relative to it.  Had the other case studies constructed 
local investment poverty lines and measured them with money-metric welfare 
measures based on household consumption, it is possible that connections between 
household welfare and conservation investments could have been found.  Also, the 
results of this study were largely in line with previous poverty studies in Panama, 
based on national censuses.  As could be expected, not all results were similar, due 
to different coverage and year, but the annual costs of nutrition had remained very 
stable between the censuses and this research and hence, the extreme poverty lines 
were strikingly alike.   
 
The main contribution of this work is the operationalization of the investment 
poverty concept.  As hypothesized, it was possible to empirically locate a threshold 
of welfare, above which households can afford to carry out conservation 
investments, albeit in this case they held a simultaneous productive dimension also.  
And, as assumed, the concept provided a valuable tool for research in the poverty-
environment –nexus.  The approach could, however, be extended to the study of 
also other types of investments.  With the same logic, poverty lines could be sought 
for, for instance, educational and entrepreneurial investments, as thresholds of 
welfare below which such investments could no longer be explained by household 
welfare.  The work on investment poverty fills a void in the poverty-environment –
discourse and finally gives the renowned conceptual work of Reardon and Vosti an 
attempt of empirical application.     
 
Another main contribution of this work is the formulation of the mechanism-
oriented and context-sensitive asset analysis method.  Instead of taking for granted 
the contribution of assets for household welfare, with the proposed method the 
relationship can be put to empirical test.  The approach offers a controlled method 
to systematically test theory-based hypotheses on the potential welfare-generating 
mechanisms of household assets and the conditions in which these mechanisms 
may be either suppressed or promoted.  The elaboration method used in the 
proposed way could be employed in other studies on not only the welfare-
enhancing effects of assets to household welfare, but also to other similar assumed 
interactions.  The benefits of the approach are numerous.   
 
There are numerous opportunities for future research to further improve the 
understanding of poverty-environment –interactions.  Any welfare poverty 
measurement in rural areas that seeks to locate a nutrition-based extreme poverty 
line would benefit from observing local rural food consumption patterns as 
distinguished from the urban food consumption patterns that may be readily 
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available from national accounts.  An adjustment would also be needed to correct 
for the consumption of other free food items such as fruit from farm trees, that 
currently are underreported and unadjusted for in both diet price and consumption 
aggregate calculi.  These improvements would yield a site-specific poverty line that 
corresponds better to local food consumption patterns and thus to the true cost of 
surviving on a locally typical diet.  The concept of investment poverty also merits 
further research.  Both the environmental dimension of the concept and the 
empirical estimation method would benefit from further development.  Similarly 
research on the contribution of assets to household welfare could benefit 
particularly from the further development of the method of accounting for the roles 
of conditioning factors in the models.  Whereas at this point the method did not 
allow elaborating on the direction of effect of the conditioning variables, such 
developments to the method would produce new information on asset dynamics in 
rural economies.  As to the entire investment poverty framework of Reardon and 
Vosti, new research could develop ways to theoretically expand and empirically 
examine how conditioning factors, such as markets, infrastructure and other 
institutions, affect the interactions between poverty and household behaviour, and 
between household behaviour and the environment.  Until date such conditioning 
factors have been discussed and their importance for the discourse acknowledged, 
but detailed theoretical work and methods that allow including them in models are 
still lacking.   
 
The results of this work contribute to the understanding of the role of investments 
and assets for rural households.  Assets can provide a pathway out of poverty, but 
different assets have different properties as contributors to the household welfare.  
Furthermore, the welfare-contributing effect of assets depends on the conditions in 
which they are used.  A more equitable division of assets has been suggested as a 
tool to alleviate poverty, but in light of the findings in this study, such an outcome 
seems unlikely.  Assets may, in the short run, compete for meagre cash resources of 
rural households, because their maintenance costs may exceed their possible 
welfare generating effects.  Without effort, inputs and complementary assets, assets 
may prove not to generate welfare at all - unless they are sold off.  And even then 
their value may be low, as the case of remote land areas.   
 
The investment poverty line, as measured in this study, can serve to indicate a level 
of welfare above which sustainable investments begin to gain importance in the 
households’ strategies.  This could suggest a level of welfare that needs to be 
obtained if the households’ pressure on their natural resource base is wished to be 
alleviated.  Such a conclusion is, unfortunately, not justified yet with these results.  
Despite leading to increasing investments that have a conservation goal, increasing 
welfare level may well simultaneously lead to increased investments into 
environmentally harmful targets, such as the expansion of livestock herds and 
pasture areas.  It is not known whether the possible increases in environmentally 
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harmful practices currently outweigh the beneficial effects of increased 
conservation investments.  Poverty eradication alone cannot thus eliminate 
environmental degradation in rural areas of developing countries. 
 
There are several dimensions in which policy interventions could bring 
improvements to the welfare of rural households.  As was seen in the results of this 
research, education increases incomes not only from work but also from 
entrepreneurship.  Women’s employment decreases the probability of poverty, 
pointing to the crucial role of not only educating both sexes, but also generating 
conditions favourable for the creation of job opportunities also for women in the 
countryside as well as in the centres.  The regionally unequal distribution of 
poverty in Herrera would also need to be directly addressed, because the current 
lack of infrastructure and, hence, of opportunities in the poorest areas contributes to 
the perpetuation of poverty.  Particular attention should be paid to improving 
market access that could create income opportunities for rural households. 
 
The agricultural and environmental extension services in Herrera need 
strengthening, if soil conservation is wished to become more common.  The current 
fragmentation of actors and information, their weak presence on the field and the 
bias in favour of working with the wealthiest households have resulted in a 
stagnant setting where few farmers are aware of possibilities to conserve the soil or 
of the health risks related to exposure to agrochemicals.  Through extension and 
incentives it could be possible to affect households’ investment preferences in a 
direction that would enable long-term sustainability of both the components of the 
environment and of farmer livelihoods.  It did not become clear during the 
research, whether facilitating access to loans would be a good tool for improving 
the economic opportunities of farmer households.  On the one hand, without loans 
the saving strategies necessary for investments are particularly challenging, 
involving often compromising daily consumption.  But on the other, the reluctance 
towards loans is great, interests high enough to make it difficult for households to 
afford payback and the associated risks could put in peril the whole base on which 
the household livelihood is built.  Loans cannot thus be promoted as a panacea for 
poverty.    
 
What will happen in the province of Herrera in the following decades remains to be 
seen.  Will farmer households migrate to cities in search of better livelihoods, and 
abandon their lands?  Will abandoned croplands be converted into pasture, to 
accommodate the growing herds of the wealthier farmers, or might they be left to 
afforest?  Or will the future Herreran countryside continue to be filled with life, 
with functioning markets and more opportunities?  With the inevitable 
globalization process opening even the remotest villages of Herrera to world 
markets, the threats and opportunities come simultaneously.  Farmers might be 
better protected against changes and gain empowerment also toward higher-level 
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processes, if they got organized and worked together.  Whatever strategy rural 
households will opt for in an evolving context, the alleviation of their poverty must 
be a shared, national priority also in the future. 
 
Returning to the initial discourse on poverty-environment –dynamics, the vicious 
circle argument will remain.  Due to investment poverty, low levels of welfare 
decrease the likelihood of carrying out conservation investments and environmental 
degradation may ensue.  But poor farmers cannot alone be blamed for degrading 
land uses, while the extensive grazing systems of their wealthier counterparts 
expand.  Although the non-poor farmers make more conservation investments, it 
could not be known whether those investment levels are sufficient to forestall or 
reverse resource degradation, or whether they are rather cosmetic in magnitude.  
The environmental outcomes of agricultural land use are not unrelated to the 
poverty or welfare level of farmer households, but the question of direction in 
which the effect operates remains open for debate.   
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De Gracia, Oliver.  Coordinator of vehicles.  Governación de la Provincia de 
Herrera.  Government of the Herrera Province.  Personal interview 
16.5.2005 Chitré, Herrera, Panama.   
 
Delgado, Dima.  Supervisor.  Cable&Wireless Panama.  Telecommunication 
company.  Personal interview 9.5.2005 Chitré, Herrera, Panama. 
 
Díaz, Cesar.  Planner.  Autoridad de la Micro, Pequeña y Mediana Empresa 
(AMPYME).  Authority of the micro, small and medium-sized enterprise.  
Group interview together with Gonzalez, Augusto 9.5.2005 Chitré, Herrera, 
Panama.   
 
Flores Marciaga, Agapito.  Pensioner.  Personal interview 31.3.2005  Llano Bonito, 
Chitré, Herrera, Panama. 
 
Franco Muñoz, Pablo.  Pediatrician.  Clinic and Hospital Dr Venancio Villarreal.  
Personal interview 14.5.2005  Chitré, Herrera, Panamá. 
 
Frías, Manuel.  Extensionist.  Personal interview 21.2.2005  Los Pozos, Herrera, 
Panama. 
 
Gallardo, José.  Topographer.  Catastro.  Land register.  Personal interview 
9.5.2005  Chitré, Herrera, Panama.   
 
García, Idania.  Controller of the commercial cycle.  Unión Fenosa, Empresa de 
Distribución Eléctrica Metro Oeste & Empresa de Distribución Eléctrica 
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Chiriquí (EDEMET-EDECHI).  Electricity distribution company.  Personal 
interview 16.5.2005 Chitré, Herrera, Panama.   
 
Gonzalez, Andrés.  Researcher.  Instituto de Investigación Agropecuaria (IDIAP).  
Agricultural Research Institute.  Group interview with Quiroz, Evelyn and 
Gordon, Román 31.5.2005 Villa de Los Santos, Los Santos, Panama. 
 
Gonzalez, Augusto.  Administrative assistant.  Autoridad de la Micro, Pequeña y 
Mediana Empresa (AMPYME).  Authority of the micro, small and medium-
sized enterprise.  Group interview together with Díaz, Cesar 9.5.2005 
Chitré, Herrera, Panama.   
 
Gonzalez, Dionis.  Commercial director of the Central Provinces.  Cable&Wireless 
Panama.  Telecommunication company.  Personal interview 9.5.2005  
Chitré, Herrera, Panama. 
 
de Gonzalez, Magalys.  Civil servant.  Ministerio de Comercio e Industria.  
Ministry of Commerce and Industry.  Personal interview 26.5.2005 Chitré, 
Herrera, Panama. 
 
Gordon, Roman.  Agronomist.  Instituto de Investigación Agropecuaria (IDIAP).  
Agricultural Research Institute.  Group interview with Quiroz, Evelyn and 
Gonzalez, Andrés 31.5.2005 Villa de Los Santos, Los Santos, Panama. 
 
Guisado, Nestor.  Coordinator of the organic agriculture project.  Ministerio de 
Desarrollo Agropecuario (MIDA).  Ministry of Agricultural Development.  
Personal interview 31.1.2005 Chitré, Herrera, Panama.   
 
Herazo, Ariel.  Extensionist, Engineer in agronomy .  Instituto de Mercadeo 
Agropecuario (IMA).  Agricultural Marketing Institute.  Personal interview 
26.5.2005 Chitré, Herrera, Panama. 
 
Kajifusa, Hiroki.  Coordinator M.A.  Proyecto de Capacitación y Extensión 
Agropecuaria Sostenible en las Áreas Rurales de la República de Panamá 
(PROCESO).  Project of training and guidance for sustainable agriculture 
and livestock farming in the rural areas of the Republic of Panama.  
Personal interview 24.5.2005 Divisa, Herrera, Panama.   
 
Marciaga, Climaco.  Promoter.  Asociación para el Desarrollo del Micro y 
Pequeño Productor (ADEMIP)  Association for the development of the 
micro and small producer.  Personal interview 23.2.2005  Los Pozos, 
Herrera, Panama.   
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Marquez de García, Fanny.  Personal communication 26.1.2005 Chitré, Herrera, 
Panama. 
 
Massiah, Roberto.  Manager.  Financiera La Hipotecaria.  Finance company.  
Personal interview 13.5.2005  Chitré, Herrera, Panama. 
 
MIDA Ocú.  Civil servant.  Anonymous.  Ministerio de Desarrollo Agropecuario 
(MIDA).  Ministry of Agricultural Development.  Personal interview 
10.2.2005 Ocú, Herrera, Panama.   
 
Miguelena de León, Bruno.  Regional supervisor.  Ministerio de Educación 
(MINEDUC).  Ministry of Education.  Personal interview 9.5.2005 Chitré, 
Herrera, Panama. 
 
MINSALUD.  Anonymous.  Public relations employee.  Ministerio de Salud 
(MINSALUD).  Ministry of Health.  Personal interview 10.6.2005 Chitré, 
Herrera, Panama.   
 
Mirones, Sebastian.  Engineer.  Ministerio de Desarrollo Agropecuario (MIDA).  
Ministry of Agricultural Development.  Presentation at the agricultural 
meeting of the BNP 5.3.2005 in Ocú, Herrera, Panama.   
 
Moraís, John.  Manager of planning.  Ministerio de Salud (MINSALUD).  Ministry 
of Health.  Personal interview 17.5.2005 Chitré, Herrera, Panama.   
 
Moreno, Eduardo.  Statistician.  Bureau of statistics and censuses of the 
Panamanian comptroller’s office, Regional office of Herrera and Los 
Santos.  Personal interview 31.3.2005 Villa de Los Santos, Los Santos, 
Panama. 
 
Moreno, Luis.  Regional manager.  Fondo de Inversión Social (FIS).  Social 
Investment Fund.  Personal interview 30.5.2005  Chitré, Herrera, Panama. 
 
Muñoz, Luis.  Cattle rancher.  Personal interview 27.1.2005  Guararé, Los Santos, 
Panama. 
 
Murillo, Celso.  Plant manager.  Empresa Hermanos Varela S.A.  Licor Distillery.  
Personal interview 10.6.2005 Pesé, Herrera, Panama.   
 
Navarro, Guillermo.  Farmer of exported crops.  Finca de raices y tubérculos de 
San José, Ocú.  Presentation at the agricultural meeting of the BNP 
5.3.2005 in Ocú, Herrera, Panama.   
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Nieves, José.  Credit negotiator.  Banco Nacional de Panamá (BNP).  National 
Bank of Panama.  Personal interview 26.5.2005 Chitré, Herrera, Panama.   
 
Noriega, Carmen.  Analyst for consumer education.  Comisión de Libre 
Competencia y Asuntos del Consumidor (CLICAC).  Commission of Free 
Competition and Consumer Matters.  Personal interview 13.5.2005 Chitré, 
Herrera, Panama. 
 
Olarte, Julio.  Civil servant.  Bureau of statistics and censuses of the Panamanian 
comptroller’s office, Regional office of Herrera and Los Santos.  Personal 
interview 26.1.2005 Villa de Los Santos, Los Santos, Panama. 
 
Peralta, Agustín.  Veterinarian.  Ministerio de Desarrollo Agropecuario (MIDA).  
Ministry of Agricultural Development.  Personal interview 23.5.2005 Santa 
Maria, Herrera, Panama.   
 
Pérez, Maggledys.  Civil servant.  Instituto de Acueductos y Alcantarillados 
Nacionales (IDAAN).  Institute of National Aqueducts and Sewer System.  
Personal interview 25.5.2005 Chitré, Herrera, Panama.   
 
Pérez B., Victor M.  General manager.  Productos Lácteos San Antonio S.A. 
(PROLACSA).  Dairy company.  Group interview with Pérez G., Ricardo A.  
24.5.2005 El Roble, Coclé, Panama.  
 
Pérez G., Ricardo A.  Plant manager.  Productos Lácteos San Antonio S.A. 
(PROLACSA).  Dairy company.  Group interview with Pérez B., Victor M.  
24.5.2005 El Roble, Coclé, Panama. 
 
Pinilla, Veronica.  Credit negotiator.  Banco General.  Private bank.  Personal 
interview 13.5.2005 Chitré, Herrera, Panama.   
 
Pinzón, Benigna.  Psychologist.  Ministerio de la Juventud, La Mujer, La Niñez y 
La Familia.  Ministry of Youth, Women, Childhood and Family.  Personal 
interview 30.5.2005  Chitré, Herrera, Panama.   
 
Quintero, Esmeralda.  Manager of technical assistence.  Instituto Panameño 
Cooperativo (IPACOOP).  Autonomous Panamanian Institute of 
Cooperatives.  Personal interview 26.5.2005  Chitré, Herrera, Panama.   
 
Quiroz, Evelyn.  Engineer in ecological agriculture.  Instituto de Investigación 
Agropecuaria (IDIAP).  Agricultural Research Institute.  Group interview 
with Gordon, Román and Gonzalez, Andrés 31.5.2005 Villa de Los Santos, 
Los Santos, Panama. 
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Riegos de Chiriquí.  Anonymous sales person.  Irrigation system company.  
Personal interview 30.5.2005 Chitré, Herrera, Panama. 
 
Rios, Petra.  Pensioner.  Personal communication 22.1.2005  Chitré, Herrera, 
Panama. 
 
Rivera, Rufino.  Civil servant of the Department of Auditing of Environmental 
Quality.  Autoridad Nacional del Ambiente (ANAM).  National 
Environmental Authority.  Personal interviews 31.1.2005 and 26.5.2005 
Chitré, Herrera, Panama. 
 
de Rodriguez, Deira.  Credit officer.  Caja de Ahorros.  Private bank.  Personal 
interview 18.5.2005 Chitré, Herrera, Panama.   
 
Rodriguez, Maria.  Credit analyst.  Cooperativa Nueva Union R.L.  Cooperative.  
Personal interview 26.5.2005  Chitré, Herrera, Panama.   
 
de Rodriguez, Mitzi.  Social worker.  Ministerio de Vivienda (MIVI).  Ministry of 
Housing.  Personal interview 9.5.2005 Chitré, Herrera, Panama.   
 
de Saavedra, Carlina E.  Business manager.  Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria 
(BBVA).  Private bank.  Personal interview 13.5.2005 Chitré, Herrera, 
Panama.   
 
Salazar, Guillermo.  Negotiating Ambassador.  Ministerio de Desarrollo 
Agropecuario (MIDA).  Ministry of Agricultural Development.  
Presentation at the agricultural meeting of the BNP 5.3.2005 in Ocú, 
Herrera, Panama.   
 
Salerno, Anarelis.  Customer service representative.  HSBC.  Private bank.  
Personal interview 18.5.2005  Chitré, Herrera, Panama. 
 
Sanchez, Yessenia.  Credit officer.  Financiera La Interiorana.  Finance company.  
Personal interview 13.5.2005  Chitré, Herrera, Panama.   
 
Servicio de Carne de Panamá.  Anonymous.  Manager.  Slaughterhouse company.  
Telephone conversation 8.6.2005  Los Canelos, Divisa, Herrera, Panama. 
 
Solis, José Luís.  Professor of Agronomy.  Universidad de Trabajo, Universidad de 
Panama.  University of Labour, University of Panama.  Personal interview 
30.5.2005  Chitré, Herrera, Panama.   
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Solis, Tomás.  Manager.  Ministerio de Desarrollo Agropecuario (MIDA).  
Ministry of Agricultural Development.  Personal interview 31.1.2005  
Chitré, Herrera, Panamá. 
 
Subasta Ganadera de Los Santos.  Auction manager.  Cattle auction company.  
Personal interview 27.1.2005 Guararé, Los Santos, Panama.   
 
Taxi driver.  Anonymous.  Personal interview 22.1.2005  Chitré, Herrera, Panama. 
 
Ureña Guillén, Rubén.  Manager of materials and printers.  Empresa Hermanos 
Varela S.A.  Licor Distillery.  Personal interview 10.6.2005 Pesé, Herrera, 
Panama.   
 
Other sites of data collection: 
 
Consulting community council.  Consejo Consultivo Comunitario.  Panamanian 
President Martin Torrijos listened to representatives from all districts of the 
Herrera Province for needs of investments, materials, and for other 
concerns.  22.1.2005  Centro Regional Universitario de Azuero, Chitré, 
Panama.   
 
Market place for agricultural products, wholesale for restaurants, vendors, shops 
and other business, and also retail for nearby consumers.  30.4.2005  
Albrook, Panama City, Panama. 
 
Panama Canal.  Miraflores Locks.  29.4.2005  
 
Subasta Ganadera de Los Santos.  Cattle auction.  27.1.2005  and 2.6.2005 
Guararé, Los Santos, Panama. 
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11.  Annexes 
 
 
Annex 1  Population age structure of the province of Herrera.   
 
Table A1.1  Population age structure of the province of Herrera (2000). 
0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000 12000
80 +
75-79
70-74
65-69
60-64
55-59
50-54
45-49
40-44
35-39
30-34
25-29
20-24
15-19
10-14
5-9
0-5
A
ge
Population
Source:  Based on information recollected in the population census of 2000 (DEC 2000a).   
 
Annex 2  Farm sizes in Herrera in the agricultural census of 2001. 
 
Table A2.1  Farm sizes in Herrera in the agricultural census of 2001. 
Farm size (ha) Number of 
farms 
Percentage of 
farms 
Total area (ha) Percentage of 
total area 
Farms less than 1,0 ha 
     < 0,1 ha 
     0,1-0,49 ha 
     0,5-0,99 ha 
Total < 1,0 ha 
6 004 
1 772 
1 242 
9 018 
31,9 % 
9,4 % 
6,6 % 
47,9 % 
202 
345 
699 
1 246 
< 0,01 % 
0,2 % 
0,4 % 
0,7 % 
1,00-4,99 ha 4 291 22,8 % 8 643 4,5 % 
5,0-9,99 ha 1 464 7,8 % 9 533 5,0 % 
10,0-19,99 ha 1 657 8,8 % 21 917 11,5 % 
20,0-49,99 ha 1 622 8,6 % 48 043 25,3 % 
50,0-99,99 ha 507 2,7 % 33 719 17,7 % 
100,0-199,99 ha 194 1,0 % 25 084 13,2 % 
200,0-499,99 ha 68 0,3 % 19 103 10,0 % 
500,0-999,99 ha 12 < 0,01 % 8 412 4,4 % 
1 000,0-2 499,99 ha 8 < 0,01 % 10 392 5,5 % 
> 2 500,0 ha 1 < 0,01 % 3 971 2,0 % 
Total Herrera 18 842  190 062  
Source:  DEC 2001. 
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Annex 3  Cattle product prices in Herrera, January-June 2005. 
 
Table A3.1  Mean cattle product prices in Herrera, January-June 2005.   
January 2005 June 2005  
PAB/ lb Mean weight Total PAB n PAB/ lb Mean weight Total PAB n 
Cow (>772 lbs) ** 0.41 899 369 15 0.43 862 367 13 
Heifer (551-772 lbs) 0.41 692 293 6 0.44 672 310 17 
Calf (female) (<551 lbs) 0.47 350 177 6 0.48 494 238 4 
Bull (>882 lbs) 0.51 1049 537 2 0.54 918 496 1 
Young bull (551-882 lbs) 0.54 754 403 1 0.55 720 404 5 
Auction * 
Calf (male) (<551 lbs) 0.65 337 220 26 0.58 468 260 36 
Cow whole, alive n.a. 
Cow in two halves (carcass) 0.90 PAB / lb (without head, blood and intestines) 
Young bull whole, alive 0.53 PAB / lb (alive and standing)  
Slaughterhouse  *** 
Young bull in two halves (carcass) 1.01 PAB / lb (without head, blood and intestines) 
Cow whole 0.50-0.51 PAB / lb (alive and standing)  Veterinarian estimate 
Cow in two halves 0.90-0.96 PAB / lb (without head, blood and intestines) 
Milk “A” quality;  for drinking 0.30 PAB/litre on the farm 
Milk “B” quality 0.28 PAB/litre on the farm 
Milk “C” quality;  industrial use and processing of cheese etc. 0.23 PAB/litre on the farm 
Milk bought by PROLACSA 
Transportation of milk 1-4 c/litre paid to transport provider depending on the distance 
 Milk bought by Nestlé 0.21-0.23 PAB/litre on the farm 
 Milk bought by Estrella Azul 0.21 PAB/litre on the farm 
 Milk bought by private cheese houses 0.19-0.24 PAB/litre  
Statistical information  Producer price of milk on the farm in 2003 in Herrera province  0.33 PAB / litre on the farm  
*) The auction company charges 4% commission from the sale.  This charge is paid by the seller, the price quoted in the table is the price paid by the buyer.  This information was collected in the Subasta 
Ganadera de Guarare, Los Santos Province, the most commonly attended auction of Herreran farmers.   
**) The classification of the weight category of each type of animal is taken from the Costa Rican cattle production market information system, since no such classification were found for Panama.  Costa Rica 
is the neighbouring country of Panama and it can be assumed that cattle production is similar enough to allow the transfer of this type of classification. 
***) This information was obtained only after persistent visits and calls from the sales company of the Servicio de Carne de Panama, situated in Divisa, Herrera Province.  The company was peculiarly 
secretive, and the most important price (of whole cows) was not given. 
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Annex 4  Quality requirements for milk in Herrera. 
 
Table A4.1  Quality requirements of milk by grade A, B,C as bacteria / ml of milk   
 Crude Consumption 
  P UHT 
A < 200.000  50.000 0 
B < 1.000.000 100.000 0 
C > 1.000.000   for cheese production / industrial use 
Source:  Morais J pers.comm. 17.5.2005. 
 
Annex 5  Financial institutes in the province of Herrera. 
 
Table A5.1  Characteristics of selected financial institutes in the province of Herrera, Panama  (based on interviews in february and may 2005) 
Currency =  Panamanian Balboa (PAB) 
 Loan sums (PAB) 
 Minimum Mean Maximum 
Interest 
rates 
Other costs Payback 
period * 
Amount of 
loans in 
Herrera 
Frequency of 
arrears 
Loans for: Required collateral 
BNP (National Bank of 
Panama) 
5 000 30 000 500 000 5-6% Commission 50-75$ 18 months-
20 years 
200 15% of debtors Land, cattle 71%, 
agriculture 29%, 
equipment 
Ranch, houses, 
<90% of value 
BDA (Agro-pastoral 
development bank) 
1 000 20 000 250 000 7,5 % - < 10 years 700-800 10-20% of 
debtors, 4-5 
auctioned farms 
per year 
60% for cattle, 40% 
for agriculture 
Farm, cattle, land up 
to 80% of value 
Banistmo 20 000 50 000 1 000 000 5-8,75% Commission 1% 12 months-
10 years 
? Few Cattle 80-90%, 
agriculture 10-20% 
Ranch, houses, 
vehicles, <90% of 
value 
BBVA 10 000 200 000 250 000 7,5% Commission 1,5% 12 months-
10 years 
200 Few Cattle 90%, 
agriculture 10% 
Savings, ranch 
Banco General 50 000 200 000 none 6,5-7,5% Commission 1-2% 12 months-
10 years 
100+ None Cattle 92-93%, 
agriculture 7-8% 
Real estate 
Cooperativa Nueva 
Unión 
100 5 000 10 000 11,5-
13,08% 
Commission 1,75% 12 months-
10 years 
1781 High Agriculture 70%, 
cattle 30% 
Ranch, house, also 
non-titled, <75% of 
value, guarantor 
La Interiorana 2 000 25 000 55 000 2,5-11% 2% commission, 
management 15PAB/m 
5-30 years ? 20% Houses 100% Purchased house 85-
90% of value 
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 Loan sums (PAB) 
 Minimum Mean Maximum 
Interest 
rates 
Other costs Payback 
period * 
Amount of 
loans in 
Herrera 
Frequency of 
arrears 
Loans for: Required collateral 
La Hipotecaria 10 000 25 000 62 500 7-7,5% 1-3% commission, 
management 5PAB/m, life 
insurance 30PAB/m 
12 months-
35 years 
? <1% Houses House 
Caja de Ahorros 500 20 000 100.000 8% Initial commission, life and 
fire insurances 
<35 years ? 5% Houses, personal Ranch, house 
HSBC 20 000 60 000 300 000 3-5,61% Initial 500-1.000 PAB, life 
insurance 20 PAB+fire 
insurance 10PAB/m 
<30 years ? ? Houses, car, 
personal 
House, car 
*)  There is a system of credit “lines” for cattle ranching.  Credit is given for typically 12 months for the purchase of male cattle, which is raised and slaughtered within the credit period.  The loan is cancelled in 
one payment, and the credit “line” allows for the client to purchase more cattle with the following 12-month loan.   
 
Interviews: 
 
BANCO GENERAL:  Pinilla, Veronica.  Credit negotiator.  Banco General.  General Bank.  Personal interview 13.5.2005 Chitré, Herrera, Panama.   
BANISTMO:  Bernal, Rubieth.  Credit manager.  Primer Banco del Istmo (Banistmo).  First Bank of the Isthmus.  Personal interview 16.5.2005 Chitré, 
Herrera, Panama.   
BBVA:  de Saavedra, Carlina E.  Business manager.  Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria (BBVA).   Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria Bank.  Personal interview 
13.5.2005 Chitré, Herrera, Panama.   
BDA:  BDA Ocú.  Anonymous.  Credit manager.  Banco de Desarrollo Agropecuario.  Agricultural and livestock development bank.  Personal interview 
10.2.2005  Ocú, Herrera, Panama. 
BNP:  Nieves, José.  Credit negotiator.  Banco Nacional de Panamá (BNP).  National Bank of Panama.  Personal interview 26.5.2005 Chitré, Herrera, 
Panama.   
CAJA DE AHORROS:  de Rodriguez, Deira.  Credit officer.  Caja de Ahorros.  Savings Bank.  Personal interview 18.5.2005 Chitré, Herrera, Panama.   
Cooperativa Nueva Union:  Rodriguez, Maria.  Credit analyst.  Cooperativa Nueva Union R.L.  Cooperative Nueva Union.  Personal interview 26.5.2005  
Chitré, Herrera, Panama.   
Hipotecaria:  Massiah, Roberto.  Manager.  Financiera La Hipotecaria.  Financial company La Hipotecaria.  Personal interview 13.5.2005  Chitré, Herrera, 
Panama. 
HSBC: Salerno, Anarelis.  Customer service representative.  HSBC Bank.  Personal interview 18.5.2005  Chitré, Herrera, Panama. 
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Annex 6  Farmer household questionnaires.   
 
- Version 1 (V1)  spanish original pp. 237-242 
- Version 2 (V2)  spanish original pp.  243-248  
- Version 1 (V1) english translation pp. 249-254 
- Version 2 (V2) english translation pp. 255-260 
 
NB:  The questionnaires were originally done on a different paper size format and 
different page settings than this publication, due to which the layout of the pages of 
the original questionnaires is not portrayed correctly here. 
 
Changes made to the second version of the questionnaire   
 
The second questionnaire version included a particular space for recording the 
farm’s fruit trees, which were recorded in the margins of the previous version.  
Various “default” input categories were added to the questionnaire, as was the 
deaths and births of cows and pigs.  The question on a hypothetical house rent 
value for house owners was changed into asking the value of the house per se, 
because most respondents considered estimating a hypothetical house rent a very 
difficult task.  The question of fuel expenditure was moved together with the 
question of vehicle ownership to avoid having to return to past questions, and the 
question of company ownership was re-worded more concretely to the ownership 
of a company, workshop, shop, kiosk, or business.  Some minor questions were 
removed due to irrelevance to the local setting or to common non-responsiveness 
and several questions were re-formulated for better understanding.  The question of 
farm insurance was added as a separate question while previously it was probed as 
an additional affiliation.  It became also obvious in the interviews that a question of 
“access to free health care” or “access to free education” were confusing, because 
even public health care is not completely free, nor is schooling, and the term access 
was seen as respondents to vary relative to distances, means of transport, costs, 
needs, etc.  Therefore the questions were removed and substituted by a question of 
health insurance, which is more effective in guaranteeing free access to a complete 
health care service.   
 
The most important structural change was made to the household economy section, 
in which the questions on household expenditure were moved to being asked 
before the income questions.  This was done because it was realized very early in 
the interviews that the respondents found it easier to recall their expenditures, and 
then consider by which income methods they manage to cover these expenditures, 
than by first trying to recall all incomes of the year and then realize that these do 
not cover the expenses they have.  In practice the questions were, thus, asked in this 
order already with the first version of the questionnaire to improve answers.  It is 
possible that questions on income are perceived as threatening or sensitive if 
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presented without a particular context, whereas expenditure questions were 
received without such caution.  The respondents were more relaxed to answer 
about incomes when these were asked about as “a means to cover the household 
needs”.   
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Encuesta a familias productoras (V1) 
 
1.Condiciones: □ min 1 ha de tierra en Herrera □ mayor parte de tierras no son alquiladas □ 
practica agricultura o cría 
2.Encuesta no: _______   3.Fecha:__________ 4.Entrevistado/a: □ Fem □ Masc 
5.Provincia: Herrera  6.Distrito: □Chitré____/18 □Las Minas____/67 □Los Pozos____/70 
□Ocú____/111 □Parita ____/39 □Pesé____/66 □Santa Maria____/29  
7.Corregimiento:__________ 8.Lugar poblado:_____ 9.Encuesta: □ en casa □ en 
otro lugar  10.Area:  □1-1,99 ha □2-2,99 ha □3-3,99 ha □4-4,99 ha □5-9,99 ha □10-19,99 
ha □20-49,99 ha □50-99,99 ha □100-199,99 ha □200-499,99 ha □500-999,99 ha □1000-
2499,99 ha 
 
Estas preguntas se refieren a toda su familia productora, lo cual incluye todas las 
personas que comparten su economia.  Esto significa que comen de los mismos 
recursos, incluyendo estudiantes dependientes que viven en otros lugares.   
 
TIERRAS 
11.Cuánta tierra Usted adueñaba en Panamá en el 2004 y cuáles son las 
características de las mismas? 
Lugar H O 
* 
Área 
(ha) 
Título*
* 
Años de 
tenencia 
Acqui-
sición 
*** 
Distancia  
a la 
residencia 
% 
Llana
Propie-
tario 
Familias 
productoras 
incl 
entrevist 
Valor del 
terreno o 
renta 
           
           
           
           
Total          
* H=Herrera O=Otra parte de Panama  ** Título o D.P.=Derecho Posesorio *** Compra, herencia, 
cedida, arriendo. 
 
12.Qué usos le dió a la tierra en el año 2004? 
__________  ha ____________________________________________ perm/temp 
__________  ha ____________________________________________ perm/temp 
__________  ha ____________________________________________ perm/temp 
__________  ha ____________________________________________ perm/temp 
__________  ha ____________________________________________ perm/temp 
__________  ha ____________________________________________ perm/temp 
__________  ha ____________________________________________ perm/temp 
 
AGRICULTURA 
13.Cuál fue la producción agrícola en el 2004, incluyendo derivados, árboles no 
frutales y paca de venta? 
Producto Cosecha  Mes Cantidad 
vendida 
Distancia 
al lugar de 
venta 
Valor 
de venta
Consum
o propio 
Valor de 
autocons 
A la cría 
u otro uso 
En 
depósito
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Total      
 
14.Qué materiales compró para la producción de los cultivos en el 2004, excl. 
pasto? (insumos agrícolas) 
 Cantidad /año Precio / unidad Total Observaciones 
Trabajadores     
Abonos     
Herbicidas     
Pesticidas     
Fungicidas     
Semillas     
Mantenimiento del riego     
Transportación     
Combustible y lubricante     
Alquiler herram/maquin     
     
     
     
Total   
 
15.Qué inversiones realizó para la producción agrícola en el 2004, excl. pasto?  
(inversiones agrícolas)  
 Cantidad Precio / unidad Total Observaciones 
Herramientas     
Tractores     
Maquinaria     
Depósito     
Cercas     
Sistema de riego     
     
     
     
Total   
 
ANIMALES 
16.Cuáles animales tuvo en el 2004? (capital ganadero) 
G A N A D O A V E S PEZ  
Te
rn
er
o 
Te
rn
er
a 
N
ov
ill
o 
N
ov
ill
a 
V
ac
a 
le
ch
er
a 
V
ac
a 
de
 c
ar
ne
 
D
ob
le
 p
ro
pó
si
to
 
To
ro
 / 
se
m
en
ta
l 
C
ab
al
lo
 
Pu
er
co
 
O
ve
ja
, c
ab
ra
,  
m
ul
a,
 b
ur
ro
 
G
al
lin
as
 y
 p
ol
lo
s 
Pa
to
,g
an
so
,p
av
o 
 
Cantidad               
Años práct.               
Comprador?               
Valor/unidad               
Valor total               
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17.Cuál fue la producción pecuaria en el 2004 incluyendo derivados? 
 Cantidad  Vendido Valor de 
venta 
Distancia 
al lugar de 
venta 
Consumo 
propio 
Valor de 
autocon-
sumo 
Leche       
Carne de res       
Carne de 
puerco 
      
Carne de 
gallina 
      
Huevos       
Animales 
vendidos 
      
       
       
       
       
Total     
 
18.Qué materiales compró para la crianza de los animales en el 2004, incl. pasto? 
(insumos pecuarios) 
 Cantidad/año Precio/unidad Total Observaciones 
Trabajadores     
Abonos para pasto     
Herbicidas para pasto     
Pesticidas para pasto     
Semillas para pasto     
Paca / paja seca     
Leche para amamantar     
Sal y otros suplementos     
Deparasitante     
Vitaminas     
Veterinario     
Alquiler herram/maquin     
Combustible y lubricante     
Transportación     
     
     
     
Total  
 
19.Qué inversiones realizó para la producción pecuaria en el 2004, incl. pasto?  
(inversiones pecuarias) 
 Cantidad Precio / unidad Total Observaciones 
Herramientas     
Tractores     
Maquinaria     
Cercas     
Sistema de riego     
Animales     
Establos o galeras     
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Total  
 
OTRAS PROPIEDADES 
20.Su casa es: □ alquilada: B ______ /mes □ hipotecada: B _____ /mes  □ 
propia, valor:B_____ /mes 
21.Cuántos vehículos posée?   
 Motos Carros Camiónes Carretas Tractores Otros  
Cantidad       Valor total 
Valor estimado        
 
22.Cuántas estructuras construidas posée? 
 Casas de 
alquiler 
Oficinas o 
locales 
Fábricas Depósitos 
o silos 
Galeras o 
corrales 
Otros  
Cantidad       Valor total 
Valor estimado        
23.Es propietario o accionista de alguna empresa? □ Sí. Nombre:________ □ No.  
24.Recibe participación de alguna cooperativa? □ Sí. Nombre:__________ □ No. 
25.Posée ahorros en algún banco o cooperativa? □ Sí. Nombre:_________  □ No. 
 
AFILIACIONES 
26.A cuáles cooperativas pertenece? ____________________________________ 
27.A cuáles asociaciones de productores pertenece?________________________ 
28.A cuáles instituciones públicas está afiliado/a ? □BDA □MIDA □BNP 
Otro:_____ 
29.En cuáles proyectos de desarrollo agropecuario u otros ha participado?________ 
30.A cuál iglesia pertenece?___________________________________________ 
 
CRÉDITOS  Y  PRÉSTAMOS 
31.Tuvo algún préstamo en el 2004? □ Sí. Cuánto?________ Interés:_____% 
Lapso: _____ meses Dónde:__________ Para qué 
propósito?__________________________ □ No. 
32.Ha aplicado para algún préstamo bancario en los últimos 12 meses? 
□ No. Por qué? ____________________□ Sí.  Dónde?_____________________ 
Para qué propósito?  ______________________________________________ 
Fue aprobado? □ Sí. Lapso:______meses  □ No. Por qué? _______________ 
33.Tomaría un préstamo este año?  □ Sí.  □ No. Por qué?____________________ 
Cree que se lo aprobarían?  □ Sí.  □ No. Por qué?_______________________ 
34.Tuvo crédito de algún tipo (para insumos etc) en el 2004?__________________ 
 
INVERSIONES 
35.En los últimos 12 meses, qué ha comprado fuera de los gastos diarios o en qué 
ha invertido?  
Por ejemplo:  casa, carro, televisor, mejoras a la vivienda, lavadora, cocina, muebles, acciones, etc. 
Excluya las ya mencionadas para la ganadería y agricultura. 
__________________________________________________________________ 
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___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
36.Si recibiera 1.000 Balboas de un préstamo, qué haría? 
___________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________ 
37.En qué meses del año tiene más dinero?_______________________________ 
38.En qué meses del año tiene menos dinero?_____________________________ 
39.Si en algún momento del año entra más dinero de lo que sale, qué hace con el 
excedente?_________________________________________________________  
40.Tiene una cuenta bancaria? □ Sí.  Donde:________________ □ No. 
 
ECONOMIA FAMILIAR 
41.Cuál es el ingreso familiar mensual? B._______________________  total 
B. ____________________ salarios 
B. ____________________ jubilacion, pensión 
B. ____________________ remesas,encomiendas 
B. ____________________ ayuda familiar 
B. ________________ transferencias del exterior  
B. ______________ venta productos agropecuarios 
B. ______________ venta prod no agropecuarios 
B. ______________ rentas, dividendos, alquileres 
B. ______________________ otros:____________ 
 
Miembro Trabajo 1 Entrada Trabajo 2 Entrada 
     
     
     
     
     
 
42.Cuánto es el gasto familiar mensual?  B._______________________  total 
B. ____________________ alquiler  
B. ____________________ agua, luz, gas, teléfono 
B. ____________________ comida 
B. ____________________ educación  
B. ____________________ salud 
B. ____________________ vestidos y calzado 
B. ____________________ transporte 
B. _________________ enseres dom&reparación 
B. ____________________ diversiones 
B. ____________________ otros:____________ 
 
CARACTERÌSTICAS DE LA PRODUCCIÓN 
43.Cuáles de las siguientes prácticas están presentes en sus tierras? 
 Sí No Área Costo Observaciones 
Riego      
Drenaje      
Establos      
Abono orgánico      
Abono químico      
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Leguminosas      
Terrazas      
Barreras protectoras      
Siembra de árboles      
Cercas vivas      
Pasto mejorado      
Cero-labranza      
Barbecho, descanso      
Rotación de cultivos      
Quemas      
 
GENERAL  
44.Edad de la cabeza familiar  ______ años 
45.Cuántos años de educación formal recibió? ____________________________   
46.Sabe: □ escribir □ leer 
47.Cuál es su profesión: ______________________________________________ 
48.Trabaja: □ con el sector gubernamental  □ con el sector privado □ por cuenta 
propia 
49.Estado civil: □ casado □ soltero □ divorciado □ viudo 
50.Número de miembros familiares: ____ (= dependientes___ + contribuyentes __) 
51.Cuántos de ellos trabajan en la finca?  ________________________________ 
52.Cuántos hijos tiene? ______________________________________________ 
53.Cuál es la ocupación y/o profesión de su cónyugue? _____________________ 
54.Qué partes de la producción están bajo el control de su cónyugue? __________ 
55.Tienen: □ acueducto, □ luz, □ letrina, □ sanitario, □ teléfono, □ tv, □ 
computadora  
56.Tienen acceso a servicios de salud gratuitos?  □ Sí.  □ No.  
57.Tienen acceso a servicios de educación gratuitos?  □ Sí. □ No. 
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Encuesta a familias productoras (V2) 
 
1.Condiciones: □ min 1 ha de tierra en Herrera  □ mayor parte de tierras no son alquiladas  □ 
practica agricultura o cría 
2.Encuesta no: ______   3.Fecha: __________ 4.Entrevistado/a: □ Fem □ Masc 
5.Provincia: Herrera  6.Distrito: □Chitré____/18 □Las Minas____/67 □Los Pozos____/70 
□Ocú____/111 □Parita ____/39 □Pesé____/66 □Santa Maria____/29  
7.Corregimiento:__________ 8.Lugar poblado:_____ 9.Encuesta: □ en casa □ en 
otro lugar  10.Area:  □1-1,99 ha□2-2,99 ha □3-3,99 ha □4-4,99 ha □5-9,99 ha □10-19,99 
ha □20-49,99 ha □50-99,99 ha □100-199,99 ha □200-499,99 ha □500-999,99 ha □1000-
2499,99 ha 
 
Estas preguntas se refieren a su familia productora, lo cual incluye todas las personas que 
comparten su economia.  Esto significa que comen de los mismos recursos, incluyendo 
estudiantes dependientes que viven en otros lugares.   
 
TIERRAS 
11.Cuánta tierra adueñaba Usted en Panamá en el 2004 y cuáles son las 
características de la misma? 
Lugar H O 
* 
Área 
(ha) 
Títu-
lo** 
Años de 
tenencia 
Acqui-
sición 
*** 
Distancia 
a la 
residencia
% 
Lla-
na 
Propi
etario
Familias 
productoras 
incl entrevist 
Valor del 
terreno o 
renta / ha 
           
           
           
           
Total          
* H=Herrera O=Otra parte de Panamá ** Título, En Proceso o D.P.=Derecho Posesorio *** 
Compra, herencia, cedida, arriendo. 
 
12.Qué usos le dió a la tierra en el año 2004? Frutas en el huerto: 
__________  ha ____________________ perm/temp __________________ 
__________  ha ____________________ perm/temp __________________ 
__________  ha ____________________ perm/temp __________________ 
__________  ha ____________________ perm/temp __________________ 
__________  ha ____________________ perm/temp __________________ 
__________  ha ____________________ perm/temp __________________ 
__________  ha ____________________ perm/temp __________________ 
 
AGRICULTURA 
13.Cuál fue la producción agrícola en el 2004, incluyendo derivados, árboles no 
frutales y paca de venta? 
Producto Cosecha  Mes Cantidad 
vendida 
Distancia 
al lugar de 
venta 
Valor 
de 
venta
Consumo 
propio 
Valor de 
autocons 
A la 
cría u 
otro uso 
En 
depósito 
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Total      
 
14.Qué materiales compró para la producción de los cultivos en el 2004, excl. 
pasto? (insumos agrícolas) 
 Cantidad /año Precio / unidad Total Observaciones 
Peones     
Abonos + urea     
Herbicidas, pestic, fungic     
Semillas     
Transporte de abonos     
Transporte de productos     
Combustible carro/riego     
Preparación del suelo     
Alquiler de bomba fumig     
Sacos     
Pilada del arroz     
Desgranada del maíz     
     
Total   
 
15.Qué inversiones realizó para la producción agrícola en el 2004, excl. pasto?  
(inversiones agrícolas)  
 Cantidad Precio / unidad Total Observaciones 
Herramientas     
Maquinaria y tractor     
Depósitos, tanques     
Cercas     
Sistema de riego     
     
     
     
Total   
 
ANIMALES 
16.Cuáles animales tuvo en el final del año 2004? (capital ganadero) 
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Cantidad               
Años práct.               
Valor/unida
d 
              
Valor total               
Animales paridos: _____ bovino _____ porcino, Animales muertos/robados: _____ 
bovino ____ porcino 
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17.Cuál fue la producción pecuaria en el 2004 incluyendo derivados? 
 Cantidad  Vendido Valor 
de 
venta 
Distancia al 
lugar de 
venta 
Consumo 
propio 
Valor de 
autoconsumo 
Leche       
Carne de puerco       
Carne de gallina       
Huevos       
Animales 
vendidos 
      
       
       
       
       
Total     
 
18.Qué materiales compró para la crianza de los animales en el 2004, incl. pasto? 
(insumos pecuarios) 
 Cantidad/año Precio/unidad Total Observaciones 
Limpieza del pasto     
Abonos para pasto     
Herbicidas&pest.x pasto     
Semillas para pasto     
Paca     
Comprar pasto (alquilar)     
Leche para amamantar     
Sal mineral     
Desparasitante     
Vitaminas y vacunas     
Baño c mosca o agarrap     
Veterinario     
Transportación     
Combustible     
Alimento de puerco     
Alimento de gallinas     
Peones de cuido / ordeño     
     
     
Total  
 
19.Qué inversiones realizó para la producción pecuaria en el 2004, incl. pasto?  
(inversiones pecuarias) 
 Cantidad Precio / unidad Total Observaciones 
Herramientas     
Maquinaria y tractores     
Cercas     
Sistema de riego     
Establo, galera, corral     
Chiquero     
Animales     
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Total  
 
OTRAS PROPIEDADES 
20.Su casa es: □ alquilada: B ____ /mes □ hipotecada: B ____ /mes  □ propia, 
valor:B____ 
21.Cuántos vehículos posée?   
 Motos Carros Camiónes Carretas Tractores Bicicleta Gasto en 
combustible 
Cantidad       
Valor estimado       
 
 
22.Cuántas estructuras construidas posée? 
 Casas de 
alquiler 
Oficinas o 
locales 
Fábricas Depósitos 
o silos 
Galeras o 
corrales 
Otros  
Cantidad       Valor 
total 
Valor estimado        
23.Es propietario de alguna empresa, taller, tienda, kiosco o negocio? □ Sí. 
Nombre:____□ No.  
24.Posée ahorros? □ Sí. Dónde:____________________________  □ No. 
 
AFILIACIONES 
25.A cuáles cooperativas pertenece? ___________________________________ 
26.A cuáles asociaciones de productores pertenece?______________________ 
27.Con cuáles instituciones públicas tiene contacto? □BDA □MIDA □BNP  
Otro:_____ 
28.Tiene sus cultivos y/o su ganado asegurado por el ISA? □ Sí.  □ No. 
29.En cuáles proyectos de desarrollo agropecuario u otros ha participado?_______ 
30.A cuál iglesia pertenece? □ Católica  □ _______________________________ 
 
CRÉDITOS  Y  PRÉSTAMOS 
31.Tuvo algún préstamo en el 2004? □ Sí. Cuánto?________ Interés:_____% 
Lapso: _______ Dónde:__________ Para qué propósito?___________ □ No. 
32.Ha aplicado para algún préstamo bancario en los últimos 12 meses? 
□ No. Por qué? _______________________ □ Sí.  Dónde?________________ 
Para qué propósito?  _______ Fue aprobado? □ Sí. □ No. Por qué?  ______ 
33.Tomaría un préstamo este año?  □ Sí.  □ No. Por qué?___________________ 
Cree que se lo aprobarían?  □ Sí.  □ No. Por qué?______________________ 
34.Tuvo crédito de algún tipo (insumos, comida) en el 2004?_________________ 
 
INVERSIONES 
35.En los últimos 12 meses, qué ha comprado fuera de los gastos diarios o en qué 
ha invertido?  
Por ejemplo:  casa, carro, televisor, mejoras a la vivienda, lavadora, cocina, muebles, acciones, etc. 
Excluya las ya mencionadas para la ganadería y agricultura. 
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___________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
36.Si recibiera 1.000 Balboas de un préstamo, qué haría? 
___________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
37.En qué meses del año tiene más dinero?_______________________________ 
38.En qué meses del año tiene menos dinero?_____________________________ 
39.Si en algún momento del año entra más dinero de lo que sale, qué hace con el 
excedente?_________________________________________________________  
40.Tiene una cuenta bancaria? □ Sí.  Donde:________________ □ No. 
 
ECONOMIA FAMILIAR 
41.Cuál es el gasto familiar mensual? B._______________________  total 
B. ____________________ alquiler 
B. ____________________ agua, luz, gas, teléfono 
B. ____________________ comida 
B. ____________________ educación 
B. ____________________ salud 
B. ________________________ vestidos y calzado  
B. _________________________ transporte   
B. ___________________ diversiones y fiestas 
B. ___________________ lotería, chances, números 
B. ______________________ otros:____________ 
Pintan su casa cada _____ años con un gasto de B. _______________ □ No pintan 
su casa. 
 
42.Cuánto es el ingreso familiar mensual?  B._______________________  total 
B. ____________________ salarios  
B. ____________________ jubilación, pensión  
B. ____________________ remesas,encomiendas  
B. ____________________ ayuda familiar  
B. _____________ venta productos agropecuarios 
B. ______________ venta prod no agropecuarios 
B. ______________ rentas, dividendos, alquileres 
B. ____________________ otros:____________ 
 
Miembro Trabajo 1 Entrada Trabajo 2 Entrada 
     
     
     
     
     
 
CARACTERÌSTICAS DE LA PRODUCCIÓN 
43.Cuáles de las siguientes prácticas están presentes en sus tierras? 
 Sí No Área Costo Observaciones 
Riego      
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Drenaje      
Establos      
Abono orgánico      
Abono químico      
Leguminosas      
Terrazas o trancas      
Barreras protectoras de veget      
Siembra de árboles      
Cercas vivas      
Pasto mejorado      
Cero-labranza      
Barbecho, descanso      
Rotación de cultivos      
Quemas      
 
GENERAL  
44.Edad de la cabeza familiar  ______ años 
45.Cuántos años de educación formal recibió? ____________________________   
46.Sabe: □ escribir □ leer 
47.Cuál es su profesión: _________________________________________ 
48.Trabaja: □ con el sector gubernamental  □ con el sector privado □ por cuenta 
propia 
49.Estado civil: □ casado □ soltero □ divorciado □ viudo 
50.Número de miembros familiares: ____ (= dependientes___ + contribuyentes __) 
51.Cuántos de ellos trabajan en la finca?  _______________________________ 
52.Cuántos hijos tiene? _____________________________________________ 
53.Cuál es la ocupación y/o profesión de su cónyugue? ____________________ 
54.Qué partes de la producción están bajo el control de su cónyugue? _________ 
55.Tienen □ acueducto,□ luz,□ letrina, □ sanitario, □ teléfono, □ tv, □ 
computadora, □ refrigeradora 
56.Tienen seguro de salud?  □ Sí. Lo paga:___□ No.  Precio de la consulta 
médica?  B. __ 
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Interview for farmer households  (V1) 
1.  Conditions: □ min 1 ha of land in Herrera □ major part of lands not acquired by rent  □ has 
crops or cattle 
2.  Interview no: ________ 3.  Date:  ___________ 4.  Respondent:  □ Female □ 
Male 
5.Province: Herrera  6.District: □Chitré____/18 □Las Minas____/67 □Los Pozos____/70 
□Ocú____/111 □Parita ____/39 □Pesé____/66 □Santa Maria____/29  
7.Municipality:______________ 8.Village:________ 9.Interview: □ at home □ 
elsewhere  10.Area:  □1-1,99 ha□2-2,99 ha □3-3,99 ha □4-4,99 ha □5-9,99 ha □10-19,99 
ha □20-49,99 ha □50-99,99 ha □100-199,99 ha □200-499,99 ha □500-999,99 ha □1000-
2499,99 ha 
 
These questions refer to your entire farmer household, including all people who share your 
economy.  This means that they eat from the same resources, including dependent students 
living in other locations.   
 
LAND 
11. How much land did you possess in Panama in 2004 and which are its characteristics? 
Location H 
O 
* 
Área 
(ha) 
Title 
** 
Years 
in 
tenure 
Acqui-
red *** 
Distance to 
residence 
% 
Plain 
Own
er 
Number of 
farmers incl. 
respondent 
Value of 
land or 
rent 
           
           
           
           
Total          
* H=Herrera O=Other province  ** Title or possessing right *** Purchase, inheritance, in use 
without payment, rented. 
 
12.Which uses did you give to the land in 2004? 
__________  ha ___________________________________________ perm/temp 
__________  ha ___________________________________________ perm/temp 
__________  ha ___________________________________________ perm/temp 
__________  ha ___________________________________________ perm/temp 
__________  ha ___________________________________________ perm/temp 
__________  ha ___________________________________________ perm/temp 
__________  ha ___________________________________________ perm/temp 
 
CROP PRODUCTION 
13. Which crops did you produce in 2004, including derivatives, non-fruit trees, and sold 
haw bales? 
Product Harvest Month Sold 
quantity
Distance 
to sales 
place  
Sales 
value 
Own 
consump
tion 
Value of 
own 
con-
sumptio
n 
To 
animals 
and 
others 
Deposited 
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Total      
 
14. What materials did you buy for the production of your crops in 2004, excluding pasture 
(crop inputs)?   
 Quantity / year Price / unit Total Observations 
Workers     
Fertilizers     
Herbicides     
Pesticides     
Fungicides     
Seeds     
Maintenance of irrigation     
Transportation     
Fuels and oils     
Rent of tools / machinery     
     
     
     
Total   
 
15.  What investments did you make for your crops in 2004, excluding pasture ? (crop 
investments) 
 Quantity Price / unit Total Observations 
Tools     
Tractors     
Machinery     
Deposits     
Fences     
Irrigation system     
     
     
     
Total   
 
ANIMALS 
16. What animals did you have in 2004?  (livestock capital) 
C A T T L E BIRDS FISH  
M
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Y
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C
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Quantity               
Years 
pract. 
              
Buyer?               
Value/unit               
Total 
value 
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17. What was your livestock production in 2004 including derivatives? 
 Quantity Sold Sales 
value 
Distance 
to sales 
place  
Own 
consumption 
Value of 
own 
consumption 
Milk       
Beef meat       
Pig meat       
Chicken 
meat 
      
Eggs       
Sold animals       
       
       
       
       
Total     
 
18.What materials did you buy for your livestock production in 2004, including pasture? 
(livestock inputs) 
 Quantity / year Price/unit Total Observations 
Workers     
Fertilizers for pasture     
Herbicides for pasture     
Pesticides for pasture      
Seeds for pasture     
Haw bales     
Milk for calves      
Salt & other supplements     
Anti-parasite medicine     
Vitamins     
Veterinarian services     
Rent of machinery/tools     
Fuels and oils     
Transport     
     
     
Total  
 
19.Which investments did you make for your livestock production in 2004, inluding 
pasture? (livestock investments) 
 Quantity Price / unit Total Observations 
Tools     
Tractors     
Machinery     
Fences     
Irrigation systems     
Animals     
Stables, stocking yards      
     
     
Total  
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OTHER PROPERTY 
20.Your house is: □ rented: B ____ /month □ mortgaged: B ____ /month  □ own, 
value:B_____ /month 
21.How many vehicles do you own?   
 Motorcycles Cars Trucks Carts Tractors Other  
Quantity       Total value 
Estimated value        
 
22.How many built structures do you possess?   
 Houses 
for rent 
Offices or 
shops 
Factories Deposits 
or silos 
Stocking 
yards  
Other  
Quantity       Total value 
Estimated value        
23.Are you the owner or stock-holder of any company?  □ Yes. Name:_______  □ No.  
24.Do you receive dividends from any cooperative?  □ Yes. Name:__________ □ No. 
25.Do you have savings in any bank or cooperative?  □ Yes. Name:_________  □ No. 
 
AFFILIATIONS 
26.Which cooperatives do you belong to? ___________________________________ 
27.Which farmer associations do you belong to?  ______________________________ 
28.Which public institutions are you affiliated to ? □BDA □MIDA □BNP 
Other:_________ 
29.Which agricultural or other development projects have you participated in?________ 
30.To which religion do you belong?_________ ________________________________ 
 
CREDITS AND LOANS 
31.Did you have a loan in 2004?  □ Yes. Amount?____ Interest rate:_____% Period: 
______ months Institution:_________ For what purpose?________________ □ No. 
32. Have you applied for a loan in the past 12 months?   
□ No. Why not? ____________________ □ Yes. Where?_______________________ 
For what purpose?  ____________________________________ Was it conceded? □ 
Yes. Period:_____months  □ No. Why not?______________ 
33.Would you take a loan this year?  □ Yes.  □ No. Why?________________________ 
Do you believe it would be conceded?  □ Yes.  □ No. Why?___________________ 
34.Did you have any type of credit in 2004 (for inputs, etc)?  _____________________ 
 
INVESTMENTS 
35. In the last 12 months, what have you purchased outside the daily expenses or in what 
have you invested? 
For example:  house, car, television, improvements to the house, washing machine, kitchen, 
furniture, shares, etc.  Exclude those already mentioned as livestock or crop investments.   
___________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________ 
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36.If you received 1.000 Balboas as a loan, what would you do with it? 
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________ 
37.In which months do you have most money? ______________________________ 
38.In which months do you have least money?______________________________ 
39.If at some moment of the year you receive more money than you spend, what do you do 
with the rest?   _____________________________________________________ 
 
HOUSEHOLD ECONOMY 
41.What is the monthly household income?  B._______________________  total 
B. ____________________ salaries 
B. ____________________ retirement benefits 
B. ____________________ remittances 
B. ____________________ help from family 
B. ________________ transfers from abroad  
B. _____________ sale of agricultural products 
B. _____________ sale of non-agricultural products  
B. ______________ rents, dividends 
B. __________________ other:____________ 
 
Member Job 1 Income Job 2 Income 
     
     
     
     
     
 
42.What is the monthly household expenditure?  B._______________________  total 
B. ________________ rents 
B. _____________ water, electricity, gas, telephone 
B. ________________ food 
B. ________________ education 
B. ________________ health 
B. ______________ clothing and shoes 
B.______________ transportation 
B.______________ hh equipment, reparations 
B.______________ parties 
B.______________ others: _______ 
 
CHARACTERISTICS OF FARMING 
43. Which of the following practices are present on your lands? 
 Yes No Área Cost Observations 
Irrigation      
Drainage      
Stables      
Organic fertilizers      
Chemical fertilizers      
Leguminous plants      
Terraces      
Buffer strips      
Tree planting      
Live fences      
Improved pastures      
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Zero – till      
Fallow      
Rotation of crops      
Burning      
 
GENERAL  
44.Age of household head _____ years 
45.How many years of formal education did you receive?______________________ 
46.Can you: □ write □ read 
47.What is your profession: _________________________________________ 
48.Works: □ in the government sector  □ in the private sector □ on own account 
49.Civil status: □ married □ unmarried □ divorced □ widow 
50.Number of household members: _______ (= dependents_____ + contributors _____) 
51.How many of them work on your farm?__________________________________ 
52.How many children do you have? ___________________________________ 
53.Which is the occupation and/or profession of your spouse?  _________________ 
54.Which parts of the farm are managed by your spouse? __________________ 
55.You have: □ aqueduct, □ electricity, □ latrine, □ water closet, □ telephone, □ tv, 
□ computer  
56.Do you have access to free health services?  □ Yes.  □ No.  
57.Do you have access to free educational services?  □ Yes. □ No. 
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Interview for farmer households (V2) 
1.  Conditions: □ min 1 ha of land in Herrera □ major part of lands not acquired by rent  □ has 
crops or cattle 
2.  Interview no: ______ 3.  Date:  _________ 4.  Respondent:  □ Female □ Male 
5.Province: Herrera  6.District: □Chitré____/18 □Las Minas____/67 □Los Pozos____/70 
□Ocú____/111 □Parita ____/39 □Pesé____/66 □Santa Maria____/29  
7.Municipality:__________ 8.Village:________ 9.Interview: □ at home □ 
elsewhere  10.Area:  □1-1,99 ha□2-2,99 ha □3-3,99 ha □4-4,99 ha □5-9,99 ha □10-19,99 
ha □20-49,99 ha □50-99,99 ha □100-199,99 ha □200-499,99 ha □500-999,99 ha □1000-
2499,99 ha 
 
These questions refer to your entire farmer household, including all people who share your 
economy.  This means that they eat from the same resources, including dependent students 
living in other locations.   
 
LAND 
11. How much land did you possess in Panama in 2004 and which are its characteristics? 
Location H 
O 
* 
Área 
(ha) 
Title 
** 
Years 
in 
tenure 
Acqui-
red ***
Distance 
to 
residence 
% 
Plain
Owner Number of 
farmers incl. 
respondent 
Value of 
land or rent 
/ha 
           
           
           
           
Total          
* H=Herrera O=Other province  ** Title, in process, or possessing right *** Purchase, inheritance, 
in use without payment, rented. 
 
12.Which uses did you give to the land in 2004? Fruit on the farm: 
__________  ha ____________________ perm/temp ______________ 
__________  ha ____________________ perm/temp ______________ 
__________  ha ____________________ perm/temp ______________ 
__________  ha ____________________ perm/temp ______________ 
__________  ha ____________________ perm/temp ______________ 
__________  ha ____________________ perm/temp ______________ 
__________  ha ____________________ perm/temp ______________ 
 
CRO P PRODUCTION 
13. Which crops did you produce in 2004, including derivatives, non-fruit trees, and sold 
haw bales? 
Product Harvest  Month Sold 
quantity 
Distance 
to sales 
place  
Sales 
value 
Own 
consump
-tion 
Value of 
own con-
sumption 
To 
animals 
and 
others 
Deposited 
          
          
          
          
          
          
Total      
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14. What materials did you buy for the production of your crops in 2004, excluding pasture 
(crop inputs)?   
 Quantity / year Price / unit Total Observations 
Workers     
Fertilizers + urea     
Herbicides, pestic, fungic     
Seeds     
Transport of fertilizers     
Transport of crops     
Fuel for car / irrigation     
Soil preparation     
Rent of spraying pump     
Sacks     
Separating rice kernels     
Separating corn kernels     
     
Total   
 
15.  What investments did you make for your crops in 2004, excluding pasture ? (crop 
investments) 
 Quantity Price / unit Total Observations 
Tools     
Machinery + tractors     
Deposits, tanks     
Fences     
Irrigation system     
     
     
     
Total   
 
ANIMALS 
16. What animals did you have at the end of 2004?  (livestock capital) 
C A T T L E BIRDS FISH  
M
al
e 
ca
lf 
Fe
m
al
e 
ca
lf 
Y
ou
n g
 b
ul
l 
H
ei
fe
r 
C
ow
 (m
ilk
in
g)
 
C
ow
 (f
at
te
ni
ng
) 
D
ou
bl
e 
pu
rp
os
e 
B
ul
l 
H
or
se
 
Pi
g 
La
m
b,
 g
oa
t, 
 
m
ul
e,
 d
on
ke
y 
C
hi
ck
en
 a
nd
 h
en
 
D
uc
k,
 g
ee
se
, 
tu
rk
ey
 
 
Quantity               
Years 
pract. 
              
Value/unit               
Total 
value 
              
Animal births:  ____ cows ____pigs,  Animals dead/stolen: _____ cows ____ pigs 
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17. What was your livestock production in 2004 including derivatives? 
 Quantity Sold Sales 
value 
Distance 
to sales 
place  
Own 
consumption 
Value of 
own 
consumption 
Milk       
Pig meat       
Chicken 
meat 
      
Eggs       
Sold animals       
       
       
       
       
Total     
 
18.What materials did you buy for your livestock production in 2004, including pasture? 
(livestock inputs) 
 Quantity / year Price/unit Total Observations 
Weeding the pasture     
Fertilizers for pasture     
Herbic+pestic for pasture     
Seeds for pasture     
Haw bales     
Rent pasture     
Milk for calves      
Mineral salt      
Anti-parasite medicine     
Vitamins and vaccines     
Bath against flies &ticks     
Veterinarian services     
Transport     
Fuels     
Pig feed     
Chicken feed     
Workers: care/milking     
     
     
Total  
 
19.Which investments did you make for your livestock production in 2004, including 
pasture? (livestock investments) 
 Quantity Price / unit Total Observations 
Tools     
Machinery + tractors     
Fences     
Irrigation systems     
Stables, stocking yards      
Pig shed     
Animals     
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Total  
 
OTHER PROPERTY 
20.Your house is: □ rented: B ____ /month □ mortgaged: B ____ /month  □ own, 
value:B_____ 
21.How many vehicles do you own?   
 Motorcycles Cars Trucks Carts Tractors Bicycles Fuel expenditure 
Quantity       
Estimated value       
 
 
22.How many built structures do you possess?   
 Houses 
for rent 
Offices or 
shops 
Factories Deposits 
or silos 
Stocking 
yards  
Other  
Quantity       Total value 
Estimated value        
23.Are you the owner of a company, workshop, shop, kiosk or business?  □ Yes. 
Name:__  □ No.  
22.Do you have savings?  □ Yes. Where:_____________________  □ No. 
 
AFFILIATIONS 
25.Which cooperatives do you belong to? ___________________________________ 
26.Which farmer associations do you belong to?  ______________________________ 
27.Which public institutions are you affiliated to ? □BDA □MIDA □BNP 
Other:___________ 
28.Do you have your crops or livestock insured by the ISA?  □Yes □No 
29.Which agricultural or other development projects have you participated in?_________ 
30.To which religion do you belong? □Catholic □ _____________________________ 
 
CREDITS AND LOANS 
31.Did you have a loan in 2004?  □ Yes. Amount?________ Interest rate:_____% Period: 
______ Institution:___________________ For what purpose?______________ □ No. 
32. Have you applied for a loan in the past 12 months?   
□ No. Why not? ___________________ □ Yes. Where?______________________ 
For what purpose?  __________________________________________________ 
Was it conceded? □ Yes. □ No. Why not?_______________________________ 
33.Would you take a loan this year?  □ Yes.  □ No. Why?________________________ 
Do you believe it would be conceded?  □ Yes.  □ No. Why?___________________ 
34.Did you have any type of credit in 2004 (for inputs, food)?  ____________________ 
 
INVESTMENTS 
35. In the last 12 months, what have you purchased outside the daily expenses or in what 
have you invested? 
For example:  house, car, television, improvements to the house, washing machine, kitchen, 
furniture, shares, etc.  Exclude those already mentioned as livestock or crop investments.   
___________________________________________________________________ 
  
259
 
 
 
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
36.If you received 1.000 Balboas as a loan, what would you do with it? 
___________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________ 
37.In which months do you have most money? _______________________________ 
38.In which months do you have least money?________________________________ 
39.If at some moment of the year you receive more money than you spend, what do you do 
with the rest?   _______________________________________________________ 
 
HOUSEHOLD ECONOMY 
41.What is the monthly household expenditure?  B._______________________  total 
B. ________________ rent 
B. _____________ water, electricity, gas, telephone 
B. ________________ food 
B. ________________ education 
B. ________________ health 
B. ______________clothing and shoes 
B.______________ transportation 
B.______________ parties and leisure 
B.______________ lottery 
B.______________ others: _______ 
You paint your house every ____ years with a cost of B._____ □ The house is not painted. 
 
42.What is the monthly household income?  B._______________________  total 
B. ____________________ salaries 
B. ____________________ retirement benefits 
B. ____________________ remittances 
B. ____________________ help from family 
B. _____________ sale of agricultural products 
B. _____________ sale of non-agricultural products  
B. ______________ rents, dividends 
B. __________________ other:____________ 
 
Member Job 1 Income Job 2 Income 
     
     
     
     
     
 
CHARACTERISTICS OF FARMING 
43. Which of the following practices are present on your lands? 
 Yes No Area Cost Observations 
Irrigation      
Drainage      
Stables      
Organic fertilizers      
Chemical fertilizers      
Leguminous plants      
Terraces      
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Buffer strips: vegetation      
Tree planting      
Live fences      
Improved pastures      
Zero – till      
Fallow      
Rotation of crops      
Burning      
 
GENERAL  
44.Age of household head _____ years 
45.How many years of formal education did you receive?________________________ 
46.Can you: □ write □ read 
47.What is your profession: ___________________________________________ 
48.Works: □ in the government sector  □ in the private sector □ on own account 
49.Civil status: □ married □ unmarried □ divorced □ widow 
50.Number of household members: _____ (= dependents_____ + contributors _____) 
51.How many of them work on your farm?___________________________________ 
52.How many children do you have? ____________________________________ 
53.Which is the occupation and/or profession of your spouse?  ____________________ 
54.Which parts of the farm are managed by your spouse? __________________________ 
55.You have:□ aqueduct, □ electricity, □ latrine, □ water closet, □ telephone, □ tv, 
□ computer, □ refrigerator  
56.Do you have health insurance?  □ Yes. Who pays for it:________ □ No. Price of 
medical care? B._____/visit 
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Annex 7  Details of the sample. 
 
Tables present all villages included in the sample, the number of interviews in each 
village (in brackets after the village name), and distances to district centres and 
Chitré (province capital).  Distances were measured on detailed maps at the 
Cartographic Section of the Bureau of Statistics and Censuses of the Panamanian 
Comptroller’s Office at Villa de Los Santos. 
 
Table A7.1  Sample in the Chitré district 
Municipality Village (sample) Distance from village to 
district centre km 
Distance to 
Chitré  
111 La Huerta (1 interview) 3,0 0 
112 Rio La Villa (1) 3,0 0 
11  Chitré centre 
(total sample 3) 
 113 Isabel Delfines (1) n.a. 0 
121 La Arena centre (5) 5,0 0 12  La Arena 
(total sample 7) 122 El Juncal (2) 7,0 0 
131 Monagrillo centre (4) 3,0 0 13 Monagrillo 
(total sample 5) 132 Boca de Parita (1) 6,5 0 
14  Llano Bonito 
(total sample 1) 
141 El Rosario (1) 3,0  0 
151 San Juan Bautista centre (1) 2,5 0 15  San Juan Bautista 
(total sample 2) 152 Camino a la Isla (1) 2,5 0 
Total for the district of  Chitré:   5 towns,  10 villages, 18  interviews   
 
Table A7.2  Sample in the Las Minas district 
Municipality Village (sample) Distance from village 
to district centre km 
Distance to 
Chitré km 
211 Las Minas centre (1 interview) 0 57,0 
212 La Pilandera (1) 5,0 62,0 
213 Los Pintos (1) 7,0 64,0 
214 La Cuchilla (2) 6,5 63,5 
215 Las Margaritas (2) 4,0 61,0 
216 Cerro Gordo Abajo (1) 9,0 66,0 
217 Cerro Gordo (1) 6,0 63,0 
218 La Calidonia (2) 4,0 61,0 
21  Las Minas centre 
(total sample 13) 
219 Cristo Peregrino (2) 1,0 58,0 
221 Chepo centre (7) 16,0 73,0 
222 Jacinto (2) 23,0 80,0 
223 Las Peñas (1) 10,0 67,0 
224 Sonadora (1)* 21,0 78,0 
225 Rio Viejo (2) ** 28,0 85,0 
22  Chepo 
(total sample 14) 
226 Las Playitas (1) 21,0 78,0 
231 Chumical centre (4) 7,0 64,0 23  Chumical 
(total sample 6) 232 Llano Largo (2) 7,0 64,0 
24  El Toro 
(total sample 7) 
241 El Toro centre (7) 23,0 80,0 
251 Leones centre (4) 23,0 80,0 
252 El Suay (4) 9,0 66,0 
25  Leones 
(total sample 10) 
253 Las Lajitas (2) 25,5 82,5 
261 Quebrada del Rosario centre (4) 13,5 70,5 
262 Virotales (2) 23,0 80,0 
263 Nanzal (3) 11,0 68,0 
264 Copé (5) 17,0 74,0 
265 Rio La Villa (1) 18,0 75,0 
266 Progreso (2) 11,5 68,5 
26  Quebrada del Rosario 
(total sample 18) 
267 Quebrada de Rosario abajo (1) 16,0 61,0 
Total for the district of  Las Minas:  6 towns,  28 villages, 68 interviews   
  
262
*) Last 5,0 km inaccessible by car.   **)  Last 7,0 km inaccessible by car 
 
Table A7.3  Sample in the Los Pozos district 
Municipality Village (sample) Distance from village 
to district centre km 
Distance to 
Chitré km 
311 Los Pozos centre (2 interviews) 0 45,0 
312 Los Pozos Arriba (1) 1,0 46,0 
313 Sabaneta de Leones (2) 4,5 49,5 
314 Rio Arriba (2) 6,5 51,5 
315 El Piro (2) 3,0 48,0 
316 San José (2) 5,0 50,0 
317 Las Llanitas (2) 7,5 52,5 
318 Las Cuestas (2) 8,0 53,0 
31  Los Pozos centre 
(total sample 17) 
319 Barro Blanco (2) 5,5 50,5 
321 Capurí centre (2) 8,5 53,5 32  Capurí 
(total sample 4) 322 Jacintillo (2) 9,0 54,0 
331 El Calabacito centre (2) 10,0 55,0 
332 Ojo de Agua (2) 8,0 53,0 
333 Las Canoas (2) 10,0 55,0 
33  El Calabacito 
(total sample 7) 
334 Las Lomas (1) 13,0 58,0 
34  El Cedro 
(total sample 4) 
341 El Cedro centre (4) 15,0 60,0 
351 La Arena centre (4) 9,0 54,0 
352 El Copé (1) 5,5 50,5 
35  La Arena 
(total sample 6) 
353 La Sabaneta (1) 5,5 50,5 
361 La Pitalosa centre (7)* 36,0 / 20,5 81,0 
362 El Cañafístulo (4)* 34,0 / 18,5 79,0 
363 El Salitre (1) 15,5 60,5 
36  La Pitalosa 
(total sample 13) 
364 Bejucosa (1)* 37,0 / 21,5 82,0 
371 Los Cerritos centre (4) 5,5 50,5 
372 Las Lomas (2) 10,5 55,5 
373 Juncalito (1) 8,0 53,0 
374 Rincón Abajo (1) 5,5 50,5 
37  Los Cerritos 
(total sample 9) 
375 Paso Viejo Los Angeles (1) 7,5 52,5 
381 Los Cerros de Paja centre (4) 10,5 55,5 
382 Las Pipas (2) 13,5 58,5 
383 El Salitre (2) 18,0 63,0 
384 La Requinta (1) 10,0 55,0 
38  Los Cerros de Paja 
(total sample 10) 
385 Pan de Azúcar (1) 10,0 55,0 
Total for the district of  Los Pozos 8 towns,  33 villages, 70 interviews 
*) From these locations the nearest district centre is in fact the town of Macaracas, which belongs to the 
Province of Los Santos.  Here the first distance is given to Los Pozos centre and the second to Macaracas 
centre. 
 
Table A7.4  Sample in the Ocú district 
Municipality Village (sample) Distance from village 
to district centre km 
Distance to 
Chitré km 
4101 El Higuito de Señales (2 
interviews) 
4,5 50,5 
4102 Las Guabas (1) 6,5 52,5 
4103 Santa Rosa (3) 2,0 48,0 
4104 Los Bajos de Cuscú (4) 15,5 61,5 
4105 La Arena (2) 12,5 58,5 
4106 Menchaca Abajo (1) 11,0 57,0 
4107 Menchaca (1) 10,5 56,5 
4108 El Guayabito (4) 8,0 54,0 
4109 El Tamarindo (1) 3,0 49,0 
4110 El Potrero (3) 9,0 55,0 
4111 La Cabuya (2) 5,0 51,0 
41  Ocú centre 
(total sample 41) 
 
4112 La Mela (1) 6,0 52,0 
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Municipality Village (sample) Distance from village 
to district centre km 
Distance to 
Chitré km 
4113 El Hatillo (3) 3,0 49,0 
4114 Bella Vista (1) n.a. n.a. 
4115 Las Arañitas (1) 2,5 48,5 
4116 Llano Grande (5) 3,0 49,0 
4117 Quebrada de Agua (3) 6,0 52,0 
4118 San Isidro (2) n.a. n.a. 
 
4119 Villa Vista (1) n.a. n.a. 
421 Cerro Largo centre (5) 14,5 60,5 
422 Los Asientos (2) 9,5 55,5 
423 El Rascador (2) 25,0 71,0 
424 Ave Maria (2) 11,5 57,5 
425 Cerro Agudo (2) 21,5 67,5 
426 Entradero del Castillo (2) 16,5 62,5 
427 La Fragua (1) 17,0 63,0 
428 El Pajal (1) 19,5 65,5 
42  Cerro Largo  
(total sample 18) 
 
429 Rio Señales (1) 11,0 57,0 
431 Los Llanos centre (3) 12,5 58,5 
432 Las Flores (2) 14,0 60,0 
433 La Penitencia (2) 14,0 60,0 
434 Los Potreros (2) 19,5 65,5 
435 Rincón Santo (2) 19,0 65,0 
436 Los Jaramillos (2) 7,5 53,5 
437 San José (5) 17,5 63,5 
438 Las Huacas (1) 15,5 61,5 
43  Los Llanos  
(total sample 21) 
439 Rodeo de las Huacas (2) 16,0 62,0 
441 Llano Grande centre (4) 13,0 37,0 
442 Calabazal (2) 15,0 39,0 
443 La Polonia (2) 10,0 36,0 
444 El Ojal (1) 21,0 45,0 
44  Llano Grande 
(total sample 10) 
445 Llano Hato (1) 20,0 44,0 
451 Peñas Chatas centre (4) 10,0 56,0 
452 El Negrito (2) 12,0 58,0 
453 Las Paredes (1) 17,0 63,0 
454 Rincon Grande (1) 14,5 60,5 
455 El Barro (2) 12,0 58,0 
456 La Raya (2) 11,5 57,5 
45  Peñas Chatas 
(total sample 15) 
457 Los Carates (3) 9,0 55,0 
461 El Tijera centre (1) 24,5 70,5 
462 Pozo Hondo (1) 30,0 76,0 
463 Entradero (3) 19,5 65,5 
46  El Tijera 
(total sample 6) 
464 El Cebadero (1) 33,0 79,0 
Total for the district of  Ocú:   6 towns,  53 villages, 111 interviews   
 
Table A7.5  Sample in the Parita district 
Municipality Village (sample) Distance from village 
to district centre km 
Distance to 
Chitré km 
511 Parita centre (2 interviews) 0 12,0 
512 Las Mercedes (1) 3,0 15,0 
513 Guanábana (1) n.a. n.a. 
514 El Sesteadero (2) 6,5 18,5 
515 Puerto Limón (2) 4,5 16,5 
516 Corozo (2) 4,5 16,5 
51  Parita centre 
(total sample 11) 
 
517 Quebrapiedra (1) 3,5 15,5 
521 Cabuya centre (2) 16,5 28,5 
522 Potuguilla (2) 20,5 32,5 
523 Los Higos (2) 21,0 33,0 
52  Cabuya 
(total sample 8) 
 
524 Pedernal (2) 14,5 26,5 
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Municipality Village (sample) Distance from village 
to district centre km 
Distance to 
Chitré km 
53  Los Castillos  
(total sample 3) 
531 Los Castillos centre (3) 11,5 23,5 
541 Llano de la Cruz centre (2) 17,0 30,5 54  Llano de la Cruz 
(total sample 3) 542 Los Cantos (1) 13,5 25,5 
55  París 
(total sample 4) 
551 Paris centre (4) 8,0 20,0 
561 Portobelillo centre (5) 14,5 26,5 56  Portobelillo 
(total sample 7) 562 Valencia (2) 8,5 20,5 
57  Potuga 
(total sample 3) 
571 Potuga centre (3) 15,5 27,5 
Total for the district of  Parita:  7 towns,  18 villages, 39 interviews 
 
Table A7.6  Sample in the Pesé district 
Municipality Village (sample) Distance from village 
to district centre km 
Distance to 
Chitré km 
61  Pesé centre 
(total sample 3) 
611 Pesé centre (3 interviews) 0 23,0 
621 Las Cabras centre (3) 8,5 31,5 
622 Las Flores (2) 5,5 28,5 
623 El Ciruelito (2) 10,0 33,0 
624 El Calabazo (2) 8,5 31,5 
625 La Arenita (2) 7,0 30,0 
62  Las Cabras 
(total sample 13) 
 
 
626 El Cascajalillo (2) 6,5 29,5 
631 El Pajaro centre (1) 10,0 33,0 
632 El Jazmin (2) 11,0 34,0 
633 El Jazmincito (2) 10,0 33,0 
634 Villa Rosa (2) 9,0 32,0 
63  El Pájaro 
(total sample 8) 
635 Valdesa (1) n.a. n.a. 
641 El Barrero centre (4) 11,0 12,0 64  El Barrero 
(total sample 6) 642 Los Hatillos (2) 10,0 13,0 
651 El Pedregoso centre (2) 5,0 28,0 
652 El Pedregosito (1) 3,5 26,5 
653 El Hatillo (2) 2,5 25,5 
65  El Pedregoso 
(total sample 8) 
 
 654 La Candelaria (3) 6,5 29,5 
661 El Ciruelo centre (1) 8,5 31,5 
662 Los Churros (1) n.a. n.a. 
663 La Trinidad (1) 12,0 35,0 
664 El Salto (1) n.a. n.a. 
665 Las Mesitas (2) 12,5 35,5 
66  El Ciruelo 
(total sample 7) 
666 El Balillo (1) n.a. n.a. 
671 Sabanagrande centre (4) 4,5 27,5 
672 Coralillos (2) 13,5 36,5 
673 Mandenga (2) 10,0 33,0 
674 Bahía Honda (2) 11,0 34,0 
67  Sabanagrande 
(total sample 12) 
675 Peñas Moradas (2) 7,5 30,5 
681 Rincón Hondo centre (1) 8,5 31,5 
682 El Banco (2) 11,0 34,0 
683 Esquiguita (1) 10,0 33,0 
684 Borrola (2) 11,5 34,5 
685 El Cocuyo (3) 6,0 29,0 
68  Rincón Hondo 
(total sample 10) 
686 Pedernal (1) 6,0 29,0 
Total sample for the district of Pesé:  8 towns within which 35 villages,  67 interviews 
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Table A7.7  Sample in the Santa Maria district 
Municipality Village (sample) Distance from village 
to district centre km 
Distance to 
Chitré km 
711 Santa Maria centre (2 interviews) 0  34,0  71  Santa Maria centre 
(total sample 3) 712 Las Pampas (1) n.a. n.a. 
721 Pueblo Nuevo (3) 20,0  54,0  
722 Los Panamaes (2) 21,0  55,0 
72  Chupampa 
(total sample 6)  
723 El Espinito (1) 22,0 56,0 
731 El Rincón centre (4) 5,5 32,5 
732 El Rodeo (2) 7,0 34,0 
733 Escotal (1) 5,0 29,0 
73  El Rincón 
(total sample 8) 
734 La Garza (1) 9,0 36,0 
741 El Limon centre (3) 21,5 55,5 
742 Cañacillas (1) 14,0  48,0 
743 El Olivo (2) 15,0 49,0 
744 Santa Ana (1) 17,0 51,0 
74  El Limón 
(total sample 8) 
745 Arenita (1) 21,5 55,5 
751 Los Canelos centre (3) 6,0 40,0 75  Los Canelos 
(total sample 4) 752 Chumicosa (1) 8,5 42,5 
Total for the district of  Santa Maria:  5 towns,   16 villages, 29 interviews 
 
Annex 8  Consumption and income aggregates of the Panamanian Living 
Standards Measurement Study (LSMS) 2003.   
 
Table A8.1  Consumption aggregate in the LSMS 2003. 
Consumption aggregate in the Living Standards Measurement Study of 2003, (reported in MEF 2006): 
1. Consumption of purchased foods 
2. consumption of non-purchased foods (household production, gifts, donations) 
3. Expenditure on consumer goods and services 
4. Household services 
5. Annual use value of household durables 
6. Annual use value of housing or paid rent 
7. Expenditure on basic services (water, electricity, gas, telephone) 
8. Educational expenses 
9. Health expenses 
 
Table A8.2  Income aggregate in the LSMS 2003. 
Income aggregate of the Living Standards Measurement Study (LSMS) 2003 (reported in MEF 2006): 
1. Formal and informal salaries from agricultural activities 
2. Net profit of independent agricultural activities 
3. Formal and informal salaries from non-agricultural activities 
4. Net profit of formal and informal non-agricultural activities 
5. Received interests 
6. Rents of equipment and property 
7. Retirement payments, alimonies, pensions 
8. Donations from institutions and private people 
9. Other income (gambling, lottery, etc) 
 
Annex 9  Valuation of home consumption of crops and livestock products. 
 
Crop and livestock products consumed by the household were valued at local retail 
market prices.  They were thus specific to the district in which the household 
resided.  Table A9.1 depicts the average prices of the items across different 
districts.  In respect to certain items, some households could not specify the 
consumed quantity but answered that for instance the household takes enough 
cassava for annual household consumption.  This was taken to mean that the 
household is self-sufficient in the item and thus the quantity consumed was taken 
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from the average 2 280 cal/day diet table 5.1.  The resulting values of, for instance, 
the average consumption of cassava is 5,93 PAB/year/person.     
 
Table A9.1  Consumption value of food items produced by household, based on average retail market prices. 
Item Consumption value = average retail market price 
If the consumed quantity was specified: 
Rice 
Corn 
Beans 
Milk 
Chicken 
Pork meat 
Cassava 
Yam 
Taro (otoe) 
Pumpkin 
0,30 PAB/lb 
0,22 PAB/lb 
0,61 PAB/lb 
0,70 PAB/litre 
1,03 PAB/lb 
1,45 PAB/lb 
0,23 PAB/lb 
0,40 PAB/lb 
0,37 PAB/lb 
0,17 PAB/lb 
If the quantity was not specified, but the household was self-sufficient in that item: 
Milk 
Chicken 
Cassava 
Eggs 
Sugar, sugarcane 
Tomato 
55,00 PAB/person/year 
32,00 PAB/person/year 
5,93 PAB/person/year 
7,70 PAB/person/year 
15,70 PAB/person/year 
15,03 PAB/person/year 
 
Some adjustments were made to the data.  If a household had more than five 
chicken for every household member and if they had not reported consuming any 
eggs or chicken meat in the interviews, an average consumption value of eggs and 
chicken meat was added to their consumption aggregate.  The chicken meat 
correction was made to 191 households, and the egg correction was made to 55 
households.  It was common for a respondent to dismiss poultry consumption in the 
interviews as unimportant, although poultry products are a significant source of 
proteins in the rural areas. 
 
It was not possible to include the value of the food, milk or cereal drink some of 
the school age children receive at school free of charge, due to the lack of specific 
data, although this was done by the Panamanian LSMS in 2003 (MEF 2006).  It 
was neither possible to correct against possible over-or under-reporting of 
household consumption with the exception of the poultry items.   
 
Annex 10  Calculi of annual values of services from housing and consumer 
durables. 
 
Imputed value of annual housing services:  The respondents were asked to 
estimate both the value of their house, and the rent they would have to pay for the 
house, were it not their own.  If the household was able to give such an estimated 
rental value, this value was used as the use value of the house.  If the respondent 
had not given a rental value estimate of the household house, an average imputed 
value was given.  The imputed use value was calculated from the data of those 
households who had stated both a value of the house and an estimate of the rental 
value.  31 households had given both values, of which one was excluded because it 
  
267
 
 
 
had a rental value of 400 PAB/month and house value 25 000 PAB, and it was 
treated as an outlier.  In the sample of 30 accepted household estimates, the house 
values ranged from 500 to 20 000 PAB, mean 7 236,67.  The monthly rental values 
ranged from 10 to 80 PAB/month, with a mean of 30,17 PAB/month.  For the 30 
included cases, the house values were grouped in four categories, and an average 
was calculated from their corresponding rental estimates.  Housing use values were 
also estimated through asking for hypothetical rent values in the Panamanian 
Living Standards Measurement Study in 2003 (MEF 2006).  For households that 
could not give such an estimate, a regression was formed based on the construction 
materials of the house (MEF 2006: 149-161).  This research did not have the 
necessary data on roof, wall or floor materials for replicating the procedure.   
 
Table A10.1  Imputation of the annual value of housing services.   
Value of the house The average rental value = the imputed value 
0-4 000 PAB 258,48 PAB/year 
4 001-8 000 PAB 336,00 PAB/year 
8 001-12 000 PAB 405,00 PAB/year 
> 12 000 PAB 470,04 PAB/year 
Households unable to estimate any value for their house were given the minimum use value of 258,48 PAB. 
 
Imputed value of annual use of television:  estimating a lifespan of 10 years 
and mean value of 140 PAB of purchased televisions in the sample, the value was 
estimated at 14 PAB/year (n=19). 
Imputed value of annual use of telephone:  estimating a lifespan of a cell 
phone of 4 years and a mean value of 40 PAB, or with fixed lines unknown 
lifespan and price, the value was estimated at 10 PAB/year. 
Imputed value of annual use of computer:  estimating a lifespan of 6 years 
and the mean value of 600 PAB the value was estimated at 100 PAB/year. 
Imputed value of annual use of vehicles:  estimating a lifespan of 20 years 
and given the values given by their owners, the value of vehicles was divided by 
20, yielding thus the annual use value of the vehicles. 
The imputed values of annual use of refrigerators or washing machines could 
not be used for the calculi, because their possession was not asked in all 
questionnaires, although their contribution to household welfare should not be 
underestimated.   
 
It is important to note that these annual values are for household.  When divided by 
number of household members, the effect on the per capita consumption aggregate 
is different for large and small households.  The larger the household, the smaller is 
the value for each member, and the lower the contribution to the consumption per 
capita.  On the other hand, in smaller households the annual values divide by fewer 
members and thus yield higher contributions to the consumption per capita values. 
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Annex 11  Ln conversions of consumption and income per capita 
 
Table A11.1  Values of Ln(consumption) and Ln(income)  (N=402) 
 Mean  Minimum Maximum Stand. dev. Median 
Ln (consumption per capita) 7,29 4,19 11,27 ,97 7,18 
Ln (income per capita) 6,82 4,83 9,43 ,63 6,80 
 
Figure A11.1  Frequency distribution of Ln(consumption per capita).  
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Figure A11.2  Frequency distribution of Ln(income per capita). 
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Annex 12  The effect of agricultural investments on welfare 
 
Table A12.1  Consumption and income relative to agricultural investments (expressed in 1 000s PAB).  Linear 
regression coefficients.  
    Dependent variable 
 
   
Ln (Consumption 
per capita) 
Ln (Income per 
capita) 
Independent variable 
 
Mean value 
all house-
holds 
Share 
participa-
ting % 
Mean among 
participating 
households 
Coeff. Sig. Coeff. Sig. 
Crop fertilizer investments ,099 72,1 ,137 ,520 ,000 1,037 ,000 
Other crop investments  ,127 13,4 ,945 ,027 ,076 ,048 ,020 
Investments into new 
animals 
2,066 31,3 6,592 ,006 ,006 ,032 ,000 
Other livestock 
investments 
,123 20,9 ,589 ,021 ,452 ,073 ,052 
Model 
   N 
   Adjusted R2 
     
402 
,066 
  
402 
,279 
 
Annex 13  Income welfare poverty measurement  
 
In addition to measuring the welfare poverty of the studied Herreran farmer 
households according to their consumption, also income poverty lines were 
constructed and income poverty analyses carried out.  The extreme poverty line is 
based on the cost of a minimum nutrition, and is thus insensitive to the adopted 
welfare measure.  The extreme poverty line was 493,71 PAB/capita/year for 
Herrera in 2005, regardless of whether measured against income or consumption.   
 
The moderate poverty line, on the contrary, is sensitive to the welfare measure 
itself, because it includes a non-food component.  For a moderate income poverty 
line, it is thus necessary to know the share of income used on food of the 
households with an income near the extreme poverty line.  Thus both particular 
income Engel populations and income Engel coefficients will be required for the 
construction of a moderate income poverty line.   
 
The Engel coefficient of income (ECI) of a household x can be calculated by: 
x
x
x IAH
FCHECI     (A13.1) 
 
in which FCHx is the value of food consumption of household x (including the 
values of consumed agricultural products produced by the household and 
purchased food) and IAHx is the monetary income aggregate of household x.   
 
The moderate poverty line of income (MPLI) can be calculated by: 
meanECI
EPLMPLI     (A13.2) 
 
in which EPL is the extreme poverty line and ECImean is the average Engel 
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coefficient of income of the income Engel population. 
 
Figure A13.1  Income poverty lines and groups 
In
co
m
e 
/c
ap
ita
 
Ext reme poverty line (EPL) 
Moderate poverty line of income (MPLI) 
Non-poor 
households (inc.) 
Moderately poor 
households (inc.) 
Ext remely poor 
households (inc.) 
 
Having both the extreme poverty line and the moderate poverty line of income, it 
will become possible to divide the studied households into three income poverty 
groups (figure A13.1).  It can be expected that the moderate poverty line of income 
will be lower than the moderate poverty line of consumption, since in developing 
regions consumption aggregates often exceed incomes.  This will cause the Engel 
coefficient of income to be higher than the Engel coefficient of consumption, since 
the food consumption’s value is equal for both.   
 
Of all the 402 households included in this study, 38 had an income aggregate per 
capita below the extreme poverty line, comprising 9,5% of the sample.  The 
incidence of extreme poverty of income is lower than the incidence of extreme 
poverty of consumption.  The differences cannot be interpreted as such due to the 
different composition of the aggregates, nor can the differences between income 
and consumption aggregates be interpreted as surplus.   
 
For the empirical estimation of the moderate income poverty line, the income 
Engel coefficient of the income Engel population was needed.  The income Engel 
population consisted of the households with an income aggregate per capita within 
+/-20% of the extreme poverty line.  The income Engel population, with income 
per capita between 394,97 and 592,46 PAB/capita/year consisted of 25 households 
or 6,2% of all households.  Their income Engel coefficient was calculated 
according to equation A11.1.   
 
Table A13.1  Income Engel coefficients of the income Engel population (n=25)  
Mean 0,6581 
Minimum 0,29 
Maximum 1,28 
Standard deviation 0,233 
 
Among the income Engel population, the average food share of income was 65,8% 
(table A13.1).  One household had an Engel coefficient greater than 1,0, depicting 
that the food consumption value exceeded the total income aggregate of the 
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household.  This is possible if the household has underestimated their incomes, if 
their agricultural or livestock production is running at a negative level (input costs 
exceeding output value) or if the household is going into debt.  On the whole the 
income Engel coefficient is more problematic than the consumption Engel 
coefficient since the income aggregate’s composition is not compatible with the 
food consumption aggregate value.  Originally the Engel coefficient was defined as 
the proportion of family income that is spent on food (Aguirregabiria 2006), but the 
calculus is not so straightforward in rural settings.  Due to the importance of 
household production for obtaining food, food is not only purchased, and the food 
consumption quantity may thus have little relevance vis-à-vis the income level of 
the household, which essentially comprises of items not corresponding to 
household production.    
 
Table A13.2  Incidence of income poverty and income poverty groups 
 Frequency 
of 
households 
Percent of 
households 
Percent of all 
household 
members 
Average 
household size 
(members) 
Minimum 
household 
size 
Maximum 
household 
size 
Extremely poor 38 9,5 %  13,3 % 5,58 2 11 
Moderately poor 53 13,2 % 14,4 % 4,32 1 11 
Non-poor 311 77,4 % 72,3 % 3,69 1 10 
Total 402 100,0 % 100,0 % 3,96   
   N=1590    
 
The resulting moderate poverty line of income, calculated according to equation 
A11.2 is 750,21 PAB/capita/year (= 493,7144/0,6581).  Of the interviewed 
households, 91 have a per capita income below the moderate poverty line of 
income, constituting 22,6% of all households but including also the extremely 
income poor.  Thus 77,4 % of households were income non-poor.   
 
Not surprisingly, the incidence of income poverty is lower than the incidence of 
consumption poverty (table A13.2).  On the whole, 22,6% of households and 
27,7% of the studied population were income poor, lower than the income poverty 
rates found in national studies of 2002 according to which 34,3% of households 
and 40,5% of population were income poor35 (INDH 2002: 83).  The income and 
consumption aggregates have different components, and the poverty lines are 
different, due to which the two poverty classification systems should not be 
compared one-to-one.  The cross-tabulation (table A13.3) shows that the two 
poverty measures of income and consumption divide the households in an uneven 
manner, finding most agreement in the non-poor group.  One interesting finding is 
that 22 households living with consumption levels under the extreme poverty line 
have income levels high enough to render them non-poor.  The reasons for this 
disparity were sought, and only four cases could be explained by major investments 
in livestock and housing and major loan paybacks.  The disparity in the remaining 
18 households could not be accounted for with the available data.  The households 
                                                 
35 Income poverty line for general poverty was 916,80 PAB/year and extreme poverty line 525,60 
PAB/year.   
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may opt to consume little out of free choice, or they might have under-reported 
their consumption levels or exaggerated their income levels in the interviews.  Part 
of the difference in the moderately poor groups is caused by different poverty lines, 
but mainly the divergences stem from the different composition of the aggregates.  
Income and consumption measure two different dimensions by two different sets of 
components, leading to incompatible results.    
 
Table A13.3  Crosstabulation of consumption poverty group and income poverty group. 
Income poverty group   
Extremely poor Moderately poor Non-poor Total 
Extremely poor 25 15 22 62 
Moderately poor 10 32 93 135 
Consumption 
poverty group 
Non-poor 3 6 196 205 
 Total 38 53 311 402 
 
Despite some cases that fall into different poverty groups depending on whether 
counted by incomes or consumption, the general tendency is clear.  The income 
aggregates do on average differ among the consumption poverty groups (table 
A13.4).  The per capita income of the non-poor is on average nearly six times the 
average per capita income of the extremely poor.  
 
Table A13.4  Income aggregates: comparison between consumption poverty groups. 
 Extremely poor 
(cons.) 
Moderately poor 
(cons.) 
Non-poor (cons.) 2-tailed significance 
of Mann-Whitney U 
Income per capita 
     Minimum 
     Maximum 
     Mean 
     Standard deviation 
     Median 
 
66,33 
4 035,20 
712,98 
627,47 
603,58 
 
250,59 
10 801,11 
1 467,50 
1 688,85 
987,49 
 
354,05 
78 360,00 
4 188,33 
7 987,24 
2 084,88 
EP-MP ,000 
MP-NP ,000 
Income per household 
     Minimum 
     Maximum 
     Mean 
     Standard deviation 
     Median 
 
199,00 
32 281,62 
3 500,31 
4 193,68 
2 775,56 
 
866,70 
44 006,10 
5 827,63 
6 761,21 
4 155,48 
 
903,50 
23 0243,34 
14 101,50 
26 138,83 
6 242,00 
EP-MP ,000 
MP-NP ,000 
N  valid 62 135 205 402 
 
Although the original income aggregates were higher than consumption, the 
average income poverty depths are larger than consumption poverty depths, 
reflecting the great income inequalities found.  The average extremely poor 
household in its income would need 942 PAB/year (or 167 PAB per person) more 
income to reach the extreme poverty line, and nearly 2 400 PAB/year (or 423 PAB 
per person) to reach the moderate poverty line.  This degree of poverty depth would 
require drastic action to overcome.  On the other hand, the surplus incomes of the 
non-poor are even higher above the poverty lines, adding up to over 3 million PAB 
over the extreme poverty line and 2,8 million PAB above the moderate poverty 
line36.   
                                                 
36 Note that the income non-poor group is 311 households, larger than the consumption non-poor of 
205 households 
  
273
 
 
 
Annex 14  Food prices for the other districts.  
 
Table A14.1  Food prices for other districts and annual cost of daily diet of 2 280 cal/person.  For each food item’s calorie content and share in daily diet see table 5.1.  
District:   Chitré    Los Pozos   Parita    Pesé   Santa Maria 
Establishment:  Supermercado Lira Supercentro Los Pozos Minisuper Hong Sing Minisuper Chung Minisuper Pueblo Nuevo 
Date: 20.5.2005 25.5.2005 20.5.2005 25.5.2005 20.5.2005 
Product Price PAB/lb *) Annual cost Price PAB/lb *) Annual cost Price PAB/lb *) Annual cost Price PAB/lb *) Annual cost Price PAB/lb *) Annual cost 
Rice 0,30  41,49 0,30  41,49 0,30  41,49 0,30  41,49 0,30  41,49 
Oil 0,81  15,27 0,62  11,69 0,76  14,33 0,59  11,12 0,69  13,01 
Sugar 0,34  13,86 0,35  14,26 0,30  12,23 0,25  10,19 0,32  13,04 
Corn grain 0,20  7,00 0,22  7,70 0,20  7,00 0,25  8,75 0,20  7,00 
Bread 0,69  18,35 0,45  12,08 0,69  18,35 0,69  18,35 0,80  21,28 
Flour 0,39  6,36 0,30  4,89 0,30  4,89 0,40  6,53 0,28  4,57 
Beans frijol 0,41  5,38 0,45  5,90 0,60  7,87 0,50  6,56 0,60  7,87 
Pasta 0,54  6,41 0,54  6,41 0,60  7,13 0,57  6,77 0,65  7,72 
Chicken 1,00  31,94 1,10  35,14 1,00  31,94 1,00  31,94 1,10  35,14 
Cereals and creams 0,89  10,40 0,84  9,82 0,91  10,63 0,65  7,60 0,91  10,63 
Powder milk 2,70  31,73 2,79  32,79 2,95  34,67 2,61  30,68 3,00  35,26 
Beef meat 1,85  51,97 1,70  47,76 1,35  37,93 1,70  47,76 1,75  49,16 
Beans poroto 0,71  7,88 0,65  7,21 0,70  7,77 0,70  7,77 0,85  9,43 
Lentils 0,51  5,70 0,55  6,15 0,50  5,59 0,35  3,91 0,55  6,15 
Plantain 0,23 * 9,93 0,23  9,93 0,23  9,93 0,23  9,93 0,23  9,93 
Liquid milk 0,31  17,04 0,44  24,18 0,37  20,34 0,31  17,04 0,29  15,94 
Pork meat 1,85  21,72 1,30  15,26 1,75  20,55 1,50  17,61 1,70  19,96 
Processed corn 0,52  8,06 1,30  20,16 0,52  8,06 1,13  17,52 0,80 * 12,41 
Peas, legumes 0,47 * 3,16 0,40  2,69 0,45  3,03 0,50  3,36 0,50  3,36 
Margarine 0,95  3,23 1,50  5,11 1,75  5,96 1,25 * 4,26 1,25 * 4,26 
Eggs 0,80  7,70 0,82  7,89 0,82  7,89 0,82  7,89 0,82  7,89 
Cassava 0,23 * 5,93 0,23 * 5,93 0,25  6,44 0,20  5,15 0,25  6,44 
Cookies 1,26  5,58 0,91  4,03 1,49  6,60 1,18  5,22 1,51  6,68 
Evaporated milk 0,99  14,44 1,07  15,61 0,93  13,57 1,07  15,61 0,91  13,28 
Cheese 1,55  9,45 1,78  10,86 1,76  10,73 1,60  9,76 1,78 * 10,86 
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Sausage 0,99  6,73 1,10 * 7,48 1,37  9,31 1,00  6,80 1,10  7,48 
Yam 0,29  4,30 0,25  3,70 0,25  3,70 0,60  8,89 0,40  5,93 
Sardines and tuna 1,20  11,56 1,17  11,27 1,02  9,83 0,91  8,77 1,39  13,39 
Banana 0,11 * 2,00 0,11  2,00 0,11  2,00 0,11  2,00 0,11  2,00 
Potato 0,39  6,77 0,40  6,94 0,30  5,21 0,40  6,94 0,40  6,94 
Fish 1,25 ** 20,50 1,25 ** 20,50 1,25 ** 20,50 1,25 ** 20,50 1,25 ** 20,50 
Taro (otoe) 0,39  3,34 0,50  4,28 0,15  1,28 0,40  3,42 0,40  3,42 
Soups 2,13  4,87 3,78  8,63 2,33  5,32 1,46  3,34 1,38  3,15 
Tomato paste &sauce 1,20  7,59 2,40  15,18 1,17  7,40 1,33  8,41 1,33  8,41 
Sodas, juices 0,47  5,31 0,60 * 6,77 0,60  6,77 0,62  7,00 0,75  8,47 
Avocado 0,33 ** 1,88 0,33 ** 1,88 0,33 ** 1,88 0,33  1,88 0,33 ** 1,88 
Mango 0,10 ** 1,72 0,10 ** 1,72 0,10 ** 1,72 0,10 ** 1,72 0,10 ** 1,72 
Pineapple 0,25 ** 2,82 0,25 ** 2,82 0,25 ** 2,82 0,25 ** 2,82 0,25 ** 2,82 
Garlic 0,64  1,69 0,90  2,38 0,91  2,40 0,90  2,38 1,00  2,64 
Carrot 0,50  4,45 0,50  4,45 0,25  2,23 0,40  3,56 0,50  4,45 
Pepper 0,52  4,45 0,50  4,28 0,57 * 4,88 0,50  4,28 0,75  6,42 
Seafood 1,12  7,18 1,50 ** 9,62 1,50 ** 9,62 1,50 ** 9,62 1,50 ** 9,62 
Orange 0,10 ** 0,78 0,10 ** 0,78 0,10 ** 0,78 0,10 ** 0,78 0,10 ** 0,78 
Tomato 0,79  7,44 0,80  7,54 0,50  4,71 0,50  4,71 0,75  7,06 
Apple 0,60  2,62 0,76  3,32 0,76  3,32 0,25  1,09 0,76  3,32 
Cabbage 0,45  2,97 0,50  3,31 0,50  3,31 0,40  2,64 0,50  3,31 
Pumpkin, veget. pear 0,16  1,36 0,20  1,70 0,15  1,28 0,20  1,70 0,15  1,28 
Lemon 0,67 ** 6,94 0,67 ** 6,94 0,67 ** 6,94 0,67 ** 6,94 0,67 ** 6,94 
Sugar cane 0,40 * 1,85 0,30  1,39 0,40 * 1,85 0,40 * 1,85 0,50  2,32 
Lettuce 0,60 * 3,76 0,60  3,76 0,70  4,39 0,70  4,39 0,50  3,14 
Papaya 0,33 ** 1,35 0,33 ** 1,35 0,33 ** 1,35 0,33 ** 1,35 0,33 ** 1,35 
Cucumber 0,23 ** 1,78 0,20  1,54 0,23 * 1,78 0,15  1,16 0,35  2,70 
Celery 0,55  2,20 0,60  2,40 0,50  2,00 0,60  2,40 0,40  1,60 
Onion 0,25  0,82 0,30  0,99 0,30  0,99 0,55  1,81 0,50  1,64 
Melon 0,15 * 0,43 0,15  0,43 0,15 * 0,43 0,15 * 0,43 0,15 * 0,43 
Total cost PAB/capita/year  491,48   514,31   484,92   486,36    517,87 
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*)  Value has been taken from the mean of other establishments, because this establishment did not have this 
item.  **)  Value has been taken from street vendors, because none of the establishments had this item.   
 
Annex 15  Discussion on another possible food basket composition.   
 
The Panamanian Ministry of Economics and Finance follow changes in the 
consumer price index through the cost of the Basic Family Food Basket (Canasta 
Básica Familiar de Alimentos), which has a different composition of items and 
different weights given to each item than in the food consumption patterns from 
LSMS 1997.  As the food consumption pattern from LSMS 1997 used in this study, 
the Basic Food Basket is also defined as the combination of basic products that 
comprise the usual diet of a population in sufficient quantities to cover at least the 
caloric needs of every individual (MEF 2006; MEF 2002; INCAP 2002; INCAP 
2000).  But the proportions of food items in the Basic Family Food Basket are very 
different from the observed consumption patterns in the LSMS 1997.  Food item 
quantities seem to be based on the available consumer package sizes without 
consideration of how much of each item is actually consumed by one person, or a 
household.  The basic basket also omits most fresh fruit and fish, which are not 
readily available in every shop but do constitute a part of the typical diet.  The two 
different nutritional combinations yield different annual costs of nutrition per 
person, in 2003 the extreme poverty line based on the LSMS was 534 
PAB/capita/year, while the cost of the Basic Family Food Basket per person was 
591,40 PAB.   
 
The Basic Family Food Basket is of greater political importance than the official 
poverty line based on the LSMS 1997, since the products in the basket receive 
relieved taxation and the price of the basket is used in the negotiation of minimum 
salaries.  Between 1997 and 2003, the cost of the Basic Basket has risen annually 
0,7 %, compared with the 3,4 % annual increase in salaries and the 1,0 % annual 
inflation.  The basic basket has the advantage that it includes also items such as 
coffee, tea and cooking gas expenses, which are omitted from the LSMS.  But the 
composition of food consumption patterns of the LSMS 1997 is more suitable for 
the purposes of this study because instead of including food items in consumer 
package sizes regardless of their actual share in consumption as is done in the Basic 
Basket, the LSMS list includes each item in the proportion in which it is actually 
used.  (MEF 2006; INCAP 2000.)   
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Annex 16 Annual fruit consumption prices in Herrera. 
 
Table A16.1  Annual price of fruit consumption in the districts.  According to the quantities of each fruit in the 
LSMS 1997 for a 2,280 cal/capita/day diet.  Prices in PAB/capita/year.   
 Chitré Las Minas Los Pozos Parita Pesé Santa Maria Mean PAB 
Plantain - 9,93 9,93 9,93 9,93 9,93 9,93 
Banana - 2,00 2,00 2,00 2,00 2,00 2,00 
Avocado 1,88 - - - - - 1,88 
Mango 1,72 - - - - - 1,72 
Pineapple 2,82 - - - - - 2,82 
Orange 0,78 - - - - - ,78 
Apple 2,62 3,32 3,32 3,32 1,09 3,32 2,83 
Lemon 6,94 - - - - - 6,94 
Sugar cane - - 1,39 - - 2,32 1,86 
Papaya 1,35 - - - - - 1,35 
Melon - - 0,43 - - - ,43 
      TOTAL 32,54 
 
 
  
277
 
 
 
Annex 17  Calculus of decomposable poverty measures by Foster, Greer and Thorbecke (1984), decomposed by districts of the Herrera province. 
 
Table A17.1  Calculus of decomposable poverty measures, extreme and moderate poverty measures decomposed by districts.  Consumption used as the welfare measure. 
District 
Household 
members in 
sampled 
households (nj) 
Share of total 
membersa 
(%) 
Weighted 
extreme poverty 
depthb Extreme nz^2c 
Extreme 
poverty 
measured 
Percentage 
contribution to 
total extreme 
povertye 
Weighted 
moderate poverty 
depthf Moderate nz^2g 
Moderate 
poverty 
measureh 
Percentage 
contribution to 
total moderate 
povertyi 
Chitré 76 4,78 0,00 18 524 966,87 0 0,00 199 942,82 58 341 882,27 0,003427089 0,18 
Las Minas 310 19,50 3 014 573,70 75 562 364,87 0,039895174 37,21 37 124 162,51 237 973 467,14 0,156001268 32,87 
Los Pozos 271 17,04 2 095 757,88 66 056 131,87 0,031726924 25,87 25 128 903,48 208 034 869,66 0,120791786 22,25 
Ocú 419 26,35 1 536 694,53 102 131 067,36 0,015046299 18,97 28 653 923,73 321 648 008,81 0,089084723 25,37 
Parita 150 9,43 409 740,11 36 562 434,62 0,011206587 5,06 8 094 531,96 115 148 451,84 0,07029649 7,17 
Pesé 251 15,79 792 022,58 61 181 140,59 0,012945535 9,78 9 964 503,61 192 681 742,75 0,05171483 8,82 
Santa Maria 113 7,11 251 735,97 27 543 700,74 0,009139512 3,11 3 762 211,78 86 745 167,05 0,043370852 3,33 
Total 1 590 100 8 100 524,77 387 561 806,92 0,020901246 100 112 928 179,89 1 220 573 589,50 0,092520583 100 
Poverty line PAB squared         
EPL 493,71 243 749,56         
MPL 876,16 767 656,35         
 
a) Share of total members = 100*(nj/n)  in which nj is the number of household members in district j and n is the total number of household members in the study 
b) Weighted extreme poverty depth =  )*( 2 iei ng   in which gei is the extreme poverty consumption shortfall per capita of household i and ni is the number of household members in household i 
c) Extreme nz^2 = nj*ze2  in which ze is the extreme poverty line 
d) Extreme poverty measure = Weighted extreme poverty depth / extreme nz^2 = 2
2
*
)*(
ej
iei
zn
ng  
e) Percentage contribution to total extreme poverty = 
total
jj
EPM
EPM
n
n
**100   in which EPMj is the extreme poverty measure of district j and EPMtotal is the extreme poverty measure of the whole province. 
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f) Weighted moderate poverty depth =  )*( 2 imi ng   in which gmi is the moderate poverty consumption 
shortfall per capita of household i and ni is the number of household members in household i 
g) Moderate nz^2 = nj*ze2   in which zm is the extreme poverty line 
h) Moderate poverty measure = Weighted moderate poverty depth / moderate nz^2 = 2
2
*
)*(
mj
imi
zn
ng  
i) Percentage contribution to total moderate poverty = 
total
jj
MPM
MPM
n
n
**100  in which MPMj is the 
moderate poverty measure of district j and MPMtotal is the moderate poverty measure of the whole province 
 
Annex 18  Natural resources. 
 
Table A18.1  Natural resources:  comparison of poverty groups. 
 Extremely 
poor 
Moderately 
poor 
Non-poor 2-tailed significance of 
Mann-Whitney U 
Quantity of parcels 
     Mean 
N valid 
1,2 
62 
1,3 
134 
1,8 
205 
EP-MP ,143 
MP-NP ,001 
Farmer estimate of land value (PAB/ha) 
     Mean 
     Median 
N valid 
1 041,0 
900,0 
48 
1 371,7 
1 000,0 
112 
1 659,2 
1 083,0 
177 
EP-MP ,043 
MP-NP ,008 
Total value of land (PAB) 
     Mean 
     Median 
N valid 
9 492,5 
2 500,0 
48 
9 181,9 
3 100,0 
112 
34 625,5 
12 500,0 
177 
EP-MP ,336 
MP-NP ,000 
Flat land (ha) 
     Mean 
     Median 
N valid 
5,7 
2,1 
62 
5,7 
2,1 
133 
12,8 
4,0 
203 
EP-MP ,819 
MP-NP ,000 
Percentage of land received as inheritance 
(opposite to purchases) 
     Mean 
     Median 
N valid 
69,0 
100,0 
62 
74,5 
100,0 
135 
58,7 
100,0 
204 
EP-MP ,453 
MP-NP ,001 
Area of titled land owned in centres (max 
distance 3 km) (ha) 
     Mean 
N valid 
,2 
62 
,4 
133 
1,0 
200 
EP-MP ,396 
MP-NP ,172 
Duration of possession of the oldest parcel 
(years) 
     Mean 
     Median 
N valid 
28,8 
27,0 
59 
24,0 
20,0 
134 
24,0 
20,0 
202 
EP-MP ,116 
MP-NP ,940 
Duration of possession of the newest parcel
(years) 
     Mean 
     Median 
N valid 
27,2 
20,0 
58 
22,6 
20,0 
134 
19,6 
15,0 
201 
EP-MP ,193 
MP-NP ,112 
Percentage of area acquired by rent or 
sharecropping  
     Mean 
     Percent participating 
N valid 
1,3 
3,2 % 
62 
1,6 
3,0 % 
135 
1,9 
3,9 % 
205 
EP-MP ,921 
MP-NP ,648 
Flat land (% of total area) 
     Mean 
     Median 
N valid 
62,4 
70,0 
62 
67,2 
80,0 
133 
66,9 
80,0 
203 
EP-MP ,113 
MP-NP ,672 
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 Extremely 
poor 
Moderately 
poor 
Non-poor 2-tailed significance of 
Mann-Whitney U 
Income received from renting land out 
(PAB) 
     Mean 
     Share having land rent income 
N valid 
144,2 
16,1 % 
62 
35,0 
10,1 % 
135 
56,3 
11,7 % 
205 
EP-MP ,267 
MP-NP ,814 
Agricultural area = crops (ha) 
     Mean 
     Median 
N valid 
2,3 
1,1 
62 
1,8 
1,0 
135 
2,4 
1,5 
205 
EP-MP ,502 
MP-NP ,094 
Fallow area (ha) 
     Mean 
N valid 
,7 
62 
,3 
135 
,2 
205 
EP-MP ,853 
MP-NP ,053 
Forest area (ha), incl. reforestation and 
fruit tree orchards 
     Mean 
     Share having forest  
N valid 
,00 
0% 
,07 
5,9 % 
,33 
8,3 % 
EP-MP ,051 
MP-NP ,387 
 
Annex 19  Human resources. 
 
Table A19.1  Human resources:  comparison of poverty groups. 
 Extremely 
poor 
Moderately 
poor  Non- poor  
2-tailed significance 
of tests 
Age of household head 
     Mean 
     Median 
N valid 
 
53,7 
54,0 
62 
 
52,5 
55,0 
135 
 
54,2 
54,0 
205 
t-test 
EP-MP ,574 
MP-NP ,252 
Literacy of household head 
     Illiterate 
     Fully literate 
     Can make a signature*   
N valid 
 
14,5 % 
83,9 % 
1,6 % 
62 
 
11,9 % 
83,0 % 
5,2 % 
135 
 
8,8 % 
85,9 % 
5,4 % 
205 
Pearson Chi-Square  
EP-MP  ,455 
MP-NP  ,653 
Civil status of household head 
     Married or united 
     Unmarried 
     Divorced 
     Widow 
N valid 
82,3 % 
6,5 % 
4,8 % 
6,5 % 
62 
83,7 % 
9,6 % 
2,2 % 
4,4 % 
135 
 
79,4 % 
12,7 % 
4,9 % 
2,9 % 
204 
Pearson Chi-Square  
EP-MP  ,615 
MP-NP  ,406 
Number of contributing household 
members (reported by respondent) 
     Mean 
N valid 
1,67 
62 
1,64 
135 
1,67 
205 
Mann-Whitney U  
EP-MP ,355 
MP-NP ,772 
Number of household members receiving
income (counted from data) 
     Mean 
N valid 
1,24 
62 
1,39 
135 
1,38 
205 
Mann-Whitney U 
EP-MP ,132 
MP-NP ,876 
Religious affiliation 
     None 
     Catholic 
     Evangelic 
     Quadrangular 
     Hossana 
     Episcopal 
     Various religions within household 
N valid 
 
1,6 % 
82,0 % 
3,3 % 
8,2 % 
3,3 % 
,0 % 
1,6 % 
61 
 
,8 % 
93,9 % 
2,3 % 
1,5 % 
,8 % 
,8 % 
,0 % 
132 
 
,0 % 
95,6 % 
2,0 % 
,5 % 
,0 % 
,5 % 
1,5 % 
203 
Pearson Chi-Square  
EP-MP  ,101 
MP-NP  ,411 
Female-headed households 
N valid 
11,3 % 
62 
4,4 % 
135 
3,4 % 
205 
Pearson Chi-Square 
EP-MP ,072 
MP-NP ,628 
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 Extremely 
poor 
Moderately 
poor  Non- poor  
2-tailed significance 
of tests 
Profession of household head 
     Farmer, livestock rancher or farm 
worker 
     Manual worker 
     Administrative employee 
     House wife 
     Others 
N valid 
 
80,6 % 
9,7 % 
1,6 % 
8,1 % 
,0 % 
62 
 
68,7 % 
14,9 % 
11,9 % 
3,0 % 
1,5 % 
135 
 
62,0 % 
16,6 % 
17,1 % 
2,4 % 
1,9 % 
205 
Pearson Chi-
Square  
EP-MP ,037 
MP-NP ,679 
Occupation of spouse   
     Does not have a spouse 
     House wife 
     Manual worker 
     Administrative employee 
N valid 
 
16,1 % 
82,3 % 
,0 % 
1,6 % 
62 
 
17,2 % 
73,1 % 
3,7 % 
6,0 % 
134 
 
20,6 % 
56,4 % 
3,9 % 
19,1 % 
204 
Pearson Chi-
Square  
EP-MP ,207 
MP-NP ,003 
Production managed by spouse ** 
     None 
     House (and chicken and pigs) 
     All same chores as househ. head 
     Works fulltime outside 
     Administration of farm 
N valid 
5,8 % 
90,4 % 
3,8 % 
0 % 
0 % 
52 
8,1 % 
73,0 % 
11,7 % 
7,2 % 
0 % 
111 
13,5 % 
54,0 % 
19,6 % 
12,3 % 
,6 % 
163 
Pearson Chi-
Square  
EP-MP ,051 
MP-NP ,034 
Number of cooperatives the household 
belongs to 
     Mean 
     % of households participating 
N valid 
,06 
6,5 % 
62 
,08 
8,1 % 
135 
,16 
15,2 % 
204 
Mann-Whitney U  
EP-MP ,677 
MP-NP ,052 
Quantity of development projects the 
household has participated in 
     Mean 
     % of households participating 
N valid 
,16 
14,5 % 
62 
,12 
10,4 % 
135 
,20 
18,6 % 
204 
Mann-Whitney U  
EP-MP ,396 
MP-NP ,040 
Insurance for crops and animals from the 
ISA 
N valid 
1,6 % 
62 
1,5 % 
135 
4,9 % 
204 
Pearson Chi-
Square  
EP-MP ,944 
MP-NP ,095 
*) In Panamanian censuses, a person is assigned illiterate if (s)he cannot read nor write, can only read but not 
write, or can only read and write numbers and sign her/his name.  (DEC 2000a). 
**) Missing share high because farmers without spouse were excluded.   
 
Annex 20  On-farm resources.  
 
Table A20.1  On-farm resources:  comparison of poverty groups.    
 Extremely 
poor  
Moderately 
poor Non- poor 
2-tailed significance 
of Mann-Whitney U 
Length of cattle tradition (years)           
     Mean 
     Median 
N valid 
24,2 
15,0 
12 
27,9 
15,0 
45 
28,7 
26,0 
112 
EP-MP ,852 
MP-NP ,665 
Number of horses 
     Mean 
     Had a horse(s) 
N valid 
,7 
40,3 % 
62 
,9 
55,6 % 
135 
1,2 
55,1 % 
205 
EP-MP ,080 
MP-NP ,476 
Number of pigs 
     Mean 
     Had a pig(s) 
N valid 
1,1 
33,9 % 
62 
1,2 
31,9 % 
135 
1,1 
29,3 % 
205 
EP-MP ,669 
MP-NP ,794 
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 Extremely 
poor  
Moderately 
poor Non- poor 
2-tailed significance 
of Mann-Whitney U 
Number of chicken 
     Mean 
     Median 
     Had chicken 
N valid 
28,4 
25,0 
98,4 % 
62 
28,2 
20,0 
88,1 % 
135 
36,1 
25,0 
81,5 % 
205 
EP-MP ,490 
MP-NP ,553 
Had no animals 3,2 % 5,2 % 8,8 %  
Own the household house 
N valid 
100,0 % 
62 
98,5 % 
135 
96,6 % 
205 
Pearson Chi-
Square 
EP-MP    ,629 
MP-NP    ,624 
Quantity of bicycles 
     Mean 
     Had a bicycle(s) 
,11 
8,1 % 
,36 
20,7 % 
,31 
17,6 % 
EP-MP ,024 
MP-NP ,429 
Quantity of trucks and public 
transportation vehicles 
     Mean 
     Had a truck or public transp. 
vehicle 
,02 
1,6 % 
,01 
1,5 % 
,11 
8,3 % 
EP-MP ,944 
MP-NP ,003 
Quantity of wagons 
     Mean 
     Had a wagon(s) 
,00 
0 % 
,02 
1,4% 
,05 
4,4% 
EP-MP ,337 
MP-NP ,142 
Quantity of motorcycles 
     Mean 
     Had a motorcycle(s) 
,00 
0 % 
,00 
0 % 
,01 
1 % 
EP-MP 1,000 
MP-NP ,250 
Quantity of tractors, harvesters, other 
large machinery 
     Mean 
     Had a tractor, harvester, etc. 
,00 
0 % 
,00 
0 % 
,03 
2,9 % 
EP-MP 1,000 
MP-NP ,045 
Total value of all vehicles (PAB) 
     Mean 30,5 492,7 4 203,3 
EP-MP ,000 
MP-NP ,000 
Value of deposits and silos (PAB) 
     Mean 
     Had a deposit(s) and/or silo(s) 
,0 
0 % 
2,6 
2,2 % 
89,5 
6,3 % 
EP-MP ,238 
MP-NP ,006 
Number of stockyards 
     Mean 
     Had a stockyard(s) 
,0 
1,6 % 
1,7 
10,1 % 
1,0 
26,3 % 
EP-MP ,023 
MP-NP ,001 
Value of stockyards 
     Mean ,0 18,5 248,1 
EP-MP ,021 
MP-NP ,000 
Value of all constructions including 
household home* 
     Mean 
     Median 
1 451,6 
,0 
4 687,1 
2 000,0 
12 460,8 
2 500,0 
EP-MP ,000 
MP-NP ,067 
N valid 62 135 205  
 
Annex 21  Living conditions. 
 
Table A21.1  Living conditions:  comparison of consumption poverty groups, part 2. 
 
Extremely poor  
Moderately 
poor  Non-poor  
2-tailed significance of 
Pearson Chi-Square 
Aqueduct 
N valid 
83,9 % 
62 
88,1 % 
135 
95,1 % 
205 
EP-MP  ,410 
MP-NP  ,018 
Electricity 
N valid 
74,2 % 
62 
89,6 % 
135 
91,7 % 
205 
EP-MP  ,005 
MP-NP  ,515 
Latrine 
N valid 
91,9 % 
62 
82,2 % 
135 
65,0 % 
203 
EP-MP  ,074 
MP-NP  ,001 
Water closet toilet 
N valid 
,0 % 
62 
18,5 % 
135 
36,5 % 
203 
EP-MP  ,000 
MP-NP  ,000 
Telephone 
N valid 
8,1 % 
62 
27,4 % 
135 
53,2 % 
203 
EP-MP  ,002 
MP-NP  ,000 
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Extremely poor  
Moderately 
poor  Non-poor  
2-tailed significance of 
Pearson Chi-Square 
Television 
N valid 
62,9 % 
62 
86,7 % 
135 
86,2 % 
203 
EP-MP  ,000 
MP-NP  ,904 
Computer 
N valid 
,0 % 
62 
2,2 % 
135 
9,9 % 
203 
EP-MP  ,237 
MP-NP  ,006 
 
Annex 22  Off-farm resources.   
 
Table A22.1  Off-farm resources:  comparison of poverty groups. 
 Extremely 
poor  
Moderately 
poor Non-poor 
2-tailed significance 
of tests  
Value of houses other than household home 
     Mean (PAB) 
     Had houses other than household home 
N valid 
16,1 
1,6 % 
62 
301,5 
4,4 % 
135 
2 769,5 
13,2 % 
205 
Mann-Whitney U 
EP-MP ,312 
MP-NP ,006 
Where does the household have savings, if 
any? 
     No savings 
     At home 
     In a bank 
     In a cooperative 
     Yes but unspecified 
N valid 
 
87,1 % 
1,6 % 
8,1 % 
3,2 % 
,0 % 
62 
 
83,7 % 
,7 % 
11,9 % 
1,5 % 
2,2 % 
135 
 
65,4 % 
2,0 % 
27,8 % 
3,9 % 
1,0 % 
205 
Pearson Chi-Square  
EP-MP  ,564 
MP-NP  ,002 
Purpose of the loan 
     Agriculture 
     Livestock 
     Housing 
     Purchase of land 
     Purchase of vehicle 
     Non-agricultural enterprise 
     Others 
N valid 
20,0 % 
60,0 % 
20,0 % 
,0 % 
,0 % 
,0 % 
,0 % 
5 
28,6 % 
28,6 % 
21,4 % 
14,3 % 
7,1 % 
,0 % 
,0 % 
14 
16,4 % 
41,1 % 
9,6 % 
16,4 % 
6,8 % 
4,1 % 
5,5 % 
73 
Pearson Chi-Square  
EP-MP ,658 
MP-NP ,589 
Household had applied for loans in the past year 
N valid 3,2 % 
62 
5,2 % 
135 
9,3 % 
204 
Pearson Chi-Square  
EP-MP ,541 
MP-NP ,260  
Household was willing to take a loan this year 
N valid 9,7 % 
62 
11,9 % 
135 
20,5 % 
205 
Pearson Chi-Square  
EP-MP ,740 
MP-NP ,105 
Received donations and remittances (PAB) 
     Mean 
     Sum 
     Have received donations and remittances 
N valid 
115,3 
7 148,0 
46,8 % 
62 
145,43 
19 633,0 
44,4 % 
135 
187,3 
38 391,4 
35,6 % 
205 
Mann-Whitney U 
EP-MP ,761 
MP-NP ,371 
Credit household has in shops 
     None 
     Local food shops 
     Agricultural shops 
     Food and agricultural shops 
     Yes, unspecified 
N valid 
 
55,2 % 
37,9 % 
1,7 % 
1,7 % 
3,4 % 
62 
 
68,4 % 
26,3 % 
1,5 % 
3,0 % 
,8 % 
135 
 
55,9 % 
26,2 % 
8,9 % 
7,9 % 
1,0 % 
204 
Pearson Chi-Square  
EP-MP  ,281 
MP-NP  ,013 
 
Annex 23  Agricultural production. 
 
Table A23.1  Crop production.  The share of farmers having harvested given crops in year 2005. 
 Extremely poor % Moderately poor % Non-poor % Total % 
Corn grain 66,1 61,5 57,1 60,0 
Rice 58,1 49,6 48,3 50,2 
Cassava 35,5 31,9 24,9 28,9 
Beans 25,8 25,2 22,0 23,6 
Yam (diamante) 21,0 17,8 20,5 19,7 
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 Extremely poor % Moderately poor % Non-poor % Total % 
Taro (otoe) 8,1 3,7 6,3 5,7 
Corn cobs 1,6 1,5 5,4 3,5 
Yam (baboso) ,0 3,0 3,9 3,0 
Pumpkin ,0 1,5 3,9 2,5 
Sugar cane * ,0 ,7 2,9 1,7 
Watermelons ,0 1,5 2,4 1,7 
Other melons ,0 2,2 2,0 1,7 
N  valid 62 135 205 402 
*) excludes the production of sugar cane for cattle feed or for the household production of sugar syrup. 
 
Annex 24  Classification of crops. 
 
Table A24.1  Classification of crops according to their requirements, by Weller (1993). 
 Type 1 (low requirements) Type 2 (high requirements) 
Capital requirements Low High 
Input intensity Low High 
Technical homogeneity Low High 
Generation of employment Low High 
Technical assistance needs Low High 
Financial assistance needs Low High 
Commercial relationships Unstable  Stable 
Principal problem related to markets Access Conditions 
Productivity of capital High Low 
Essential productivity to increase incomes Land Capital  
 
Annex 25  Agricultural production characteristics. 
 
Table A25.1  Agricultural production characteristics:  comparison of poverty groups. 
 Extremely 
poor   
Moderately 
poor 
Non-poor 2-tailed significance 
of Mann-Whitney U 
Value of crop sales (PAB)* 
     Mean 
     Median 
N valid 
204,4 
,0 
55 
717,7 
100,0 
113 
1 863,8 
160,0 
171 
EP-MP ,001 
MP-NP ,086 
Value of home consumed crops (PAB)*  
     Mean 
     Median 
N valid 
465,7 
350,0 
55 
629,8 
460,6 
113 
1 010,2 
630,0 
171 
EP-MP ,307 
MP-NP ,020 
Total value of crop production (PAB)*  
     Mean 
     Median 
N valid 
823,3 
560,0 
55 
1 379,7 
746,0 
113 
3 005,6 
1 200,0 
171 
EP-MP ,019 
MP-NP ,000 
Expenditure crop production inputs (PAB)* 
     Mean 
     Median 
N valid 
77,7 
63,0 
55 
275,1 
115,4 
113 
828,7 
194,4 
171 
EP-MP ,000 
MP-NP ,000 
No inputs to crop production* 9,1 % 2,7 % 2,9 %  
Expenditure on livestock inputs (PAB)** 
     Mean 
     Median 
     Purchased no inputs 
N valid 
49,8 
5,1 
38,3 % 
60 
114,8 
37,0 
24,2 % 
128 
1 720,1 
139,5 
14,4 % 
187 
EP-MP ,004 
MP-NP ,000 
Value of milk sales (PAB)** 
     Mean 
     Had milk sales 
N valid 
182,1 
8,1 % 
14 
165,7 
13,7 % 
51 
3 893,4 
34,5 % 
113 
EP-MP ,557 
MP-NP ,002 
Had milk sales (incl. all households) 1,6 % 5,2 % 19,0 %  
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 Extremely 
poor   
Moderately 
poor 
Non-poor 2-tailed significance 
of Mann-Whitney U 
Value of livestock sales (PAB)** 
     Mean 
     Median 
N valid 
800,4 
,0 
60 
1 612,6 
26,3 
128 
8 044,0 
514,0 
187 
EP-MP ,163 
MP-NP ,000 
Value of home consumption of livestock 
products (PAB)** 
     Mean 
     Median 
N valid 
99,6 
79,4 
60 
158,9 
104,1 
128 
254,4 
123,0 
187 
EP-MP ,058 
MP-NP ,201 
Total value of livestock production (PAB)** 
     Mean 
     Median 
N valid 
899,9 
147,3 
60 
1 771,5 
248,4 
128 
8 298,4 
1 013,7 
187 
EP-MP ,006 
MP-NP ,000 
Note:  Home consumption and the respective production for household use are valued at retail prices. 
*) Including only households with crop area>0.  **) Including only households with livestock value > 0. 
 
Annex 26  Sold and consumed shares of agricultural products. 
 
Table A26.1  Sold and consumed shares of agricultural products: comparison of poverty groups. 
 Extremely 
poor 
Moderately 
poor 
Non-poor 2-tailed significance 
of Mann-Whitney U 
Share of crop value consumed in the 
household 
     Mean 
     Median 
 
64,6 % 
92,7 % 
 
55,7 % 
66,7 % 
 
51,0 % 
55,7 % 
EP-MP ,050 
MP-NP ,385 
Consumed no crops in the household 21,0 % 25,2 % 28,8 %  
Consumed all crops in the household 45,2 % 25,9 % 25,4 %  
Sold share of crops 
     Mean 
     Median 
 
13,3 % 
,0 % 
 
25,3 % 
3,7 % 
 
27,5 % 
7,4 % 
 
EP-MP ,009 
MP-NP ,644 
Sold no crops 64,5 % 45,9 % 44,9 %  
Sold all crops 6,5 % 8,1 % 10,3 %  
Share of livestock production value 
consumed in the household 
     Mean 
     Median 
 
 
68,5 % 
100,0 % 
 
 
55,0 % 
70,0 % 
 
 
38,6 % 
14,7 % 
EP-MP ,031 
MP-NP ,000 
Consumed no livestock products in the 
household * 
1,6 % 11,9 % 18,0 % 
 
Consumed all livestock products in the 
household 
53,2 % 43,0 % 25,4 % 
 
Sold share of livestock production value 
     Mean 
     Median 
 
29,9 % 
,0 % 
 
36,8 % 
,0 % 
 
51,2 % 
57,9 % 
EP-MP ,290 
MP-NP ,001 
Sold no livestock products 54,8 % 51,1 % 35,6 %  
Sold all livestock products* ,0 % 3,7 % 8,3 %  
Sales share of total production value 
     Mean 
     Median      
 
26,5 % 
10,3 % 
 
44,3 % 
41,3 % 
 
54,2 % 
57,8 % 
 
EP-MP ,001 
MP-NP ,015 
Sales minus inputs (PAB) 
     Mean 
     Median 
 
837,1 
11,2 
 
1 789,9 
133,5 
 
6 631,8 
783,5 
 
EP-MP ,157 
MP-NP ,000 
Production value minus inputs (PAB) 
     Mean 
     Median 
 
1 484,4 
613,3 
 
2 494,6 
897,3 
 
7 816,3 
2 082,3 
EP-MP ,067 
MP-NP ,000 
Sold no crops nor livestock products 40,3 % 20,0 % 13,2 %  
Sold all production 4,8 % 8,1 % 11,7 %  
Input expenses exceeded income from 
sales 
45,2 % 34,1 % 29,3 % 
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 Extremely 
poor 
Moderately 
poor 
Non-poor 2-tailed significance 
of Mann-Whitney U 
Input expenses exceeded total 
production value 
3,2 % 3,7 % 3,4 % 
 
N  valid 62 135 205 402 
*) Livestock household consumption value has been corrected for underreporting, with the possible 
consequence of assigning household consumption to households with no such consumption. 
 
Annex 27  The productivity of each farmed hectare.   
 
Table A27.1  The productivity of each farmed hectare. 
 Extremely 
poor   
Moderately 
poor 
Non-poor  2-tailed significance 
of Mann-Whitney U 
Gross productivity:  production value / 
productive hectares (PAB/ha) 
     Mean  
     Median 
N valid 
491,4 
371,0 
60 
726,5 
378,5 
132 
1 023,0 
402,9 
203 
EP-MP ,225 
MP-NP ,713 
Net productivity: (production value-
inputs)/productive hectares (PAB/ha) 
     Mean 
     Median 
N valid 
431,5 
294,0 
60 
610,3 
302,9 
132 
885,2 
302,7 
203 
EP-MP ,554 
MP-NP ,768 
 
Annex 28  Net incomes from different crops and recommended input use.   
 
Table A28.1  Net incomes from different crops, according to national estimates (MIDA 2000-2005).   
 Net income per hectare, 
with contracted labour 
(PAB) 
Net income per hectare, 
when household does all 
labour (PAB) 
Inputs per hectare, 
excluding labour and 
land rent (PAB) 
Corn 
     Traditional 
     Mechanized 
 
228,13 
187,60 
 
358,13 
277,10 
 
286,87 
555,40 
Rice 
     Mechanized 
          Rain fed 
          Irrigated (gravity) 
 
 
304,61 
398,27 
 
 
327,11 
487,77 
 
 
722,89 
762,23 
Cassava 799,79 1 100,59 999,41 
Bean guandu 
     frijol 
     poroto 
167,95 
56,67 
479,27 
468,75 
296,67 
710,27 
147,25 
123,33 
449,73 
Taro (otoe) 
     Irrigated (drip) 
1 957,33 
3 796,30 
2 546,13 
4 538,70 
1 453,87 
2 961,30 
Yam (baboso) 
     Irrigated (drip) 
4 639,34 
7 019,04 
5 400,94 
7 857,44 
2 999,06 
4 392,56 
Yam (diamante) 
     Irrigated (drip) 
3 259,48 
6 145,27 
4 027,48 
6 990,07 
2 572,52 
4 209,93 
Watermelon  
     Gravity irrigation 
     Drip irrigation 
 
527,73 
890,11 
 
1 237,73 
1 145,11 
 
1 762,27 
2 104,89 
Crops were valued at market prices, by the estimate year.  Inputs include:  rent of machinery for some crops, 
fertilizers, certified seeds, agrochemicals, transport of inputs and outputs, 5% unforeseen costs, interest costs, 
sacks. 
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Annex 29  Consumption patterns.   
 
Table A29.1  Consumption value shares of total consumption value (%):  comparison of poverty groups. 
 
The data of this research: 
Herrera 
LSMS 2003 (reported in MEF 2006):  
Whole Panama 
 All 
Extre-
mely 
poor 
Mode-
rately 
poor  
Non- 
poor  
Rural non-
indigenous 
Extre-
mely 
poor 
Mode-
rately 
poor  
Non- 
poor 
Food 54,8 58,3 57,3 52,0 48,6 62,9 51,1 35,0 
  Purchased 31,3 30,3 34,3 29,7 33,0 29,5 37,2 31,5 
  Produced 23,4 28,0 23,0 22,3 10,3 23,4 8,6 1,7 
  Received n.a. 5,1 10,1 5,4 1,6 
  Other* n.a. 0,5 0,3 0,4 0,2 
Education 4,7 5,5 3,7 5,2 4,7 4,9 5,5 5,1 
Health 3,5 2,8 3,1 4,0 0,9 0,2 0,4 1,3 
Services and goods for 
personal use 9,2 5,5 9,3 10,3 13,1 9,8 12,3 15,5 
Consumer durables Not included in the consumption 
aggregate 2,8 0,9 1,6 4,8 
Transport, travel 7,5 4,8 6,2 9,11 7,3 3,3 6,0 9,5 
Rent or imputed annual 
value of housing 11,3 17,1 12,3 8,8 15,3 13,7 15,9 19,6 
Electricity, gas, 
kerosene 6,7 5,3 6,7 7,1 3,3 2,7 3,8 4,1 
Water, telephone Included above 1,8 0,8 1,7 3,6 
Transfers of goods n.a. 2,3 0,9 1,7 1,4 
Imputed annual value 
of consumer durables 2,3 0,7 1,4 3,5 n.a. 
N 402 62 135 205     
* Refers to food received as payment or taken from household business. 
 
Annex 30  In-kind share of consumption. 
 
Table A30.1  In-kind share of consumption:  comparison of poverty groups. 
 Extremely 
poor 
Moderately 
poor 
Non-poor 2-tailed significance of 
Mann-Whitney U  
In-kind share of consumption    
     Mean 
N valid 
 
45,7 % 
62 
 
36,6 % 
135 
 
34,6 % 
205 
 
EP-MP    ,001 
MP-NP    ,303 
 
Annex 31  Investments:  comparison of consumption poverty groups.  
 
Table A31.1  Investments:  comparison of poverty groups.  
 Extremely 
poor 
Moderately 
poor 
Non-poor  2-tailed significance 
of Mann-Whitney U 
Investments in crop production (PAB) 
excluding fertilizer use 
     Mean 
     Have made crop investments 
N valid* 
,1 
1,8 % 
55 
19,5 
15,9 % 
113 
285,4 
20,5 % 
171 
EP-MP ,006 
MP-NP ,248 
Has the household made household 
investments? 
    Yes 
N valid 
 
 
36,1 % 
61 
 
 
48,9 % 
135 
 
 
56,9 % 
205 
Pearson Chi-Square  
EP-MP  ,095 
MP-NP  ,149 
Investments in housing (PAB) 
     Mean 
     Have invested in housing 
N valid 
145,2 
3,2 % 
61 
147,4 
14,1 % 
135 
200,4 
14,1 % 
205 
EP-MP ,028 
MP-NP ,856 
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 Extremely 
poor 
Moderately 
poor 
Non-poor  2-tailed significance 
of Mann-Whitney U 
Investments in electronics and furniture 
(PAB) 
     Mean 
     Have invested in electr. and furn. 
N valid 
32,8 
30,6 % 
61 
59,7 
34,8 % 
135 
113,8 
40,5 % 
205 
EP-MP ,461 
MP-NP ,053 
Investments in vehicles (PAB) 
     Mean 
     Have invested in vehicles 
N valid 
,0 
0 % 
61 
39,3 
3,7 % 
135 
439,1 
7,3 % 
205 
EP-MP ,126 
MP-NP ,145 
Other household investments (PAB) 
     Mean 
     Have made other investments 
N valid 
,0 
0 % 
61 
16,7 
1,5 % 
135 
10,0 
1,5 % 
205 
EP-MP ,337 
MP-NP ,985 
*) Including households who participate in the activity. 
 
Annex 32 Contents of investments in farmer household interviews. 
 
Crop investments (in 2004) (PAB): 
- fertilizers 
- tools 
- machinery, tractors 
- deposits, grain containers 
- irrigation systems 
 
Livestock investments (in 2004) (PAB): 
- fertilizers 
- tools 
- machinery, tractors 
- irrigation systems 
- stables, stocking yards 
- pigpens 
- new animals 
- establishment costs of improved pasture 
 
Fence investments (in 2004) (PAB): 
- materials (barbed wire, nails, wood, etc.) and hired labour for the 
maintenance and construction of fences for both crops and pastures 
 
Household investments (in the past 12 months) (PAB): 
- purchase of house and/or building materials 
- improvements to existing housing 
- purchase of cars and other vehicles 
- furniture 
- household electronics:  e.g. television, stereo sets 
- household appliances:  e.g. washing machines, kitchen appliances 
- business, stocks 
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Educational investments (including all levels of education) (in the past 12 months) 
(PAB): 
- transportation costs to educational facility 
- registration fees, other annual/monthly quotas 
- school books and other materials (notebooks, pens, backpacks) 
- school uniforms including shoes 
- boarding school fees 
- possible school lunch costs 
 
Annex 33 Comparison of consumption aggregates among investors and non-
investors. 
 
Table A33.1  Comparison of consumption aggregates among investors and non-investors.  Taking into account 
crop, livestock, fence, household and educational investments. 
 Investors 
(investm. >0) 
Non-investors (no 
investments) 
Significance of 
Mann Whitney U 
Consumption aggregate per household (PAB) 
     Mean 
     Median 
     Minimum 
     Maximum 
N valid 
4 110,3 
3 296,8 
573,0 
37 267,6 
379 
2 350,7 
1 574,5 
453,9 
6 449,2 
23 ,000 
Consumption aggregate per capita (PAB) 
     Mean 
     Median 
     Minimum 
     Maximum 
N valid 
1 162,3 
904,4 
149,4 
12 422,5 
379 
721,0 
787,2 
125,2 
1 289,9 
23 ,013 
 
Annex 34  Comparison of consumption between practitioners of 
environmentally friendly practices. 
 
Table A34.1  Comparison of consumption between practitioners of environmentally friendly practices. 
 Practiced Did not practice 2-tailed significance of 
Mann-Whitney U 
Live fences 
     Mean consumption per pax (PAB) 
     Median consumption per pax (PAB) 
N valid 
 
1 148,4 
897,0 
373 
990,6 
838,0 
29 ,382 
Fallow land 
     Mean consumption per pax (PAB) 
     Median consumption per pax (PAB) 
N valid 
1 098,4 
860,5 
110 
1 151,6 
897,8 
292 ,970 
Buffer strips 
     Mean consumption per pax (PAB) 
     Median consumption per pax (PAB) 
N valid     
1 092,8 
843,5 
39 
1 141,8 
902,5 
363 ,737 
Terraces 
     Mean consumption per pax (PAB) 
     Median consumption per pax (PAB) 
N valid 
1 254,0 
842,3 
24 
1 129,6 
897,3 
378 ,449 
Leguminous plants 
     Mean consumption per pax (PAB) 
     Median consumption per pax (PAB) 
N valid 
1 428,2 
1 179,3 
21 
1 121,0 
888,0 
381 ,162 
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 Practiced Did not practice 2-tailed significance of 
Mann-Whitney U 
Drainage 
     Mean consumption per pax (PAB) 
     Median consumption per pax (PAB) 
N valid 
1 196,3 
1 086,2 
7 
1 136,0 
888,0 
395 ,349 
 
Annex 35  Fertilizer expenditure among welfare poverty groups. 
 
Table A35.1  Fertilizer expenditure among welfare poverty groups (measured in consumption).  Including only 
households who practice given activity. 
 Extremely 
poor 
Moderately 
poor 
Non-poor Significance of 
Mann-Whitney U 
Expenditure on fertilizers and urea for crops 
(PAB) 
     Minimum 
     Maximum 
     Mean 
     Standard deviation 
     Median 
 N valid 
 N not participating in agric. 
,0 
175,0 
39,6 
40,3 
29,3 
55 
7 
,0 
910,0 
76,8 
113,9 
48,0 
113 
22 
,0 
2 000,0 
167,2 
325,2 
60,5 
171 
34 
EP-MP ,016 
MP-NP ,015 
Share of households with no fertilizers for crops 21,8 % 16,8 % 11,7 %  
Expenditure on fertilizers and urea for crops 
per hectare of cultivated land (PAB/ha) 
     Minimum 
     Maximum 
     Mean 
     Standard deviation 
     Median 
 N valid 
 N not participating in agric. 
,0 
140,0 
24,9 
27,8 
19,9 
55 
7 
,0 
352,0 
45,2 
48,4 
32,0 
113 
22 
,0 
288,0 
57,5 
60,9 
36,0 
171 
34 
EP-MP ,002 
MP-NP ,187 
 
Annex 36  Calculation of a farm-specific recommended fertilizer usage level. 
 
A farm specific recommended fertilizer usage level was calculated by relating the 
household’s crop area to the different produced crops and to each crop’s specific 
recommended fertilization level.  Recommended fertilization levels of each crop 
for Panama were obtained from the Panamanian Ministry of Agricultural 
Development (MIDA) and from the Institute of Agricultural Research (IDIAP) for 
years 2000-2005 (table A36.1).  The recommended levels are not necessarily the 
economically optimal rates of fertilization, but may be based on the maximization 
of plant growth.  Fertilizer price (14,59 PAB/quintal) was the mean fertilizer price 
paid by farmers in the sample. 
 
Since there was no household level information of the precise area covered by each 
crop, the farm specific fertilizer need was weighted with the relative economic 
importance of each crop.  In order to eliminate the differences in prices caused by 
the choice of either selling or consuming the crops in the household, an average 
weighted value was calculated for each crop (eq. A36.1 and table A36.2).  In this 
way the same crop received the same value in every household disrespectful of 
whether it was sold or consumed.  These weighted values of crops were multiplied 
by the harvests of each household to form their total crop harvest value (eq. A36.2).  
This method may give a disproportionate fertilizer need figure to households that 
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have highly valuable and fertilizer-intensive cash crops, such as melons, on a small 
share of their farmland. 
 
Table A36.1  Recommended fertilizer usage per hectare of given crops, according to MIDA and IDIAP 2000-
2005 (Panama).  Including both fertilizers and urea. 
 
 Quintales/ha* =Pounds/ha Cost PAB/ha if fertilizer=14,59 PAB/q 
 
Rice (traditional) 5 500 72,95  
Rice (mech) 8 800   116,72 
Corn (traditional) 7 700 102,13 
Corn (mech) 10,50 1 050 153,20 
Cassava 6-9 600-900  87,54-131,31 
Taro (otoe) 6,5-16 650-1 600 94,84-233,44 
Taro (otoe) irrig. 19 1 900 277,21 
Yam baboso 12-28 1 200-2 800 175,08-408,52 
Yam baboso irrig. 12-23 1 200-2 300 175,08-335,57 
Yam diamante  12-35 1 200-3 500 175,08-510,65 
Yam diamante irrig. 35 3 500 510,65 
Beans guandú 2 200  29,18 
Beans frijol 2 200  29,18 
Beans poroto 6,5 650 94,84 
Watermelon irrig. 8-14 1 400 116,72-204,26 
Other melons 13  1 300 189,67   
Sugar cane 9 900 131,31 
Pumpkin 4-5  400-500 58,36-72,95 
 
*) 1 quintal = 100 lbs = 45,36 kg.  In bold the minimum recommended dosages, used later in the calculi. 
 
Weighted value of crop A / unit = Mean sales price of crop A/unit * Sold share of total production 
of crop A + Mean household consumption value of crop A/unit * Household consumed 
share of total production of crop A   (A36.1) 
 
Table A36.2  Basis of calculation of weighted values for crops 
Item Mean sales price Mean cons.value Share sold Share cons. Weighted value 
Rice (lb) 0,124375 0,3 0,0865 0,9135 0,284808 
Corn grain (lb) 0,105924 0,2 0,5089 0,4911 0,152125 
Corn cob (lb) 0,04 0,04 0,9843 0,0157 0,04 
Yam diamante (lb) 0,112385 0,4 0,9086 0,0914 0,138673 
Yam baboso (lb) 0,309727 0,5 0,7897 0,2103 0,349741 
Cassava (lb) 0,046348 0,23 0,5255 0,4745 0,133491 
Taro (otoe) (lb) 0,146429 0,37 0,8688 0,1312 0,175762 
Beans (lb) 0,300698 0,57 0,6984 0,3016 0,381919 
Pumpkin (lb) 0,064375 0,16 0,9676 0,0324 0,067473 
Sugar cane (ton) 15,3 15,3 0,3663 0,6337 15,3 
Watermelon (unit) 0,794444 0,794444 1 0 0,794444 
Other melons (unit) 0,853571 0,853571 1 0 0,853571 
NB:  mean consumption value= mean retail price (household consumption valued at retail prices). 
 
Total crop harvest value = Harvested quantity of crop A * weighted value of crop A + harvested 
quantity of crop B * weighted value of crop B + … + harvested value of crop N * weighted 
value of crop N    (A36.2) 
 
The household specific aggregated fertilizer need per hectare was then calculated 
by relating each crop’s recommended fertilizer usages to each different crop’s 
economic contribution to the entire crop production value (eq. A36.3).  The 
  
291
 
aggregated fertilizer needs per hectare for the households are depicted in table 6.6, 
ranging from 2 to 12 quintales per hectare.  The comparison of this farm specific 
recommended fertilization level to the actual fertilizer uses per hectare reveals that 
the vast majority of farmer households fertilize their crops below their specific 
recommended levels.  Since the use of organic fertilizers is minimal in Herrera 
(table 6.1), its effect can be neglected from the calculi.   
 
Fertilizer need per hectare of cultivated land for farmer household X = (Value of harvest of crop 
A/Total crop harvest value * Recommended fertilizer usage for crop A/ha) + (Value of 
harvest of crop B/Total crop harvest value * Recommended fertilizer usage for crop B/ha) + 
… + (Value of harvest of crop N/Total crop harvest value * Recommended fertilizer usage 
for crop N/ha)    (A36.3) 
 
Annex 37  Comparison of farm and household characteristics among nutrient 
balance groups. 
 
Table A37.1  Comparison of farm and household characteristics among nutrient balance groups (mean 
values), variables with statistically significant differences. 
Mean value 
Characteristic 
Negative 
nutrient 
balance 
Positive 
nutrient 
balance 
Sig. of Mann 
Whitney U N 
Distance to province capital (km) 51,1 41,4 ,005 316 
Total quantity of parcels 1,4 2,1 ,000 326 
Duration of possession of the newest parcel (years) 22,8 14,0 ,001 319 
Percentage of total area inherited 68,8 55,5 ,029 325 
Land area that is flat (ha) 6,9 9,4 ,007 323 
Pasture area (ha) 8,5 16,7 ,005 326 
Value of sold crops (PAB) 668,7 4 148,3 ,034 326 
Total value of crop production (PAB) 1 534,1 5 459,2 ,004 326 
Expenditure on crop inputs (PAB) 281,4 1 864,7 ,000 326 
Investments in agriculture (PAB) 18,8 73,5 ,000 326 
Number of bovine animals 7,0 15,9 ,000 326 
Value of all animals (PAB) 2 603,6 5 943,8 ,000 326 
Sales of milk and derivatives (PAB) 139,7 1 430,0 ,003 326 
Expenditure on livestock inputs (PAB) 198,9 586,5 ,002 326 
Investments into new animals (PAB) 776,7 332,5 ,046 326 
Livestock investments including animals (PAB) 829,4 847,7 ,013 326 
Value of vehicles (PAB) 1 407,0 2 777,2 ,000 326 
Amount of loans (PAB) 1 343,6 5 137,0 ,000 326 
Household expenditure (excl. production) (PAB) 2 298,3 2 908,1 ,001 326 
Age of household head (years) 53,6 49,5 ,048 326 
Formal education of household head (years) 5,4 7,0 ,005 326 
Net production value of crop production PAB/ha  1 252,7 3 601,5 ,000 326 
Total investments in production and household (PAB) 1 335,8 1 932,5 ,011 326 
 
  
Sig. of 
Pearson Chi 
Square  
Is member in associations 7,3% 10,9 % ,033 324 
Has contact with the BDA 9,7 % 19,6 % ,048 325 
Has contact with MIDA 11,1 % 23,9 % ,016 325 
Has contact with BNP 9,3 % 19,6 % ,038 325 
Has loans 19,3 % 43,5 % ,000 326 
Has an aqueduct 87,9 % 97,8 % ,043 326 
Has a telephone 31,8 % 50,0 % ,016 326 
Has a computer 3,6 % 10,9 % ,030 324 
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Annex A37.2  Comparison of farm and household characteristics among nutrient balance groups (mean 
values), variables without statistically significant differences. 
Mean value 
Characteristic 
Negative 
nutrient 
balance 
Positive 
nutrient 
balance 
Sig. of Mann 
Whitney U N 
Distance to district head (km) 12,0 10,6 ,423 316 
Total area of land (ha) 13,5 20,0 ,115 326 
Percentage of total area titled  50,7 62,1 ,150 324 
Duration of possession of the oldest parcel (years) 25,1 20,0 ,059 320 
Crop area (ha) 2,5 2,4 ,251 326 
Value of crop production for household cons. (PAB) 767,1 1 185,5 ,553 326 
Cattle and poultry sales 1 580,4 2 490,2 ,234 326 
Value of livestock production for household cons.(PAB) 180,9 232,1 ,562 326 
Total value of livestock production (PAB) 1 761,3 2 722,4 ,157 326 
Investments into livestock excl. animals 52,7 515,2 ,087 326 
Quantity of development projects ,15 ,22 ,344 325 
Mean value 
Characteristic 
Negative 
nutrient 
balance 
Positive 
nutrient 
balance 
Sig. of Mann 
Whitney U N 
Household investments (PAB) 437,0 942,0 ,524 326 
Number of contributing household members 1,4 1,3 ,308 326 
Annual household income excluding production (PAB) 3 571,7 4 004,2 ,761 326 
Irrigated area (ha) ,27 ,42 ,192 322 
Number of household members 4,0 4,2 ,277 326 
Dependent household members  2,4 2,4 ,460 326 
Number of children 3,9 3,4 ,198 326 
Food share of total consumption 58 % 53 % ,340 326 
In kind share of consumption 41 % 38 % ,311 326 
Net value of crop production (PAB) 1 252,7 3 594,4 ,143 326 
Net value of livestock production (PAB) 1 562,4 2 135,8 ,400 326 
Sold percentage of crop value 26 % 42 % ,075 326 
Sold percentage of livestock production value 37 % 43 % ,509 326 
Net value of crop and livestock production (PAB)  2 815,1 5 730,2 ,089 326 
Calorie production/calorie need of household 1,5 1,5 ,608 326 
Food consumption share of total consumption 58 % 53 % ,082 326 
Livestock share of incomes 12 % 17 % ,480 326 
Self-employment share of income 8 % 9 % ,763 326 
Daily wage share of income 14 % 14 % ,941 326 
Retirement and pension share of income 4 % 2 % ,314 326 
Remittance and scholarship share of income 6 % 3 % ,124 326 
Rents share of income 2 % 0,8 % ,171 326 
Fertilizer need per hectare of crops 6,4 6,4 ,569 326 
Animal units per hectare 1,3 ,94 ,385 326 
 
Annex 38  Nutrient balance explained by income variables. 
 
Table A38.1  Logistic regression model.  Dependent variable: Nutrient balance.  Independent variable:  Income 
aggregate per capita (PAB).   
 Coefficient of income 
aggregate per capita 
Significance of income 
aggregate per capita 
N 
Income aggregate per capita (PAB) ,000 ,310 326 
 
Annex 39  Cash net incomes related to nutrient balance 
 
Cash net income per household = cash incomes – cash expenditures = SUM 
(received rents, sales of crops, sales of livestock products, income from labour, 
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money transfers) – SUM (paid rents, input purchases for crops and livestock, 
expenditure on fuels, household expenditure on living expenses: education, food 
purchases, clothing, electricity, water, gas, telephone, health, recreation, public 
transport, lottery and others) 
 
Cash net income per capita = cash net income per household / number of 
household members 
 
Table A39.1  Comparison of cash net incomes for nutrient balance groups.  Including those 326 households 
who practice agriculture. 
 Negative nutrient 
balance 
Positive nutrient 
balance 
Sig. of Mann-
Whitney U 
Cash net income per household PAB 
     Mean 
     Median 
     Minimum 
     Maximum 
N valid 
    missing 
2 987,22 
877,06 
-26 487,85 
107 356,00 
280 
0 
4 910,60 
859,93 
-4 628,23 
77 783,00 
46 
0 ,776 
Cash net income per capita PAB 
     Mean 
     Median 
     Minimum 
     Maximum 
N valid 
    missing 
875,10 
273,53 
-8 829,28 
35 785,33 
280 
0 
1 181,94 
286,38 
-857,25 
19 445,75 
46 
0 ,586 
 
Table A39.2  Logistic regression model.  Dependent variable: Nutrient balance.  Independent variable:  Cash 
net income per household. 
 Coefficient of cash net 
income per household 
Significance of cash net 
income per household 
N 
Cash net income per household ,000 ,250 326 
 
Table A39.3  Logistic regression model.  Dependent variable: Nutrient balance.  Independent variable:  Cash 
net income per capita. 
 Coefficient of cash net 
income per capita 
Significance of cash net 
income per capita 
N 
Cash net income per capita ,000 ,538 326 
 
Annex 40  Expert views on efficient stocking rates for the province of Herrera, 
Panama.   
 
Avila & Pinzon (1993):   
The pasture species Brachiaria decumbens can maintain stocking rates of 2,5 AU/ha in the rainy 
season and 1,0 AU/ha in the dry season.  The pasture must be fertilized. 
 
Rufino Rivera, Ministry of the Environment:  (email 15.9.2006) 
The tradition in Herrera is to have 1 cow/1 hectare of natural pasture, such as “faragua”, which is 
used for decades.  With improved pastures, many farmers have now up to 2 animals /hectare, with a 
non-technified management.  Other farmers who have drilled wells and thus have water even in the 
dry season, and use silos, bales and rotate pastures have up to 3-3,5 animals/ha.   
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Victor M. Perez B., CEO of PROLACSA  (email 17.9.2006) 
With a good supplementation of feed, fodder, corn silos, controlled pasture rotation, improved 
pastures and leguminous plants a farmer can achieve up to 4 and more animals / hectare.  In Herrera 
and Los Santos provinces, there are abundant problems in the dry season, farmers have become 
aware of the need to supplement in the dry season, due to which many farms pasture 2-2,5 animals / 
hectare.  The traditional grazing practice on traditional pastures is 1 animal / hectare. 
 
Roman Gordon, researcher, IDIAP (email 25.9.2006), having consulted with 
engineer Domiciano Herrera (agricultural researcher): 
Improved pasture can maintain up to 3 animal units of 400 kg of weight each.  With 2-2,5 animal 
units/hectare it is considered that a pasture (fertilized and rotated) is in efficient use.  On natural 
pastures and poor management one or less animal units/ha can be maintained. 
 
Annex 41  Comparison of characteristics among stocking rate groups. 
 
Table A41.1  Comparison of farm and household characteristics among stocking rate groups.  
Mean value 
Characteristic 
Low stocking 
rate < 2,5 
AU/ha 
High 
stocking rate 
≥ 2,5 AU/ha 
Sig. of 
Mann 
Whitney 
U N 
Distance to district centre (km) 12,8 8,5 ,013 170 
Distance to province capital (km) 50,3 36,5 ,002 170 
Land area (ha) 34,9 7,3 ,000 175 
Duration of possession of the oldest parcel (years) 29,1 20,0 ,039 173 
Percent of flat area  58 % 83 % ,002 173 
Flat area (ha) 17,9 6,6 ,016 173 
Pasture area (ha) 31,0 4,8 ,000 175 
Total annual household income (excl. production) (PAB) 4 374,5 5 200,9 ,031 175 
Formal education of household head (years) 6,2 8,3 ,027 175 
Expenditure on livestock inputs PAB /  ha of pasture 34,0 229,7 ,000 175 
Food consumption share of total consumption 53 % 43 % ,040 175 
 
Annex A41.2  Comparison of farm and household characteristics among stocking rate groups  
Mean value 
Characteristic 
Low stocking 
rate < 2,5 
AU/ha 
High 
stocking rate 
≥ 2,5 AU/ha 
Sig. of 
Mann 
Whitney 
U N 
Quantity of parcels 1,9 1,6 ,683 174 
Percentage of total area titled 65,3 60,4 ,512 174 
Duration of possession of the newest parcel (years) 24,1 18,9 ,300 171 
Percentage of land inherited 63,4 62,0 ,972 175 
Crop area 1,9 2,5 ,308 175 
Value of sold crops (PAB) 753,8 3394,4 ,155 175 
Value of crop production for household consumption (PAB) 793,2 379,8 ,343 175 
Total value of crop production (PAB) 1678,8 3785,3 ,819 175 
Expenditure on crop inputs (PAB) 448,4 2091,9 ,221 175 
Investments in crop production (PAB) 16,0 110,1 ,284 175 
Number of bovine animals  31,6 20,6 ,108 175 
Total value of animals 12706,9 8591,0 ,150 175 
Sales value of milk and derivatives (PAB) 2511,5 3147,0 ,162 175 
Total value of livestock sales (PAB) 7277,1 8375,7 ,863 175 
Value of livestock production for househ. consumption (PAB) 291,5 163,6 ,165 175 
Total value of livestock production (PAB) 7568,6 8536,3 ,592 175 
Input expenditure per animal unit (PAB/au) 31,71 46,93 ,935 175 
Investments into livestock production excl. animals (PAB) 63,9 1746,4 ,721 175 
Investments into new animals (PAB) 2461,7 4139,0 ,272 175 
Investments into livestock incl. animals (PAB) 2608,4 5885,4 ,860 175 
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Mean value 
Characteristic 
Low stocking 
rate < 2,5 
AU/ha 
High 
stocking rate 
≥ 2,5 AU/ha 
Sig. of 
Mann 
Whitney 
U N 
Value of vehicles (PAB) 3757,7 2923,1 ,512 175 
Quantity of development projects ,26 ,11 ,224 175 
Amount of loans (PAB) 3593,3 6711,1 ,098 175 
Household investments (PAB) 447,8 1244,7 ,075 175 
Household expenditure excl. production (PAB) 3032,7 4778,5 ,408 175 
Number of contributing household members 1,3 1,4 ,190 175 
Irrigated land area (ha) ,55 ,83 ,155 175 
Age of household head 54,9 50,1 ,195 175 
Number of household members 4,0 3,6 ,345 175 
Number of dependent household members 2,2 1,9 ,550 175 
Number of children 3,7 3,1 ,573 175 
In kind share of consumption 36 % 29 % ,218 175 
Net value of crop production 1230,5 1693,4 ,544 175 
Net value of livestock production 2690,1 7572,8 ,507 175 
Sold percentage of crop production 19 % 36 % ,072 175 
Sold percentage of livestock production 68 % 65 % ,800 175 
Net value of crop and livestock production (PAB) 6920,6 9266,3 ,361 175 
Calorie production / calorie need of household 1,4 0,74 ,206 175 
Crop share of income 16 % 12 % ,564 175 
Livestock share of income 32 % 26 % ,289 175 
Self-employment share of income 7 % 16 % ,153 175 
Daily wage share of income 8 % 8 % ,466 175 
Regular employment share of income 18 % 20 % ,915 175 
Retirement and pension share of income 4 % 9 % ,625 175 
Remittance and scholarship share of income 3 % 1 % ,115 175 
Rents share of income 1 % 0 % ,327 175 
Crop production value per ha of crops 716,0 1022,5 ,811 175 
Total investments into production and household 3182,4 7402,0 ,183 175 
 
Annex 42  Cash net incomes among stocking rate groups. 
 
Table A42.1  Cash net incomes among stocking rate groups. 
 Low stocking rate 
(<2,5 AU/ha) 
High stocking rate 
(≥2,5 AU/ha) 
Sig. of Mann-
Whitney U 
Cash net income per household PAB 
     Mean 
     Median 
     Minimum 
     Maximum 
N valid 
    missing 
6 759,84 
1 585,50 
-4 628,23 
148 746,00 
157 
0 
8 913,04 
2 425,28 
-26 487,85 
77 783,00 
18 
0 ,559 
Cash net income per capita PAB 
     Mean 
     Median 
     Minimum 
     Maximum 
N valid 
    missing 
2 077,66 
427,56 
-1 168,43 
74 373,00 
157 
0 
2 252,79 
684,92 
-8 829,28 
19 445,75 
18 
0 ,492 
 
Table A42.2  Logistic regression model results.  Dependent variable:  stocking rate (high/low).  Independent 
variable: cash net income per household.   
 Coefficient of cash net 
income per household 
Significance of cash net 
income per household 
N 
Cash net income per household ,000 ,635 175 
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Table A42.3  Binary logistic regression model results.  Dependent variable:  stocking rate (high/low).  
Independent variable:  cash net income per capita. 
 Coefficient of cash net 
income per capita 
Significance of cash net 
income per capita 
N 
Cash net income per capita ,000 ,919 175 
 
Annex 43  Testing with different stocking rate thresholds. 
 
Table A43.1  Comparison of consumption among stocking rate groups (threshold 2,0 AU/ha) 
 Stocking rate < 2,0 
AU/ha 
Stocking rate ≥ 2,0 
AU/ha 
Sig. of Mann-
Whitney U 
Consumption per capita PAB 
     Mean 
     Median 
     Minimum 
     Maximum 
N valid 
    missing 
1 337,30 
1 066,15 
191,00 
6 301,33 
143 
0 
1 540,53 
1 255,04 
149,41 
12 422,54 ,333 
Share of households 
N valid 
79,9 % 
143 
20,1 % 
36  
 
Table A43.2  Comparison of consumption among stocking rate groups (threshold 3,0 AU/ha) 
 Stocking rate < 
3,0AU/ha 
Stocking rate ≥ 3,0 
AU/ha 
Sig. of Mann-
Whitney U 
Consumption per capita PAB 
     Mean 
     Median 
     Minimum 
     Maximum 
N valid 
    missing 
1 317,28 
1 081,49 
149,41 
6 301,33 
163 
0 
1 998,57 
1 289,98 
383,33 
12 422,54 
16 
0 ,118 
Share of households 
N valid 
91,9 % 
163 
8,9 % 
16  
 
Annex 44  Comparison of investment poverty groups. 
 
Table A44.1  Natural resources:  comparison of investment poverty groups.   
 Investment 
poor 
Investment 
non-poor 
Sig. of Mann 
Whitney U 
Inherited land (% of total); opposite to purchased land 
     Mean 
N 
73,2 
169 
56,8 
170 ,001 
Distance to district centre (km) 
     Mean 
N 
11,2 
167 
10,9 
162 ,918 
 
Table A44.2  Human resources:  comparison of investment poverty groups. 
 Investment 
poor 
Investment 
non-poor 
Sig. of Mann Whitney U 
Age of household head (mean years) 
N 
53,1 
170 
53,9 
170 ,821 
Contributing members (mean number) 
N 
1,7 
170 
1,7 
170 ,867 
Number of children* (mean number) 
N 
3,7 
170 
3,3 
170 ,163 
Has an insurance for crops and/or livestock 
N 
1,2 % 
170 
5,9 % 
169 ,018 
   Pearson Chi-Square** 
Fully literate 81,2 % 88,2 % ,160 
Married or united 81,2 % 81,1 % ,650 
Catholic 93,4 % 96,4 % ,114 
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 Investment 
poor 
Investment 
non-poor 
Sig. of Mann Whitney U 
Female-headed household 4,7 % 2,9 % ,396 
Household head’s profession is farmer 67,5 % 61,8 % ,168 
Spouse works fulltime off-farm 6,6 % 13,8 % ,054 
*) total number of children of household head and spouse.  All these children do not necessarily live in the 
household. **) Compares distributions.  In this table only most common or interesting values are portrayed. 
 
Table A44.3.  On-farm resources:  comparison of investment poverty groups. 
 Investment 
poor 
Investment 
non-poor 
Significance of 
Mann Whitney U 
Total value of bovine animals (PAB) 
     Mean 
N 
2 240,0 
170 
11 478,7 
170 ,000 
Mean number of 
    Horses 
    Pigs 
    Chicken 
N 
1,0 
1,2 
27,8 
170 
1,2 
1,1 
38,1 
170 
,502 
,644 
,389 
 
 
Table A44.4  Basic living conditions:  comparison of investment poverty groups. 
 Investment 
poor 
Investment 
non-poor 
Significance of 
Pearson Chi-Square 
Has an aqueduct (%) 
N 
88,8 % 
170 
95,9 % 
170 ,014 
Has electricity (%) 
N 
90,0 % 
170 
91,8 % 
170 ,572 
Has a latrine (%) 
N 
81,2 % 
170 
62,5 % 
168 ,000 
Has a water closet (%) 
N 
20,0 % 
170 
38,7 % 
168 ,000 
Has a telephone (%) 
N 
28,2 % 
170 
57,6 % 
170 ,000 
Has a television (%) 
N 
85,9 % 
170 
86,9 % 
168 ,784 
Has a computer (%) 
N 
2,4 % 
170 
11,3 % 
168 ,001 
 
Table A44.5  Off-farm resources:  comparison of investment poverty groups. 
 Investment 
poor 
Investment 
non-poor 
Significance of 
Pearson Chi-Square* 
No regular incomes 45,3 % 47,3 % ,125 
Purpose of loan: cattle husbandry 29,6 % 39,0 % ,323 
Applied for loans in past 12 months 11,0 % 22,0 % ,068 
Willing to take a loan a this year 14,8 % 26,7 % ,222 
Has no credit in shops 53,8 % 41,7 % ,001 
*) Compares distributions.  In this table only most common or interesting values are portrayed. 
 
Table A44.6  Consumption patterns:  comparison of investment poverty groups. 
 Investment 
poor 
Investment 
non-poor 
Significance of 
Mann Whitney U 
Mean consumption shares into: 
     Food total 
     - home produced food stuff 
     - purchased food 
     Education 
     Health 
     Services and goods of personal use 
     Transportation (public and private) 
     Housing 
     Electricity, gas, water, telephone 
N      
,57 
,23 
,34 
,04 
,03 
,09 
,06 
,12 
,07 
170 
,51 
,23 
,29 
,06 
,04 
,11 
,10 
,08 
,07 
170 
,007 
,516 
,000 
,164 
,581 
,091 
,000 
,000 
,846 
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Annex 45  Assets of Herreran households and their characteristics. 
 
Table A45.1  Assets of Herreran households and their characteristics as generators of welfare grouped 
according to Reardon and Vosti.   
 Can be 
sold in the 
market 
Can be used as 
collateral for 
loans 
Type of income flow 
generated 
Maintenan-
ce cost level 
Risk 
level 
Natural resources 
     
Land  
    in centres 
    in peripheral areas 
Yes  
No 
Yes if titled 
Not even if titled 
Rent, sales, in kind 
Rent, sales, in kind 
Medium 
Medium 
Low 
Low 
Trees on farm Yes No Sales, in kind Medium Medium 
Human resources      
Education No No Salaries, sales, in kind Low Low 
Literacy No No Salaries, sales, in kind Low Low 
Health No No Salaries, sales, in kind Medium High 
Profession No No Salaries Low Low 
Permanent job or retirement 
payments No Yes Salaries Low Medium 
Belong to cooperatives No Not alone None, interest, sales Medium Medium 
Belong to associations No No None Low Low 
Household size No No Salaries, in kind High Low 
Labour force size No No Salaries, in kind High Low 
On-farm resources      
Livestock Yes Yes if bovine In kind, sales High High 
Pastures (excluding land) If cut into 
bales No In kind, sales, rent Medium Low 
Fences No No Protect against risk Medium Low 
Machinery Not easily Yes if valuable In kind, rent Med/High Med/Hig 
Vehicles Yes Yes if new In kind, salaries, sales High High 
Silos, deposits, stockyards No No In kind Medium Low 
Non-agri enterprise No Yes Profits High High 
Having a loan No No None / Negative High High 
Savings Yes No None or small interest Negative Low 
Own house  
    in a centre 
    in peripheral areas 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
No 
In kind 
In kind 
Medium 
Medium 
Low 
Low 
Toilet type No No In kind Medium Low 
Electricity No No In kind, sales Medium Low 
Water No No In kind Medium Low 
Television No No In kind Medium Medium 
Telephone No No In kind Med/High Med/Hig 
Refrigerator No No In kind, sales High Medium 
Washing machine No No In kind Medium Medium 
Computer No No In kind Medium Med/Hig 
Off-farm resources      
Access to markets No No  Sales, salaries Low Low 
Off-farm enterprise capital Yes Yes Profits Med/High High 
Houses other than 
household home Yes Yes Rent Medium Medium 
Having relatives who send 
remittances No No Remittances Low High 
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Annex 46  Logistic regression results for focal asset labour force size, without fixing household size. 
 
Table 46.1  Two binary logistic regression results for focal asset 4:  Labour force size (number of contributors in the household)  Response:  Consumption poverty level. 
    
Extremely poor (0) vs moderately poor (1) 
 
Moderately poor (0) vs non poor (1) 
 
    Focal Mechanism Context Focal Mechanism Context 
 Focal Mechanism Context Coeff. Sig. Coeff. Sig. Coeff. Sig. N Coeff. Sig. Coeff. Sig. Coeff. Sig. N 
Labour   -,022 ,883     195 ,043 ,743     329 
 crop&livestock sales  -,032 ,836 ,000 ,199   195 -,005 ,968 ,000 ,014   329 
  distance to prov. capital -,047 ,763 ,000 ,248 -,031 ,001 195 -,008 ,952 ,000 ,025 -,012 ,048 329 
  vehicles -,058 ,701 ,000 ,293 ,001 ,117 197 -,032 ,810 ,000 ,272 ,000 ,000 340 
  inputs -,177 ,272 ,000 ,614 ,004 ,001 197 -,172 ,229 ,000 ,460 ,001 ,000 340 
  cattle -,064 ,682 ,000 ,359 ,040 ,074 197 -,101 ,460 ,000 ,237 ,031 ,000 340 
1 
  education -,032 ,835 ,000 ,254 ,108 ,039 196 -,013 ,923 ,000 ,034 ,070 ,028 339 
Labour   -,024 ,872     197 ,032 ,804     340 
  -,069 ,651 ,000 ,094   197 -,032 ,806 ,000 ,003   340 
 
crop&livestock 
consumption inputs -,213 ,191 ,000 ,138 ,004 ,001 197 -,269 ,073 ,000 ,002 ,001 ,000 340 
  cattle -,106 ,502 ,000 ,107 ,000 ,033 197 -,194 ,180 ,000 ,002 ,000 ,000 340 
  education -,077 ,620 ,001 ,057 ,125 ,018 196 -,043 ,747 ,000 ,001 ,104 ,001 339 
2 
  topography -,048 ,755 ,001 ,050 ,007 ,154 195 -,034 ,803 ,000 ,002 ,003 ,378 336 
Labour   -,022 ,883     195 ,043 ,743     329 
 job incomes  -,167 ,306 ,000 ,003   195 -,019 ,889 ,000 ,012   329 
  distance to prov. capital -,130 ,437 ,000 ,051 -,024 ,015 195 -,017 ,900 ,000 ,035 -,012 ,054 329 
  distance to district centre -,150 ,364 ,000 ,022 -,050 ,015 195 -,021 ,875 ,000 ,011 ,010 ,552 329 
3 
  education -,160 ,329 ,000 ,010 ,085 ,123 196 -,009 946 ,000 ,116 ,069 ,042 339 
Units of measurement:  Labour force size:  number of contributing household members.  Household size:  number of household members.  Crop&livestock sales:  value PAB.  Distance to province 
capital: km.  Vehicles: value PAB.  Inputs: crop and livestock inputs PAB.  Education: years of education of household head.  Crop&livestock consumption:  value of household consumption of crop 
and livestock products PAB.  Cattle:  value of cattle PAB.  Topography: % of plain land.  Job incomes:  incomes from salaries and wages PAB.  Distance to district centre:  km.   
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Annex 47  Logistic regression results for focal asset labour force size, expressed in the labour force’s share of total household size. 
 
Table A47.1  Two binary logistic regression results for focal asset 4:  Labour force share (share of contributing household members of total household size)  Response:  Consumption poverty level. 
    
Extremely poor (0) vs moderately poor (1) 
 
Moderately poor (0) vs non poor (1) 
 
    Focal Mechanism Context Focal Mechanism Context 
 Focal Mechanism Context Coeff. Sig. Coeff. Sig. Coeff. Sig. N Coeff. Sig. Coeff. Sig. Coeff. Sig. N 
Labour %   ,015 ,050     195 ,021 ,000     329 
 crop&livestock sales  ,015 ,047 ,000 ,191   195 ,022 ,000 ,000 ,009   329 
  distance to prov. capital ,015 ,055 ,000 ,242 -,031 ,001 195 ,022 ,000 ,000 ,018 -,012 ,054 329 
  vehicles ,014 ,059 ,000 ,266 ,011 ,131 197 ,024 ,000 ,000 ,238 ,000 ,000 340 
  inputs ,014 ,064 ,000 ,546 ,004 ,001 197 ,022 ,000 ,000 ,348 ,001 ,000 340 
  cattle ,015 ,051 ,000 ,423 ,000 ,056 197 ,021 ,000 ,000 ,226 ,000 ,000 340 
1 
  education ,018 ,022 ,000 ,252 ,132 ,014 196 ,025 ,000 ,000 ,031 ,113 ,001 339 
Labour %   ,015 ,055     197 ,020 ,000     340 
  ,017 ,031 ,001 ,059   197 ,022 ,000 ,000 ,001   340 
 
crop&livestock 
consumption inputs ,016 ,042 ,000 ,114 ,004 ,001 197 ,023 ,000 ,000 ,001 ,001 ,000 340 
  cattle ,017 ,027 ,001 ,071 ,000 ,033 197 ,023 ,000 ,001 ,001 ,000 ,000 340 
  education ,021 ,008 ,001 ,025 ,158 ,004 196 ,029 ,000 ,001 ,000 ,154 ,000 339 
2 
  topography ,018 ,017 ,001 ,022 ,009 ,077 195 ,022 ,000 ,001 ,000 ,006 ,103 336 
Labour %   ,015 ,050     195 ,021 ,000     329 
 job incomes  ,013 ,093 ,000 ,008   195 ,021 ,000 ,000 ,011   329 
  distance to prov. capital ,014 ,085 ,000 ,095 -,025 ,012 195 ,021 ,000 ,000 ,032 -,012 ,061 329 
  distance to district centre ,014 ,068 ,000 ,046 -,053 ,010 195 ,021 ,000 ,000 ,011 ,005 ,763 329 
3 
  education ,016 ,046 ,000 ,027 ,112 ,048 196 ,025 ,000 ,000 ,209 ,115 ,002 339 
Units of measurement:  Labour force size:  number of contributing household members.  Household size:  number of household members.  Crop&livestock sales:  value PAB.  Distance to province 
capital: km.  Vehicles: value PAB.  Inputs: crop and livestock inputs PAB.  Education: years of education of household head.  Crop&livestock consumption:  value of household consumption of 
crop and livestock products PAB.  Cattle:  value of cattle PAB.  Topography: % of plain land.  Job incomes:  incomes from salaries and wages PAB.  Distance to district centre:  km 
 
